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Abstract
Early modem Europeans, particularly during the Enlightenment, looked outwards to 
foreign lands to satisfy their curiosity, enhance theories or support nationalist or 
religious agendas, as well leam from other advanced civilizations. This dissertation 
examines British and French views of China’s political economy during the 
Enlightenment until the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth o f Nations. It studies the 
construction of knowledge on China’s political economy by British and French primary 
travellers, geographers and philosophers, which results in several conclusions. First, 
while certainly evident in eighteenth century encounters with China, the 
sinophilia/sinophobia dichotomy is a flawed way to assess early Enlightenment 
perceptions of China’s political economy. Rather there was a striking degree of 
consensus among sources that have been conventionally divided. Second, Europeans 
did not possess comfortable assumptions of superiority in the area of political economy 
and expressed a great degree of civilizational relativism. Finally, Enlightenment 
commentators and observers displayed a genuine interest in what could be learned from 
China. At times, Europeans used China as a mirror for self-evaluation and exploration, 
such as when considering views of economic culture. In other instances an active 
engagement with the Chinese model existed, as philosophers analysed how aspects of 
the Chinese system could be reconciled with -  and even be used to improve -  their own 
burgeoning theories of political and economic organization. China’s military weakness 
and scientific stagnation offered insight on pitfalls to avoid. Europeans often viewed 
China’s history, geography and population as unique and thus argued that Chinese 
practices could not be replicated in a European setting. On topics such as foreign trade 
and the form of government, China was dismissed as a useful model, not on normative 
grounds, but rather because its uniqueness and singularity meant it could not 
comfortably be worked into the universal models that characterized European 
Enlightenment thought.
3
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Joan-Pau Rubies for supporting 
and encouraging my intellectual development. I also greatly appreciate the 
encouragement I received from the Economic History Department at the LSE and 
the “How Well do ‘Facts’ Travel?” research group. I have deep gratitude for 
having the opportunity to work with Professor Larry Epstein for the first year of 
my doctoral studies. He always managed to know the answer before I asked the 
question.
I would like to express my appreciation to the International History Department 
and Economic History Department at the London School of Economics, as well as 
Hanna Paper Fibres, the Canadian Centennial Scholarship Fund and the Funds for 
Women Graduates for their financial support of my doctoral studies.
On a personal note, I dedicate this dissertation to my husband, Malan, who has 
read and edited this thesis countless times, supported me throughout and still 
decided to marry me along the way. There are not enough words to express my 
gratitude. Finally, I would like to thank my mother, who has always encouraged 
me to leam for the sake of learning and to follow my passions.
4
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Judging different schemes of oeconomy.......................
1.1. Scope and Terms
1.2. The Sinophilia-Sinophobia Dichotomy
1.3. Civilizational Relativism
1.4. Ethnography and Views of China’s Political Economy
1.5. Thesis Structure
Chapter 2. Travelling knowledge in the “discerning age” ............
2.1. From China to Europe
2.2. Compilers and Geographers
2.3. Philosophers
Chapter 3. “le people le plus fourbe de la terre” .............................
3.1. European conceptions of morality
3.2. Chinese immorality in primary sources
3.3. Explaining the Chinese case
Chapter 4. “Your Beggarly Commerce!” .......................................
4.1. From El Dorado to Impervious
4.2. Understanding Chinese Trade Policy
4.3. A European Problem? National rivalries and monopolies
4.4. The Power Dynamic in the China Trade
4.5. Balance of Trade
Chapter 5. “La Science des Princes”................................................
5.1. Oriental Despotism
5.2. Chinese despotism in Enlightenment debates
5.3. The moderate character of the Chinese constitution
Chapter 6. Duties of Government.....................................................
6.1. Expense of Defence
6.2. Expense of Justice
6.3. Commercial Institutions
6.4. Taxes
Chapter 7. “raisonneurs tres ignorants”..........................................
7.1. The Status of Science and Technology
7.2. Assessing China’s science and technology
7.3. Explanations for Stagnation
8. Conclusion
Bibliography 
Appendix I 
Appendix II
O u t l i n e : 1. Ju d g in g  d if f e r e n t  sc h e m e s  o f  (e c o n o m y
1.1. S c o p e  a n d  T e r m s
1.2. T h e  S in o p h il ia -S in o p h o b ia  D ic h o t o m y
1.3. ClVILIZATIONAL RELATIVISM
1.4. E t h n o g r a p h y  a n d  V ie w s  o f  C h in a ’s P o l it ic a l  E c o n o m y
1.5 T h e sis  S t r u c t u r e
Early modem Europeans, particularly during the Enlightenment, looked outwards to
foreign evidence to enhance their theories of political economy. Sir James Steuart, often
referred to as the last mercantilist, began his An inquiry into the principles o f political
oeconomy (1767) by emphasizing the importance of contrasting various forms of
political economy:
If one considers the variety which is found in different countries, 
in the distribution of property, subordination of classes, genius of 
people, proceeding from the variety of forms of government, 
laws, and manners, one may conclude, that the political 
oeconomy in each must necessarily be different...It is the 
business of a statesman to judge of the expediency of different 
schemes of oeconomy...The speculative person...must do his 
utmost to become a citizen of the world, comparing customs, 
examining minutely institutions which appear alike, when in 
different countries they are found to produce different effects: he 
should examine the cause of such differences with the utmost 
diligence and attention.1
At the time of Steuart’s publication, another member of the Scottish Enlightenment had 
begun a project to define and explain the divergences in the economic fortunes of 
different countries. Adam Smith’s The Wealth o f Nations (1776), groundbreaking as it 
was, also reflected the contemporary trend of drawing on modem history and 
descriptions of the wider world to enhance his theoretical models of political economy.
As a relatively unknown advanced civilization, the Chinese Empire held a unique and 
important place in early modem Europe, and particularly in Enlightenment Britain and 
France, as numerous thinkers tried to make sense of a widening world and their own 
place in it. Early modem authors—from missionaries and merchants to scholars and 
geographers—displayed great interest in understanding the nature and workings of the 
Chinese Empire. The motivations for this inquisitiveness varied, as did the ways in 
which knowledge of China was constructed and used. While European societies
1 Sir James Steuart, An inquiry into the principles o f  political oeconomy: being an essay on the science o f  
domestic policy in free nations 2 Volumes (London: printed for A. Millar and T. Cadell, 1767), vol. 1, 3. 
Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison, “Sir James Steuart as the Apotheosis o f Mercantilism and His 
Relation to Adam Smith”, Southern Economic Journal 51:2 (1984), 456-468.
remained largely religious, secular interests were rapidly expanding amongst their 
intellectual and commercial elites. Philosophers, polemicists, and geographers eagerly 
debated topics of political economy and began to incorporate information about the 
widening world into their conversations.
This study asks what were British and French perceptions of China’s political economy 
during the Enlightenment? The Enlightenment, as an intellectually vibrant period prior 
to the age of European economic supremacy, represents a key moment for European 
assessments of China during which there was scope for an honest evaluation of different 
forms of social, economic and political organization. Against the backdrop of intense 
examination and debate by Enlightenment philosophers over the merits and changing 
the foundations of their own societies, there was a genuine openness towards, and desire 
to leam from, the Chinese system.
In a recent article, David Porter discussed the process of “writing China out of history” 
due to the challenge it posed to the narrative of European exceptionalism.2 He claims 
that views of China as a viable alternative to this European model were “deliberately 
and usefully forgotten in England over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries”.3 Porter calls for further research into the historicization of this act of 
forgetting which he describes as the development of “instrumental amnesia”. While this 
process certainly occurred over this lengthy period of time, this research will show that 
for an influential group of eighteenth century philosophers of political economy, and 
popular geographers the act of forgetting had not yet occurred. In fact, discussions of 
China as an alternative system of political economy were vibrant. Views of the viability 
of the Chinese model differed greatly depending on the particular topic at hand and this 
is where the examination of particular elements of China’s political economy is most 
enlightening.
This chapter proceeds with a definition of the scope and terms of this question, 
including a brief introduction to the sources that will be used. Next, it addresses the 
historiography on three themes connected to European views of China’s political 
economy. The first theme is the influential dichotomy between sinophilia and 
sinophobia in assessing Western views of China. It is argued that a focused study on
2 David Porter, “Sinicizing Early Modernity: The Imperatives o f Historical Cosmpolitanism”, Eighteenth- 
Century Studies, 43:3 (2010), 299-306, quote at 305.
3 I b i d 304.
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assessments of China’s political economy blurs such boundaries and these categories 
occlude more than they reveal. The second theme is the role of civilizational relativism 
in eighteenth century approaches to China’s political economy. It is shown that 
Europeans did not take for granted that their own systems of political economy were 
innately superior to the one found in China. Finally, connected to this relativism, is the 
theme of openness and genuine interest with which many Europeans considered 
knowledge of China. A variety of Europeans sought out ethnographic information on 
the Middle Kingdom to assist in the creation of their schematics of the world. This 
introductory chapter concludes by outlining the significance of these three themes to the 
subsequent chapters of this study.
1.1. SCOPE AND TERMS
This study examines three main bodies of sources that are selected based on their 
contemporary popularity, their influence on the development of new ideas, and their 
relevance to the topic of China’s political economy. The first group is comprised of 
accounts by early-modern missionaries, merchants, emissaries and travellers from 
several European countries—notably Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France and 
England—who relayed first-hand information about China back to interested audiences 
in Europe. The second group is constituted by the writings of geographers, which, as a 
result of a profit-driven printing culture and popular demand, reflect more accessible 
descriptions of the wider world that are key to understanding the broader acceptance of 
the intellectual evaluations of the wealth of civilizations. These geographers saw it as 
their task to organize and reframe the primary descriptions of the world encountered in 
the first group.4 In Britain, many of these geographers were Grub Street “hack” writers, 
but they were also often men of great intelligence (if not reputation) who engaged with 
the primary travellers and philosophers interested in China. The final group is formed 
by the works of a number of Enlightenment philosophers who referenced China in their 
studies. Given the focus on political economy, the most relevant British and French 
philosophers were Francis Quesnay, Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, 
Voltaire (Francis-Marie Arouet), Jean Jacques Rousseau, Abbe Raynal, Denis Diderot, 
David Hume and Adam Smith. This research, however, is not a history of philosophical 
views of China. Rather, it is a study of the construction o f knowledge of China’s
4 The term “geographers” is used as a broad category, encompassing travel compilers and authors of 
popular modem histories of China. A closer explication o f this category can be found in chapter two.
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political economy in eighteenth-century Britain and France. It examines the travelling 
of information and arguments about China’s political economy that occurred between 
the primary sources, geographers, and French and British philosophers. These three 
categories of sources are fluid and there are individuals that traverse these constructed 
boundaries. Chapter two offers a detailed assessment of these sources and their 
relationship to one another. For now it is sufficient to note that this research is not 
intended as a comprehensive catalogue of all that was written about China’s political 
economy; it is a study of the most influential, iconic and representative works that offer 
important or interesting discussions of the state of politics and economics in the Chinese 
Empire during the Enlightenment.5
The concept of the Enlightenment is contested and thus needs to be defined for the 
purposes of this enquiry. In the broadest sense, it is used as a temporal marker to delimit 
the period from the scientific breakthroughs of Isaac Newton and the political changes 
of the Glorious Revolution at the end of the seventeenth century to the start of the 
French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. However, the use of the term 
Enlightenment is not limited to being a synonym for this particular period. Historians 
debate whether there was a single Enlightenment or whether it should be understood 
more broadly as a period that witnessed numerous smaller intellectual movements, 
highly dependent on local contexts. J.G.A. Pocock argues there were multiple 
Enlightenments, and that national contexts mattered greatly in shaping them. However, 
he accepts these contexts are complicated by the “intensification of the patterns of 
exchange and interaction” across European countries.6 In a similar vein, John Robertson 
asserts that “the intellectual coherence of the Enlightenment may still be found... in the 
commitment to understanding, and hence to advancing, the causes and conditions of 
human betterment in this world”.7 He rightly acknowledges that the Enlightenment had 
patriotic impulses, which led to the identification of solutions particular to specific 
national contexts, but alongside this impulse was one of cosmopolitanism that 
encouraged philosophers to think comparatively and about humanity as a whole. 
Crucially, Robertson identifies this cause of betterment as a central motive of
5 For a catalogue o f European views o f Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see Donald Lach, 
Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 2 Volumes (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1965-1970) and Donald 
Lach and Edwin J. Van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, vol. 3 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1993).
6 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
138.
7 John Robertson, The Case fo r Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 28.
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Enlightenment thought, articulated through the terms of political economy. For this 
reason, a focus on the universal language of political economy as a key commonality of 
the Enlightenment is of particular relevance to the aims of this study.
The importance of national contexts has not only been emphasized in relation to 
Enlightenment thought in general, but also specifically in regard to differing narratives 
on Asia emanating from England and France. One prominently identified difference 
was their varied religious orientations. Ros Ballaster, for instance, contends that 
England and France had different relationships with China, because the former was a 
potential trade partner while the latter viewed China primarily as an outpost for Jesuit 
missionary activity.9 Still, Ballaster qualifies this distinction by also noting that the 
“construction of the ‘fabulous’ Orient” often overrode national and geographic 
difference within Europe.10 Indeed, European views of non-Europeans occupy a central 
place in European Enlightenment thought as a whole. As Sankar Muthu points out, 
“more substantive and conventional understandings of “the Enlightenment” usually 
occlude more than they illuminate the writings about non-European peoples and empire 
by eighteenth-century political thinkers.”11 Similar to Muthu’s study of anti-imperialism 
in the Enlightenment, this research also seeks to “broaden our understanding of 
Enlightenment era perspectives”. To this end, the term Enlightenment is employed here 
to refer to an age of philosophical thought defined by a particular project to advance 
knowledge (or, as the case may be, apply “reason”) in order to improve the welfare (and 
thus the wealth) of states. For this reason, considerations of political economy were of 
immense concern to the development of Enlightenment thought and especially its 
engagement with the non-European “other”.
Another problematic aspect of defining the Enlightenment concerns its chronology. For 
the purpose of examining European views of China’s political economy, this study 
focuses on the period between 1696 and 1776. Information produced before 1696 will, 
at times, be of great relevance as it continued to be referenced well into the eighteenth
* Ibid., 377.
9 Ros Ballaster, Fabulous Orients: Fictions o f  the East in England 1662-1785 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 20.
10 Ibid., 20-1; Lach and Van Kley discuss the seventeenth-century printed reports stemming from northern 
Europe, particularly Holland, while missionary reports originated from Catholic publishing centres such 
as Rome. They note, however, that the original missionary and merchant reports were often reprinted, 
translated, republished in travel collections and used in articles published in scholarly journals on Asia. 
Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, xli.
11 See Sankar Muthu Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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century. However, the detailed description of China by the French Jesuit Louis Le 
Comte provides a meaningful starting point to the period directly relevant to this study. 
His Nouveaux Memoires sur I ’etatpresent de la Chine (1696) was as controversial as it 
was popular, and continued to be routinely referenced by late eighteenth-century 
geographers and philosophers. The period under consideration ends with Adam Smith’s 
assessment of China’s political economy in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f 
the Wealth o f Nations (1776).12 Spanning eighty years and two countries, the French 
missionary and Scottish philosopher reflect diverging conclusions about the status of 
China’s political economy. And yet, both agreed in their assessments of several 
elements of the Chinese system and showed a genuine interest in understanding the 
workings of China’s political economy.
In defining the particular subject areas used to organize perceptions of China’s political 
economy, this study follows contemporary categories. Political economy was an 
evolving concept in early modem Europe. The Greek etymology of the term economy 
(ioikonomia) referred to the government of the household for the common good of the 
family. In the seventeenth century this definition expanded to political economy, which 
referred to the government of the great family, the State. The first published use of the 
term is attributed to Antoine de Montchrestien’s Traite de Veconomie politique (1615). 
Montchrestien’s understanding of political economy was heavily based on the writings
1 'Iof Jean Bodin and reflected his mercantilist and xenophobic bias. By the eighteenth
century, political economy had become more of a theoretical field through which to
examine the actions of a state. James Steuart defined “oeconomy” as referring to a
family and “political oeconomy” as referring to a state. He argued that the economy of
states “depends upon a thousand circumstances”, a number of which he sought to
analyse. Steuart described political economy as both an art and a science, noting that its
first purpose is to adapt to the spirit, manners, habits and customs of people and then to
“introduce a set of new and more useful institutions.”14 He continued,
The principal object of this science is to secure a certain fund of 
subsistence for all the inhabitants; to obviate every circumstance 
which may render it precarious; to provide every thing necessary 
for supplying the wants of the society, and to employ the
12 Adam Smith, The Wealth o f  Nations, ed. Edwin Caiman (New York: Bantam Dell, 2003 [first publ. 
London 1776]), 926.
13 Jacques Fontanel, Jean-Paul Herbert and Ivan Samson, “The Birth o f the Political Economy or the 
Economy in the Heart of Politics: Mercantilistm,” Defence and Peace Economics 19:5 (2008), 331-338; 
Antoine de Montchrestien, Traicte de I ’ceconomie politique, ed. Fran?ois Billacois (Geneve: Librairie 
Droz, 1999).
14 Steuart, An inquiry into the principles o f  political oeconomy, 2.
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inhabitants (supposing them to be freemen) in such a manner as 
naturally to create reciprocal relations and dependencies between 
them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply one 
another with their reciprocal wants.15
Contemporaries, such as Jean-Fran^ois Feraud, agreed with Steuart’s understanding of 
political economy, while others such as Samuel Johnson did not.16 While no definite 
consensus on what political economy meant was reached during the Enlightenment, it 
was widely understood to refer to the interlocking realms of the state and its economy. 
The main chapters of this study address the most important themes of political economy 
as related to China. These themes were defined by a thorough examination of 
contemporary descriptions and classifications. They are: economic culture and morality 
(lest we forget that Adam Smith wras a moral philosopher); trade policy; the nature of 
government; the duties and practicalities of government; and science and technology. 
Approached through these categories, European perceptions of, and discourses on, 
China reveal their direct connection to debates about Europe’s own past, present, and 
future, debates that came to form a cornerstone of Enlightenment thought.
Although many authors have addressed European views of China in the early modem 
period, it is striking that there is no single text whose primary aim is to evaluate 
perceptions of China’s political economy in this period.17 Studies that touch on this 
topic suffer from their imposition of modem analytical categories on the past, when 
economics did not exist as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour. The problems 
inherent in this approach can be resolved through an alternative focus on political
Ib id .,2-3.
16 A French dictionary that repeated this definition is Jean-Franfois Feraud, Dictionaire critique de la 
langue frangaise (Marseille: Jean Mossey, 1787-88), s.v. “Economie". Other dictionaries, by contrast, 
retained the restricted definition o f economy as the management of a family; see, for instance, Samuel 
Johnson, A dictionary o f  the English language, 2 Volumes (London: J. and P. Knapton, et. al., 2nd ed., 
1755-56), s.v. “Economy”.
17 The most notable texts include: A. Reichwein, China and Europe: intellectual and Artistic Contacts in 
the Eighteenth Century, trans.. by J.C. Powell (London: Kegan, 1925); Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la 
formation de Vespritphilosophique en France (1640-1740) (Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 
1932); Lewis A. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe (San Antonio: Paul Anderson Company, 1946); 
William Appleton, A Cycle o f  Cathay: The Chinese Vogue in England during the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); Basil Guy The French Image o f  
China Before and After Voltaire (Geneva: Institut et Musee Voltaire, 1963); Lach, Asia in the Making o f  
Europe', Lach and Van Kley Asia in the Making o f  Europe', Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon:
An Analysis o f  European Conceptions o f  Chinese Civilization (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); 
Colin Mackerras, Western Images o f  China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Rene Etiemble,
L ‘Europe Chinoise 2 Volumes (Paris: Gallimard, 1988); Adrian Hsia, ed., The Vision o f  China in the 
English Literature o f  the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1998); Jonathan Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1999); David Martin Jones, The Image o f  China in Western Social and Political Thought (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001); David E. Mungello, The Great Encounter o f  China and the West, 1500-1800 
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
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economy as it was contemporaneously understood. Another potential objection to a 
focused study on political economy is the neglect of important moral and religious 
debates, which are deemed outside the concerns of present-day economics but were 
very much part of early-modern debates about political economy. Indeed, morality and 
religion were important components of European views of China. This study therefore 
addresses these topics at particular moments when they are most relevant to the subject 
of political economy (most expressly in the examination of views on Chinese moral 
philosophy in chapter three). However, anachronistic presumptions having been cast 
aside, there does remain good reason to analyse in detail views of political economy in 
its more narrow sense. First, unlike religion, an area where most Europeans were 
assured of the superiority of Christianity, political economy was an area of interest that 
was still open to great relativism and debate. Second, topics of political economy— 
particularly international trade, the role of government in society, and the increase of 
science and technology—were all growing in importance and relevance throughout this 
period. Finally, it enables the focused examination of an area in which primary sources 
suffered from less of a culturalist or Eurocentric bias than many other fields—a fact that 
was even acknowledged by contemporary commentators. The remaining sections of this 
introduction address how concentrating on the issue of political economy leads to a 
rethinking of three historiographical themes: the sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy; 
civilizational relativism; and the use of ethnographic information in the construction of 
Enlightenment debates.
1.2. THE SINOPHILIA-SINOPHOBIA DICHOTOMY
A predominant paradigm in studies of European views of China has been to identify and 
analyse a shift from sinophilia (a strong admiration for China) to sinophobia (an 
aversion towards China). For instance, referring to Enlightenment discussion of China’s 
morality and political system, David Mungello claims “there was a tension throughout 
the Enlightenment between sinophilia and sinophobia”.18 This dichotomy is not only a 
construction of modern historians, but was also recognized at the time. The English 
translator of Jean Baptiste Grosier’s updated version of Jean Baptiste Du Halde’s 
description of China openly discussed the conflicting views of China in 1788. He 
observed:
18 Mungello, The Great Encounter, 125
14
the learned seem to differ widely in their ideas respecting [the Chinese].
By some they have been extolled as the wisest and most enlightened of 
mankind; while others, perhaps equally, if not more remote from the 
truth, have exhibited them in the most contemptible point of view, and 
represented them as a despicable people, deceitful, ignorant, and 
superstitious, and destitute of every principle of human justice 19
Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu and Voltaire have been assigned positions
at the opposite ends of this spectrum, with the former labelled a sinophobe and the latter
a sinophile. The primary sources of information about China have also been deemed
representative of one of these two categories, with the Jesuit missionaries seen as
sinophiles and other compilers of primary information, such as non-Jesuit missionaries,
merchants, emissaries and travellers, labelled sinophobes.
Some historians have attempted to categorise views of China along social or class lines. 
Longxi Zhang argues that “average people in the market” admired China for its material 
products, and that afterwards the philosophers of the Enlightenment came to admire the 
Confucian system of Chinese civilization. While this dissertation does not examine 
diaries, letters or other contemporary sources to ascertain the views of “average people 
in the market”, it does consider the more popular views as expressed in geographies. 
Their editors and compilers demonstrated interest in China’s civilization beyond its 
material products. While their audience was literate, thus not necessarily “average 
people in the market,” they were also not limited to philosophers. Moreover, even 
amongst the ostensibly ‘sinophile’ philosophers, we find dramatic disagreement. At 
times, a given scholar may have held ideological views on China that resembled more 
closely those of popular geographers than those of his fellow philosophes.
Apart from the purported differences in scholarly and popular views, there is also the 
question of variations in perceptions of China between nations in Europe. Reichwein
91argues that intellectual interest in China survived longer in France because of art. 
Charles Boxer likewise contends that in England the idea of a virtuous China was not as
19 Anonymous, “Translator’s Preface”, in A general description o f  China... ed. Jean-Baptist Grosier, 
Translator unknown. (London: Printed by G.G. and J. Robinson, 1788), iv. The French edition was 
published in 1777-1783. Grosier and Cornelius de Pauw engaged in a literary debate over the validity and 
merits o f the Jesuits and over the nature o f the Chinese Empire.
20 Longxi Zhang, “The Myth o f the Other: China in the Eyes o f the West”, Critical Inquiry 15:1 Autumn, 
1988, 108-131, quote at 118.
21 Reichwein, China and Europe, 151. The following authors also all argue there was a difference 
between the French and English views o f China: Qian Zhongshu “China in the English Literature o f the 
Eighteenth Century” in The Vision o f  China, ed. Hsia, 166; Gunther Lottes, “China in European Political 
Thought, 1750-1850”, in China and Europe: Images and Influences in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth 
Centuries ed. Thomas H.C. Lee (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991), 71.
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readily accepted as it was in France.22 Similarly, Chen Shouyi claims that “enthusiasm 
for China never grew very strong in England”.23 Chen lists a selection of English 
sources such as the modem part of An Universal History and Oliver Goldsmith’s 
Chinese Letters to support his notion that English commentators on China were largely 
sinophobes. However, as this study will demonstrate, on the topic of political economy 
there is no shortage of English sources that show respect towards, or at least a genuine 
consideration of, Chinese institutions. Indeed, we shall see that on a number of 
particular topics, the modem part of An Universal History presented a favourable view 
of China. Additionally, French sources also reflected a variety of unfavourable views 
on China, including incisive criticism of their military and science and technology.
There is also considerable disagreement on the timing of the shift from a predominantly 
sinophile Europe to the rise of sinophobes during the latter part of the Enlightenment.24 
Arnold Rowbotham identifies the 1735 publication of Du Halde’s description of China 
based on primary sources as the point when sinophilia became sinomania 25 In his view, 
this sinomania reached its apogee in 1760, the year that Voltaire published his Essai sur 
les moeurs.26 Adolf Reichwein concurs with Rowbotham that 1760 represents a turning 
point.27 Looking from the perspective of the rise of sinophobia, Chen Shouyi likewise 
identifies 1760 as a critical year, pointing out that it marked the first appearance of 
Oliver Goldsmith’s sinophobic Chinese Letters in The Public Ledger. John Hobson, 
on the other hand, dates the shift to 1780, despite noting a number of inconsistencies 
with such a dating.29 Indeed, most authors have qualified their arguments with the claim 
that the shift was not complete. Gregory Blue has pointed out the overlap of sinophilia 
and sinophobia, while still maintaining that the balance of opinion and approach to 
China as a deviation from the Western model shifted from the mid-eighteenth to the
22 C.R. Boxer “Some Aspects of Western Historical Writing on the Far East, 1500-1800” in Historians o f  
China and Japan, ed. by W.G. Beasley and E.G. Pulleyblank (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
313.
23 Chen Shouyi, “Oliver Goldsmith and His Chinese Letters” in The Vision o f  China, ed. Hsia, 297.
24 Authors such as David Mungello, The Great Encounter, Mackerras, Western Images o f  China', and 
Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants o f  Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1999) are examples o f recent scholarship that address the evolution o f the relationship between 
China and Europe over many centuries.
25 Arnold H. Rowbotham, “The Impact o f Confucianism on 17th century Europe” The Far Eastern 
Quarterly 4 (1944-45): 224-42.
26 Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the court o f  China (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1942), 288.
27 Reichwein, China and Europe, 22.
28 Chen Shouyi argues that this year marked “the culmination o f English interest in Chinese culture and 
things Chinese”. Chen Shouyi “Oliver Goldsmith and His Chinese Letters,” 283.
29 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins o f  Western Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 197.
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mid-nineteenth century.30 Taking a broad view of the shift, as Blue does, is most useful 
because the transition in European views of China was piecemeal and protracted.
Various factors that contributed to this transformation in European attitudes towards 
China have been proposed. Some point to art-historical explanations and the mercurial 
nature of fashion that led to the unpopularity of chinoiserie, while others look to the rise
'X1of hostile information stemming from non-Jesuit sources. The change in views on 
China has also been attributed to the rise of European science and technology. Michael 
Adas describes how the Physiocratic admiration of China’s system of political economy 
became “anachronistic in an age when commerce and manufacturing were rapidly
'X'yassuming predominant roles in the more advanced economies of Western Europe”. 
Adas argues for the influence of material culture, particularly science and technology, in 
shaping European perceptions of non-Westem people. However, his evidence on China 
does not support his larger hypothesis. He describes at length the period of sinophilia in 
Europe and points out that during this time, the one area that was consistently more 
likely to be criticized by the Jesuits and even Voltaire was Chinese science. Yet, as 
Adas himself acknowledges, Europeans from the beginning of the Jesuit mission in 
China in the sixteenth century were critical of Chinese science, which draws into 
question its explanatory capacity for the shift in European perceptions from sinophilia 
to sinophobia in the second half of the eighteenth-century. China’s supposed failures 
in developing its science and technology had been a standard element in critiques of 
China’s system of political economy since the time of the earliest Jesuit reports. While 
the criterion of science and technology in assessing non-Westem people did increase in 
importance over time, the descriptions of China by the mid to late eighteenth century 
did not give a more prominent place to discussions of these areas. Adam Smith, for one, 
did not refer to the weak status of China’s science and technology in his attempt to 
explain the Middle Kingdom’s economic stasis.
30 Gregory Blue, “China and Western Social Thought”, in China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies 
o f  Sinological Knowledge eds. Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 70-72.
31 For the art-historical explanations, see Arthur F. Wright, “The Study o f Chinese Civilization”, Journal 
o f  the History o f  Ideas, 21:2 (1960): 233-55; and Reichwein, China and Europe, 16. For explanations 
based on changes in the available information, see Guy, The French Image o f  China, 12; Lottes, “China 
in European Political Thought”, 66; and David Martin Jones, The Image o f  China in Western Social and 
Political Thought, 11. Blue, by contrast, regards both these explanations as too vague; Blue, “China and 
Western Social Thought”, 70-72.
32 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies o f  Western 
Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1989), 93.
™ Ibid.,, 86.
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The explanations for the shift from sinophilia to sinophobia based on economic change 
have been subject to particular attention. Geoffrey Hudson emphasizes the role of 
changes in economic efficiency and military power between Europe and China, while 
Ho-Fung Hung describes a more general shift in the global economic balance that led to 
a decline in the estimation of China.34 Gregory Blue and Joanna Waley-Cohen take a 
more nuanced approach in their respective writings, both arguing that the decline of the 
Jesuit mission, the forces of industrialisation, the growing disenchantment of China by 
European merchants, and the rise of political liberty all contributed to the devaluation of
'X cChina in European perceptions. While it is plausible that these changes in Europe 
affected views of China in the long-term, they are broad shifts that are difficult to 
connect to particular views of China’s political economy during the Enlightenment.
The disagreements about the nature, timing, and causes of the shift in views of China 
suggest that the rigid juxtaposition of sinophilia and sinophobia may not always be 
useful. It is undisputable that “a change in the balance of opinion” occurred between the 
mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. However, when examining the 
particular area of political economy, categorising one work, let alone one country, as 
representative of sinophilia or sinophobia is counterproductive because commentary 
varied dramatically depending on the particular the topic. Indeed, posing such a sharp 
dichotomy serves to obfuscate significant instances of consensus in reports and writings 
on China and to neglect elements in contemporary debate that do not fit comfortably 
into the sinophilia-sinophobia framework. Rather than study views of China through the 
paradigm of admiration or disdain, it is more useful to focus on a particular topic and 
examine the complex relationship between the provision of primary information and the 
reordering of that information into theories that sought to explain the world—a 
distinctly Enlightenment project.
1.3. CIVILIZATIONAL RELATIVISM
34 Geoffrey Hudson, “The Historical Context o f Encounters between Asia and Europe: as seen by a 
European”, in The Glass Curtain Between Asia and Europe: A symposium on the historical encounters 
and the changing attitudes o f  the peoples o f  the East and the West. ed. Raghavan Iyer (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965); Ho-Fung Hung, “Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories: China and the 
European Conceptions of East-West Differences from 1600 to 1900,” Sociological Theory, 21:3 (2003): 
254-280.
35 See Blue, “China and Western Social Thought”, 70-76; and Waley-Cohen, The Sextants o f  Beijing,
128.
36 Blue, “China and Western Social Thought”, 71.
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In light of recent advances in global economic history that show the economic 
divergence between Western Europe (particularly Britain and France) and China to have 
occurred as late as 1800, studying contemporary views of China’s political economy 
gains new significance. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that Europeans did not 
possess sweeping assumptions of superiority in their approaches to China. There was a 
widespread belief in Europe in the superiority of the Christian religion and cultural 
relativism was relatively rare; however, when it came to the assessment of China’s 
political economy, many early-modern Europeans looked to the Middle Kingdom with 
open minds and a high level of civilizational relativism.
The current debate between the “Eurocentrists” and “revisionists” in global history 
captures the disagreement on the nature of China’s political economy and its position 
relative to Europe in the eighteenth century. Fernand Braudel, Eric L. Jones, and David 
Landes have all been accused of Eurocentrism in their writings on the relative economic 
superiority of Europe, as they argue Europe had the preconditions for modem economic 
growth well before the eighteenth century (according to Jones, even before 1492). 
Others such as Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Kenneth Pomeranz have written 
revisionist histories that argue for the proper recognition of the wealth of China relative 
to Europe until c. 1800.38 While debate continues on the merits of the revisionist 
argument, it has become clear that the divergence between Western Europe and China 
was neither as certain nor as complete in the eighteenth century as was previously 
assumed.
Even if a precise date of the economic divergence could be set in the eighteenth century, 
it is unlikely that contemporaries would have recognized the moment of change. Guy 
argues that the shift to sinophobia was connected to “the prodigious progress of 
European civilization”, the start of the Industrial Revolution, and the era of steam and
37 Femand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century, vol. 3: The Perspective o f  the World, 
translated by Sian Reynolds (London: Phoenix Press, 2002); Eric L. Jones, The European Miracle: 
Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History o f  Europe and Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); and David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty o f  Nations: Why some are so rich 
and some so poor  (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1998). The latter two o f these authors stand 
accused o f Eurocentrism in J.M. Blaut, Eight Eurocentric Historians (New York: The Guilford Press, 
2000).
38 Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1998); Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, trans. by Russell Moore (London: Zed Books, 1989); Kenneth 
Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making o f  the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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* 10superiority, natural science, commerce and invention as well as moral science. If, as 
Guy claims, the shift towards sinophobia—or rather, European assumptions of their 
civilizational superiority—was a result of the “Rise of the West”, this shift must have 
occurred slowly over the course of the nineteenth century.40 Economic historians have 
not settled the debate over dating the Industrial Revolution, and even if reconstructed 
data sets can ever determine the timing of the take-off, it remains that even by 1776, 
Adam Smith “was clearly quite unable to foresee the rapid industrialisation process of 
the next three quarters of a century”.41
Few historians who study European images of the Far East have undertaken the task of 
directly connecting the implications of these revisionist findings to images of China’s 
political economy in the eighteenth century 42 One notable exception is Robert Markley, 
a literary historian who has made the connection between global economic history and 
early-modern English views of China.43 He appreciates the revisionist project of 
economic historians such as Frank, Pomeranz, K.N Chaudhuri, Paul Bairoch, Bin 
Wong, and Jack Goldstone and believes their work has “profound implications for 
ecological, economic, and social history of Sino-European relations”.44 By looking at 
Peter Heylyn’s Cosmography (first published in 1652, with eight further editions 
published before 1700), Markley demonstrates that seventeenth-century English writers 
did not assume the superiority of Europe. On the contrary, he sees in travel narratives, 
diplomatic correspondence and geographies a "compensatory rhetoric" for what was 
feared to be Europe's marginalisation within an Asian-dominated world economy.45
Ultimately, the early modem period should not be viewed with an anachronistic lens of 
the subsequent economic ascendancy of Europe. Instead, understanding the greater level
39 Guy, The French Image o f  China, 453.
40 William H. McNeill, The Rise o f  the West: A History o f  the Human Community (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963).
41 Nick Crafts “The Industrial Revolution” in The Economic History o f  Britain since 1700 eds. Roderick 
Floud and Donald McCloskey, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 50.
42 Louis Dermigny addressed early modem European views o f China in the context o f the economic 
history o f the Canton trade. He argues the idealized image of the Jesuits was gradually supplanted by the 
disillusioning commercial realities described by traders. Louis Dermigny, La Chine et VOccident: Le 
commerce a Canton au XVIIIe Siecle, 1719-1833 (Paris: S.E.V.P.E., 1964).
43 Ros Ballaster gives credence to the place of revisionist economic history in the analysis o f  fictions of 
the East, and also points to the insecurity o f the European narrator in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries; Ballaster, Fabulous Orients, 6. Gregory Blue and Timothy Brook, “Introduction,” in China and 
Historical Capitalism eds. Brook and Blue, likewise anticipated the importance o f revisionist global 
economic history in analysing views of China.
44 Robert Markley, “Riches, power, trade and religion: the Far East and the English imagination, 1600- 
1720,” Renaissance Studies, 17:3 (2003): 433-55, quote at 494,496.
AS Ibid., 495.
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of uncertainty of the seventeenth-century observers brings the nuances and insecurity in
the European voices to the fore. As Markley concludes:
If, as Frank and Pomeranz argue, there is no empirical evidence for the 
technological superiority and economic domination by western Europe 
before 1800, then seventeenth-century texts do not foreshadow an 
inevitable rise of modem notions of history, economics, and social 
theory, but register instead complex and often competing assessments 
of European relations with the Far East.46
Markley, however, does not systematically address views of China’s political economy 
(for instance he chooses not to analyse views of the military), and does not examine 
important authors beyond England nor into the second half of the eighteenth century.
It is therefore important to examine European perceptions of China prior to the age of 
European imperial domination, and to situate these earlier views within the context of 
European thinkers who embraced evidence provided by encounters with the non- 
European world in their efforts to construct better theories of civilization. Anthony Reid 
discusses the uniqueness of the cultural interaction during the Renaissance, when 
civilizations discovered each other without “the great burden of inequality”.47 He claims 
that despite the infighting amongst Europeans “there was also a pervading curiosity, 
puzzlement and even awe at the different ways in which Asian and European 
civilizations handled the great questions of ordering human society and connecting to 
the world beyond”.48 This leads to the question of the emergence of the idea of 
civilizational hierarchies. Tarikhu Farrar’s study of fifteenth-century contacts with West 
African societies suggests that Europeans did not think in terms of the (yet to be 
invented) theory of cultural evolution, instead treating foreign societies individually 
rather than grouping them together into civilizational stereotypes.49 Farrar also 
describes how a “barbarian” in medieval and early-modem Europe "was certainly to be 
inferior, but this inferiority had little to do with levels of political sophistication or 
technological complexity"; rather, his difference was rooted in his membership of a 
society that “in space and culture lay beyond the Christian world, regardless of its 
degree of political or technological complexity".50 This curiosity continued into the 
Enlightenment; however, as global explorations accelerated, observers and interested
" ib id ., 496-7.
47 Anthony Reid, “Preface” in Asian Travel in the Renaissance ed. Daniel Carey (Oxford: Society for 
Renaissance Studies/ Blackwell, 2004), ix.
48 Ibid.
49 Tarikhu Farrar, “When African Kings Became ‘Chiefs’: Some Transformations in European 
Perceptions of West African Civilization, c. 1450-1800” Journal o f  Black Studies 23:2 (1992): 158-278.
50 Ibid., 259.
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Europeans began to assess the diverse cultures and societies they were confronted with 
on new grounds. Joan-Pau Rubies discusses the relationship between the “two distinct 
languages of human classification”: Christianity and civilization. The language of 
Christianity created a “hierarchical classification of non-Europeans according to 
primarily moral traits, and to the perception of failure or success of the religious 
enterprise”.51 With the rise of the study of civilization throughout the eighteenth 
century, other factors beyond religion and morality became relevant. In particular, 
topics of political economy began to be used in the new hierarchical classifications of
9^the non-European world.
As these considerations suggest, it is futile to isolate political economy from other 
factors that determined China’s position in European hierarchies. Fernand Braudel 
reminds us of the inextricable links between creating orders based on economics and 
other factors:
However plentiful the evidence of economic subordination, and 
whatever its consequences, it would be a mistake to imagine that the 
order of the world-economy governed the whole society, determining 
the shape of other orders of society. For other orders existed. An 
economy never exists in isolation. Its territory and expanse are also 
occupied by other spheres of activity -  culture, society, politics -  
which are constantly reacting with the economy, either to help or as 
often to hinder its development.53
It is evident that the rise of the idea of progress had a profound affect on the European 
worldview. This has been addressed by numerous authors, and will be considered in 
further detail in chapter eight.54 As revisionist economic history as shown, progress 
happened slowly and the Enlightenment occupied a moment of transition where 
progress was not assumed. It was an era when many European authors were open to 
other civilizations’ answers to the questions they asked about political and economic
51 Joan-Pau Rubies, “Introduction: Interaction and Discourse in the Expansion o f Europe” in, Shifting 
Cultures: Interaction and Discourse in the Expansion o f  Europe eds. Henriette Bugge and Joan-Pau 
Rubies (Munster: LIT, 1995), 7.
52 Ibid, 8.
53 Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 45.
54 Pulleyblank assesses its impact in the nineteenth century; Edwin G. Pulleyblank, Orientalism and 
History (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1954), 72. Rowbotham traces the movement in Europe from 
“the cult o f classical Reason” to “worshipping the new goddess Progress” and how this led to a rejection 
of China as static; Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, 280-282. Henri Baudet discusses the 
Enlightenment thinkers who shared a belief in growth and progress; Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth:
Some Thoughts on European Images o f  Non-European Man, trans. by Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1965), 40. Marshall and Williams briefly consider the effect o f “progress” on 
ordering societies; P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, The Great Map o f  Mankind: Perceptions o f  New 
Worlds in the Age o f  Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 134.
22
organization. As George Rousseau and Roy Porter claimed in their study of exoticism in 
the Enlightenment:
Arguably, however, there was a moment of equilibrium in the 
eighteenth century. Europe and Asia were still finely 
balanced.. .because of the power of Enlightenment pens, Europe itself 
was sufficiently self-critical and free from bigotry to be able to 
confront other cultures, admittedly not as equals, nor even necessarily 
on their own terms, but at least as alternative versions of living -  for a 
brief moment before the logic of the white man’s mission required 
they be subordinated.55
A central implication of the revised contextualisation from global economic history, 
then, is the absence of a general assumption of European superiority in encounters with 
China during the Enlightenment, which appears in sharp contrast with confrontations 
that followed in the nineteenth century. In fact, many Europeans, who struggled with 
cultural relativism (particularly as related to religion), expressed a degree of 
civilizational relativism in their openness to understanding the workings of the Chinese 
Empire. Early modem Europeans up to, and including, Adam Smith, who examined 
China, actively engaged with the available information to use the Middle Kingdom to 
help answer the pressing questions of political and economic organization of the time. 
This dissertation examines European engagements with China’s political economy 
based on an understanding of the Enlightenment as a period still open to different 
answers to particular questions about Europe’s political and economic organization, and 
more broadly, to alternative models of civilizations.
1.4. ETHNOGRAPHY AND VIEWS OF CHINA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
Eighteenth-century observers regarded China as an advanced civilization that could 
yield information on the merits, pitfalls, hazards and lessons of its particular system of 
political economy. Direct accounts about China were not solely motivated by their 
authors’ desire to further their own individual agendas, nor did European philosophers 
who discussed these accounts only do so to veil their criticism of their own 
governments. Rather, Europeans interested in China often displayed a sincere desire to 
understand how aspects of China’s political economy could be reconciled with -  and 
even used to improve -  their own theories on the fundamental principles of organizing a 
state. China was, of course, at times used as a mirror or a model for European self­
55 G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter “Introduction”, in Exoticism in the Enlightenment eds. G.S. Rousseau 
and Roy Porter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 9.
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evaluation (such as when considering views of economic culture). Additionally, the 
genuine interest in China’s political economy did not always manifest itself in 
admiration (notably on the topics of military and science). However, in many instances 
-  such as on taxation policies -  it was seen to offer valuable lessons for the ongoing 
project of remodelling of European political and economic organization. At other times, 
like when discussing foreign trade policy or the form of government, China’s political 
economy was considered essentially incommensurable, because its history, geography 
and culture were thought so unique that it was deemed impossible to derive any lessons 
applicable to a European setting. Thus China was dismissed as a useful model because 
it was regarded as a sui generis case that could not be worked into the universal models 
typical of Enlightenment thought. By examining particular topics under the theme of 
political economy, the different ways that China was used to shape European 
knowledge become clear.
In a discussion of perceptions or images -  defined here as the ways in which a particular 
subject is represented, understood and made sense of- it is necessary to deal with the 
difficult question of the relationship between the reality and the idea.56 Henri Baudet 
articulates the division between the real and the imagined in the context of views 
Europeans held of non-Europeans:
There was, on the one hand, the actual physical outside world which 
could be put to political, economic, and strategic use; there was also 
the outside world onto which all identification and interpretation, all 
dissatisfaction and desire, all nostalgia and idealism seeking 
expression could be projected.
It is the tension between these two realms that prompts the question of whether a 
resultant epistemological conflict between the actual and its images existed for thinkers
C Q
of the time. This question is especially relevant to images of China in Europe as China 
was more distant and less familiar than other parts of the non-European world such as 
India. Historians have answered this question in predominantly two ways: the first 
posits that actual China is irrelevant to any discussion of its images in Europe, while the 
second claims that reality is pertinent but with ambiguity as to what extent it is so.
56 For a philosophical examination of images o f China and the relationship between knowledge, belief 
and myth, see Jamie Morgan, “Distinguishing Truth, Knowledge and Belief: A  Philosophical 
Contribution to the Problem o f Images o f China” M odem China 30:3 (2004), 398-427.
57 Baudet, Paradise on Earth, 55.
58 Joan-Pau Rubies, “Introduction”, 2; Rubies asks this question in analysing the relevance o f new 
empirical reports from travel literature to the views of European “armchair cosmographers”.
There are many historians who support the view that the realities of China were largely
irrelevant to early-modern authors; for the purposes of this discussion, this view may be
referred to as the “model perspective”. Raymond Dawson argues that in the case of
European constructions of China, there was a tension between the image and the reality
that stems from the ways in which the Jesuits constructed and transmitted of
information. Undertaking a self-proclaimed “history of the observer rather than of the
observed”, Dawson suggests that actual China is less relevant than understanding how
the information was constructed.59 Gunther Lottes takes an even more sweeping
approach to claim that Europeans took very little notice of the Chinese reality.60 Walter
Davis argues that for most writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
particularly those of France, “praise of some distant Utopia remained merely an
instrument of social criticism...without running afoul of the censors”.61 Mungello also
suggests philosophers were not interested in the serious study of China:
The tendency to refer to Enlightenment thinkers as sinophiles and 
sinophobes reflects the philosophes’ shallow understanding of China, 
sinophilia and sinophobia belong to categories of enthusiasm while 
knowledge belongs to more neutral and objective categories of 
thought. The Enlightenment’s understanding of China was built on 
shallow foundations and, as a result, was more vulnerable to the 
shifting ties of intellectual fashion.62
However, on the topic of political economy these labels are not appropriate and as will 
be seen, many thinkers actively engaged with nuanced elements of China’s political 
economy.
The degree to which the primary sources of information reflected actual China varied 
and depended largely on their level of interaction with the Middle Kingdom, but it is 
clear that there was some genuine engagement with the realities of the Middle 
Kingdom. Following this line of thought, Edwin Pulleybank reminds us that “while the 
sinomania of the eighteenth century both in art and in philosophy was based on very 
false notions of what was Chinese, the Chinese inspiration behind it cannot be
59 Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon, 8.
60 Lottes, “China in European Political Thought,” 94«. 1.
61 Walter W. Davis, “China, The Confucian Ideal, and the European Age o f Enlightenment”, Journal o f  
the History o f  Ideas, 44:4 (1983): 523-548, quote at 523.
62 D.E. Mungello, “Confucianism in the Enlightenment: Antagonism and Collaboration between the 
Jesuits and the Philosophes” in China and Europe: Images and Influences in Sixteenth to Eighteenth 
Centuries ed. Thomas H.C. Lee (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), 55; repeated almost 
verbatim in Mungello, The Great Encounter o f  China and the West, 122.
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ignored...all these ideas had some foundation in fact.”63 Arthur Wright makes a 
somewhat altered version of this argument, suggesting that it was the unrealistic 
Chinese self-image that affected European perceptions, but nevertheless it was Chinese 
self-perception from China. He argues that the impressions from the merchants and the 
Jesuits combined with the “aesthetic appeal of Chinese objects of art, [to] set the tone of 
the early European study of China”.64 As we will see in the following chapter, both the 
sinophile and sinophobe primary sources engaged with China and reported a 
combination of positive and negative aspects of its political economy.
Some historians differentiate authors within the model perspective and note that there 
were individuals who did care about Chinese realities, others who ignored inconvenient 
aspects of it, and still others who used China as a model only when they discussed 
topics considered controversial in Europe. This approach, considering the motivations 
and interests of specific authors, is the most useful. Gregory Blue maintains some 
philosophes were less interested in actual China and uses the example of Montesquieu 
who partly ignored certain aspects of the Chinese reality such as the imperial civil 
service to make China fit his model.65 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese distinguishes the 
different uses of China for the Physiocrats. When they addressed economic issues, she 
argues, they would address France directly but when they addressed political or social 
issues they would often talk of universal models or a distant land such as China.66
Personal agendas are discussed further in the following chapter, but it is important to 
recognize that some authors did praise or criticize China almost entirely based on their 
own bias and prejudice. For instance, Chen argues that if English authors respected 
ancient culture, attacked revealed religion, or championed modem progress, their 
perspectives of China changed. In fact, he argues that Defoe’s opinion of China was 
“predetermined” because of his Christianity, English nationalism, and merchant, 
military and journalistic background.67 All early modem authors were not driven by 
bias, but it is important to recognize that even if they were, bias does not eliminate the 
importance of Chinese reality. Urs Bitterli comments, “Perception, understanding and
63 Pulleyblank, Orientalism and History, 72.
64 Wright, “The Study of Chinese Civilization”, 233.
65 Gregory Blue, “China and Western Social Thought”, 89.
66 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins o f  Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in 
Eighteenth-century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 11.
67 Chen Shouyi, “Daniel Defoe, China’s Severe Critic” in The Vision o f  China in the English Literature o f  
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries ed. Adrian Hsia (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998), 
242.
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representation are all obliged to use stereotypes. Stereotypes are not falsehoods, but 
simplified models which are necessary if we are to cope with the multiplicity of 
experience.”68 Similarly, David Mungello argues the “ideas of Leibniz did not originate 
in, so much as receive confirmation from Chinese culture”, though he continues on to 
note “that a corroborative influence is still an influence.”69 Walter Demel aptly 
summarises the compromise in his description of Christian Wolffs use of China to 
confirm his philosophy; he argues that the importance of such confirmation cannot be 
underestimated:
For it makes a great difference whether an ideal state can be regarded 
only as a utopia, or whether a political theorist is able to refer to an 
historical, or contemporary, state where his ideals were, or are, 
realized in a more or less perfect way. This was the true importance of 
the Chinese model.70
In short, following Blue, the view of the “Orient” as a passive function, as a set of
71symbols open to manipulation of changing Western interests is too simplistic.
While Enlightenment philosophers, geographers and the primary sources of information 
on China, clearly had their own agendas, many were also sincerely interested in 
empirical China. On this middle ground, it is useful to follow Joan-Pau Rubies’ 
argument that Europeans “were often genuinely concerned with understanding the East, 
for practical and intellectual reasons” and the “intense interaction between direct 
observation and conceptual development is the key to the emergence of an early- 
modern discourse on non-Europeans”.72 It is important to consider what could have 
been known at the time, and to find the balance between how reality and image were 
combined, without assuming maliciousness or blind ignorance. It is true that China was 
ignored by some scholars and geographers who preferred not to address the issues it 
raised.73 However, as we will see in throughout this study, there was also interest in 
China’s political economy. This interest was expressed in three primary ways. First, 
China was used as a mirror for self-reflection. Second, it was seen to offer lessons,
68 Urs Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492- 
1800, translated by Ritchie Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 7.
69 David E. Mungello, “Some Recent Studies on the Confluence o f Chinese and Western Intellectual 
History”, Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas, 40:4 (1979), 649-661, quote at 660.
70 Walter Demel, “China in the Political Thought o f Western and Central Europe, 1570-1750” in China 
and Europe, ed. Lee, 55.
71 Blue, “China and Western Social Thought,” 69.
72 Joan-Pau Rubies, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu”. Journal o f  
Early Modern History 9:1 (2005): 109-180, quote at 113.
73 Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History famously did not include China as part o f its universal 
geography (this will be discussed in chapter two). Rousseau ignored China or preferred not to address the 
issue o f China where civilization and virtue were both reported. See, for instance, Muthu, Enlightenment 
Against Empire, 32; Lottes “China in European Political Thought,” 79.
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which some argued should be applied in European countries. Finally, China was seen to 
be too unique in many areas to offer an imitable model of political economy.
1.5. THESIS STRUCTURE
A specific focus on views of China’s political economy leads to several conclusions. 
First, while certainly a phenomenon that was evident in the eighteenth century, the 
sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy is not always a useful way to analyse perceptions of 
China. With regards to political economy, we find a surprising degree of consensus 
among those sources conventionally cast on either side of the dichotomy. Second, in the 
area of political economy Europeans did not possess comfortable assumptions of 
superiority over China and in fact many expressed a high level of civilizational 
relativism. Finally, there was a genuine interest in what could be learned from China’s 
civilization.
To demonstrate these arguments this study looks to the primary, geographical and 
philosophical descriptions of China. The weight of these groups of sources varies in 
each chapter depending on the debate at hand. This methodology is necessary in order 
to focus on the salient contemporary concerns. The second chapter gives an historical 
context to these sources, and examines their respective biases. Genuine interest in China 
is seen through the travelling of knowledge and arguments between these sources. This 
chapter also argues many European writers were able to separate religious and secular 
areas of interest.
Chapters three to seven examine particular areas of interest connected to China’s 
political economy and each case reiterates aspects of the aforementioned arguments. 
Chapters three and four concentrate on views of Chinese commerce. Chapter three 
examines discussion of the commercial behaviour of the Chinese. While views of 
China’s moral philosophy diverged greatly, descriptions of day-to-day practical 
morality were surprisingly similar in sources conventionally labelled as sinophile and 
sinophobe and displayed a high level of relativism on this topic. It is on this topic above 
all others in this study that Europeans used China as a mirror for self-reflection. Chapter 
four considers views of China’s foreign trade policies. This topic represents another 
instance of self-reflection as Europe’s own trade practices were considered highly 
problematic and a hindrance to the China trade. The approach to understanding China’s
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attitude towards foreign trade reflected a great deal of interest in the unique 
circumstances that allowed the Middle Kingdom to restrict international trade. Chinese 
policy, while not generally praised, was largely understood as rational.
The next two chapters address views of China’s government. The fifth chapter 
examines the structure of China’s government in the eyes of European observers and 
authors. The chapter reveals that even a famed ‘sinophobe’, such as Montesquieu, 
recognized particular exceptions to the Chinese case and repeated similar information as 
‘sinophile’ sources. Once again, the unique characteristics of the Chinese Empire 
enabled a level of understanding for the moderation of the Chinese form of government. 
This chapter highlights an important division in views of China; that between 
philosophers who believed China was imitable and others who felt its system of 
political economy was irreproducible. Chapter six takes a more detailed look at 
particular areas of Chinese governance, following the duties of government laid out by 
Adam Smith. Here too a high level of consensus amongst those sources that are 
typically divided is evident, alongside instances of civilizational relativism. This chapter 
addresses views of China’s military, justice system, public institutions and taxation 
policies. Discussion of China’s military reveals it as a key weakness of the Chinese 
system of political economy. This is the first topic on which we are confronted with a 
fundamental flaw of the Chinese system.
Finally, the seventh chapter examines views of China’s science and technology. 
Although this is a topic on which the primary sources are widely believed to diverge 
greatly, there is in fact a remarkable degree of similarity in the negative reports on the 
state of China’s speculative sciences and mechanical arts. This is a second area of 
political economy in which European sources reflect an air of definite (though not 
assumed) superiority. Significantly, the theme of science and technology elucidates the 
transition to the rise of progress as the main assessor of the Chinese system. The 
conclusion of this thesis builds on this theme of the role of progress in examining the 
shift from China being seen as stable to being assigned the label of stationary.
CONCLUSION
Without anachronistic knowledge of the ultimate success and dominance of the 
European models of political and economic organization, Enlightenment observers and 
commentators were not assured of Europe’s supremacy over the Chinese in this realm.
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European confidence grew over the course of the eighteenth century, however, many 
Enlightenment thinkers still recognized and valued alternative structures of political and 
economic organization. This last point connects to the genuine interest in China’s 
political economy. Europeans often displayed an active engagement with the Chinese 
model, analysing how aspects of it could be reconciled with -  and even be used to 
improve -  their own theories on some of the fundamental questions of their time. There 
were many elements of China’s political economy that were deemed relatively 
successful and seen to offer valuable lessons for an envisioned “enlightened” 
remodelling of European political and economic organization. At other times, China 
was seen to offer information on pitfalls to avoid. We will see this exemplified with 
regards to China’s military weakness (discussed in chapter six), and the stagnation of its 
science and technology (addressed in chapter seven). In the view of many 
contemporaries, China’s history, geography and population were such unique elements, 
that they were seen as not being able to be translated into a European setting. Thus 
China was not dismissed as a useful model on normative grounds, but rather it was seen 
as a unique case that could not be worked into the universal models that characterized 
European Enlightenment thought. This is exemplified in debates over China’s foreign 
trade policy (as discussed in chapter four), its form of government (considered in 
chapter five) and government revenue (addressed in chapter six). To be sure, China was 
at times used as a mirror for European self-evaluation and exploration. This is evident 
with reference to China’s economic culture, a topic Europeans were struggling with in 
their own backyards (as will be seen in chapter three).
European, and particularly British engagement with China’s political economy on 
several levels reveals openness to foreign answers to European questions on how to 
organize a society politically and economically. Appleby has argued, “The modem 
transformation of European society has been viewed as a process rather than a series of 
developments capable of leading to conclusions other than the one actually realized”.74 
However, if we return to the Enlightenment era we find much more flexibility in 
accepting an alternative model of civilization.
74 Joyce Oldham Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 16.
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O u t l i n e : 2. T r a v e l l in g  k n o w l e d g e  in  t h e  “d is c e r n in g  a g e ’
2 .1 . F r o m  C h in a  t o  E u r o p e
2.2. G e o g r a p h e r s
2.3. P h il o s o p h e r s
“Since the world is no longer to be amused with the fabulous relations o f 
travellers and historians, any more than with the dreams o f superstition and 
enthusiasm; an attempt to distinguish truth from fiction, and to discover the 
certainty o f those accounts we have received o f distant nations, it is presumed, 
will not be unacceptable in this discerning age.”
— Thomas Salmon75
Early modem Europeans found their curiosity of distant societies and civilizations 
piqued by a flood of first-hand descriptions. By the eighteenth century, discussions of 
foreign lands grew heated, as Enlightenment scholars and geographers fervently 
debated the nature, validity and implications of the empirical accounts. This chapter 
examines the sources that created and recycled information on China in Enlightenment 
Britain and France (which necessarily leads to a broader study as knowledge travelled 
across countries and over time). It does not add to or repeat the findings of the field of 
publication history, nor does it expand the cataloguing efforts of Donald Lach and 
Edwin Van Kley.76 Rather, it contextualizes the sources that are examined in subsequent 
chapters and explains the ways in which knowledge of China travelled in eighteenth 
century Europe. From this contextualization, two key findings are evident: first, the 
boundaries between primary sources, geographers and philosophers blurred as 
information on China’s political economy travelled over space and time and was 
translated and analysed by different authors; second, many Europeans could separate 
religious dogma from secular interests in their descriptions and assessments of China’s 
political economy.77
75 Thomas Salmon, Modern History. 3 Volumes (London: Printed for M. Bettesworth et. al., 1739), vol.
1, ix. This quote is the first line in the introduction to the octavo edition, which was first published in 
1724.
76 John Feather, “The Commerce o f Letters: The Study o f the Eighteenth-Century Book Trade,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, Special Issue: The Printed Word in the Eighteenth Century. 17:4 (Summer, 
1984): 405-424; Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe Vol. 1 and 2; Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the 
Making o f  Europe, Vol. 3.
77 Franco Venturi argues that political economy was a powerful unifying force o f Enlightenment 
philosophy precisely because it offered a secular way for philosophers to discuss human betterment. See 
Franco Venturi, Utopia and reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1971), chapter five. See also John Robertson, “The Enlightenment above National Context: Political 
Economy in Eighteenth-Century Scotland and Naples”, The Historical Journal, 40:3 (September 1997): 
667-697.
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Historians have made different choices of which authors to examine when considering 
the broad subject of views of the other. Guy and Mungello largely restrict themselves to
no
published works they believe best typify the general reaction in Europe. Donald Lach 
offers the most direct assessment of the primary sources on Asia in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. He bases his research on extant printed material though he 
acknowledges that these “are not completely representative of what was then in 
circulation” because manuscript and oral reports also contributed to shaping
70contemporary views. This dissertation selects sources based on their contemporary 
popularity, their influence on the development of new ideas, and their relevance to the 
topic of China’s political economy. This latter focus necessarily neglects detailed 
analysis of important authors on China, such as the Jesuit Martino Martini, who stirred 
controversy in his writings on Chinese chronology, and the philosopher Christian Wolff 
who controversially analysed Confucianism. The purpose of this research is to identify, 
examine and contextualise those works that were critical to the dissemination of and 
reflection on knowledge of China’s political economy during the Enlightenment.
An advantage of focusing on the area of political economy is that early modem 
Europeans widely considered it to be less of a controversial topic than religion or 
history. Contemporary authors perceived the Jesuit missionaries as having little 
incentive to be deceptive about aspects of China’s political economy. The anonymous 
editor of The Chinese Traveller, an English compendium based on Jesuit sources that 
presented a generally favourable view of China, argued the Jesuits could be trusted on 
non-religious topics: ‘We have no reason to distrust the fidelity of the [Jesuit 
missionaries] in their various relations, except where the religion or particular interest 
of the Jesuit order is concerned.’80 The subject of political economy certainly stood in 
relation to knowledge of other aspects of China but at the same time was a space that 
enabled candid analysis.
As mentioned in chapter one, this dissertation examines the texts, the reading and 
production of three main bodies of sources: the early modem European travellers who 
relayed first-hand information about China to audiences in Europe; the British and 
French geographers who categorized, assessed and popularized knowledge of the 
Middle Kingdom; and the European philosophers who addressed China’s political
78 Guy, The French Image o f  China, 18; D.E. Mungello, The Great Encounter o f  China and the West.
79 Lach, Asia in the making o f Europe, Vol. 1, xviii.
80 Anonymous, The Chinese Traveller, 2 Volumes (London: Printed by E. and C. Dilly, 1772), Vol. 1, iv.
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economy. A study of the circulation and construction of information of China’s political 
economy offers a more revealing map of knowledge than other methodologies that 
focus on one particular group of sources. This method leads to the clear identification of 
the most popular themes, awareness of pieces of information that were neglected by a 
particular group of sources or individual author, as well as the relationship between the 
ethnographic descriptions of China and the ways in which this information was 
reworked. Focusing on the topic of political economy makes this project possible. This 
chapter is not designed to examine what these sources had to say about China, but rather 
seeks to contextualize the travelling of knowledge on China’s political economy.
Although each of these three groups is treated separately in this chapter, information 
and ideas were transmitted between the sources and some individual authors blurred the 
boundaries altogether. Geographers and philosophers influenced the authors of the 
primary sources. As Ros Ballaster reminds us: “travellers went to eastern territories 
with stories in their heads and measured what they met there quite self-consciously 
against those stories”.81 Further, primary sources were conscious of the way their 
accounts were being received in Europe and the effect this had on their varying agendas. 
Additionally, the editors of travel compilations shaped the presentation of primary 
sources to a European readership, and geographers actively re-arranged the information 
found in the numerous primary sources. Philosophers drew information from the 
primary and geographical sources to complement their theories, and, at times, also 
sought to explain information that did not fit their theoretical arguments. As discussed 
in the preceding chapter, Jesuit authors were usually labelled sinophiles while the non- 
Jesuit primary sources were predominantly considered sinophobes. In assessing the 
information provided, the geographers and scholars took a stance on which group was 
the most trustworthy and were often explicitly critical of the other group. Interestingly, 
even in cases where a source met with scepticism, the information it contained was 
often still circulated. The geographers and philosophers also related to each other’s 
works. Books such as Guillaume Thomas Francis Raynal’s Histoire des Deux Indes 
(discussed below) blur the boundaries between the popularizing geographies and the 
erudite philosophical works. Thus these three groups were closely linked and 
information circulating on China’s political economy can only be accurately understood 
when we consider them together.
81 Ballaster, Fabulous Orients, 5.
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Alongside print runs, number of editions and translations, contemporary library 
catalogues are useful to identify the influential sources on China circulating in the 
eighteenth century. By the sixteenth century the private library became the principal 
resource for scholarly materials. A new class of collectors emerged including lawyers, 
merchants, royal officials, tradesmen and artisans. Melissa Calaresu describes how the 
growth of the publishing industry led to lower book prices and greater accessibility of 
the printed word to an increasingly literate pan-European audience. The catalogue of 
John Bell’s travelling library gives an indication of the books circulating in England 
containing information of China.83 Bell was a major figure in the London printing and 
book trade. His bookshop on the Strand in London was home to a diverse printing and 
publishing business, where he established himself as one of the most successful 
booksellers of his time, including running the British Library in 1769, and achieving the 
title of bookseller to the Prince of Wales in the 1780s.84 Appendix I gives a list of 
important works on China available in his travelling library. This library represented a 
diverse group of authors, from Jesuits, to non-Jesuit missionaries, merchants, explorers, 
travel collections, sixteenth century to eighteenth century compendiums and 
philosophical sources. It also reflects the travelling of information around Europe; for 
instance, Spanish, Dutch, French and English authors all wrote primary sources on 
China found in this collection.
Another way of identifying the most important sources on China in Great Britain is to 
examine the works referenced by contemporary authors. One particularly useful case is 
that of Thomas Percy, a writer and Church of Ireland bishop, who published a list of 
over twenty-five sources that he relied on when creating the notes for his translation of 
a Chinese novel (see Appendix II). His work, Hau Kiou Choaun, or The Pleasing 
History (1761) was popular around Europe and translated into French in 1766 and 
Dutch in 1767. Friends with Samuel Johnson, Oliver Goldsmith and David Hume, 
Percy was an avid reader and was certainly one of the most informed people in 
eighteenth century England on the state of China.85 His sources ranged from the Jesuits
82 Melissa Calaresu, “Looking for Virgil’s Tomb: The End of the Grand Tour and the Cosmopolitan Ideal 
in Europe” in Voyages and Visions: Towards a cultural history o f  travel eds. Jas Eisner and Joan-Pau 
Rubies (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 140.
83 John Bell, A New Catalogue o f  B ell’s Circulating Library, consisting o f  above fifty thousand volumes 
(London: printed for John Bell, 1778).
84 Hanna Barker, “Bell, John (1745-1831)”, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
85 Chen Shouyi, “Thomas Percy and His Chinese Studies” in The Vision o f  China in the English 
Literature o f  the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in ed. Adrian Hsia (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press, 1998).
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(who he criticized but nonetheless greatly relied on), non-Jesuit travellers (notably 
Admiral George Anson), a collection of voyages and philosophical publications. Percy 
relied primarily on English and French sources and at times listed the same source in 
two different languages indicating that he compared the editions. While identifying 
French primary and philosophical sources, he did not refer to any French geographical 
sources. Percy’s book was not popular, and his methodology of commenting throughout 
a work of literature was unusual; however, the sources he relied upon were the standard,
O /J
available, popular descriptions of China in mid-eighteenth century Britain. Based on 
the insights provided in these two contemporary bibliographies, as well as a 
consideration of influential sources determined by consistent cross-referencing across 
all genres, this chapter proceeds by examining the three sources of information in this 
study. First it considers the nature of the primary sources of information, second the 
geographers and finally the philosophers.
2.1. FROM CHINA TO EUROPE
In the early modem world information travelled from China to Europe through 
individuals with careers varying from missionaries to merchants, men of war to 
emissaries. In this first phase of travelling the differing backgrounds of the authors in 
addition to their contrasting exposure to China shaped the information they produced. 
Reliable Medieval information on China in Europe was mixed with fantastical tales, and 
audiences were left unsure as to what to believe. However, they did develop a keen 
interest in the Middle Kingdom. By the sixteenth century, Iberian travellers began to 
report more detailed information on China, painting it in both a positive and negative 
light. From the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries the information increased 
dramatically in both quality and quantity. The primary sources circulated rapidly and 
were quickly translated into the major European languages. Every prominent source 
discussed below, apart from Ricci and Trigualt’s description of China, was translated 
into both English and French.
86 For more on the reception of Percy’s work see, James Watt, “Thomas Percy, China and the Gothic”,
The Eighteenth Century 48:2 (2007): 95-109.
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S o u r c e s  u p  t o  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y
Before the Age of Discovery, authors and readers approached the Middle Kingdom 
without assumptions of superiority on secular matters. Descriptions of China (or ‘Seres’ 
or ‘Cathay’ as it was then known), although limited, generally portrayed an advanced 
civilization. The most influential medieval European book that revealed the world of 
Cathay was Marco Polo’s The Description o f the World (written with Rustichello of 
Pisa as Livre des divers ite in 1298-99).87 Polo was clearly impressed by China, 
providing an “account of Cathay as the largest, wealthiest, and most populous land of
QQ
the thirteenth century.” The pre-Age of Discovery approach to the East blended 
descriptions of fantastical tales, religious and moral exoticism, self-promotion and
OQ
criticism of Western meanness in contrast to Eastern wealth. Interestingly, Polo was 
still influential by the eighteenth century, despite some of his information having been 
discredited. He was defended in the modem part of the Universal History, which argued 
that while readers presumed much of Polo’s description was exaggerated, “...the more 
they have become acquainted with China, the better they have been statisfied of the 
faithfulness of that Venetian traveller.”90
By the end of the Middle Ages many educated Europeans increasingly expressed 
interest in overseas civilizations; however, it was only with the expansion of the 
Portuguese sea route to the coast of Southern China in 1514 (when the Portuguese first 
touched the southern coast of China near Hong Kong), and the rise of the printing press 
(following the production of the Gutenberg bible in 1456) that this demand for 
information on the Far East could be met. In the sixteenth century Iberian travellers 
provided the most current information on the Chinese Empire. Galeote Pereira, a 
Portuguese trader and soldier, wrote an account of his observations on the customs and 
government of the Chinese Empire in 1565, which enjoyed a fairly wide circulation at
87 AC Moule and P Pelliot. Marco Polo: The Description o f  the World (London: George Routledge and 
Sons Ltd, 1938), 32. John Horace Parry also notes the fourteenth century popularity o f the travels of  
Odoric o f  Pordenone and even more famous Travels of Sir John Mandeville. However, it is the account of 
Marco Polo that had the most influence into the early modem period. John Horace Parry, The Age o f  
Reconnaissance (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1963), 7.
88 Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 1,36.
89 Spence, The Chan's Great Continent, 17.
90 The modem part of An universal history. . . ,4 4  Volumes (London: Printed for S. Richardson, et. al.,
1759), vol. 8, 9. Travel compilers made similar arguments about Polo’s description o f Cathay. Samuel 
Derrick. A collection o f  travels, thro ’ various parts o f  the world; but more particularly, thro ' Tartary, 
China, Turkey, Persia, and the East-Indies 2 Volumes (London: Printed for John Wilkie, 1762), Vol. 1, 
56-7; John Harris, (updated by John Campbell), Navigantium atque itinerantium bibliotheca. Or, a 
complete collection o f voyages and travels... 2 Volumes (London: Publisher Unknown, 1744-48) Vol. 1,
545
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the time.91 Another Portuguese author, the Dominican Friar Gaspar da Cruz also
09published an influential account specifically on China. Lastly, the Spanish 
Augustinian Martin de Rada wrote an important first-hand account of China in the 
sixteenth century. De Rada’s description was much more critical of the Middle 
Kingdom than those of Pereira or da Cruz. These authors represent an important step 
in the expansion of European knowledge of China. Their accounts were not widely read 
in the rest of Europe but they greatly impacted European views of China through the 
synthesis offered by the Spanish Augustinian Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza’s popular 
Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y  costumbres del gran reyno de la China 
(1585).94 Written at the command of Pope Gregory XIII, Mendoza’s description of 
China was very popular; it was reprinted forty-six times by the end of the sixteenth 
century, translated into seven European languages and read by most educated 
Europeans.95 His Historia was a systematic assessment of the Chinese Empire, covering 
topics as diverse as geography, customs, religion, moral philosophy and politics. The 
Augustinian did not let his religious agenda affect his discussion of secular aspects of 
China.
Mendoza never went to China (not for lack of trying) and he relied heavily on a mix of 
published and unpublished information from Pereira, the missionaries da Cruz, de Rada, 
Jesuit letters, Joao de Barros, and Chinese books96; however, his work offered new 
information to the European public about China and thus is considered a primary
91 Pereira’s account was translated into English from the abridged Italian version in 1577 by Richard 
Willis and published in Richard Eden, History o f  Travayle in the West and East Indies (London, printed 
by Richarde Iugge, 1577); Charles R. Boxer, ed. South China in the Sixteenth Century: Being the 
Narratives o f  Galeote Pereira, Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, O.P., Fr. Martin de Rada, O.E.S.A. (Bangkok: 
Orchid Press, 2004), lvi.
This was the first book on China printed in Europe, however it was not widely distributed because it 
was published in a plague year and was written in the Portuguese vernacular. A copy o f da Cruz’s 
account was found in Richard Hakluyt’s papers and subsequently translated and published by Samuel 
Purchas (who reduced the original text by approximately one-third). Boxer, South China, lxvi.
93 De Rada’s report was not published in its entirety at the time, nor was it translated into English. Boxer, 
South China, lxxviii.
94 The less popular Spanish Augustinian Jeronimo Roman’s Republicas del Mundo (1575) also relied on 
Da Rada. See Joan-Pau Rubies, “The concept o f gentile civilization in missionary discourse and its 
European reception: Mexico, Peru and China in the Republicas del Mundo byJeronimo Roman (1575- 
1595)”, in Circulation des savoirs et missions d'evangelisation (XVIe-XVIIIe siecle) (Madrid: Casa de 
Velazquez, 2010).
95 Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 1, 744. It ran through 30 editions in the principal European 
languages by the end o f the sixteenth century. Boxer, South China, 310. The French translation was made 
by Luc de la Porte and was published in Paris (1588, 1589 and 1600), Geneva (1606), Lyon (1606) and 
Rouen (1604). The English translation is discussed below. Juan Gonzales de Mendoza, The history o f  the 
great and mighty kingdom o f  China, and the situation thereof Translated by R. Parke. (London: Printed 
by I Wolfe for Edward White, 1588). Reprinted George Staunton ed. (London: Reprinted for the Hakluyt 
Society, 1853(. Facsimile reprint o f the 1853 edition by (Elibron Classics, 2005).lxxxii.
96 Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 1, 747
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source. Although he did rely on da Rada as a source, as Boxer argues, Mendoza 
presented a view of China as an “enviable country” and he initiated “what may be 
termed the ‘China Legend.’”97 In other words, Boxer contends that Mendoza instigated 
the era of sinophilia by starting to idealise the government of China; a project the 
Jesuits would take up in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Similarly, Lach 
points out that Mendoza rejected de Rada’s critical attitude and followed Barros, 
Bernardino de Escalante (another Spanish cosmographer who described China based on
QQ
Barros and da Cruz) and da Cruz’s acclaim of China. However, once we begin to 
scrutinize exactly what was written on particular subjects such as international trade and 
economic culture, we find that Mendoza’s account was not as one-sided as it may have 
been on other subjects.
Religious interests motivated the transmission of much of the information on China, but
did not account for all of the attention paid to the Middle Kingdom, particularly in an
era of expansionist European ambitions. Robert Parke’s 1588 English translation of
Mendoza’s work, for example, demonstrates the demand for information on China to
encourage overseas trade.99 Richard Hakluyt, who as we will see below was an English
nationalist and believed in the importance of exploration and trade, commissioned this
translation. Published in a year of war between England and Spain, there is a marked
economic nationalism present in Parke’s introduction. His translation is dedicated to the
English explorer Thomas Cavendish who, he hoped, would find a new trade route to
Asia. Parke also praised the teenage King Edward VI for his encouragement of trade
with the East 35 years earlier:
[he] went about the discoverie of Cathaia and China, partly of desire 
that the good young king had to enlarge the Christian faith, and partlie 
to finde out some where in those regions ample vent of the cloth of 
England...100
Although Parke lists both religion and trade as motivations for expanding information 
on China, the rest of his dedication concentrates solely on trade. Parke attributed his 
decision to translate Mendoza’s work into English to the need for a better understanding 
of “the intelligence of the govemement of the countrie and of the commodities of the 
territories and provinces”.101 Therefore, it is evident, that from the travels of the
97 Boxer, South China, xci.
98 Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 1, 748. Rubies, “The concept o f gentile civilization.. .”
99 Parke’s translation was based on the Madrid edition o f 1586 that contained additional materials. See 
Rubies, “The concept o f gentile civilization...”
100 Mendoza, The history o f  the great and mighty kingdom o f  China, 2.
101 Ibid., 4.
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merchant Marco Polo to the English translation of Mendoza, political economy 
encouraged the transmission of information about China.
J e s u i t  s o u r c e s  f r o m  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  t o  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y
Beginning in the seventeenth century, the Jesuit missionaries provided the most detailed 
accounts of the Chinese Empire. Ignatius of Loyola founded The Society of Jesus in 
1534 and Pope Paul III officially confirmed it six years later. The society prioritized 
missionary work and religious and secular education and thus the polymath,
109adventurous Jesuits were well equipped to provide information on China. Giovanni
Petri Maffei’s Historiarum Indicarum libri XVI (Florence, 1588) was the first
1 01systematic Jesuit work on the Eastern Missions, including China. However, it was in 
the seventeenth century that a more detailed picture of the Middle Kingdom began to 
emerge. Matteo Ricci established the first Jesuit mission in China in 1583 and reached 
Peking in 1601. The Jesuits used their wide-ranging diplomatic and linguistic skills, 
religious openness and scientific knowledge to gain a greater understanding of the 
Chinese by forming close relationships with the imperial court and literati. The arrival 
of the early Jesuits coincided with the peak of the Ming Dynasty’s (1368-1644) 
strength, allowing for cultural syncretism between self-assured missionaries and 
confident Chinese literati. The Jesuits were a diverse a group of individuals with 
varying nationalities, motivations, interests and opinions. For instance, botany 
interested Michael Boym, while Adam Schall von Bell focused on astronomy. In fact, 
Marshall and Williams make an oft-neglected point that the Jesuits did not speak with 
one voice.104 Adding to this, depending on the topic being addressed, many perspectives 
were evident within a single Jesuit source.
The most influential seventeenth century Jesuit source on China was Nicolas Trigaulf s 
publication of Matteo Ricci’s journals as De Christaina expeditione apud Sinas 
(1615).105 Trigault arrived in Macao in 1610, the year that Ricci died in Peking and the
102 Liam Brockey, Journey to the East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 7.
103 Also translated into Latin, Italian and French but not into German and English. It was based on the 
manuscripts o f Alessandro Valignano, private interviews and Jesuit archives and letters. Lach and Van 
Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 354.
104 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map o f  Mankind, 85.
105 This work appeared in 5 Latin editions (1615, 1616, 1617, 1623 and 1648), 3 French editions (1616, 
1617 and 1618), and a German, Spanish and Italian edition as well as having English excerpts reproduced 
in Samuel Purchas Purchas, His Pilgrimes (London: Henrie Fetherstone, 1625). D.E. Mungello, Curious 
Land: Jesuit accommodation and the origins o f  Sinology (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 48.
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two never met; and yet, together they produced one of the most influential primary 
descriptions of China in early modem Europe. Trigault’s contributions to Ricci’s diaries 
were to translate them into Latin, organize them into five books, add brief sections, and 
write chapters in the last two books.106 The focus of this research on political economy 
means the first book of De Christaina expeditione is of the most relevance. This book 
derived entirely from Ricci’s diaries, and thus in the text I cite Ricci as the author of this
1 ft7work, though Trigault’s editing and translating efforts are noted.
Although running fewer editions than other sources, and being the only key primary 
source not to have a full contemporary English translation (it was available in Latin, 
French, German, Spanish and Italian), it was an extremely influential work as “[i]t was 
almost universally cited by scholars who mentioned China, and it was regularly pilfered 
by later authors and publishers”.108 Ricci argued that he offered a unique perspective for 
readers because he lived in China for over thirty years, travelled around the empire, 
spoke the Chinese language, read their literature and discoursed with the people.109 This 
claim to authority became prominent in the debate over the accuracy of information 
provided by the Jesuits relative to that provided by emissaries, merchants and men of 
war who did not have the same level of access to the Chinese court. As we shall see 
throughout this study, a reading of Ricci that focuses on topics of political economy 
contradicts the notion (both contemporary and modem) that Jesuit writings too highly 
extolled the Chinese and that non-Jesuit reports were more nuanced in their 
assessments. For instance, Ricci disparaged China’s military and scientific capacities.
Maintaining a focus on identifying important sources for eighteenth century Europeans 
interested in China, three seventeenth century Jesuits are emblematic of the popular 
(and at times controversial) reception of Jesuit descriptions. First, the work of Martino 
Martini, an Italian (and part German) Jesuit who lived in China from 1642 to 1651, and 
from 1658 until his death in 1661, highlight the controversial aspects of Jesuit 
publications. One of his books recounted Chinese ancient history, leading to a greatly
106 Mungello, Curious Land, 47.
107 Matteo Ricci and Nicolas Trigault. China in the Sixteenth Century: the journals o f  Matthew Ricci: 
1583-1610 [The compilation by N. Trigault] Translated by Louis J. Gallagher (New York: Random 
House, 1953), xviii.
108 Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 513. Mungello argues in terms o f  readership it was 
“probably the most influential book on China published in seventeenth century Europe”. Mungello, 
Curious Land, 48.
Ibid., 5.
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contested questioning of biblical chronology.110 This work stirred great controversy and 
was widely read, with at least 21 editions being produced in 20 years. The publications 
of two other important Jesuists, Alvaro Semedo and Gabriel de Magalhaes, reveal the 
role of editing, reorganizing, and popularizing Jesuit descriptions of China. These 
Portuguese Jesuits were not “seminal thinkers” but had deep knowledge of China’s 
culture, language and society leading to the popularity of their works.111 Semedo’s 
manuscript on China (written in Portuguese) was translated into Spanish and 
reorganized by Manuel de Faria I Sousa under the title Imperio de la China (Madrid,
1191642). The structure of Semedo’s publication reveals its design to appeal to popular 
audiences. The first half of the work addressed major themes (under clear headings) to 
understanding the nature of the Chinese Empire, while the second half focused on the 
history of Christianity in China (carrying on from Ricci’s publication). The goal of this 
work was to simplify information on China, and as explained in the preface to 
abbreviate information to what was useful or of interest. Magalhaes’ description of 
China was also composed in Portuguese. It was transported from China via Philippe 
Couplet and posthumously translated into French and restructured by Abbe Claude 
Bemou as Nouvelle relation de la China (Paris, 1688).113 As Mungello points out this 
work was “light and popular in tone”.114 It covered a wide range of subject matters 
including discussion of China’s justice system (based on first-hand experience). 
Magalhaes’ description was a practical work designed to identify aspects of China that 
he felt were not addressed in sufficient detail by previous sources, such as the Chinese 
language. Both Semedo and Magalaes offer a mixed view of praise and criticism of 
China’s political economy.
Another important seventeenth century Jesuit text, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus 
(1687), also focused on a contentious topic. Largely driven by the Flemish Jesuit 
Philippe Couplet, it was a collaborative Jesuit effort that was translated into French by 
Louis Cousin (1688) and from this edition to English as The Morals o f Confucius, a 
Chinese Philosopher (1691). While it was an influential Jesuit source, it did not offer 
information on China’s political economy. Written to defend the Jesuit position in the 
Rites Controversy, the original Latin text was a translation and commentary of three of
110 Martino Martini, Sinicae historiae Decas Prima (Munich 1658)
111 Mungello, Curious Land, 74.
112 From Sousa’s version it was then translated into Italian (1643), French (1645) and English (1655).
Ibid., 75.
113 Public demand led to reprinting the French edition in 1689 and 1690, and an English translation by 
John Ogilby in 1688. Mungello, Curious Land, 95.
114Ibid., 96.
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the four Confucian books. This work aimed to teach European audiences about the 
ancient moral philosophy of the Chinese and was extremely popular in Europe, 
influencing thinkers such as Gottfried Leibniz. While later Jesuits focused a greater 
amount of attention on the Emperor, especially the Kangxi Emperor, Confucianism 
continued to play an important role in all Jesuit works on China. Confucius Sinarum 
Philosophus was (and is) viewed as ‘sinophile’ propaganda based in large part due to its 
publication during a particularly difficult period of the Rites Controversy.
The reputation of the Jesuits as sinophiles arose, in large part, from their position in the 
Chinese Rites Controversy. The Controversy began in the 1630s, reached a peak in 
1700 and continued into the eighteenth century. It involved the Jansenists, the Societe 
des Missions Etrangeres, the Dominicans (who disagreed with the Jesuit practice of 
cultural accommodation) as well as European intellectuals such as Leibniz, and 
institutions including the Sorbonne. The substance of the controversy was over the 
Jesuit practice of cultural accommodation. In particular, it related to the terminology the 
Jesuits allowed for the Chinese to refer to God and Heaven, as well as the Chinese 
practices of Confucian rites and ancestor worship. The Jesuits, following their policy of 
cultural accommodation wanted to allow the converted Chinese to maintain certain 
cultural rites that the missionaries did not believe interfered with their newfound 
Christian beliefs. By 1700 the Chinese Rites Controversy had largely shifted from 
Rome to Paris where Jesuit books were burned at the Sorbonne.115 The Chinese rites 
were eventually condemned by Rome in 1704 (confirmed in a papal bull in 1715), 
however the controversy attached to their publications continued. The presentation of 
information on China, therefore, became particularly sensitive to this European context 
and Jesuit sources were increasingly questioned and attacked in Europe. This 
controversy helped to create the perceived dichotomy between sources seen as praising 
China and ones viewed as criticizing it, particularly on the subject of religious customs 
and historical chronologies. One important Jesuit work by Louis Le Comte was 
particularly engaged with the Rites Controversy and also served as a key eighteenth 
century reference for information on China’s political economy.
Father Le Comte was one of six Jesuits sent to China by the Academie des Sciences and
115 For more on the Chinese Rites Controversy see D.E.Mungello (ed). The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its 
History and Meaning (Nettetal, Germany: Steyler, 1994); Joan-Pau Rubies, “The concept of cultural 
dialogue and the Jesuit method of accommodation: between idolatry and civilization”, Archivum 
historicum societatis iesu, 74:147 (2005): 237-280.
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Louis XIV in 1685 with the purpose of promoting science and French nationalism. 
Based on information gained during his stay in China from 1687 until 1692, Le Comte’s 
widely read Nouveaux memoires sur Vetat present de la Chine (1696) was one of the 
main sources for Europeans who wrote on China in the eighteenth century. Le Comte’s 
account was faithfully translated into English by an unknown, likely Grub Street, writer 
as Memoirs and Observations made in a late journey through the Empire o f China and 
published by Benjamin Tooke and Samuel Buckley in 1697.116 The Sorbonne 
condemned Le Comte’s work for his proposition that China had true knowledge of God 
to such an extent that it could serve as a model for Europeans.117 The Sorbonne’s 
condemnation did not affect the popularity or influence of the work, as by 1700 it had 
gone through 10 editions, and was translated into English, German and Italian.118 
Mungello argues that the Sorbonne did not have a problem with admiring the “secular 
achievements” of the Chinese, but could not accept the idea of emulating the pagans in 
the spiritual realm.119 Beyond the Catholic faculty at the Sorbonne, other readers could 
also separate religious matters from secular interests. Le Comte separated secular and 
religious topics in Nouveaux memoires, which consisted of separate letters on different 
aspects of China. This structure differed from most primary books of China, though 
numerous philosophical and literary Enlightenment sources followed this structure. This 
work revealed a great deal about non-Rites Controversy issues, on topics such as 
China’s geography, its economy and government policies, some aspects of which were 
criticized, others which were praised thus underlining the folly of labelling an entire 
book as sinophile or sinophobe.
Another important Jesuit source of information on China for eighteenth century 
geographers, and philosophers was Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s Description de la Chine 
(1735). Despite the fact that like Mendoza he had never travelled to China, Du Halde 
may be labelled a source of primary information because he had access to unpublished 
Jesuit reports and he was contemporaneously viewed as the source of new, credible 
information about China for much of the eighteenth century. Du Halde edited the 
influential and popular Lettres edifiantes et curieuses ecrites des missions etrangeres 
(34 vols. 1702-1776), a collection of Jesuit letters from all their global missions to 
Rome. Approximately one quarter of the thirty-two published volumes contained
116 Chen Shouyi “Daniel Defoe, China’s Severe Critic,” 233.
117 Another work that was condemned was the Jesuit Charles Le Gobien’s Histoire de I ’edit I ’empereur 
de la Chine (1698).
118 Mungello, Curious Land, 331.
u9 Ibid., 338.
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information on China.120 These letters included discussion of China’s religion, 
infanticide, chronology, paternal government, examination system, porcelain 
productions, medicine and gardens, as well as accounts of Jesuit activity in China,
191scientific experiments and philosophical dialogues with the Emperor. Du Halde 
began to edit the collection in 1709 and stopped in 1743 (volumes DC to XXVI). The 
information on China he took from these letters was incorporated into his popular 
description of China. Du Halde claimed authority by pointing out that Father Contancin, 
who lived in China for 32 years including 10 years in Peking, examined this description 
several times before its publication.122 Du Halde’s book was of great importance to 
Enlightenment philosophers as well as geographers and compilers who relied heavily on 
his information about China.123 However, not all reviews of his book were positive. For 
instance, Du Halde was criticized in the Monthly Review (November 1749) and an 
anonymous publication entitled An Irregular Dissertation, occasioned by the reading o f 
Father Du Halde’s description o f China appeared in 1740, attacking him for being 
partial and never having been to China. Nonetheless, even authors such as Montesquieu 
who explicitly criticized the veracity of Jesuit sources still relied on Du Halde for 
information on China. Du Halde was criticized (even by his fellow Jesuits) for his 
extensive editing of the Lettres edifiantes}24 However his manipulation of the 
information revealed his skill as a popularizer. Du Halde knew how to write to appeal to 
the eighteenth century European reading public and as a result his work achieved great 
popularity. As we will see in the following chapters, Du Halde provided his audience 
with a detailed and ambivalent description of China’s political economy.
120 Isabelle Landry-Deron, “Early Translations o f Chinese Texts in French Jesuit Publications in 
Historiography”, in Encounters and Dialogues: Changing Perspectives on Chinese-Western Exchanges 
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The translation of Du Halde’s description of China into English highlights the 
uniqueness of political economy as a less contentious aspect of China. Du Halde’s 
Description had two separate English translations. Richard Brookes, along with the 
printer John Watts, undertook the first translation, which was published as The General 
History o f China in four quarto volumes in 1736.125 The Watts edition was (and still is) 
criticized for its unsatisfactory translation, though it was immediately popular and 
passed to a third and corrected edition in 1741.126 Edward Cave (the proprietor of 
Gentleman’s Magazine) produced a more faithful translation of Du Halde, entitled A 
Description o f the Empire o f China (1738-1741) and published it in two folio volumes 
in 1742. It is established that the Irishman John Green (alias Bradock Mead) edited the 
Cave edition, and it is suggested that another needy Grub Street geographer, William 
Guthrie (a Scotsman) also contributed to the effort.127 As we will see below these 
editors also wrote about China in popular geographies, demonstrating the fluidity 
between primary descriptions and their reception in Europe. While the Cave edition was 
arranged much more closely to the original French version, for the subject areas 
relevant to this research, the original French, the Cave and the Watts editions all have 
corresponding citations (apart from a few linguistic differences on the contentious topic 
of despotism discussed in chapter five) illustrating that not all areas were 
controversial.128
Historians debate the extent to which the Jesuits could address China without their 
religious mission dominating the portrayal. Basil Guy challenges Michele Duchet’s 
assessment that the “Jesuits were ethnographers in the modem sense” since, Guy
1 >}Q
argues, their ultimate objective was the propagation of the Christian faith. Similarly, 
Arnold Rowbotham describes the Jesuit information as “Sinophile propaganda” based
125 Very little information is known about Richard Brookes (fl. 1721-1763) apart from knowledge that he 
compiled and translated books on medicine, surgery, natural history and geography and at some point in 
his life he travelled in both Africa and America. See G. T. Bettany, “Brookes, Richard (fl. 1721-1763)”, 
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126 Fan Cunzhong, “Dr. Johnson and Chinese Culture,” 265.
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128 T.C. Fan points out that English writers such as Thomas Percy (who was one o f the most informed 
people on China in Britain in the eighteenth century) relied on the French and both English translations o f  
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on “...the simplification, to suit their own needs, of an ancient, complex and effective 
system of religion, ethics, and social philosophy”.130 One speculates as to why the 
Jesuits, if driven entirely by their need to engender support for their mission, would 
defend Chinese chronology, knowing it would stir controversy in Europe for the 
challenge it posed to the biblical chronology. I will argue in this research that the 
Jesuits, like all authors, necessarily had biases (which varied amongst them 
individually); however, as Lach stresses, an “interpretive bias need not necessarily 
produce inaccurate history”.131 Jesuit publications, especially after the Rites 
Controversy increased in intensity and certainly were partial towards the self-preserving 
motivations of the mission; however, this need not discredit the idea that the Jesuits 
were also genuinely concerned with presenting an nuanced image of China, especially 
when it came to the less controversial subject of political economy. The Jesuit 
depictions of China were largely positive, however, as George Dunne points out, “they 
were not blind to the faults from which it suffered” and a “critical balance” can be 
found in most of the Jesuit sources.132 In spite of the controversy surrounding them, 
European commentators still relied on the Jesuits as sources of information, especially 
on the topic of China’s political economy.
N o n -J e s u i t  p r i m a r y  s o u r c e s  f r o m  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  t o  t h e
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, non-Jesuit missionaries, emissaries, 
merchants, and men of war also produced primary accounts of China. Contemporary 
philosophers and geographers, as well as modem historians, argue these sources 
depicted a more negative view of China. The Spanish Dominican friar Domingo 
Fernandez Navarrete’s Tratados historicos, politicos, ethicos y  religiosos de la 
Monarchia de China (Madrid, 1676) was one particularly influential non-Jesuit 
description.133 Philosophers and geographers referred to his description of China as a 
reliable source well into the eighteenth century because Navarrete studied the Chinese 
language and lived there from 1657 until 1673 when he returned to Rome to discuss the 
question of Chinese Rites in Rome. He attacked the Jesuit position in the Rites
130 Rowbotham, ‘The Impact of Confucianism...”, 224.
131 Lach and van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 1730.
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Controversy and disagreed with their assessment of Chinese religion; however, 
furthering the point that authors speak with different perspectives depending on the 
topic, Navarrete portrayed China’s political economy in a relatively positive light. 
Indeed, he could separate religious dogma from secular interests.134 Cited by Voltaire 
and Quesnay, both archetypal “sinophiles”, Navarrete reflects the multi-faceted nature 
of the production of information on China.
Merchants, emissaries and men of war also provided primary information on the 
Chinese Empire. Attempts to expand the China trade provided ambassadors from states 
such as Russia, the Netherlands, France, and England as well as representatives from 
their respective East India Companies, with the opportunity to claim their own authority 
in describing China. The merchants dramatically outnumbered the Jesuits. Between 
1552 and 1800 there were 926 Jesuits in China. As early as 1563 there were already 
700 Portuguese on the island of Macao.135 However, in spite of their larger numbers, 
these merchants and emissaries, unlike many Jesuits, had not mastered the Chinese 
language, and had limited access to the Chinese literati who were responsible for 
educating the Jesuits on Chinese moral philosophy, literature and science. In the 
seventeenth century, the non-Jesuit accounts of China were primarily Dutch, as the 
Netherlands took over from the Portuguese in dominating the China trade.136 One of the 
most widely cited and translated works was Johan Nieuhof s description of a Dutch 
East India Company (VOC) delegation to China, which he took part in from 1655-57. 
This work was translated into French in 1665 and John Ogilby translated it into English 
as An Embassy from the East India Company (1669).137 As a member of a VOC 
embassy to Peking Nieuhof was tasked with reporting on the economic activity he 
witnessed on the journey of over two thousand kilometres from Canton. Apart from the
numerous anecdotes of his trip, a large amount of his description of China came from
118the published works of the Jesuits Ricci, Martini and Semedo. This is a clear example 
of how the parenthood of information could be confused or lost, once again revealing 
the inapplicability of categorizing an entire source as sinophobia or sinophilia.
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Two notable eighteenth century emissaries travelled to China and reported on the 
commerce they found. The Scotsman John Bell travelled to China as part of the Russian 
Izmailov embassy in 1720 but the account of his journey (Travels from St. Petersburg 
in Russia to Diverse Parts o f Asia) was not published until 1763. While popular, this 
account was not as influential or provocative as Anson’s and it was rarely referenced by 
the geographical or philosophical sources. The more prominent traveller was Lorenz 
(Laurent or Laurence) Lange, a Swedish explorer, who joined a Russian envoy sent by 
Peter the Great to China from 1715 to 1717. The mission was tasked to promote 
Russian commerce. Lange’s account of his travels were first published in German in 
Friedrich Christian Weber German’s description of Russia. This work was translated 
into English in 1723 as The present state o f Russia. The second volume contained 
Lange’s description of his journey to China. The account was full of the personal 
anecdotes of the trip and engagement between the envoys and the Chinese mandarins, 
who Lange painted as very accommodating. Lange admired the Kangxi Emperor. His 
description of China, like other non-Jesuit sources was (and is) viewed as contradicting 
the Jesuit images.139 When addressed by geographical and philosophical sources, Lange 
was often considered in conjunction with the description of China found in Admiral 
George Anson’s Voyage Round the World (1748).
Anson’s description of China was short, unsystematic, and became the most influential 
eighteenth century non-missionary account of China. Anson was commander of the first 
official British naval expedition into the Pacific and reached China in 1743. Jonathan 
Spence describes Anson as personifying “the newly assertive side of expansionist Great 
Britain” and indeed his attempt to enter China was an audacious undertaking.140 The 
limited contact these men had with the Chinese is apparent in the account of his voyage: 
‘we could have no communication with [the Chinese] but by signs’, and yet, his account 
was highly influential. 141 Anson’s chaplain, Richard Walter, initiated the publishing of 
the account as Voyage Round the World in 1748. Benjamin Robins also contributed to 
the work but their respective contributions cannot be disentangled. Anson took a close 
interest in the publication and was often contemporaneously referred to when describing
139 Dermigny, La Chine et I'Occident, 29.
140 Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent, 52.
141 George Anson, A Voyage round the world...Compiled from the papers...[oj] Anson, and published  
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the source. His name will be used as the author of the source in this thesis, with Robins 
and Walter’s contributions duly noted.142 The popularity of this work is striking as the 
first edition had over 1800 advanced subscribers, by 1776 there had been fifteen 
editions in Britain alone and it had been translated into French, Dutch, German and 
Italian with extracts also printed in Gentleman’s Magazine.143 Walter Demel contends 
that Anson’s account must “have come as a great relief for the English” as they finally 
had a compatriot who they could rely on. He argues that Anson was “proof’ to them 
that the Jesuits were lying, reflecting the Protestant distrust of Catholic information.144 
This, however, does not explain why so many British sources from philosophers to 
geographers continued to rely on the Jesuit descriptions of China. Colin Mackerras 
argues Anson’s work was the ‘first full-scale attack on the rosy images of China which 
the French Jesuits were pushing’.145 This claim is based, in part, on Anson’s criticism of 
Chinese manufacturing, military and fine arts, as well as his frustration in dealing with 
immoral Chinese merchants.146 However, as we shall see in chapters three, five and 
seven, Jesuit sources made similar points much earlier. Thus, while he certainly was 
critical of the Jesuit descriptions, his account, held to be one of the strongest critiques of 
China during its time, did not offer any radical new evidence.
One final non-Jesuit traveller who was influential in constructing views of China’s 
political economy in the eighteenth century was the Frenchman Pierre Poivre. The 
almost missionary, administrator, philosopher, trader and traveller used his time in the 
East to gather information on China’s agricultural system. Although he was too young 
to take missionary orders, the Society of Foreign Missions in Paris sent him to China in 
1740 at the age of 20. He eventually fell out with the missionaries in the East and 
undertook a career as a trader, horticulturalist and author travelling throughout Asia 
spending time in Cochinchina, Batavia, Pondicherry in the South of India and 
Mauritius.147 While in China he travelled to Macao, Canton and Tongking. His time as a 
member of the French East India Company gave him first-hand insight into the 
monopolistic trade system in the East. Throughout his time in the East he was a 
corresponding member of the Academie des Sciences and a follower of Physiocratic
142 See. G. Williams Documents Relating to Anson’s Voyage (London: Navy Records Society, 1967)
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doctrine.745 Returning back to France in 1757 he began his philosophical writings and 
public addresses on commerce and agriculture. Two of his addresses in 1763 and 1764 
were circulated in manuscript copies that reached the Physiocrats and published as 
Voyage d ’un philosophe (1768), which was later translated into English.149 He supplied 
the Physiocrats, and later Adam Smith with a great deal of inspiration and information 
on the East from several points of view including that of an agriculturalist who praised 
the rule of nature.150
The primary authors had different experiences of China. The emissaries and merchants, 
whose aim was to increase trade, did not provide a great deal of unique information 
because they had less ability to understand the operation of the Chinese system. As we 
will see in chapter three, their anecdotal evidence was also not extraordinary though it 
was relevant. The Jesuits, whose purpose was to convert the Chinese to Christianity, 
used their predominant position as the providers of detailed information to engender 
support for their mission. European observers picked up on these differences and 
overestimated the influence these biases had in the transmission of information on 
particular topics. While the primary sources may have disagreed on the implication of 
the particulars they provided, the content on China’s political economy did not differ as 
dramatically as some historians have presumed, especially when the topic of political 
economy is in focus. Next we turn to the receivers of the primary information on China.
2.2. COMPILERS AND GEOGRAPHERS
While Enlightenment thought is a staple of historical enquiry, contemporary popular 
geographies remain greatly understudied. Authors and editors of these works in Europe 
drew information from the primary sources, and repackaged the material in order to 
present it to a wider audience. Popular sources played an important role in discussions 
of China’s political economy. Travel compilations offered access to primary sources 
that were not readily available while geographies were designed to be accurate
148 Rainer Klump, “The kingdom o f Ponthiamas- a Physiocratic model state in Indochina: a note on the 
international exchange o f economic thought and o f concepts for economic reforms in the 18th century” in 
Ingo Barens, Volker Caspari and Bertram Schefold (eds.) Political Events and Economic Ideas 
(Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd., 2004).
149 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 42 and 55. Turgot referred to the manuscript (in a reference 
about the Chinese tax o f one-tenth o f the crops forming the principal revenue o f the Empire) in 1765, one 
year before the publication o f Quesnay’s Despotisme de la Chine.
150 Lewis A. Maverick, “Pierre Poivre: Eighteenth Century Explorer of Southeast Asia” Pacific Historical 
Review 10:2 (1941), 165-177.
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summaries of the reliable information available on various places in the world. The 
change in ways information circulated in Europe from the Renaissance through the 
Enlightenment impacted the growth of this genre.151 In A Social History o f Knowledge, 
Peter Burke discusses the idea of a ‘knowledge explosion’, with the blossoming of print 
culture in sixteenth century England.152 Alongside the changes in the publishing 
industry, an increasing amount of information about the world was travelling back to 
Europe where it met a rising demand for the presentation of this knowledge in a quickly 
digestible format.
Reader scepticism was also increasing, and the public was suspect of the primary 
accounts of China. The Chinese Traveller pointed to the absurdity of John Albert de 
Mandelslo’s report on China from his 1640 trip, which included descriptions of 
unicorns and twenty-four stone oysters.153 An even more famous case was that of 
George Psalmanazar, who claimed to be an inhabitant of the East Asian island of 
Formosa travelling in Europe. He published an account of ‘his birth land’ entitled An 
Historical and Geographical Description o f Formosa, an Island subject to the Emperor 
o f Japan (1704), and managed to convince many people (despite the protests of the 
Jesuit missionaries who worked in Asia) of the veracity of his account. Upon his 
confession in 1706 that, in fact, he had never been to Asia, the public became acutely 
aware of the ease with which they could be deceived.154 Cases such as these made 
readers question primary reports, and new information on foreign lands. The popular 
compilations and geographies were designed to embody the “discerning age” and guard 
against these false reports.
Travel compendiums reflect the blurred boundaries between primary sources and 
editors based in Europe. These collections involved translating, editing, arranging and 
often publishing for the first time, primary accounts of foreign lands. With the Age of 
Exploration well underway, seventeenth century Europeans witnessed a rise in the 
popularity of travel compendiums. The two main English sources of information on
151 One important change in England was the lifting o f the Stationers’ monopoly on printing in 1695.
152 Peter Burke, A Social History o f  Knowledge: From Gutenburg to Diderot (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002), 149.
153 Anonymous, Chinese traveller, v.
154 As his confession did not receive much attention, his reputation as a Formosan was still being 
defended decades later in Patrick Barclay, The universal traveller (London: n.p., 1735), 604. Psalmanazar 
managed to maintain a good reputation, and became one o f the main contributing editors to An Universal 
History (1736-1768). Tamara Griggs, “Universal History from Counter-Reformation to Enlightenment.” 
Modem Intellectual History, 4:2 (2007), 219-247, quote on 229.
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China in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century England were those 
compiled by Richard Hakluyt and Samuel Purchas.155 One of Hakluyt’s many 
professional labels was geographer; however, the nature of his work differed from the 
editors and authors of special geographies (discussed below).156 He was a skilled editor, 
translator, and collector, known for his compilation of travel descriptions in Principal 
Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries o f the English Nation (1589). He advised the 
English East India Company and invested in the Virginia Company revealing his 
patriotic pride and economic focus.157 Hakluyt provided the needed information on 
products, climates, customs and geography to accompany the bravery of the merchants 
and develop a successful English foreign trade.158 Much like the Jesuit desire to publish 
information to support their mission, Hakluyt believed his works encouraged the much 
needed societal support to encourage exploration.159 He applied this belief to China by 
commissioning Robert Parke to translate Mendoza’s history of China in 1589. Samuel 
Purchas continued the work of Hakluyt and like his predecessor, Purchas’ Hakluytus 
Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes Contayning a History o f the World... (1625) was 
immediately popular in England.160 He provided his English readers with a great deal of 
information on China including Da Cruz’s Tractado, an abridged English version of 
Ricci and Trigualt, and sections of the accounts of Polo, Peirera, de Rada, Pantoja, and 
Mendoza. He also reproduced Thomas Mun’s A Discourse o f Trade from England to 
the East Indies, which systematically addressed objections to the East Indies trade and 
reflects the agenda and diversity of sources found in his collection. Eighteenth century 
compilers accused both Hakluyt and Purchas of a haphazard arrangement of the 
material.161 These criticisms came in light of the changes in popular collections of the 
later seventeenth and especially eighteenth centuries.
155 Fan Cunzhong, “The Beginnings o f the Influence o f Chinese Culture in England” in Adrian Hsia (ed.) 
The Vision o f  China the English Literature o f  the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1998), 81.
156 The first word after his title in the ODNB is “geographer”. Anthony Payne, “Hakluyt, Richard (1552?- 
1616)”, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography (Online Edition: October 2006).
157 J.A. Williamson, “Richard Hakluyt” in Richard Hakluyt and His Successors, Edward Lynam (ed.) 
Second Series No. XCIII (London: Hakluyt Society, 1946); E.G.R. Taylor (ed.), The Original Writings 
and Correspondence o f  the Two Richard Hakluyts 2 Volumes. (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1935), 
Vol. 1,48.
158 George Bruner Parks, Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages (New York: American Geographical 
Society, 1928), 2.
m Ibid., 21.
160 Sir William Foster, “Samuel Purchas” ” in Edward Lynam (ed.) Richard Hakluyt and His Successors. 
Second Series No. XCIII (Hakluyt Society: 1946), 49.
161 In the introductory pages o f Churchill’s 1732 travel collection there is an account o f travel books 
categorized according to their language o f publication, and a characterization o f their reputation. Hakluyt 
is portrayed as having a “method o f heaping together all things good and bad”. Without dismissing 
Hakluyt’s value, the editor wished he was more selective o f  what was “really authentick and useful”; and
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Melchisedec Thevenot’s Relations de Divers Voyages Curieux (1663) was a 
seventeenth century French travel collection that had a lasting impact and was held in 
the libraries of Locke, Voltaire, and Turgot.162 His compilation began as a translation of 
Hakluyt and Purchas, reflecting the circulation of knowledge between France and 
England in this genre. Thevenot’s Relations was the first major travel collection to 
emerge from France. It included information on China including French translations of 
Nieuhof s embassy, the Jesuit Michael Boym’s description of Chinese flora, Martino 
Martini’s account of China’s dynastic history as well as a small Chinese grammar. The 
French editor gathered primary accounts from Dutch, Polish, Italian and Russian 
sources. His later compilation, Recueil de voyages (1681), included the relation of the 
Baikov embassy sent from Russia to China in 1653.163 By the end of the seventeenth 
century travel compilations provided access to an array of primary sources on China to 
the English and French public.
The style of editing and nature of reading of travel collections evolved in the eighteenth 
century but information continued to circulate between France and Britain. Awnsham 
and John Churchill’s A Collection o f Voyages and Travels (1704, 1732 and 1744) was 
widely read.164 By 1702, only one year after the issuance of the proposal, subscriptions 
lists had already amounted 200 names.165 This collection included translations of 
Navarrete’s and Nieuhof s accounts of China. A contemporary competitor to the 
Churchill collection was John Harris’ Navigantium atque itineratium (1707). In the 
same year, Abbe Morvan de Bellegarde and Du Perier de Montfraiser published a 
comparable work to Harris’ in France entitled Histoire universelle des voyages. In 1744, 
John Campbell published an updated version of the Harris collection, much of which 
was taken from Thevenot. One year later, Thomas Osborne published two volumes, 
which were meant to be supplements to the famous Churchill collection. Interestingly, 
eighteenth century travel compilations still reproduced sixteenth and seventeenth
the same was argued for Purchas’ volumes. J. and A. Churchill, A Collection o f  Voyages and Travels 6 
Volumes (London: printed by assignement for Churchill, 1732), lxxxviii.
162 Nicholas Dew, “Reading Travels in the Culture o f Curiosity: Thevenot’s Collection o f  Voyages” 
Journal o f  Early Modern History 10: 1-2 (2006), 39-59, quote on 41.
163 Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 410-411.
164 The Churchill brothers were strong Whigs who believed in religious toleration. Awnsham was a friend 
of John Locke (whom he printed for and who advised Churchill on his collection). This collection may 
have been compiled by the astronomer Edmund Hailey. Mark Nights, “Churchill, Awnsham (1658- 
1728)”, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
165 G.R. Crone and R.A. Skelton, “English Collections o f  Voyages and Travels: 1625-1846” in Richard 
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century sources, in particular the non-Jesuit descriptions of China. This was likely a 
result of the popularity of Jesuit publications in the market. As the 1732 Churchill 
edition claimed in reference to Le Comte’s description of China, “they have abundance 
of very remarkable passages and singular curiosities, and have been too much talked of 
to require much to be said of them”.166 Information on China evidently travelled from 
the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, and between British and French popular 
sources.
Joan-Pau Rubies describes the eighteenth century shift from Renaissance travel 
collections that aimed to reproduce narratives in an authentic way, to the rising popular
1 67genre that sought to impose an order on the increasing amount of information. 
Special geographies fall into the latter category, where editors often eliminated what 
they deemed boring or unnecessary. This study focuses on these sources precisely 
because of their imposition of order on the primary sources of information. The history 
of special geographies is examined in the discipline of geography and has recently been 
the subject of a revisionist project to appreciate their contemporary relevance, rather 
than label them as “bibliographic dinosaurs”.168 Robert Mayhew defines geography in 
the early modem British context as “a coherent body of knowledge about a clearly- 
defined object, namely the situation of places on the earth and the content of those 
places in natural and human terms...5,169 Geographies were a unique type of publication 
that compiled and combined materials taken from other sources. The eighteenth century 
geographies are heirs of the work of Sebastian Munster in Germany, Giovanni Botero in 
Italy, Peter Heylin in England, and Pierre Davity in France. The legacies of these early 
geographical thinkers include the focus on matters of state, as well as the arrangement 
of material under particular headings.
The intended and actual audience of the eighteenth century geographies included 
dignitaries, scholars as well as those with a utilitarian interest such as statesmen,
166 Churchill, A Collection o f  Voyages and Travels, lxxxi.
167 Joan-Pau Rubies, “From the history o f travayle to the history o f travel collections: the rise of an early 
modem genre” in Daniel Carey and Clare Howitt (eds.) Richard Hakluyt: His times, life, legacy (Ashgate 
and the Hakluyt Society: forthcoming).
168 Alan Downes, “The Bibliographic Dinosaurs o f Georgian Geography (1714-1830)” The Geographical 
Journal, 137:3 (September 1971), 379-387. For the revisionist historiography o f the genre o f early 
modem geography see Robert J. Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography: The Political Languages o f  British 
Geography, 1650-1850 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), chapter one. Charles W.J. Withers, 
“Eighteenth-century geography: texts, practices, sites,” Progress in Human Geography, 30:6 (2006), 711- 
729.
169 Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography, 30.
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merchants, mariners, and soldiers.170 A select number of geographies also had a more 
educated audience, as grammar schools taught geography as a foundation of history in a 
humanist education. 171 Subscription lists changed over the course of the eighteenth
1 79century with fewer clergy and more merchants requesting these books. The prefaces
of these works offer an indication of the intended audience. For instance, Herman Moll,
a German bom English geographer known mostly for his cartographic efforts, described
the importance of the genre in his first geographical work:
’tis needless to speak of the Usefulness of Geography, since every 
body that Read’s, even a Gazette, finds himself perpetually at a Loss 
without some Knowledge in this Science. And therefore there needs 
no Apology for publishing a Work on that Subject; at this time 
especially, when the Actions abroad that are so much the Subject of 
Conversation, make every Man desire a Knowledge of the Countreys 
where those great Affairs are Transacted.173
Although I consider both French and British geographers, the latter carry more weight 
for the topic at hand for two reasons. First, the nature of this research necessitates 
culling and popular British sources incorporated French knowledge and vice-versa. 
Second, the special geographies from Britain represent the largest volume of popular 
sources that addressed China’s political economy. This genre’s place in Britain is 
discussed below, but first it is necessary to briefly address its status in French literature.
An influential seventeenth century French geography was Pierre Davity’s (d’Avity) Les 
estats, empires, et principautez du monde (St. Omer, 1614). This work was extremely 
popular and ran through twenty French editions before 1666 and was also very 
successful in Germany.174 In 1615 Edward Grimstone translated this work into English. 
However, as Allan Gilbert points out, “the fame of the work hardly outlived the 
century.”175 Davity focused on contemporary political systems and as a result examined 
wealth, government, military forces and manners in relation to the state. Unlike his 
contemporaries Hakluyt and Purchas, Davity did not solely rely on primary sources. In
170 Robert Mayhew, “The character o f English geography c. 1660-1800: a textual approach,” Journal o f  
Historical Geography, 24:4 (1998), 385-412, quote on 394-395.
171 Mayhew uses the example o f geography used by Locke and Johnson as examples o f two diverse 
scholars who found geography books indispensable. Mayhew, “The character o f English geography”, 
402; Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography, 33.
172 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map o f  Mankind, 51.
173 Dennis Reinhartz, “Moll, Herman (16547-1732)”, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography (Online 
Edition: January 2008). Herman Moll, A system o f  geography... (London: printed for Timothy Childe, 
1701), Preface.
174 Allan H. Gilbert, “Pierre Davity: His ‘Geography’ and Its Use by Milton”, Geographical Review  7:5 
(1919), 322-338, quote on 323.
115 Ibid., 324.
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fact, a great deal of his information was taken directly from the Italian 
geographer/philosopher Giovanni Botero, whose own work sought to the find the causes 
of the greatness of states.176 Botero is discussed below (in the section addressing 
philosophers) but his influence on Davity’s depiction of China is noteworthy.177 Davity 
also relied on the dated information provided by Marco Polo for his assessment of
t 78China. Davity’s description of China’s quality, manners, riches, forces, government, 
religion and the genealogies of the kings showed no independent assessment or critical 
analysis. He was generally positive towards Middle Kingdom, claiming China was the 
richest country in the world; however he was critical of Chinese sciences.179 While 
Davity’s geography was influential in the seventeenth century, it was not of direct 
importance by the eighteenth century.
By the eighteenth century, France had a few notable geographies that addressed China, 
although the genre differed from the English context. The cartographer Didier Robert de 
Vaugondy wrote the entry “geographie” in the Encyclopedic. He gave a history of 
geography from ancient times and an assessment of the state of geography throughout 
Europe. Vaugonday identified six subjects of geography: natural, historical, civil or 
political, sacred, ecclesiastical and physical. Historical geography addressed 
revolutions, succession issues, trade, battles, treaties, or “everything that relates to the 
history of a country.”180 Thus, eighteenth century France had the notion of special 
geography and yet it was not as prominent a genre as in England. Anne Godlewska’s
study of French geography during the Enlightenment is focused on geography as a
181science. The well-known geographers found in her research were primarily 
cartographers such as Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon D’Anville, who made maps of China 
for Du Halde. However there are some French sources that Godlewska does not 
consider as part of French geography that are directly comparable to the British genre. 
In particular, Antoine Francis Prevost’s Histoire generate des voyages (15 vols., Paris,
176 Ibid., 331.
177 Pierre Davity, The estates, empires, & principalities o f  the world... Translated by Edward Grimstone 
(London: printed by Adam Slip for Mathhew Lownes and John Bill, 1615), 729. Davity followed Botero 
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1746-1759), which began as a translation project of an English collection published by 
Thomas Astley (discussed below).
A key eighteenth century French geography that reveals the close interaction between 
primary sources, geographies and philosophers is Jacques Philibert Rousselot de 
Surgy’s description of the world, Melanges interessans et curieux, ou abrege d ’histoire 
naturelle, morale, civile, et politique de I ’Asie, de VAfrique, de VAmerique, et des terres 
polaires (10 vols., Paris, 1763-1765). This work drew heavily on Du Halde and was the
1 R9principal source of information for Francois Quesnay’s description of China. 
Described as “impartial and scholarly”, de Surgy was committed to giving a full 
impression of China from both the favourable and unfavourable reports. Rousselot de 
Surgy described his sources in the first five pages of the fourth Paris volume. He noted 
the Jesuits did not address every subject and one has to keep in mind their religious 
bias. Nonetheless, he claimed Du Halde was the basis for his description. He also 
asserted to have examined Du Halde’s original sources and those which the Jesuit did 
not reference including the accounts of Marco Polo, Emanuel Pinto, Navarette, Dutch 
travellers, Gemelli Carerra, Laurent Lange, Ysbrandt-Ides and Admiral Anson.184
A final important continental geography that addressed China was that by the Dutch
editor and doctor, Olfert Dapper. Jacob van Meurs published Dapper’s compendium in 
11670. At the time of its publication, Amsterdam was an important (if not the most 
important) publishing centre in Europe; in fact, “In the seventeenth century more books 
were printed in Amsterdam than in any other European city, many of them in French,
1 fiAEnglish and Latin.” The publisher Jacob van Meurs was also responsible for the 
publication of Nieuhof s description of the Dutch embassy to Beijing, and Anthanius 
Kircher’s compilation on China.187 Dapper’s work was based on numerous primary 
sources, notably unpublished VOC reports, the Jesuits Trigault, Semedo, Martini and
182 Later republished in Iverdun (1764-1766,12 vols.) It was this Swiss edition that Quesnay relied on. 
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183 Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 127; J.A.G. Roberts confirms that Quesnay’s Physiocratic ideas 
were formed before he read Rousselot de Surgy’s description o f China. J.A.G. Roberts, “L'image de la 
Chine dans l'Encyclopedie” in Recherches sur Diderot et sur I'Encyclopedie, 22 (1997), 87-108, quoted at 
99.
184 Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy, Melanges inter essans et curieux... 10 volumes (Paris, 1763), 
vol. 4, 1-5.
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Kircher as well as Mendoza, Nieuhof and the Dutch embassies to China by Balthasar 
Bort (1663-1664) and Pieter van Hoorn (1666-68). As Lach and Van Kley note, 
“Dapper expended little effort at integrating the material he had collected.” His 
piecemeal approach to his work on China led to inconsistent views on the Middle 
Kingdom.
The authors of the eighteenth century British geographies fall into two groups: Grub 
Street journalists or wealthier scholarly historians.189 On average in Britain six special 
geographies were published per decade.190 Mayhew argues that unlike France, these 
types of cheaper Grub Street publications were typically uncontroversial, as the editors 
rarely had distinguished intellectual reputations, and the aim of the publishers was to 
“compile marketable products and paid by the page, not according to the quality of the 
work.”191 While their accounts did not have the penetrating analysis of philosophers, the 
ideologies or personal convictions of several prominent editors of popular geographies 
led to comments on controversial debates such as Chinese chronology and assessment 
of primary sources.
The evolution of Thomas Salmon’s work is demonstrative of how the personal 
experiences or viewpoints of geographers impacted these geographies. Salmon was a 
“typical hack writer” of Grub Street whose career progressed as he published three 
distinct global geographies.192 Salmon claimed to have spent two periods as a soldier in 
the English East India Company, and lived in the West Indies. Although he was an 
editor and condenser, he had strong philosophical views that evolved when composing 
The Review o f the History o f England (1722), in which he argued for the royal 
prerogative. This interpretation, along with his agenda that criticized the Whig 
government for not expanding overseas shaped his Modem History, or, The Present 
State o f All Nations, which appeared between 1724 and 1738 (and was later translated 
into Dutch, German and Italian). He claimed to have consulted over two hundred travel 
books but relied mostly on Le Comte for his description of China, which notably was 
the first section in the work.193 His description of the eunuchs of China as villains who
188 See Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 490.
189Ibid., 38.
190 O.F.G. Sitwell, Four Centuries o f  Special Geography (Vancouver: University o f British Columbia 
Press, 1993), 16-17.
191 Mayhew, “The character o f English geography,” 404 and 402.
192Ibid., 403.
193 Thomas Cooper, “Thomas Salmon (bap. 1679-d.l767),” Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography 
(Online Edition: Oxford University Press, May 2006)
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disrupted the emperor reflected his political view of defending the royal prerogative.194 
Salmon’s time accompanying Anson on his voyage around the world from 1739-1740, 
led him to write a new geography entitled A New Geographical and Historical 
Grammar (1749).195 This work represented a harsher criticism of the Chinese people 
and their greed. This was an unsurprising result of his respect for the account of 
Anson’s voyage (though Salmon himself was not a part of Anson’s time in China). His 
final grand work was The Universal Traveller (1752-3), which had a longer description 
of China, was primarily based on Jesuit sources. In spite of his allegiance to Anson, he 
still had (and chose) to rely on the Jesuits for information on China. As with his first 
work, the beginning section of The Universal Traveller was on the Chinese Empire, 
indicating the interest and importance of the Middle Kingdom in eighteenth century 
geographies.
Of even greater importance to shaping views of China in the eighteenth century in both 
France and Britain was the popular and influential Universal History. It was compiled 
by a group of editors, notably John Campbell, John Swinton, George Sale, George 
Psalmanzar and Archibald Bower.196 The Universal History was divided into two 
sections known as the ancient part and the modem part The ancient part of this work 
was published in seven volumes from 1736 to 1744. The modem part was edited 
primarily by Tobias Smollett, John Campbell and William Shirley and was published 
between 1759-1765. Volume 8 of the 44 octavo volumes covered contemporary China. 
Qian Zhongshu argues the discussion of China in the ancient and modem parts is 
unsympathetic and reflects a belief in the inferiority of the Chinese, however, he also 
notes that when criticizing the antiquity of China the compilers claimed they were 
reporting received opinion, not their own views.197 Their description of China in the 
modem part was also ambivalent. As Guido Abbatista argues, the subject matter of the 
modem part reflects an emphasis on the superiority of Europe: 50 % of the work is 
devoted to the history of European nations and their conquests overseas; 23 % was 
focused on the history of the East, with the rest being composed of the history of Africa,
1 OSAmerica and the southern hemisphere. The editors cite mostly Jesuit sources, 
claiming that their accounts have been verified:
194 Salmon, Modem History, 2.
195 It ran another 13 editions by 1785.
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Nor were the relations of [the Jesuits] so universally credited 
(especially as many of them appeared not only exaggerated, but even in 
a great measure romantic, at least in whatever related to religion, or 
their numerous conversions), till we had them, or at least a great part of 
them, further confirmed by persons of other nations and religions, and 
less liable to be suspected.199
Again, these influential geographies believed secular subjects were less contentious
spaces. As we will see below, Voltaire referenced this work, demonstrating the flow of
information across genres and between European countries.
Many geographers not only relied on Jesuit sources, but also greatly respected them. A
New general collection o f Voyages and Travels (1745-1747) was published by Thomas
Astley and most likely edited by John Green.200 As mentioned earlier, John Green was
probably the editor and translator of Du Halde’s Description o f China, upon which he
largely drew to compose volume 4 of A New General Collection. Though Green is said
to have had violently Protestant prejudices, he was a professional editor and respected
the Catholic Jesuit sources.201 Green noted his sources carefully and gathered
information from authors including Ricci, Semedo, Martini, Magalhaes, Nieuhof,
Navarette, Le Comte, and Du Halde. Unsurprisingly, he relied primarily on Du Halde
who, he argued, had already extracted the most reliable information from other Jesuit
sources. The Chinese Traveller (1772), a compilation by an anonymous editor entirely
focused on China, was even kinder to Jesuit sources. The editor argued the Jesuits were
the most qualified to provide information because of their
education and great erudition, their knowledge of various arts and 
sciences, and of the Chinese tongue; their winning address, their 
admittance into the court of the Emperor’s palace, their familiar 
intercourse with the inhabitants.202
199 The modern part o f  an universal history, vol. 8, 9.
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taken from the John Ogilby translation. However, it is Volume 4 o f the collection that reveals this work is 
a geography rather than travel compilation as the Middle Kingdom is examined systematically. A  
translation o f this collection was used as the starting point for Antoine Francois Prevost’s Histoire 
Generate des Voyages (1746-59).
201 G.R.Crone, “John Green...”, 85.
202 Anonymous, Chinese Traveller, iv. The only information on the sources o f this compilation is given 
on its title page that claimed it was collected from Le Comte, Du Halde and “other modem travellers”. 
Charles and Edward Dilly, whose publications reflected their Whig and patriot political sympathies, 
published The Chinese Traveller. These publishers had close relationships with their authors and
interacted with figures such as Benjamin Franklin and Samuel Johnson. See J.J. Claude, “Dilly, Charles 
(1739-1807)” and “Dilly, Edward (1732-1779), Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). The Chinese Traveller was found in John Bell’s travelling library 
categorized under “Romances, Novels, and Other books o f entertainment” not under “Voyages and 
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century indicating its lasting popularity. Hugh Gaine, Hugh Gam e’s catalogue o f  books (New York: 
Printed by Hugh Gaine, 1792). This catalogue classified The Chinese Traveller under “History”.
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The Jesuits were seen to be particularly reliable when compared to the merchants who, 
the editor reasoned, “just touch upon the coast of a country, or who dwell in it for some 
time merely to trade there”.203
Not all geographers were convinced of the veracity of the Jesuit sources. William
Guthrie (the speculated second translator of Du Halde’s description) wrote a popular
Grub Street geography entitled A New Geographical, Historical and Commercial
Grammar (1770).204 Intended to be an extension of Thomas Salmon’s A New
Geographical and Historical Grammar (1749), Guthrie was keen to ensure his volume
was not dry or boring and thus it required significant editing. A relatively short work,
considering he covered the known world, the section on China is a mere eleven pages.
Guthrie questioned the bias of the Jesuit sources.
Some of those fathers were men of penetration and judgment, and had 
great opportunities of being informed about a century ago; but even 
their accounts of this empire are justly to be suspected. They had 
powerful enemies at the court of Rome, where they maintained their 
footing, only by magnifying their own labours and success, as well as 
the importance of the Chinese empire.
In spite of these speculations, Du Halde was the main source for the section on China,
which also relied on the Universal History. It is clear that explicitly questioning the
veracity of the sources did not prevent their use.
Apart from the assessment of sources, some British geographies were also often driven 
by a particular ideology. Guthrie moved from Scotland to London in 1730 were he was 
a reporter for Gentleman’s Magazine and an ally of the Whig administration. Although 
Mayhew describes Guthrie as a “typical hack writer”, he argues that his geography was 
the “most popular, and perhaps the most intellectually ambitious, of the late eighteenth- 
century compendia of geography.”206 A New Geographical, Historical and Commercial 
grammar simplified the Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on history and politics and it 
presented world geography through the lens of civilizational progress. Guthrie’s 
agenda is clear in the preface where he argued for the importance of books of geography
204 It was printed by a fellow Scotsman, John Knox, who is also said to be a significant contributor to the 
work. It ran twenty-one editions by 1801. Alastair J. Durie, “Knox, John (1720-1790)” Oxford Dictionary 
o f  National Biography (Online edition: Oxford University Press, 2008)
205 William Guthrie. A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar; and present state o f  the 
several kingdoms o f  the world... (London: Printed for J. Knox, 1770), 464.
206 Mayhew, “The character of English geography,” 403.
207 David Allan “Guthrie, William (17087-1770)”, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography (Online 
Edition: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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to reveal the world and human action “under various stages of barbarity or refinement,” 
what he called, “Political Geography”.208
While many of these authors or editors had personal agendas that will be considered 
throughout this study (for instance, promoting free trade), the explicit primary functions 
of this genre were to assess and organize the information and present it in a digestible 
and understandable form. Even in geographies that criticized the Jesuits, the 
missionaries were still used as the sources of information on China. These special 
geographies had a particular focus on issues of political economy as their audience was 
a wider group of literate Europeans who had an increasing desire for knowledge of the 
world, and in particular, a civilization as advanced as China’s.
2. 3. PHILOSOPHERS
As discussed in chapter one, reports on distant lands had an impact on debates over 
political economy in Europe; however, individual agendas still played a leading role in 
philosophical discussions of China. Philosophers certainly had their own perspectives, 
and different approaches to the use of primary information on China. Generally the 
philosophers tried to fit the accounts of the rest of the world into their predetermined 
frameworks, models or theories, which in turn influenced the selection of primary 
sources they drew on. However, there were also many instances of these thinkers 
actively engaging with the Chinese model in order to extrapolate lessons and any 
interested philosopher had to rely (directly or indirectly) on Jesuit sources.
Philosophical analysis of China’s political economy dates back to the late Renaissance, 
particularly in Giovanni Botero’s popular Delle cause della grandezza delle citta 
(1588), Delle ragion di stato (Rome, 1589) and Relationi Universali (Rome, 1591- 
1596).209 Botero defies classification, as he was a political philosopher, a cosmographer 
and compiler of geographical descriptions of the world. Relationi Universali was his 
most geographical work in the sense that it systematically assessed the known states in 
the world to test his theories on the causes of wealth expounded in The Greatness o f 
Cities and The Reason o f State, especially as these causes related to climate and 
geography. For information on China, Botero relied on Jesuit letters, Barros and
208 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, iv.
209 By 1700 it went through eighty editions and had been translated into Latin (1596) and German (1596), 
English (1601), Spanish (1603), and Polish (1609) -  and it was used for the better part o f a century as the 
reference on geopolitics.
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91 ftMendoza in the first two of his greatest works. In these earlier books he praised the
911industry, character, self-sufficiency and mechanical arts of the Chinese. However, as 
Lach points out, by the publication of Relationi, Botero had read the Jesuit descriptions 
of Giampietro Maffei and Michele Ruggiero, which were more denunciatory of China. 
Even though he still described China’s immense wealth, Botero was much more critical 
of their military technology and liberal arts (two areas that remained the most
919condemned aspects of China in the eighteenth century). Botero offers a good example 
of how the Jesuits offered a nuanced view of China when it came to the subject of 
political economy. His work influenced later philosophers but his popularity largely 
subsided by the beginning of the eighteenth century and thus he is only considered in 
key moments of this study, such as his role in the debates over Oriental despotism.
Intellectual interest in China in the seventeenth century largely centred on religion and 
history. Isaac Vossius, a Dutch scholar, in a direct response to the work of Martini’s 
history, was one of the first to attempt to reconcile Chinese history with the European 
biblical chronology in Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi (Hague, 1659). Similarly, 
though with a more epistemological tone, Blaise Pascal, the French philosopher and 
critic of the Jesuits, discussed the challenge China posed to biblical history in Pensees 
(1660).213 Many scholars and religious opponents of the Society of Jesus also found 
common ground in rejecting the Jesuit version of Chinese religion. By the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, religion and history were still the subjects that 
aroused the most passionate condemnations of primary sources. For instance Pierre 
Bayle, a French Protestant philosopher in exile, argued the Chinese were atheists.214 
Taking another view, the German Philosopher Gottfried Leibniz was one of the few 
intellectuals who supported the Jesuits in Rites Controversy. He advocated for 
recognizing the commonalities in the history between the East and West, and argued 
that the I  Ching held the key to unlocking the Chinese language as the root of all global 
languages. In Novissima Sinica (1697), he called on Protestants to send missions to 
China, as the Catholics did, in order to learn from the Chinese. In his long 
correspondence with the Catholics Jesuits, he encouraged them to transmit more
210 Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 2, 236.
2,1 Ibid., 239.
212 Ibid., 246.
213 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, Translated by W. F. Trotter (Digireads.com Publishing, 2005), Section IX, 
Perpetuity.
214 Dena Goodman, The Republic o f  Letters: A Cultural History o f  the French Enlightenment (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 14.
63
practical information about China.215 Similarly, John Webb, one of the few seventeenth 
century English scholars to address China, also expressed interest in the language and 
politics of China. In The antiquity o f China: or An historical essay ,..{\669), he 
speculated about the nature of the Chinese language, and used China as a political 
model to support his domestic royalist agenda.216 From Leibniz and Webb it is evident 
that several seventeenth century scholars who were primarily interested in Chinese 
religion, antiquity as well as secular topics.
Contemporaneous to the religious and chronological debates, scholarly discussion of 
China’s system of political economy began to rise, particularly on the topics of 
international trade and tax policy. For instance, John Locke, like Pierre Boisguilbert in
9 1 7France, addressed the issue of luxury goods coming from China. Further, many 
French philosophers and administrators on the subject of political economy analysed the 
Chinese tax system.218 By the eighteenth century, interest in political economy as a 
subject and China’s place as a source of evidence increased. In Enlightenment France, 
the Physiocrats were the most famous and influential group of authors writing on 
political economy. Physiocracy was the first science of wealth and thus is an important 
school of thought not only for its intellectual influence on Adam Smith, but also on its 
own merit. Literally meaning “rule of nature”, the Physiocrats, particularly expressed in 
Francois Quesnay’s Tableau economique (1759), believed in the primacy of agriculture 
over trade and industry. In his Despotisme de la Chine (1767) Quesnay argued that 
China operated on natural law.219 The Physiocratic interest in China was not solely to 
use it as an abstract model as Elizabeth Fox Genovese has suggested but also as an 
empirical example of their system.220 Quesnay’s use of a variety of primary sources 
including Du Halde, Gemelli Carreri, George Anson, Mendes Pinto, the Dutch 
travellers and Navarette, largely through the work of Rousselot de Surgy’s Melanges
215 Donald Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica: Commentary, Translation, Text (Honolulu: 
University o f Hawaii Press, 1957), 27.
216 Rachel Ramsey, “China and the Ideal o f Order in John Webb’s An History Essay...'’'’ Journal o f  the 
History o f  Ideas, 62:3 (2001), 483-503.
217 John Locke, The Works o f  John Locke in Nine Volumes, 9 Volumes (London: Rivington, 1824 12th 
ed.). Vol. 4, Chapter: Some Considerations o f the Consequences o f the lowering o f interest, and raising 
the value o f money. In a letter sent to a member o f parliament. This was first published in 1691.
218 For instance, Sebastien le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban (1633-1707), a precursor to the Physiocrats and 
later economists, wrote Dime Roy ale (1707), praising China’s tax system.
219 Quesnay’s Despotisme de la Chine was published in four consecutive instalments o f the Physiocratic 
journal, Ephemerides du citoyen, in the spring o f 1767. Quesnay’s publication was provocative and 
sparked a public debate. Abbe de Mably criticized Quesnays’s view o f China. In 1768 he published 
Doutesproposes aux Philosophes economistes sur I ’Ordre naturel et essentiel des Societespolitiques in 
the form o f ten letters addressed “to the author o f the Ephemerides du Citoyen.”
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interessans et curieux (1763-65) indicates his desire to be accurate in his description 
and assessment of China. Nevertheless, Quesnay did try to minimize the importance of 
elements of the Chinese system, such as their military weakness, that proved to be 
flawed.
Some Enlightenment philosophers, however, did use China only as a tool to further 
their domestic agenda. This was particularly the case in the literary works of the 
Enlightenment. Those sources are not addressed in this study because most of them 
were not interested in understanding the nature of China’s political economy. From Jean 
Baptiste Boyer D’Argens’ Lettres Chinoises, Horace Walpole’s Letters from Xo Ho, 
and Oliver Goldsmith’s The Citizen o f the World (1762), Enlightenment philosophers 
did, in these instances, use China to reflect and comment on domestic affairs without 
attracting too much trouble for themselves. Some authors, such as Goldsmith, relied on 
primary sources such as Le Comte and Du Halde, as well as other sources such as 
Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs;221 but, as Chen Shouyi argues, Goldsmith’s “chief 
purpose is to enlighten or satirize England.. .and not to exalt or interpret China”.222
Philosophers interested in constructing universal models or developing theories of
civilizations based on empirical reports were drawn to (and often confounded by) the
case of China. Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu’s De Vesprit des lois (1748)
is especially important for understanding the rising criticism of China’s system of
political economy. His use of evidence when discussing China is surprising. In a
published letter to Abbe Count de Guasco, written in 1755, Montesquieu describes the
dispute he had with Jean-Jacques d'Ortous de Mairan over the different presentations of
China. The editor of the English edition of Montesquieu’s works, published in 1777
describes the disagreement:
These two learned gentlemen did not agree in some points 
relating to the Chinese, in the favour of whom Mr. de Mairan 
declared, on the authority of Father Paranin, a Jesuit’s letter, of 
whose veracity M. de Montesquieu doubted not a little. As soon 
as the voyage of Admiral Anson appeared, Montesquieu 
triumphantly exclaimed ‘I had always said that the Chinese were 
not such very honest men, as the missionary Jesuits would fain 
make us to believe them through the channel of their edifying 
letters’.223
221 Chen Shouyi “Oliver Goldsmith and His Chinese Letters," 285.
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Despite Montesquieu’s argument about the bias of the Jesuit sources, in the following 
paragraph he referred to a Jesuit source to support his argument on the despotic nature 
of the Chinese government. In fact, he cited Du Halde several times on topics ranging 
from the Chinese gain in trade from sugar, the origins of the Chinese work ethic, their 
views on luxury, and the corruption of former dynasties. Recognizing the contradiction, 
Montesquieu seeks to explain it. First he suggested that the missionaries might have 
been too obtuse to clearly understand the nature of China: ‘Might our missionaries have 
been deceived by an appearance of order?’224 He then posited a maxim in defence of his 
use of the Jesuit sources that he adamantly criticized: ‘In fine, there is frequently some
99^kind of truth even in errors themselves’. Even vehement critics of the Jesuits still 
relied on them for information. Montesquieu’s view of China often revealed his deep 
interest in the Middle Kingdom, particularly in identifying the unique circumstances 
that shaped it.
In opposition to Montesquieu was Francis Marie Arouet de Voltaire. Through his 
works, Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764), Orphelin de la chine (1755), Essai sur les 
Moeurs (1756), La philosophie de VHistoire (1765), and Lettres Chinoises (1774) he 
praised the Chinese government, infrastructure, inventions, manufactures, history, and 
morality -  nearly everything apart from their science. Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs 
(1756), which blends with the genre of geography, was in part a reaction to Jacques
99£
Benigne Bossuet’s universal history because it did not discuss China. Voltaire’s Essai 
was immensely popular and influential running through 27 editions between 1753 and
9971778. The English translation derived from the Geneva edition and was done under 
the author’s inspection.228 Voltaire relied on the most popular Jesuit sources including 
works by Ricci, Semedo, Kircher, Le Comte, Du Halde, Confucius Sinarum
Letters..., Letter lvii (written Paris, 1755), Editor’s Footnote. The letter describes the dispute between 
Mairan and Montesquieu. The editor is the only source for this story that I have found.
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00 0Philosophus, and Le Gobien as well as the non-Jesuit Navarrete. In his Philisophical
Dictionary, he expressed his frustration with how the debate on authority of the Jesuits
connected to the way in which their information was used. He mocks the logic of the
ancient part of the Universal History, that discredited Chinese chronology simply
because it originated in Jesuit sources:
The compilers of a universal history, printed in England, have also 
shown a disposition to divest the Chinese of their antiquity, because 
the Jesuits were the first who made the world acquainted with China.
This is unquestionably a very satisfactory reason for saying to a whole 
nation -  ‘You are liars’.230
Voltaire’s view of China evolved over time and he was influenced by the criticism 
directed at the Middle Kingdom, especially that by his correspondent, Cornelius 
(Corneille) de Pauw. De Pauw was a Dutch philosopher, naturalist, geographer and 
diplomat at court of Frederick of Prussia. While most known for his expertise on 
America his description of China in Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les 
Chinois (London, Laussane and Geneva, 1774) was read not only by Voltaire but also 
by Raynal and Smith.231 As Basil Guy argues, de Pauw “undertook [the work] to 
controvert the Jesuits and their machine de guerre, China, not from a factual, but form a 
rational, logical argument”.232 Voltaire, in Lettres chinoises (1774) (dedicated to de 
Pauw), concluded that de Pauw excessively criticized China while Voltaire had shown 
it too much admiration.233 Pauw’s criticisms were indeed voracious and he is one of the 
few philosophers to maintain a steadily dismissive attitude towards China’s political 
economy, though his analysis was not penetrating. For instance, as we will see in 
chapter three, unlike other philosophers who addressed China, de Pauw criticized but 
did not offer an explanation for Chinese avariciousness.
A final important French work that crossed genres is Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes. 
Rubies describes this work as a “philosophical compilation,” reflecting its place 
between the previous category of geographies and that of the philosophers.234 When it 
first appeared nobody believed that Raynal had authored it, and attributed it to Denis
229 D.E. Mungello “Confucianism in the Enlightenment”, 103.
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Diderot.235 The first edition was published in Amsterdam in 1770, and it was 
substantially edited in 1774 and further modified in 1780. In spite of the official 
controversy surrounding it, this work was extremely successful and international 
bestseller running though at least fifty editions in less than twenty years, excluding the 
numerous extracts reproduced in books and pamphlets . It was translated into several 
languages and made its way across the globe to North and South America.236 The 
English edition, translated by J.A. Justamond, appeared as early as 1776 and was re- 
edited up to 1821. The sources for Book I (which included the chapters on China) were 
primarily the Universal History (largely the French edition) and Abbe Prevost’s 
Histoire generate. Peter Jimack notes that for the Chinese section, Raynal also likely 
relied on Poivre and Du Halde’s descriptions of China as well as the analyses of 
Voltaire and Montesquieu.237 While this work had several collaborators the most 
important was Denis Diderot, who is estimated to have written about one-third of the 
finished work in the 1781 edition.238
There was one chapter on China in the 1770 and 1774 editions. Jimack argues that 
Raynal likely wrote the first “almostly eulogistic account” of China (Chapter 20), which 
he believes was informed by Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs (1756). The third edition 
contained a new chapter (Chapter 21) on “The Present State of China according to its 
Detractors”, which Jimack believes was composed by Diderot, who took up the view of 
Montesquieu presented in De L ’esprit des lois (1748). Sankar Muthu agrees that 
Diderot authored the second chapter on China but believes he wrote it in order to 
“present a broader range of views that readers could peruse in order to make a better 
informed set of judgments about the nature of Chinese society”.240 Even if Diderot did 
view Chinese civilization negatively, it certainly is remarkable that Diderot and Raynal 
presented the two views on China in such a straightforward way. This presentation 
places the Diderot chapter in the tradition of a popular geography that sought to
235 John Viscount Morley, Diderot and the Encyclopaedists 2 Volumes (London: Macmillan and Co., 
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238 Sunil Agnan, “Diderot and the Two Indies o f the French Enlightenment” in Larry W olff and Marco 
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explicitly assess available evidence. Jimack argues that Diderot’s added chapter on 
China is an example of him adding “philosophy” to Histoire.241 And yet Raynal’s 
chapter, inspired by Voltaire, had a philosophic air to it, and the chapter written by 
Diderot had elements of geography. Thus Raynal and Diderot both reflected the genres 
of philosophy and geography. This research focuses only on the first two editions of 
Histoire des deux Indes published before the Wealth o f Nations. Raynal’s early editions 
were a reference for Adam Smith as we will see below.
It was Britain’s political economists, particularly the members of the Scottish 
Enlightenment who initiated the nineteenth century tradition of viewing China’s 
political economy as stationary in their stadial view of history and the world. David 
Hume sought to explain why China became ‘stationary’ and Europe was ‘dynamic’. In 
his Rise and Progress o f the Arts and Sciences he discussed China without referring to 
any sources but described the “peculiarity in the situation of that country.”242 Noting the 
exceptionality of the Chinese case (based on geography, population and culture), he 
indicated his engagement was based on sources that held detailed knowledge of 
China.243
Adam Smith often referred to his sources directly and as his library is catalogued, thus
his engagement with ethnography is clearer. Christian Marouby’s study of Adam
Smith’s use of ethnographic sources in developing his theories of economic progress
finds his use of information to be highly questionable and selective.244 Similarly, Roy
Campbell and Andrew Skinner, describe Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) ‘use of history’:
No one of his intellectual eminence would distort the facts, even if only 
because refutation would thus have been infinitely easier, but, even 
when facts were not distorted, they may still have been used in such a 
subordinate and supporting role to the dominating systematic model 
that their use for any other purpose needs qualification. 45
There is no doubt that Smith’s knowledge of China was subordinated to his theory, but
that need not imply that it had no effect. Adam Smith’s library and his use of sources
241 Jimack, A History o f  the Two Indies..., 14.
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reveal the importance of reconstructing the circulation of information on China by 
examining the primary, geographical and philosophical sources. Smith relied on several 
explicit and implicit primary sources when he referred to the “accounts of travellers” in 
China.246 He cited Marco Polo and Pierre Poivre (though not directly when discussing 
China). From his library catalogue it is clear he also had access to the descriptions of 
China from Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations, the Churchill brother’s Collection o f 
Voyages, and de Pauw’s description of China.247 Smith also referenced philosophers 
who wrote about China including Raynal, and engaged with his fellow philosophers, 
particularly Hume, Quesnay and Montesquieu. His travels from 1764 to 1767 
introduced him to the Physiocrats, and his library contained the volumes of 
Ephemerides du Citoyen that contained Quesnay’s Despotisme de la Chine (1767). 
From these sources and his discussions of China, his approach towards describing the 
Middle Kingdom was certainly empirical. Although he did question the primary 
evidence on China, he still chose to engage and explain important elements of the 
Chinese system of political economy such as the provision of commercial institutions, 
their reluctance to expand their international commerce and the need to reduce the 
corruption of government officials. He did not address important aspects of China such 
as science, because this topic was not of primary importance to his system, reflecting 
the centrality of his theory above analysis of China. His conclusions about the Middle 
Kingdom were based on the knowledge available combined with his theoretical beliefs. 
While he ultimately labeled China as a stationary state, he offered several 
recommendations on how it could begin to improve based on the ethnographic 
descriptions and analyses he had read. Smith represents a natural conclusion to this 
study because his account of China was entirely focused on political economy, he 
accounted for the views and arguments (both positive and negative) that came before 
him and he worked the Chinese Empire into a schema of civilization that was to last 
throughout the nineteenth century.
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CONCLUSION
As this chapter has demonstrated, the reconstruction of knowledge on China’s political 
economy in the eighteenth century necessarily includes the examination of the three 
genres of primary, geographical and philosophical sources across Britain and France. 
The three groups of sources capture the common themes and perspectives in debates on 
China’s political economy, and help ascertain the impact that the Chinese system had in 
shaping Enlightenment theories and views of political economy. From Serica to Cathay 
to China, Europeans have been interested in many facets of Chinese civilization. It is 
important to differentiate between European descriptions of China’s morality, religion, 
history and political economy, instead of categorizing one period, or author, as a 
sinophile or sinophobe.
The respective primary sources of information, namely the missionaries, merchants, 
men of war and emissaries, all had varying motivations and loyalties in mind when 
constructing and transmitting facts about China’s political economy. On the receiving 
end, the expanding role of geographers led to the arrangement and consolidation of the 
primary sources of information. These sources were largely driven by political economy 
and thus showed particular interest in this subject. More broadly, European 
philosophers who included China in their writings showed a genuine interest in the 
Middle Kingdom, though they manipulated the available information to fit their 
arguments and frameworks of analysis. It is from and between these three broad 
contexts that the content of China’s political economy was formed. As we will see in 
chapter three’s study of views of Chinese economic culture, sources often agreed in 
their descriptions of China.
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O u t l i n e : 3 . “l e  p e o p l e  le  p l u s  f o u r b e  d e  l a  t e r r e ”248
3.1 . E u r o p e a n  c o n c e p t io n s  o f  m o r a l it y
3.2 . C h in e s e  im m o r a l it y  in  p r im a r y  s o u r c e s
3.3. E x p l a in in g  t h e  C h in e s e  c a s e
In an era when Europeans -  from philosophers to politicians and merchants to peasants 
-  were confronting a rapidly expanding commercial world, questions of morality in 
economic action were of the utmost interest. Long before the field of economic 
anthropology became a ground for disagreement between culturalists, substantivists, 
and formalists, the moral philosophers of the Enlightenment were debating the place of 
culture and the role of human nature in commercial relations. As a branch of moral 
philosophy, political economy was imbued with questions of morality from its 
inception. Indeed, Adam Smith’s Wealth o f Nations (1776) was only logical after he 
laid the important theoretical and ethical foundations of social interaction in his book on 
moral philosophy, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments (1759).
China occupied a unique position in eighteenth-century debates over morality, acting as 
a mirror for Europeans -  especially the British and French -  as they struggled to 
reconcile traditional moral paradigms with a rapidly expanding commercial society. As 
a comparatively highly developed civilization with expansive domestic commerce 
(discussed in chapter four), China was a study in the prioritization of self-interest and 
the role of moral philosophy and natural theology in controlling avarice. A friction 
existed in China (as also in Europe) between the purported ideal system of moral 
philosophy and descriptions of immorality and avarice in day-to-day life. Montesquieu 
dedicated an entire chapter to describing the unique tension in China. The philosophe 
was distinct for his direct approach to addressing this well-known issue, which most 
observers and commentators of China acknowledged in some way. Montesquieu’s 
chapter on this topic was entitled “Explanation of a paradox relating to the Chinese”, 
and it sought to answer why “the Chinese, whose life is entirely directed by rites, are 
nevertheless the most unscrupulous people on earth. This appears chiefly in commerce,
248 Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws Eds Anne M. Cohler, Basia 
C Miller and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 321. “the most 
unscrupulous people on earth”. It has also been translated as “the greatest cheats on earth”. Montesquieu, 
De Tesprit des lois. Edition electronique par Jean-Marie Tremblay 6 parts (Geneve: Barillot et fils, 1748), 
Part 3, 108. “le people le plus fourbe de la terre”. Throughout this chapter I will cite the English edition 
and also reference the original French but only discuss the language i f  it differs from the English 
translation.
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which has never been able to inspire in them the good faith natural to it.”249 Here 
Montesquieu recognized a struggle between the ideal (rites) and the reality 
(unscrupulous people). In spite of the praise that some writers lavished on 
Confucianism and China’s perfection of the moral sciences, the system appeared to fall 
short of actually controlling the immoral inclinations of the Chinese people. This 
inconsistency featured prominently in descriptions of Chinese practical morality. While 
these discussions of the divide between moral codes and commercial greed occurred in 
context of addressing the Chinese case, concurrent discussions about the tension 
between ethical codes and commercial behaviour on a universal level also existed in 
Europe.
This chapter examines views of China’s economic culture in three sections. First, it 
describes the context within which Europeans received primary reports on China’s 
economic culture. It examines the European struggle with the issue of morality in 
commercial interactions on both theoretical and practical levels. This section focuses on 
themes of avarice as they related to China thus a full discussion of Adam Smith’s moral 
philosophy, or a comprehensive analysis of moral theories of the Enlightenment is not 
intended. There are two useful threads to focus on given the centrality of China. First, 
on the practical level, popular merchant manuals sought to define a contemporary code 
of conduct for commercial behaviour. The rules laid out by writers such as Daniel 
Defoe reflected the shifting norms of behaviour in the eighteenth century and thus the 
lack of conviction with which European commentators judged Chinese commercial 
behaviour. Second, on a theoretical level, Europeans struggled to reconcile ideal 
morality with an increasingly secular and rapidly expanding commercial world. The 
image of commercial self-interest evolved throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries culminating in the Wealth o f Nations, in which Adam Smith deemed self- 
interest to be an innocuous force that, through the invisible hand, actually benefited the 
general interests of society.
The second section of this chapter examines what the primary sources of information 
reported about Chinese morality. The primary authors -  largely the Jesuits -  expatiated 
on the Confucian system of moral philosophy. Praise for this philosophical system led 
to the perception that the Jesuits adulated Chinese morality. However, the negative view 
of the day-to-day avarice and fraud in China also originated in the primary reports by
249 Ibid. This also reflects Montesquieu’s view o f the douceur o f commerce.
73
both the Jesuits and non-Jesuits, reflecting the inapplicability of a crude sinophilia- 
sinophobia dichotomy. Further, not all the primary descriptions (whether Jesuit or non- 
Jesuit) of practical morality were entirely negative and the authors recognized the 
diversity within China. The primary reports revealed the similarities between China and 
European countries in the struggle to harness self-interest to benefit their societies.
The final part of this chapter examines the rationalizations and explanations for Chinese 
immorality given by the primary observers and philosophers. The views of geographers 
are not discussed in detail in this chapter because on this topic they do not offer a 
distinct perspective and largely repeated the descriptions of the primary sources. 
Changing European views of self-interest, and the ethnographic reports on Chinese 
morality contributed to shaping an understanding of Chinese economic culture and 
morality. These explanations reveal as much about the evolution of Enlightenment 
thought on economic behaviour as they did about perceptions of China. Four 
predominant, yet intertwined, explanations were proffered. The first pointed to China’s 
heathen status as a possible reason for their immoral behaviour; however, this view was 
rarely a sufficient explanation. The second reason was based on the unique history and 
geography of the Chinese Empire. Anson and Montesquieu in particular pointed to 
specific circumstances in China that led to excessive greed. A third explanation 
contextualized the reports and focused on the diversity of behaviour found in China. 
Proponents of this view held that the coastal Chinese were more avaricious than those 
of the interior. The final explanation pointed to the larger universal problem of avarice 
and the weaknesses of humankind, reflecting a view of all societies as equally 
corruptible. These four explanations indicate the European desire to understand, 
rationalize and contextualize the reports of Chinese avarice.
The behavioural and moral foundations of what was to become the modem capitalist 
system were being conceived, debated, and analysed at this moment in history. As a 
society with a comparable level of commercial activity to advanced European states, 
and with a supposedly insatiably greedy population, China was viewed as a useful 
example of the anticipated consequences of the rise of self-interest. However, China 
was not merely a convenient foreign model, there was also genuine interest in 
understanding the role and causes of avarice in the Middle Kingdom. The primary, 
geographical and philosophical sources that contemplated the subject of morality in 
commerce explained and learned from discussions of China’s economic culture. While
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they criticized Chinese practical morality, they also moderated their disapproval by 
noting not only the diversity within China, but also the similarities to Europe. The 
Chinese were criticized for the immorality present in their commercial actions, but this 
disapproval was not sufficient to dismiss their system of political economy.
3.1. EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY
The idea that religion was inadequate to restrain the destructive passions of men 
emerged during the Renaissance, but was solidified in the seventeenth century.250 Since 
religion could no longer harness the negative impulses of Europeans, philosophers 
debated alternative constraints and, as Albert Hirschman as explained, ultimately turned 
to the passion of avarice to countervail the other negative passions such as pride and 
envy.251 Early modem Europeans debated the role of avarice in a commercial society, 
and sought philosophically and practically to make it as helpful, or at least as 
innocuous, as possible. One way to harness avarice was to define a code of acceptable 
and unacceptable merchant behaviour. An important text in this field of moral merchant 
manuals was Daniel Defoe’s The Complete English Tradesman (1725), a paradigmatic 
work in a growing genre that articulated the code of conduct for merchants within a 
framework of national economic advancement.252 Defoe was an intriguing character 
who in many ways bridged the popularizing and philosophical genres. He was a 
businessman who went bankrupt several times and had a keen understanding of the 
emerging credit economy; a political activist who was involved in the government and 
arrested for libel; a journalist who edited The Review and was criticized as a hack 
writer; and, most famously, the literary author of Robinson Crusoe, which touched on 
the genre of popular travel literature.253 In The Complete English Tradesman -  
described as one of his “most passionate and personal books” -  Defoe laid out the
250 See Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
14-15.
251 Ibid., 21.
252 This was a pan-European genre with common sensibilities across Western Europe. See Daniel A. 
Rabuzzi, “Eighteenth-Century Commercial Mentalities as Reflected and Projected in Business 
Handbooks,” Eighteenth Century Studies, 29:2 (1995-1996), 169-189. Another important early English 
merchant manual was Anonymous, Character and Qualifications o f  an Honest, Loyal Merchant (London: 
Printed by Robert Roberts, 1686). For more on early modem English merchant morality see Richard 
Grassby, The Business Community o f  Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). An even more popular book in this genre was published by Samuel Richardson,
Apprentice’s Vade Mecum (London: Printed for T. Cooper, 1734).
2 3 Paula R. Backscheider, ‘Defoe, Daniel (16607-1731)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Maximillian Novak, Defoe and the Nature o f  Man 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) which addresses the relationship between Defoe’s morality and 
theology
“difference between an honest man, and an honest tradesman” and defined the
boundaries beyond which a tradesman cannot wander if he wants to retain his the
epithet “honest”.254 While the tradesman could not cheat or defraud, Defoe did allow
him some latitude “which by the custom and usage of trade he may give himself a
liberty in, which cannot be allow’d in other cases to any man, nor to the tradesman
himself out of his business...”255 These liberties, such as “the liberty of asking more
than he will take” so as to allow a “reasonable profit,” if taken “within bounds”, should
allow the tradesman to be regarded in society as an honest man. Defoe distinguished
between unacceptable, immoral lying and “trading lies” that were connected to self-
interest, but were increasingly acceptable in society, because they were necessary for
economic improvement. Although “trading lies” were to be avoided, Defoe argued, this
could not always be done. One should be honest in their foundations but within
reasonable expectations.
Custom indeed has driven us beyond the limits of our morals in 
many things, which trade makes necessary, and which we cannot 
now avoid; so that if we must pretend to go back to the literal sense 
of the command...why then it is impossible for tradesmen to be
25 7Christians, and we must unhinge all business...”.
Here, Defoe separated custom from morals, or practical norms from ethical ideals. 
Defoe argued that if Europeans followed these unrealistic ideals, they would also have
to stop conversing with each other because there are many lies in the ordinary
communication of life, and there is “no such thing as every man speaking truth with his 
neighbour” 258 However, not every immoral act committed by a merchant or tradesman 
was considered acceptable in Defoe’s scheme. There were customary frauds that were 
not justifiable, such as falsifying money, which Defoe noted was widely prevalent 
during the reign of King William of Orange, when “people were daily upon the catch to
2 5Qcheat and surprise one another, if they could”. This debate between utility and 
honesty was present much earlier in relation to the role of the statesman.260 This 
distinction was the subject of great debate in early modem Europe because European
254 Ibid; Daniel Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman (London: printed for Charles Rivington, 1726), 
274.
255 Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman, 275.
256 Ibid., 276.
257 Ibid., 284-5.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid., 293.
260 See Dirk van Miert, Humanism in an Age o f  Science (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 281-2. Van Miert describes 
the conflict and Caspar Barlaeus (a humanist relying on Aristotle and Plato) who defended honesty 
against Machiavelli who propounded pragmatic utility. Barlaeus also discussed this in relation to the 
“wise merchant”, who he stressed needed honesty.
76
countries were grappling with the same questions as the Chinese, with the marked 
difference that in the former case Christianity replaced Confucianism as the ideal moral 
compass. Still the relationship between utility and honesty transcended the Christian 
ethical ideal and was present in the Renaissance humanist as well as and pagan classical 
debates.
There were clearly problems with fraud in England during, before and after Defoe’s 
time, which were widely known and reflected in the genre of the merchant manual. 
However there were no clear rules on where the line of utility and honesty was to be 
drawn. The boundaries between avarice, fraud, immorality and self-interest were fluid, 
as Defoe’s “trading lies” indicates. In this context, the descriptions of China do not 
stand out as exceptionally immoral, and yet it was still written about by scholars such as 
Montesquieu as the land containing “the most unscrupulous people on earth”. Perhaps 
China was held to a higher standard as a result of the panegyrics of the Jesuits on 
Confucian morality; however, the assessment of the Chinese as immoral in commerce 
also reflects the complexity in drawing the new boundaries of acceptable commercial 
behaviour.
Philosophers, especially those interested in matters of political economy, recognized the 
tension between morality and its practical application, particularly with regards to 
commercial activity.261 They dealt with the subject of avarice as a human problem. The 
question of how to tame the passions of human nature (such as avarice, sloth, ferocity 
and ambition) rose in importance as the role of religion as a controlling force in society 
declined. Within the Enlightenment one part of the debate over taming the passions 
occurred between those philosophers such Francis Hutcheson, who defended an 
optimistic anthropology and still believed in some sort of natural morality (or innate 
“moral sense”), and thinkers in the Hobbesian tradition such as Mandeville and Hume, 
who believed that morality was entirely a human creation used to control natural self- 
interest. In his Fable o f the Bees (1724) Mandeville pointed out the role of the vice of 
avarice in British society, as well as the hypocrisy of those who tried to downplay it. He 
described the frauds, criminals and knaves present in English society:
These were called Knaves; but, bar the Name,
The grave Industrious were the Same.
261 See Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, “Needs and justice in the Wealth o f  Nations: an introductory 
essay” in Michael Ignatieff and Istvan Hont (eds.), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping o f  Political Economy 
in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 11-12. They situate Smith 
as seeking to defme a “realistic account o f moral sentiments”
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All trade and Places knew some Cheat,
No Calling was without Deceit.262
The members of the beehive (or England) that were accused of deceit included lawyers,
physicians, priests, soldiers, Kings and merchants. Mandeville quipped,
For there was not a Bee, but would 
Get more, I won’t say, than he should;
But than he dared to let them know,
That pay’d for’t...263
This observation is particularly interesting when compared to discussions of Chinese 
commercial tenet that allowed the buyer to sell his product or service for as much as 
possible, without considering what was fair. Mandeville argued “The root of evil 
avarice” actually was the “wheel, that turn’d the trade” and he criticized the bees for 
their hypocrisy.264 Mandeville’s picture of British wealth (something he extrapolated to 
any “populous, rich and extended kingdom”) requiring avarice was so controversial at 
the time that he was nicknamed “Man-devil.” However, he greatly influenced 
contemporary debate and reflects the slowly changing views on commercial self-interest 
in eighteenth century philosophical circles.
These questions on commercial morality were central to Enlightenment debates. As 
Nicholas Phillipson points out, “Hume studiously avoided the more troubling ethical 
questions Mandeville had raised. If commerce and the psychological motors that drove 
it transformed the human personality, were there not still qualitative questions to be 
asked about the effects of the civilizing process on human personality?”266 Rousseau 
answered this question in Discourse on Inequality (1754) by arguing civilization was 
corrupting force. According to Rousseau, the introduction of property led to inequality 
and injustice. In other words, “what Rousseau’s critique had exposed were the ethical 
questions about sociability which would have to be addressed if commerce was to be 
defended from its critics.”267 Smith criticized Rousseau’s denunciation of civilization 
and yet he was deeply challenged and inspired by it. He entered the debate mid-century 
with his Theory o f Moral sentiments (1759) arguing that both natural and constructed 
moral traits were present in society. Underpinning Smith’s thought on human 
relationships was the idea of sympathy, a concept that dated back to the Stoics and was
262 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable o f  the Bees Phillip Harth (ed.) (London: Penguin Books, 1989), 64.
26iIbid., 67
2M Ibid., 68 and 69.
265 For more on Mandeville see E.J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the 
Discovery o f  Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
266 Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 144.
267 Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, 148.
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a popular concept in theories of human relationships during the Enlightenment. Smith 
believed in the controversial notion of a largely artificial morality, but he sought to 
distinguish himself from the contentious writings of Hobbes and Mandeville, who 
argued that morality was merely a form of self-love. As Hirschman points out, Smith 
“blunted the edge of Mandeville’s shocking paradox by substituting for ‘passion’ and
TQ
‘vice’ such bland terms as ‘advantage’ or ‘interest’”. Smith argued two forces 
develop morality in individuals: one is the social mirror, which appeals to an 
individual’s self-love, as they desire to be approved; and the other is a more ambiguous
'Jf\Qforce -  the impartial spectator. The conception of the impartial spectator allowed 
Smith to bridge Mandeville and Hutcheson by arguing that a more natural force was 
partially responsible for morality. With the repositioning of avarice as a form of self- 
interest, the view that commercial behaviour could be natural and innocuous began to 
anchor itself in European thought.
While thinkers like Defoe worked out the fine lines between immorality and trading 
lies, other philosophers such as Adam Smith subtly argued for acceptance of the 
positive effects of self-interest in commercial societies in universal and abstract terms. 
These advances in thought were to change the public acceptability of self-interest and 
thus redefined established morality, and hence they were necessarily slow to evolve. It 
was this dynamic eighteenth century environment that confronted the growing 
ethnographic information on morality in Chinese commerce.
3.2. CHINESE IMMORALITY IN PRIMARY SOURCES
As discussed in previous chapters, many eighteenth century observers as well as 
modem scholars have argued the Jesuit and non-Jesuit reports on China differed 
sharply, especially on the topic of morality. It is reasonable to assume that secular 
authors were more sympathetic towards self-interest in commercial interactions than the 
missionaries. However, if the personal motivations of observers are kept in mind, it is 
also logical to assume that merchants and men of war were frustrated by their dealings 
with Chinese traders; and the Jesuit missionaries praised Chinese morality to engender 
support for their mission by presenting the Middle Kingdom as a civilization only 
waiting to leam the word of God. If either of these assumptions holds, the primary
268 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 19.
269 See D.D. Raphael, The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s moral philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) for more on Smith’s moral philosophy.
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sources would be expected to present a one-dimensional view of Chinese morality. 
However, the observers gave a nuanced view of Chinese morality and economic 
behaviour that was remarkably similar across authors.
The sixteenth century Iberian reports on China did not address Confucian ideology but 
did comment on practical Chinese morality. The early description of China by the Friar 
Gaspar da Cruz was not positive towards the Middle Kingdom. He characterized the 
merchants as “commonly false and liars” who deceive buyers because “they have no 
conscience which reproaches them...” By the seventeenth century Jesuit accounts of 
China, a more complex portrayal of Chinese morality emerged. On the one hand, the 
Jesuits expounded the Confucian teachings on morality and virtue, while on the other 
hand they recounted anecdotes of immoral behaviour and fraud. The Jesuits were the 
first Europeans to gain sufficient access to China that they were able to understand 
Chinese moral philosophy and Confucianism. Ricci described the ancient Confucian 
philosophy of China, arguing that the “only one of the higher philosophical sciences
971with which the Chinese have become acquainted is that of moral philosophy”. He 
qualified this by pointing out the deficiencies of Chinese moral philosophy (such as 
mistaking the divisions of the subject resulting in a confusing set of maxims). Ricci 
mentioned the Chinese emphasis on politeness as a cardinal virtue, even when it came 
to commerce: “with [the Chinese], respect and deference and consideration in business 
transactions constitute the foundation of urbanity”.272
Aside from these reports on Chinese moral philosophy and Confucianism, the Jesuits 
gave contemporaneous accounts of the immoral behaviour of the Chinese in practical 
affairs. Ricci’s descriptions of his experiences in China are the most surprising given his 
supposed “sinophile” perspective. Two chapters after discussing China’s cardinal 
virtues, he described the common fraud of fortune-tellers in China 273 When addressing 
the history of the Jesuit mission, Ricci relayed numerous accounts painting the Chinese 
as immoral frauds, who often tried to cheat the Jesuits in business transactions and 
falsified credit when the opportunity arose.274 However, it was not only common people 
who were deemed avaricious, as this label was also assigned to members of the Chinese
270 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 130.
271 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 30.
212Ibid.59.
273Ibid., 83-4
274Ib id , 351
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government, and in particular, the eunuchs.275 The discussion of corruption and greed in 
government will be addressed further in chapter five, but for now it suffices to 
acknowledge that Chinese officials (mandarins) also attracted much moral criticism 
from the Jesuits.
By the end of the seventeenth century the Jesuit reports had grown more censorious on
the topic of immorality in daily interactions as they continued to praise Confucian ideal
morality. Father Le Comte’s 1696 account of China noted how Confucius “[r]esolved to
preach up a severe morality, to prevail upon men to condemn riches and worldly
pleasures and esteem temperance, justice, and other virtues...”276 Le Comte, however,
also reported that the Chinese people ignored this Confucian precept:
there is no nation under the sun, that is more fit for commerce and 
traffick, and understand them better: One can hardly believe how far 
their tricks and craftiness proceed when they are to insinuate into mens 
affections to manage a fair opportunity to improve the overtures that are 
offered: the desire of getting torments them continually, and makes 
them discover a thousand ways of gaining, that would not naturally 
come into their head 277 [emphasis added]
He concluded that the “trade and commerce, that is carried on every where, is the soul 
of the people, and the primum mobile of all their actions”.278 This obsession with gain, 
according to Le Comte, led “[the Chinese to] falsifie almost every thing they vend”.279 
Pointing out that a “stranger will always be cheated, if he buys alone,” he cautioned that 
foreigners should use a Chinese to assist in their dealings, and hope the trusty ally did 
not collude in the fraud.280 Therefore, along with descriptions of Chinese fraud came an 
image of a highly commercial country.
The extension of credit was another commercial area that Le Comte, like Ricci before 
him, believed was affected by deceit and he pointed out, one must have “sureties” when 
lending to the Chinese because they do not keep their promises. The borrowers build up
11S Ibid., 83-4, 343, and 359.
276 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations Typographical, Physical, Mathematical, Mechanical, Natural, 
Civil, and Ecclesiastical, Made in a Late Journey through the Empire o f  China, Translated from the Paris 
edition (London: Printed for B. Tooke and Sam Buckley, 1697), 201. Accurately translated from the 
original French see Louis Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires sur I ’etat present de la Chine. Seconde edition,
2 Volumes (Paris: Chez Jean Anisson, 1697), Vol. 1, 330.
277 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 237. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1, 401.
278 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 237. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1, 402. “...et le 
principe de toutes leurs actions”.
579Ibid.
2*°Ibid.
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their credit with small amounts, he argued, and then steal a larger amount later.281 Le 
Comte wished that the Chinese would add more honesty to their “labour and natural 
industry”, as they would then be able, rounded merchants; but, “their essential quality is 
to deceive and cozen when it lies in their power” 282 Indeed, he reported that some 
Chinese even boasted of their immoral lying. These characteristics were not confined 
only to merchants: “Avarice, ambition, and love, bear a great stroke in all transactions. 
They cozen and cheat in traffick; injustice reigns in sovereign courts.. .In the mean time, 
persons of quality take so many measures to conceal vice...” Thus Le Comte, the 
Jesuit condemned by the Sorbonne and used as paradigmatic example of sinophilia, was 
surprisingly scathing in his description of Chinese commercial immorality and 
corruption.
By the mid-eighteenth century, Du Halde was more tempered in his account than Le 
Comte, arguing that the Chinese “are not so deceitful and knavish as P. Le Comte 
represents them”, although he certainly did not ignore the evidence on Chinese
J O A
avarice. Du Halde, like the earlier Jesuits, described a world where the Chinese were 
led by trade and commerce, and controlled by their self-interest. However, he was less 
critical of self-interest than his seventeenth century fellow Jesuits. Indeed, he argued 
that
[i]nterest is the grand foible of the Chinese; with whom you must 
act all sorts of parts, even that of being disinterested. When they 
have any gain in view, they employ all their cunning, artfully to 
insinuate themselves into the favour of the persons, who may 
forward their business...assuming all sorts of characters with 
suprizing address, and turning to their advantage the most trifling 
occasions to obtain their ends. Interest is the spring of all their 
actions; for when the least profit offers, they despise all difficulties, 
and undertake the most painful journeys to procure it. In a word, this 
puts them in continual motion, fills the streets, the rivers, and the 
high roads with infinite numbers of people, who pass and repass, 
and are always in action.285
281 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 237. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1, 403.
282 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 237. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1, 402.
283 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 126. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1,213.
284 Jean Baptiste Du Halde, A description o f  the empire o f  China... 2 Volumes (London: printed by T. 
Gardner for Edward Cave, 1738) (referred to as the Cave edition), Vol. 1, 279. Jean Baptiste Du Halde,
The General History o f  China: Containing a Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Political and 
Physical Description o f  the Empire o f  China. Translated by Richard Brookes from the Paris edition. 4 
Volumes (London: Printed by and for John Watts, 1736) (referred to as the Watts edition), Vol. 2, 132.
Jean Baptiste Du Halde, Description geographique, historique, chronologique, politique, etphysique de 
Vempire de la Chine. 4 Volumes (Paris: Chez P.G. Le Mercier, 1735) (referred to as the French edition), 
Vol. 2, 77
285 Ibid.
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He recognized the abundant commercial activity of the Chinese was a direct result of 
their self-interest. Like the earlier Jesuits, Du Halde also argued that the Chinese system 
of moral philosophy tried to temper self-interest. He described the instructions given by 
the mandarins to the people on the first and fifteenth of every month. The fifth 
instruction was “That they accustom themselves to a prudent oeconomy by frugality, 
temperance, and modesty”.286 The orders reminded the people of all classes that they 
should never use their credit to make them formidable “that you are never to be allow’d 
to make use of craft or to lay snares for your neighbours... to seek to enrich your self at
987the expence of others, are things that you ought absolutely to avoid”. Du Halde also 
realized ideals did not determine reality, and with reference to government behaviour, 
he argued:
But among so great a number there are always some, who, placing their 
happiness in the pleasures and enjoyments of this life, do not often 
scruple to sacrifice the most sacred laws of reason and justice to their 
private interest.288
The Jesuits, therefore, presented a detailed and often critical view of Chinese morality 
and depicted the tension betw een theory and practice.
Equally surprising as the Jesuit’s negative picture of Chinese avarice, was the varied 
picture of Chinese morality the non-Jesuit sources painted. The Dominican Domingo 
Navarrete, notable for his anti-Jesuit stance in the Rites Controversy, recounted of the 
Chinese merchants: “if they can get any thing, tho never so little, they don’t slip the 
opportunity”; however, he also described them as “all very obliging and civil.”289 
Navarrete recognized the tension between the Confucian denigration of immoral 
merchant behaviour and the impetus to self-interest. Repeating the teachings of 
Confucius, Navarrete described the moral teachings in China: “In all business and 
affairs.. .be virtuous, and endeavour to advance, and attain to perfection in virtue, is the 
prime and principal part of man.”290 He alluded to the disconnect between moral 
teachings and practice as a common human problem: “All the world grows more 
deprav’d every day. The learned men of China look’d upon merchandizing as a shame
7Q1and dishonour; yet of late years even the great mandarins are fallen to it.” This was of
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particular significance because the mandarins passed examinations focused on the 
teachings of Confucius. Attached to his discussion of Chinese morality and commerce, 
the Dominican mentioned the rise of commerce in Europe: “The merchants in France 
told me, trade was much exalted in that kingdom, for even the king himself was 
concern’d in it”292 By addressing the increase of commerce in France, and its grow ing  
acceptability, Navarrete pointed to a commonality with China, thus the immorality of 
the Middle Kingdom was even more germane to a European readership.
While Navarrete’s view of the tension between moral philosophy and commercial
practices was remarkably similar to that of the Jesuits, it is those travellers who went to
China with secular interests in mind who are thought to have “added the shadows” to
the adulatory accounts of the Jesuits.293 In fact, they offered little more criticism on this
topic than their religious counterparts in China. They rarely addressed Confucian moral
philosophy in any detail, in large part because they could not do so, having little
knowledge of Chinese culture and less access to the Chinese literati. The omissions of
praise for the ideal system of morality contributed to the view that these secular authors
were especially critical of China. Johannes Nieuhof did briefly discuss Confucius. He
noted that the Chinese esteemed him and
believ'd him to have far exceeded in Vertue, Learning, and Integrity, 
all other Mortals that ever liv'd upon the face of the Earth: And 
certainly, if his Works, which are extant in Chinese Books, were 
minded with a due regard, Men must acknowledge him to have been a 
Person of great Learning and Vertue.294
Confucius was therefore dismissed as irrelevant because his philosophy was not
practiced. Nieuhof did have first-hand knowledge of immoral commercial behaviour in
China from his journey to Peking, but his description was no more severe than those given
by the Jesuits. Nieuhof warned his European readers that if they planned on trading in
China, they “must always have a pair of scales about [them]” because the Chinese “are
so nimble and deceitful in their balancing, that you had need of Argus’s Eyes [one
hundred eyes] when you buy any thing of them”.295 He added to this that the
“abundance of trades in China” have a “great defect and abuse...that they only appear
292 Ibid.
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and seem fair to the eye, but are really for the most part very sleight...”296 One such 
fraud of the Chinese was stuffing pigs with valueless materials to increase their weight. 
Thus, Nieuhof offered no greater criticism than the Jesuits of the behaviour of Chinese 
merchants.
As discussed in chapter one and two, commentators from Montesquieu to modem 
historians identify a turning point in views of China with the mid-eighteenth century 
description by Admiral George Anson. His assault on the Chinese character in Voyage 
Round the World (1748) became infamous. Michael Adas describes how “Anson 
accused the Chinese of greed, deceit, dishonesty, and outright thievery.” Indeed, 
Anson claimed self-interest had a boundless influence in China and the people had a 
“strong attachment to lucre”.298 Anson also argued “[i]t [would be] endless to recount 
all the artifices, extortions and frauds which were practiced on the commodore and his 
people, by this interested race”.299 His anecdotes of Chinese fraud were strikingly 
similar to the earlier Jesuit and merchant reports, such as the Chinese attempt to falsify 
weights.300 The commodore tried to find a Chinese captain to guide his ships to Macao 
by offering dollars, which he believed was “a most alluring bait for Chinese of all ranks 
and professions”. Thus Anson had a preconceived notion of Chinese greed, perhaps 
gathered from encounters with Chinese merchants in foreign ports, and likely from 
earlier sources reflecting that his account did not uniquely describe Chinese greed.
Surprisingly, given the similarities in the Jesuit and commodore’s descriptions of
Chinese greed, Anson directly attacked the Jesuit portrayal of Chinese morality:
.. .we are told by many of the missionaries, that tho’ the skill of the 
Chinese in science is confessedly much inferior to that of the 
Europeans; yet the morality and justice taught and practiced by them 
are most exemplary: So that from the description given by some of 
these good fathers, one should be induced to believe, that the whole 
Empire was a well-governed affectionate family, where the only 
contests were, who should exert the most humanity and social 
virtue. But our preceding relation of the behaviour of the 
magistrates, merchants and tradesmen at Canton sufficiently refutes 
these Jesuitical fictions.
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Anson set his own view of China against those of the Jesuits without accepting that the 
Jesuits also pointed out the discord between ideal Confucian morality and day-to-day 
immorality. Although Anson did not discuss Confucianism directly, he did comment on 
the relevance of China’s system of moral philosophy. He believed that the Confucian 
principles described by the Jesuits (his only access to Confucian philosophy) were 
“immaterial” and neglected “discussing the proper criterion of human actions, and
' X C i ' Xregulating the general conduct of mankind to one another”. Thus, he maintained that 
China’s ideal morality (the philosophy of Confucius) was divorced from the practical 
morality of every day life. Although Anson did not recognize it, the Jesuits also saw the 
gap between ideals and practice.
These primary reports were not one-dimensional assessments of Chinese character. In 
fact, they were surprisingly balanced in their assessment of Chinese morality. These 
nuanced reports travelled back to Europe, where geographies largely emphasized the 
prevalence of self-interest in China and the many frauds that were committed against 
foreigners. A few sources recognized that the missionary and secular accounts did not 
differ greatly in their description of the immorality of Chinese merchants. For example, 
Daniel Fenning and J. Collyer’s A New System o f Geography (1764-5) gave examples 
of fraudulent and immoral behaviour by the Chinese and commented on the primary 
sources of this information: “[t]hese accounts of the dishonesty of the Chinese in 
general, are selected from the writings of the missionaries who had long lived in the 
country, and perfectly agree with the treatment commodore Anson received in the river 
of Canton...”304 This is an exam ple o f  a geography undertaking the task o f  assessing and 
comparing primary descriptions o f  China.
3.3. EXPLAINING THE CHINESE CASE
The Chinese case proved to be an opportunity to assess the negative and positive role of 
self-interest as well as theorize as to its causes and place in a commercial society. Four 
dominant and interconnected explanations for Chinese immorality were offered by the 
primary and philosophical sources.
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R e l ig io n
One of the most predictable explanations for Chinese immorality was that they were not 
Christians. This argument was widely used before the Enlightenment and regained 
prevalence in the nineteenth century. Descriptions of this kind also furthered the Jesuit 
cause of supporting a mission in China to reform the Chinese and save them from these 
barbarous practices. For instance, Ricci described practices in China such as selling 
their children into slavery and infanticide, which, he reported, the Chinese considered 
“quite morally correct.” He argued that “[t]his people is really to be pitied rather than 
censured, and the deeper one finds them involved in the darkness of ignorance, the more 
earnest one should be in praying for their salvation”.
Le Comte was more explicit in his connection between Christianity and morality. He 
described how amongst the Christian Chinese, “religion hath reformed the evil 
inclinations of nature”. Le Comte, however, also argued that earlier in its history 
China was “wiser, more sincere, and honest, less corrupted than they are at present. 
Virtue, which they cultivated with so much care, which contributed infinitely to model 
their reason, made them at that time the wisest people of the universe...”307 He thus 
implied that virtue was attainable without Christianity. Because Le Comte tried to 
actively engage with Chinese history and culture, he did not convincingly attribute 
Chinese immoral behaviour (particularly as it related to avarice) to their non- 
Christianity. The Jesuits were unconvinced that conversion to Christianity alone would 
resolve the problem of greed in Chinese society.
A notable eighteenth century writer who addressed Chinese greed directly in 
relationship to their pagan status was Thomas Percy, a church of Ireland bishop. In 1761 
Percy, who relied on numerous primary sources including Le Comte, Du Halde and 
Anson for his assessment of China, described the Chinese “love of gain” as a 
predominant characteristic of the Chinese people. Citing Montesquieu, he speculated on 
the causes for such avariciousness: “The populousness of their country, and the 
frequency of famines, renders their very lives precarious without great industry and
305 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 85-6.
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307 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 239. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1, 409.
87
great attention to private gain.”308 However, this theorizing on the origins of avarice did 
not reveal his argument as to why the Chinese could not control such greed. To explain 
this, Percy argued that where there is “no check from conscience, we must not wonder 
that general dishonesty and corruption prevail too.” Because people try to escape 
detection from human laws, “the great deficiency of the Chinese laws, [is] that they are 
not supported by higher sanctions, than what affect temporal hopes and fears”.309 In this 
comment Percy was referring to China’s lack of belief in the afterlife. However, he did 
not manage to explain fraud, greed, or immorality present in England and his argument, 
pointing to religion, was increasingly out of touch with the avant-garde philosophers of 
the Enlightenment. Religion was not a sufficient explanation for Chinese 
avariciousness.
P e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  C h in a
A second predominant way to address and explain Chinese immorality was to point out 
its relationship to the unique geographic and political situation of China. Anson looked 
to China’s political policies to find an explanation that connected with the 
Enlightenment debate discussed earlier about the role of passions and interests in 
society. China’s only claim to a better morality, he argued was “founded, not on their 
integrity or beneficence, but solely on the affected evenness of their demeanour, and 
their constant attention to suppress all symptoms of passion and violence.” However, he 
believed that this suppression encouraged “hypocrisy and fraud”, which could be just as 
bad to “the general interests of mankind” as “impetuosity and vehemence of temper”, 
since the latter qualities still allowed for “sincerity, benevolence [and] resolution”. 
Anson noted
it has been often observed by those who have attended to the nature of 
mankind, that it is difficult to curb the more robust and violent passions, 
without augmenting at the same time, the force of the selfish ones: So 
that the timidity, dissimulation, and dishonesty of the Chinese, may, in 
some sort, be owing to the composure, and external decency, so 
universally prevailing in that Empire.310
Thus, he believed that curbing the passion of violence in Chinese society (China was 
notable for avoiding foreign expansion and warfare), led to an increase in the passion of 
avarice. Anson’s explanation for Chinese avarice was akin to philosophical discussions
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on countervailing passions.311 Similarly, Adam Smith related com m ercial behaviour to 
warfare. He talked about the disadvantages of the “commercial spirit,” which included 
that the “heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished.”312 Thus the speculation in Voyage 
Round the World related to the philosophical debates of the time. Although we cannot be 
sure whether it was Benjamin Robbins or Richard Walter, or perhaps the conjecture of 
the commodore him self, w hich  is responsible for these com m ents, they reveal an important 
connection between the European context and the empirical evidence gathered by the 
primary observers of China.
Anson also reflected on the difficulty of understanding the customs of another culture. 
Describing an anecdote of a Chinese merchant taking advantage of Anson and his crew, 
he noted that “it might be expected that some satisfactory account should be given of 
the motives of the Chinese for this faithless procedure” and observed “it may perhaps be 
impossible for a European, ignorant of the customs and manners of that nation to be 
fully apprized of the real incitements to this behaviour”.313 Anson believed that “it may 
be safely concluded, that the Chinese had some interest in thus amusing the 
commodore, yet it may not be easy to assign the individual views by which they were 
influenced”.314 Beyond recognizing similarities between Europe and China, Anson 
understood that he could not understand some behaviour, especially as he had a 
relatively cursory interaction with the Chinese. The presence of cultural relativism in 
this source is surprising.
Montesquieu, who directly referred to Anson’s descriptions of China to support his 
belief in Chinese immorality, also maintained the Chinese case was unique. He used the 
subject to further his theory of climatic determinism, which itself was built upon 
thinkers such as Giovanni Botero. The reason for the inconsistency between the Chinese 
people being guided by rites and their immoral behaviour, he argued, stemmed from the 
insecure nature of Chinese subsistence.315 Discussing the natural mixture of virtue and 
vices in the Chinese character, Montesquieu cited Du Halde and noted “the
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precariousness of their lives [Montesquieu’s Footnote: Because of the nature of the 
climate and the terrain] makes them so prodigiously active and so excessively desirous 
of gain that no commercial nation can trust them”.316 As a result of the climate, 
Montesquieu argued, intense labour and industry were needed to maintain the 
population:
Necessity and perhaps the nature of the climate have given all the 
Chinese an unthinkable avidity for gain, and the laws have not 
dreamed of checking it. Everything has been prohibited if it is a 
question of acquisition by violence; everything has been 
permitted if it is a matter of obtaining by artifice or by
“X 17industry.
Montesquieu distinguished between something acquired by violence and something 
obtained by artifice or by industry. This differentiation is particularly interesting if we 
recall Anson’s argument that suppressing violence might be worse to the general 
interests of mankind as it encouraged hypocrisy and fraud. Montesquieu, however, did 
not argue that the Chinese were worse off for their practices of artifice or industry. In 
fact, he concluded his section with a remarkable expression of cultural relativism:
Therefore, let us not compare the morality of China with that of 
Europe. Everyone in China has had to be attentive to what was 
useful to him; if the rascal has watched over his interests, he who 
is duped has had to think of his own. In Lacedaemonia, stealing 
was permitted; in China, deceit is permitted.
Montesquieu resolved the paradox he described between Chinese ideal and practical
0 1 0
morality. In the process, he surprisingly came to the defence of the Chinese morality.
In fact, he went further and argued Chinese self-interest assisted their commercial 
success. When discussing the unique mixture of virtues and vices in the character of the 
Spanish and the Chinese, he argued that unlike the Spaniards whose faithfulness and 
laziness made them poor in commercial affairs, the Chinese desire for gain (and 
resulting untrustworthiness) led them to keep their successful Japan trade away from the 
Europeans. He concluded from these observations that “not all political vices are moral 
vices and that not all moral vices are political vices, and those who make laws that run
- 1 1 Q
counter to the general spirit should not be ignorant of this.” By distinguishing 
between politics and morality, Montesquieu again points to a gulf between practical 
issues of political economy and what Anson referred to as “immaterial points”. China
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could be attacked for immorality but the effect it had on its system of political economy 
was actually positive.
L o c a l  C o n t e x t
A third explanation for Chinese commercial culture involved contextualizing the 
immorality to a particular area and aspect of Chinese commerce. Apart from the friction 
between ideal and practical morality, primary sources also addressed the variation 
amongst a population as large as that of China. Ricci claimed some magistrates were 
moral and showed “no signs of avarice”.320 Similarly, Le Comte described the honest 
mandarins he encountered when he first arrived in China. He also noted that when the 
Jesuits offered a gift to the commissioner of the customhouse, the official protested that
he would not accept any gifts from the Europeans as it could be considered immoral
^  1
bribing. Du Halde argued the fraud and self-interest was particular to a select group 
of low-level traders: “This knavish wit is found chiefly among the vulgar, who have
9^9recourse to a thousand tricks to adulterate every thing they sell”. Further “they 
seldom practice these tricks on any but strangers; and in other places [distant from the 
sea-coast] the Chinese themselves will hardly believe them”.323 These descriptions 
implied the issue was one of class and location rather than endemic to Chinese culture 
or society. Nieuhof also differentiated between groups who were ethical and immoral. 
He presented the Chinese as of “an affable and peaceable disposition, addicted to 
husbandry”, whereas the Tartar “delights in nothing so much as hunting, being very 
cunning and deceitful...”324 The Chinese appeared as good-natured agriculturalists, and 
the coastal merchants appeared more like the invading Tartars.
Even the notoriously critical Anson described an honourable, honest mandarin (the
Regency of Canton), with whom he met. Recognizing a potential flaw in generalizations
about the morality of the Chinese -  namely, that he was isolated to the coast of the great
empire -  Anson attempted to explain his assumptions. He acknowledged that
observations made at Canton only, a place situated in the comer of 
the Empire, are very imperfect materials on which to found any 
general conclusions, yet as those who have opportunities of 
examining the inner parts of the country, have been evidently
320 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 394.
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influenced by very ridiculous prepossessions, and as the transactions 
of Mr. Anson with the Regency of Canton were of an uncommon
325nature...
Anson hoped that his narrative would be acceptable to readers despite the 
acknowledged generalizations that he made.
These views travelled to European philosophical descriptions of Chinese commercial 
behaviour. In a section entitled “Commerce Viewed as Serving Agriculture”, the French 
Physiocrat, Franfois Quesnay (repeating almost verbatim a section of Rousselot de 
Surgy’s Melanges interessans et curieux (1763-1765) ) connected the size and 
efficiency of China’s domestic trade with Chinese self-interest, which he noted, “is the 
dominating passion of the Chinese people.” He acknowledged the “one blemish in 
their commerce,” namely, “the lack of good faith” and described their desire to sell as 
dearly as possible, and the practice of falsifying merchandise. Quesnay also repeated a 
particular Chinese maxim that circulated in numerous primary and geographical 
sources. The maxim was that buyers should give as little as possible for their purchase, 
whereas the seller should ask the greatest price and if the buyer is ignorant enough to 
pay this, it is not the merchant who deceives, but rather the buyer who deceives 
themselves.328 This maxim of wanting the greatest price and the market determining 
what the buyer pays is similar to Mandeville’s description of the avaricious merchants in 
England.
Quesnay then stopped following Rousselot de Surgy and inserted his own speculations 
on the reasons behind the self-interested and immoral behaviour in Chinese commerce. 
He criticized the travellers for giving the impression that Chinese falsifications were 
committed with impunity, which would be ironic in a country known for its strictness 
and rites. The Physiocrat believed that travellers “have certainly confounded the 
business carried on with Europeans in the port of Canton” -  where “both sides cheat 
one another” -  with the commerce that occurs between subjects of the empire. Quesnay 
argued that the Chinese government had to tolerate fraudulent practices in particular
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areas “because it is difficult to discipline foreigners three thousand leagues from home, 
who disappear as soon as they have sold their merchandise.” Because he expounded 
the prioritization of agriculture over foreign trade, Quesnay believed there were many 
examples of “nations that have been corrupted by the contamination of foreign 
commerce,” of which China happens to be the most corrupted because it is the most 
skilled in its fraud. These immoral practices however could not be present in the 
domestic Chinese trade, he argued, because nothing would be gained and it would make 
daily commerce “almost impossible.” He believed “this is even more inconceivable in a 
nation so civilized as China, where at all times good faith and rectitude in commerce 
have been noteworthy; this is one of the principal subjects of the ethics of Confucius, 
the ethics which amount to law in this empire.”330 Quesnay thus emphasized the
-i o  1
practical role of reputation as a check on immoral behaviour. While Quesnay hinted 
at the common human nature of immorality and the role of Confucianism in checking 
behaviour, the core of his argument focused on noting the variation within China and 
arguing about the corrupting effects of foreign commerce on the Chinese coast.
Numerous sources commented on the variation within the China trade domestically and 
with foreigners (or in the interior compared to the coastal). For instance, the modem 
part of the Universal History argued the Chinese are “arrant cheats” with foreigners as 
with each other, but later noted there are many instances among them “of honest and 
fair dealing, and open and generous usage...even of fidelity, incapable of being 
corrupted.” In Essai sur les moeurs (1756) Voltaire repeated this discussion of 
variation in China. Questioning Anson’s contempt towards Chinese immorality, he 
repeated the commodore’s self-assessment of his observations: “But are we to judge of 
the government of a great nation from the behaviour of the populace in a sea-port 
town?” However, he added a perspective of cultural relativism by asking, “what 
would the Chinese say of us, if they had been cast away upon our coasts, at the time 
when the laws of European nations confiscated shipwrecked effects, and custom
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permitted the murder of the proprietors?”334 Voltaire was likely referring to jus 
naufragii (right of shipwreck), a medieval custom that allowed people to seize the 
property (as well as persons) of shipwrecks if they discovered them. This practice 
continued into early modem Europe, being fully abolished by the French in 1681. Thus 
Voltaire demonstrated the relativity (over geography and time) of defining morality in 
commercial actions.
In both of the 1770 and 1774 editions of Histoire des deux Indes, Raynal praised the
honour and virtue of the people in China. In the 1774 edition he added an explanation:
If this picture of the manners of the Chinese should be different 
from that drawn by other writers, it is not, perhaps, impossible 
to reconcile opinions so seemingly contradictory. China may be 
considered in two distinct points of view. If we study the 
inhabitants as they appear in the sea-ports, and great towns, we 
shall be disgusted at their cowardice, knavery and avarice: but 
in the other parts of the empire, particularly in the country, we 
shall find their manners domestic, social and patriotic.335
There was a clear recognition that Chinese morality varied based on class and
geographical location.
Even Cornelius de Pauw, who was especially critical of the Chinese, noted the variation 
in the Empire. He argued that unlike the Chinese peasants in the rural areas, the 
merchants “steer against the stream, instead of being discouraged by obstacles. They 
resemble the Jews, who inhabit the different states of Asia: their continual grievances 
goad them on...”336 This comparison indicates a view of the Chinese as one of a few 
remarkably avaricious groups in the world. While de Pauw repeated Laurent de Lange’s 
description of the wealthy merchants colluding with the elite members of Chinese 
society in Peking, he did not look to explain the root causes that made the Chinese 
merchants similar to the Jewish population in Asia, indicating his shallow description of 
China’s political economy.
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H u m a n  N a t u r e
The final explanation for Chinese immorality was that it was a result of human nature. 
The Jesuits posited that human nature was responsible for the examples of immorality 
they found in China. The missionaries believed avarice, as one of the seven deadly sins, 
afflicted all people. When Ricci discussed thieves and robbers in China, he commented 
“the lure of gold to human avarice had been so great.” Thus avarice was human, not 
just Chinese. Corruption was a problem the Jesuits found in Europe as well as in China. 
Le Comte made this point more explicitly when he claimed that with regards to 
immorality in commerce, the Chinese resemble the Europeans. He demonstrated the 
immorality of Europeans by describing an anecdote of a French woman who tried to 
commit fraud by pretending to be from China. In the eighteenth century, Du Halde 
made this connection even more direct when after he described an example of a Chinese 
fraudster, he commented, “...in reality it is said, that some Europeans have taught them 
their trade.”339 Within early modem Christianity, two views of human nature and 
morality can be distinguished. First, the Augustinian view that pointed to mankind’s 
corruptibility and fallibility. The Jansenists largely followed this philosophy. The 
second was the Stoic position that argued humankind had a natural moral sense (similar 
to the one that Hutcheson articulated) which depended upon reason. The Jesuits largely 
followed the Stoic view, reflecting their belief in the ability of humans to use universal 
reason to improve their behaviour. In this view, the immoral Chinese traders, as well as 
self-interested Europeans, all needed to use reason to improve themselves.
Surprisingly, in sections of Voyage Round the World, Anson takes a similar v iew  as the 
Jesuits on human nature. While discussing the corruption and greed in the Chinese 
government, Anson described how the mandarins were “composed of the same fragile 
materials with the rest of mankind”.340 For all of his criticism of Chinese immoral 
behaviour, he did not believe it was endemic to China. Even more surprising were 
indications of self-awareness that pointed to the “fragile materials” of the commodore 
himself. For instance, there were examples of Anson’s own untrustworthiness as he 
broke his word when dealing with the Chinese. The Chinese “revered the Commodore’s 
power...yet suspected his morals, and had considered him rather as a lawless
337 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 343
338 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 129. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 1,213 and 220-226.
339 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 279, Watts edition, Vol. 2, 132., French edition, Vol. 2, 77.
340 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 363.
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freebooter...”341 Indeed, through all the criticisms of Chinese morality and behaviour, 
Anson was aware of the same problems in his own society.
In the Preface to Novissima Sinica (1699), Gottfried Leibniz expounded the belief that 
avarice was a part of human nature. He claimed, “man is a wolf to man”; this line was used 
by Thomas Hobbes in De cive (1651) to refer to the inherent selfishness of men.342 The 
Chinese, according to the German philosopher, also possessed this quality of human 
nature: “To be sure, they are not lacking in avarice, lust or ambition.” In this respect, the 
Chinese were the same as the Europeans and Leibniz remarked, “everything is done just 
as it is here. Hence the Chinese do not attain to full and complete virtue.” He supported 
the Jesuit cause in the Rites Controversy, and argued that Confucianism was a state cult 
rather than a religion (though he maintained the Chinese were deists not atheists).343 
Leibniz believed the Chinese could not attain full virtue without Christian teachings, but 
this did not mean that the Christians lacked vices. While he believed the Chinese 
needed European missionaries to show them revealed religion, he was impressed with 
China’s natural theology, which he thought had a lot to offer European societies: “they 
surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, 
in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of morals.”344 
He continued on to argue that the Chinese “temper the bitter fruits of vice, and though 
they cannot tear out the roots of sin in human nature, they are apparently able to control 
many of the burgeoning growths of evil.”345 Leibniz’ argument is similar to the Jesuits 
who praised the Confucian system of morality for encouraging restraint, but understood 
it could not temper all avarice and immorality.
Leibniz’s view travelled to seventeenth and early eighteenth century England to the 
Deists, who had liberal interpretations of scriptures. In 1730, Mathew Tindal referred to 
China as support for the idea that Christians are not morally perfect in relation to the 
rest of world.346 He described Leibniz’s comparison of Christians with “Infidels of 
China”, where he gave the latter preference in relation to “all moral virtues.”347 Tindal
341 Ibid., 389.
342 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, 70.
343 Julia Ching and Willard G. Oxtoby, Moral Enlightenemnt: Leibniz and Wolff on China (Steyler 
Verlag: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1992); Franklin Perkins, Leibniz and China: a commerce o f  light 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
344 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz, 69-70.
345 Ibid.
346 Mathew Tindal (published anonymously), Christianity as Old as Creation: or, the Gospel, A 
Republication o f  the Religion o f  Nature. Second edition (London [Amsterdam?]: n.p., 1731), 372.
347Ibid., 371.
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cited Navarette as saying “It is God’s special Providence, that the Chinese did not know 
what is done in Christendom, for if they did, there woul’d be never a man among them, 
but woul’d spit in our faces.”348 In not recognizing the numerous descriptions of 
immoralities present in China, Tindal’s use of China is superficial. He used China to 
attack Eurocentrism in debates over moral philosophy, but in the process reduced China 
to a one-dimensional antithesis to European immorality. While this thesis supports the 
argument that ethnographic information was important to the formation of views of 
China’s -  and as a consequence Europe’s -  system of political economy, there certainly 
were individuals, like Tindal, who were not as interested in the first hand descriptions of 
China.
In Philosophical Dictionary (1764), Voltaire articulated his view that avarice was a 
flaw of human nature and there was nothing unique about such behaviour in China. Just 
as in Europe, the Chinese succumbed to the pull of their self-interest. Voltaire praised 
the antiquity and erudition of the Chinese civilization and admired China’s system of 
government and meritocracy, he added “[y]et, we must confess, that the common 
people, guided by the bonzes, are equally knavish with our own; that everything is sold 
enormously dear to foreigners, as among ourselves...”.349 Thus, from the early Jesuit 
accounts through to Voltaire, commentators pointed to human nature as part of an 
explanation for Chinese avarice.
There were several explanations proffered as to why the Chinese suffered from immoral 
commercial behaviour. The religious argument was the least popular and tenable in the 
eighteenth century as Europeans recognized that their own Christian countries 
experienced similar problems. Several observers and commentators attempted to 
identify the singular reasons why the Chinese were exceptionally avaricious. 
Montesquieu in the process placed responsibility for Chinese avarice away from its 
culture and with its geographical situation. Others pointed to the variation within China 
or expressed cultural relativism, arguing particular norms for commercial conduct
348Ibid., 372.
349 Francois-Marie Arouet Voltaire, “China,” Philosophical Dictionary in The Works o f  Voltaire: A 
Contemporary Version. Translated by William Flemming, 21 volumes (New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901), 
Vol. 4, 94. In the original French Voltaire writes “mais on doit avouer que le petit peuple gouveme par 
des bonzes, est aussi fripon que le notre, qu'on y vend tout sort cher aux etrangers, ainsi que chez nous.” 
“Fripon” was translated into knavish in the eighteenth century context, and at the time the adjective form 
was used to describe someone who was dishonest with money. See Voltaire, “De La Chine” Dictionnaire 
philosophique, Tome II in Oeuvres de Voltaire (ed.) Adrien-Jean-Quentin Beuchot Tome XXVIII (Paris: 
Gamier Frere, 1878), 158.
changed over place and time. Finally, numerous observers and commentators 
recgonized the similarities between the European and Chinese cases, and argued that 
avarice was a part of human nature and certainly attached to a commercial society. 
Nearly every source discussed above offered more than one explanation for Chinese 
immorality in commerce indicating their irresolution in theorizing commercial morality.
CONCLUSION
This examination of European views of Chinese commercial culture throws light on the 
question once asked by Albert Hirschman (following Max Weber), “How did 
commercial banking, and similar money-making pursuits become honorable at some 
point in the modem age after having stood condemned or despised as greed, love of 
lucre, and avarice for centuries past?”350 This transformation was a European 
intellectual and social phenomenon; however, the present study of European views of 
Chinese practical morality (or immorality) demonstrates the role that discussions of a 
non-European civilization had in debates on self-interest. While Mandeville, Hutcheson, 
Hume, Rousseau and Smith did not reference Chinese morality directly in their 
theorizing on the role of sympathy or self-interest in civilization, discussions of Chinese 
morality were certainly connected to such issues.
This chapter has revealed the malleable and evolving view of morality in commercial 
activity in eighteenth century Europe. More than any other topic related to political 
economy, on this subject China was a mirror to which Europeans could project and 
develop changing views on the role of avarice in a commercial society. The information 
on Chinese morality reached a European environment that was struggling to identify its 
own practical commercial morality, seen through merchant manuals and a changing 
social hierarchy where commerce began to dominate agriculture (or the interests of the 
landed nobility). On a more theoretical level, moral philosophers of the Enlightenment 
speculated on the nature of avarice in their societies. Adam Smith transformed this vice 
into a more innocuous form of self-interest, which over time became an acceptable 
theoretical position to ease the tension with practical morality.
The primary sources on China reflected a tension between ideal morality (represented 
by Confucian moral philosophy) and practical morality (seen in the anecdotes of
350 Hirschman, Passions and the Interests, 9.
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immoral behaviour by Chinese merchants and mandarins). However, the Jesuit 
recognition of the friction between practical and ideal morality was rarely noted in the 
philosophical, geographical and even secular primary sources. This led the Jesuits to be 
viewed as presenting a favourable view of Chinese morality. Some geographers did 
comment on the similarities between the primary sources on this subject, or tried to 
explain the difference in their perspectives.
The combination of the changing European attitude towards self-interest and commerce 
as well as the ethnographic information on China, led to the emergence of several 
explanations and rationalizations of Chinese morality. Some argued the pagan status of 
the Chinese contributed to their immorality, while others such as Montesquieu turned to 
its unique climate and geography. Local contexts were also seen to be an important 
qualifying factor for Chinese avarice. However, explanations that drew comparisons 
between Europe and China in the struggle of reconciling commerce with morality were 
more prominent. These comparisons reflected an approach to China as an Empire 
struggling with the same problems of advanced civilization as France and Britain. The 
insecurity in the European voice was also present in the relativist position that 
attempted to understand the Chinese moral norms or at least pointed out that the 
Chinese might disagree with European commercial practices. Nature, education, culture, 
and geography were all given as explanations of the greedy behaviour of the Chinese 
traders. These discussions reflected the European struggle to understand the relationship 
between social mores and the new economic order.
As an advanced commercial civilization, China played an important part in the 
Enlightenment’s struggle to deal with the theme of moral philosophy in an expanding 
commercial world. As we will see in the following chapter, as a result o f  the great force o f  
self-interest and in spite of the fraud and immorality, China’s domestic commerce was 
portrayed as flourishing. While immorality was certainly believed to be an important 
topic worth contemplating, it did not lead to a dismissal of the Chinese system of 
political economy precisely because, on this subject, the Chinese problem reflected a 
concurrent European problem.
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O u t l in e : 4. “Y o u r  B e g g a r l y  C o m m e r c e !”
4 .1 . F r o m  E l  D o r a d o  t o  Im p e r v io u s
4.2 . U n d e r s t a n d in g  C h in e s e  T r a d e  P o l ic y
4.3 . A  E u r o p e a n  P r o b l e m ? N a t io n a l  r iv a l r ie s  a n d  m o n o p o l ie s
4.4 . A w a r e n e s s  o f  C h in a ’s F o r e ig n  T r a d e
4.5 . B a l a n c e  o f  T r a d e
International trade was of central importance to Enlightenment conceptions of wealth.
As Daniel Defoe - the famed champion of the merchant class - wrote, “the rising
greatness of the British nation is not owing to war and conquests, to enlarging its
dominion by the sword, or subjecting the people of other countries to our power; but it
is all owing to trade, to the encrease of our commerce at home, and extending it
abroad”.351 European philosophers and a broader group that included popular
geographers and merchants hotly debated international trade. These debates portrayed
China as having a more cautious, restricted view of foreign trade. No lesser authority
than Adam Smith succinctly expressed this view:
The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your 
beggarly commerce! was the language in which the 
Mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr. de Lange, the Russian 
envoy, concerning it. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry 
on, themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign 
trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom 
that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign 
trade therefore is, in China, every way confined within a 
much narrower circle than that to which it would naturally 
extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their 
own ships, or in those of foreign nations.
Modem historians have addressed the idea of Chinese isolations. John Hobson labelled 
the traditional narrative that China turned inward during the Ming Dynasty as “China’s 
great leap backward”.353 Proponents of this view maintain that China’s decline relative 
to Europe began in 1434 when the Emperor Xuande, following the “Confucian 
traditions” of his father, the Emperor Hongxi, imposed restrictions on foreign trade and 
navigation.354 According to this view, by the end of the eighteenth century Europeans 
recognized the limitations of the Chinese system of political economy, particularly with 
regards to international trade. Adam Smith’s promotion of the free market in 1776 and
351 Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman, 382-3.
352 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 864-5.
353 Hobson, The Eastern Origins o f  Western Civilization, 62.
354 While the narrative o f China’s “great leap backwards” includes resistance to foreign trade and foreign 
navigation and exploration, this chapter only concentrates on the former.
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the 1793 failed British Embassy to China under Lord Macartney led to a dominant
ICC
image of an arrogant China, resistant to the progress of the modernising world.
Frustration with Chinese policies of isolation, however, dated as far back as Ancient 
Rome, thus was not a reaction to the rising European faith in the mutual benefits of free 
trade, expressed most famously by Smith. Further, the narrative of Chinese isolation 
was only part of a wider eighteenth century discussion of the China trade. In fact, early 
modem European observers and commentators were not assured of their superiority and 
reflected a wide range of views on the China trade beyond simple frustration. This is 
reflected in recent scholarship that examines the interaction between the Qing Dynasty 
and European states as the encounter of imperial forces, indicating a comparable 
balance of power, and a dynamic of international trade more complicated than the mere 
idea of a European rejection of Chinese policies.356
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of how the travellers, geographers and 
philosophers related to the topic of international trade. It also addresses the tension 
between the European desire for trade with China and the Chinese policies of restricting 
international relations. European ambitions of achieving a bountiful trading relationship 
with China certainly met with the reality of Chinese restrictions. The interplay between 
optimism and rejection led to a consistent narrative of frustration in many European 
sources. It is important to recognize that the narrative of Chinese isolationism was not a 
construction of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nor was it a concept created 
in twentieth century. The remainder of this chapter analyses the other prominent 
narratives attached to the China trade. In addition to a view of Chinese restrictions on 
foreign trade, which certainly existed, four additional themes were conspicuous. First, 
Europeans attempted to understand China’s unique ability to restrict international trade.
355 David Porter describes the eighteenth-century encounter between the Europeans and the Chinese, 
where the former believed in the importance o f international trade, and the latter strictly limited 
international commerce, leading to “a widespread perception among British observers that an unnatural 
tendency toward blockage and obstructionism was an integral, defining feature of Chinese society as a 
whole”. D. Porter, “A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse o f Commerce in 
Eighteenth Century England”, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 33:2 (1999-00): 181-199; James Hevia 
describes the historiographical tradition (from Euro-America as well as China) o f viewing the early 
modem trade relationship between China and Europe as a clash between tradition and modernity. James 
L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy o f 1793 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1995), 242; Joanna Wayley Cohen argues that the wave of Sinophilia ended, in 
part, because o f the shift in views in the China trade, particularly that “the restrictive Canton system o f  
trade went directly against the free world market advocated by Adam Smith in 1776” Waley-Cohen, The 
Sextants o f  Beijing, 92- 99 and 128.
356 James L. Hevia’s Cherishing Men from Afar explores the interaction between the Qing Dynasty and 
European states in the eighteenth century as the encounter between two imperial powers.
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As we will see throughout this thesis, Europeans often recognized China’s uniqueness. 
Second, observers and commentators identified obstacles to trade that originated in 
Europe. Again, like in the previous chapter, China heightened European self-awareness 
and self-criticism. Third, these sources discussed the nature of the trade that did exist, 
and recognized the Chinese encouragement of said trade. Finally, Europeans debated 
the implications of the balance of trade with China, and demonstrated awareness of 
China’s place in a global trading system.
This chapter concludes that the overarching image of China’s foreign trade was that as a 
uniquely large and independent country that had the ability to restrict international 
trade, and when they did partake in it, they maintained a formidable position exporting 
luxury items. Concurrent to this image was the view held by many (but not all) that 
China would benefit from expanding its international trade, a view supported by the 
idea that their history of fluctuating trade policies indicated that increasing foreign trade 
was indeed possible. The awareness of China opening up to foreign trade with the 
transition to the Qing Dynasty encouraged a view of their system of political economy 
as mutable. Criticisms of European trade policies reveals that they did not assume the 
superiority of their own practices above China. As with the subject of morality 
discussed in the previous chapter, while China’s restrictive policies were criticized, they 
were not sufficient to dismiss their system of political economy.
4.1. FROM EL DORADO TO IMPERVIOUS
The primary authors, both missionary and secular, had an interest in understanding 
China’s foreign trade policy. As we saw in chapter two, trade, religion, and information 
on China were intertwined in this period. This connection was reflected in the early 
Portuguese engagement in the East Indies. Portugal received the padroado (patronage) 
with the Jus patronatus granted by a papal bull in 1514, vesting exclusive control of 
European missionary, political and economic activity in the East with the Portuguese 
monarchy. Missionaries travelled to China on merchant ships and resided alongside 
European traders on the island of Macao.357 The Portuguese control of European 
engagement with the East did not last long, and at the turn of the seventeenth century 
the Dutch and English quickly expanded their commercial interests in the area. Under 
these different dominating European powers, Catholic missionaries from European
357 For more on the Jesuit travels to China see Brockey, Journey to the East.
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states such as Portugal, Italy, Spain, France and Germany continued to travel and 
transmit information on China. In their roles as translators and influencers of Chinese 
opinions, these European missionaries acted in the interest of their own missionary 
orders, and at times in their national interests. For instance, in 1697-98 a group of 
French Jesuits urged the French government to develop a chartered company for the 
China trade to search for alternative trade routes to those controlled by the English and 
Dutch. Although the Jesuits were primarily concerned with their religious mission, 
they did provide information highly relevant to the China trade. The secular authors 
who travelled to China, such as Nieuhof and Anson, were more interested in commerce 
than the Christianizing agenda of the missionaries. These authors were first-hand 
witnesses to China’s restrictive trade policies and thus, on this topic in particular, their 
point of view is germane.
The growth of popular works in Britain over the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
was driven, in large part, by the desire for information on international trade, and many 
of these sources had commercial biases embedded in their texts. For instance, as we 
saw in chapter two, Robert Parke’s 1588 English translation of the Augustian Juan 
Gonzalez de Mendoza’s The Historie o f the great and mightie kingdome o f China... 
(Rome, 1585; London, 1588), was highly influenced by interest in foreign trade and its 
publication expressed a form of economic nationalism. Another (later) example of the 
connection between trade and information on China is found in the first English 
translation of Du Halde’s description of China. While this was the less reliable of the 
two early translations, of interest here is a main motivation for the quick publication of 
the work. Richard Brookes, the English translator of the edition, dedicated the fourth 
volume “to the Directors of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the 
East Indies.” In this dedication, Brookes argued, “it is a fond mistaken notion of 
some” that Britain is self-sustainable and does not need anything from the rest of the 
world, when in reality “the most common repast must be supply’d with ingredients from 
the remotest parts of the globe.”
Philosophers, especially those interested in the emerging field of economics, showed a 
great deal of interest in the topic of international trade. Douglas Irwin’s intellectual 
history of free trade is divided into two parts: the first addresses the dominance of the
358 Lach and van Kley, Asia in the making o f  Europe, 432.
359 Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination, 270.
360 Du Halde (Watts edition), Volume 4, Dedication
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pre-Smithian protectionist view culminating in the mercantilist literature of the 
seventeenth century, and the other examines the post-Smithian period of the pre- 
eminence of free trade ideology. Of particular interest then is the transitionary period 
of the eighteenth century, which is situated between the apogee of mercantilism and the 
publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth o f Nations (1776). As Irwin acknowledges, during 
the eighteenth century, “The general presumption in favor of trade restrictions was 
gradually tempered by criticisms from within the mercantilist camp, as well as by a 
quite different form of reasoning from moral philosophers and others in favor of 
economic freedom”.362 Smith’s system was responsible for undermining the 
protectionist view with a more “theoretical analysis”. Prior to the establishment of a 
consensus view in favour of free-market trade, philosophers had dramatically debated 
varied policies of international trade. This is not the place for a detailed description of 
early modem European debates about foreign trade but a brief account of the main 
schools of thought will be useful to contextualize views of the China trade.
In the seventeenth century, the diverse group referred to as the “mercantilists” debated 
theories of international trade. Historians dispute the common traits that bind them. 
Some nineteenth century commentators, following Adam Smith, maintain the 
mercantilists were united by a belief in the balance of trade theory and bullionism (the 
view that wealth is defined by the quantity precious metals), whereas later thinkers, 
such as the historian Eli Heckscher argue it was a system of state intervention in the 
economy. Still others, such as Joyce Oldham Appleby, assert this group changed 
over time. By the end of the seventeenth century there were dozens of publications that 
argued concern about a negative balance of trade was outmoded, did not believe that 
gold and silver had intrinsic value and argued that free trade was the way to prosperity. 
The expression of mercantilism also varied from England to France. In England, 
merchants published works supporting mercantilist beliefs whereas in France it was 
statesmen such as John-Baptiste Colbert who were the main proponents of the system. 
Colbert’s institution of mercantilist protectionist policies to limit imports and increase 
French exports was so prominent that French mercantilism is often referred to as
361 Douglas Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History o f  Free Trade (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 3.
362 Ibid.
363 For instance, see Adam Smith, Book IV, Chapter 1 "Of the principle o f the commercial or mercantile 
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Colbertism. In the English case, these debates heavily focused on interest and exchange 
rates and were not extended to the China trade directly thus they are not addressed in 
detail in the present study. By the eighteenth century, more information about the nature 
of the China trade began to be reported and thus intellectuals theorizing on the 
motivations and implications of international trade explicitly discussed it.
Theories on foreign trade evolved over the course of the eighteenth century towards a 
view of the mutual benefits of trade as well as the benefits of freer international trade.
In Hume’s essays Of the Balance o f Trade (1752) and Jealousy o f Trade (1758), he 
expounded an analysis of foreign trade that naturally balanced prices, and he attacked 
the zero-sum game view of international trade where benefits accrued in one country 
meant losses in another.364 In France, the Physiocrats, focused on demonstrating the 
supremacy of agriculture, were not greatly interested in foreign trade and “viewed it 
disdainfully as a necessary evil” for the export of domestic agricultural products.365 
Adam Smith thought the Physiocrats gave too much precedence to agriculture above 
commerce. Following Hume, Smith articulated a system where free international trade 
without the dominance of monopolies was integral to domestic development.
It was from this evolving context of theorizing international trade that Europeans looked 
to the China trade in both its direct connection to Europe and in relation to its own 
system of political economy. European sources oscillated between optimism and 
disappointment in their discussion of the China trade. On the one hand, there was an air 
of hope for the potential wealth that the China trade could generate. The desire to 
increase state-sponsored commercial profit in the context of rising domestic demand for 
foreign goods and new global opportunities for trade led to popular literature of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries expressing the hope of finding foreign lands that 
offered bountiful trade relationships. Voltaire commented on the dreams of easy profits 
in his popular novel Candide (1759). Upon leaving El Dorado, Candide exclaims: “if 
we return to our own world with only a dozen of El Dorado sheep, loaded with the 
pebbles of this country, we shall be richer than all the kings in Europe”. The reports 
of the grand scale of the Chinese Empire and its significant wealth came to represent
364 John F. Berdell, "Innovation and Trade: David Hume and the Case for Freer Trade." History o f  
Political Economy 28:1 (Spring: 1996): 107-126. Istvan Hont, Jealousy o f  trade: international 
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University Press, 2005)
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another El Dorado, and a tangible object for the European desire for profits. As the 
English merchant Joshua Gee declared, “the greatest empires, and the vastest numbers
'I f i n
of people are found in the part of the world called Asia.” Nieuhof s description of the 
numerous Dutch attempts to develop a free trade with China reflects the determination 
of the Europeans: “From the time that the Netherlanders had commerce with their ships 
into several parts of India, they continually sought unto the people of China to trade 
with them...”368
China, however, was not the easiest trading partner and Europeans expressed a 
concurrent frustration with the practicalities involved in the China trade. The earliest 
descriptions of China by European authors reveal a long history of the theme of Chinese 
isolation. Ancient Romans wrote about a place known as Serica (believed to refer to the 
north-eastern part of modem day China). Pliny the Elder, for example, claimed “The 
Seres are of inoffensive manners, but, bearing a strong resemblance therein to all savage 
nations, they shun all intercourse with the rest of mankind, and await the approach of 
those who wish to traffic with them”.369 This history was not lost on eighteenth century 
commentators, as a popular compendium about China, The Chinese Traveller (1772), 
addressed the antiquity of the view of Chinese isolation: “It is remarkable that the 
manners of the modem differ not much from those of the antient Chinese... [Pliny] says 
that the Chinese...like wild animals industriously shun any communication with 
strangers...They are at this day courteous and gentle, but will not suffer merchants of
7^fiother nations to penetrate into their country.”
Indeed, China’s restrictive policies continued into the early modem world. In 1517, 
Tome Pires led the first official embassy from a European state (Portugal) to China. The 
reality of China’s foreign policy quickly moderated the Portuguese enthusiasm when 
after their long journey the emissaries were not granted an audience with the emperor. 
The Portuguese conquering of Malacca (a tributary state of the Chinese), as well as their
7^1thieving and dismptive behaviour around Canton led to the Chinese constraints. 
China sentenced Pires to death because of the actions of his compatriots, and he took his
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own life in prison. The repetition of this archetypal embassy by the English, French, 
Dutch and Russians, despite continuing failures to gain significant trade concessions,
• * 7^7demonstrated the European determination to expand the China trade.
The failure of early modem European trade missions reflected China’s ability to resist 
the foreign overtures. Unlike other parts of the world, threats of violence were 
insufficient to achieve the European desire for open trade with China. Rather, Chinese 
trade concessions were erratic and highly dependent on the emperor. The Chinese, 
according to John Wills Jr., never had anything resembling “a coherent or effective 
foreign policy.” Wills lists three primary reasons for this discord between the 
Europeans and Chinese in trade negotiations: first, Chinese culturalism degraded the 
study of foreigners; second, limited contact meant there was little opportunity to build 
real knowledge of foreign areas; finally, the tributary system’s focus on ceremony kept 
relations superficial, where appearance mattered more than reality.374 He argues the 
Chinese government pushed trade away from the central administrative area to the coast 
in order to maintain the “illusion” that their tributary system was intact. Meanwhile, the 
Europeans were holding on to the “illusion” that the Chinese would increase their 
foreign trade.375These inconsistencies were increasingly difficult for Europeans to
t\nf.
understand as they rationalized international trade as ordained or natural. By the 
eighteenth century, thinkers such as Defoe and Smith began to expand the 
legitimization of international trade beyond the dictates of divine Providence to the 
original principles of human nature. From these perspectives, emissaries in China were 
frustrated and confused by the Chinese refusal to adapt to European customs and trade
*577
practices. Although acknowledging that foreign relations took place on several levels 
(apart from the tributary system), John Wills points out how the European experience of
372 Between 1655 and 1795 there were approximately seventeen Western missions that reached the 
emperor (six from Russia, four from Portugal, three or four from Holland, three from the Papacy, and one 
from Britain). J. K. Fairbank, ‘Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West’, The Far Eastern 
Quarterly, 1:2 (February, 1942), 148-9. For more information on failed trade negotiations see Markley,
The Far East and the English Imagination, Chapter 3 and Wills, Embassies and Illusions.
373 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 20.
374Ib id , 21-2.
375 Ibid., 38.
376 For instance, Nieuhof repeated a letter from the general of Batavia to the Emperor o f China describing 
the European explanation for trade based on God’s division of things necessary and convenient for life 
across the globe. Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 310.
377 David Porter, Ideographia: The Chinese Cipher in Early Modem Europe (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 197 and 199.
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China’s tribute system reflects “the clash between the basic values and world-views of 
the tribute system and those of Western formal diplomacy.”
Seventeenth and eighteenth century primary accounts composed by secular authors 
revealed the practical encounter between European and Chinese customs in 
international relations. For instance, Nieuhof described the confrontation between 
European and Chinese expectations. In an excerpt of the decree of the Chinese Emperor 
on the Holland trade, he noted the Chinese comments on how the Hollanders and 
Muscovites “will not submit themselves to those ceremonies of reverence accustom’d in 
this palaces. They are novices, and ignorant in affairs, and obstinate in refusing to 
accommodate themselves to the customs of the country”. Anson’s experience in 
Canton also reflected significant differences in expectations and customs. Although he 
was not a merchant, but a man of war, to the Chinese the distinction was negligible and 
they were evidently concerned by his presence. As a man of war, Anson refused to pay 
duties for his engagement at Canton (as was customary amongst European states). 
However, Chinese custom dictated all ships that enter Chinese ports must pay duties. 
Ultimately, the Chinese desire for the commodore to leave their port made them 
acquiesce to his refusal to pay a duty. Despite these idiosyncrasies of Chinese policy, 
Europeans attempted to understand the principles behind their reluctance to engage in 
international trade.
4.2. UNDERSTANDING CHINESE TRADE POLICY
Early descriptions of the Chinese, including those by the Jesuits, depicted an arrogant 
nation who believed they were at the centre of the world. Ricci concluded that 
“[Chinese] pride, it would seem, arises from an ignorance of the existence of higher 
things and from the fact that they find themselves far superior to the barbarous nations 
by which they are surrounded”.381 Or, as the geographer Thomas Salmon argued in his 
popular compendium, they looked upon “the rest of mankind as little better than 
brutes”.382 This assertion was supported by the knowledge that the Chinese had access 
to the compass before the Europeans, and yet explored little in comparison.
378 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 172.
379 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 316
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Nonetheless, Europeans sought to understand China’s motivations for restricting trade 
beyond simple arrogance.
In the seventeenth century, numerous European observers respected China’s policy of 
limiting international trade. The expansion of European interests overseas, concurrent 
with internal wars, revolutions and the spread of disease, reminded early modem 
observers of lessons from Ancient Rome, and concerns about overexpansion led some 
to admire China’s restraint.383 One of the early Iberian accounts of China by Gaspar da 
Cruz described how the Chinese had a large empire earlier in their history, ruling over 
Malacca, Siam and Champa in Southeast Asia. He explained their motivations for 
reducing this empire and turning inwards: “the King of China, seeing that his kingdom 
went to decay, and was in danger by their seeking to conquer many other foreign 
countries, he withdrew himself with his men to his own kingdom...”384 Navarrete was 
an early seventeenth source that explicitly commended the limitations on international 
relations as “a good piece of policy,” adding “[t]he same might be done in other 
kingdoms” Later when discussing the Chinese treatment of strangers, he noted 
“[t]hey have reason enough not to admit of strangers, as having no need of them for any 
worldly affairs”.386 These early primary descriptions travelled back to a European 
audience, many of whom agreed the Chinese policy was wise.
In Europe, particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, geographers and 
philosophers repeated the praise of China’s wise policy. Giovanni Botero explained 
China’s motivations for restricting foreign interactions: “Strangers are not admitted to 
enter into the kingdome, lest their customes and conversation should breed alteration in 
manners, or innovation in the state. They are onely permitted to traffick upon the sea
^ o 7
coasts, to buy and sell victual, and to vent their wares”. The Chinese, he argued, were 
“more ready and fit to defend, then offend, to preserve rather than increase”, an indirect 
criticism of European states’ expansionary policies.388 Thus Botero presented the 
Chinese view of foreign relations as protective and cautious. By the eighteenth century,
383 Edward Gibbon chronicled this notion of internal decay from overexpansion in his influential Decline 
and Fall o f  the Roman Empire (1776).
384 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 67.
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a few European philosophers and geographers rationalized China’s cautious approach 
towards entering into relationships with foreign states. For instance, Raynal reminded 
his readers of the problems of the Sino-Portuguese relationship during the time of Tome 
Pires; under those circumstances, what incentive did the Chinese have to expand their 
foreign relations?389 Similarly, the geographer, Thomas Salmon, in his Modem History 
explained the Chinese restrictions at the harbour of Nanking were a result of the 
besiegement of a pirate, which showed the Chinese “how much the place was expos’d 
to insults from abroad” leading them to “Remove the trade to other towns which were 
more secure”.390 In a later work he argued the Chinese restricted the Europeans to the 
port of Canton because they witnessed the Dutch deposing Indian princes and usurping
1Q1dominions, and “they know that their forces are not equal to European Armies.”
Another explanation for China’s restrictive policies gained prominence in the eighteenth 
century, though it originated in earlier sources. It was based on the belief that China’s 
domestic trade made their Empire self-sufficient thus they had no need for international 
commerce. Sixteenth century European reports of China’s trade revered China’s 
massive domestic trade. Gaspar da Cruz claimed “[t]he great plenty and riches of the 
country doth this, that it can sustain itself alone.”392 Mendoza, who relied on da Cruz a 
great deal, popularized this view in Europe. He described how China’s isolation from 
international trade was possible because as “one of the greatest and best kingdoms of 
the world.. .many strange nations do profite themselves from them, and they have need 
of none other nation for that they have sufficient of all things necessarie to the 
mainteining of human life”.393 Mendoza took the argument further by directly 
comparing the scale of trade in China with the size of European trade. The reports about 
the activity on China’s rivers and canals astonished him: “In my opinion it might be 
said with greater truth and without fear of exaggeration, that there are as many boats in 
this kingdom as can be counted up in all the rest of the world”.394 Mendoza, who had 
never been to China himself, admitted the comparison was speculatively based on 
reports he read. Nonetheless, these early modem sources demonstrated how China’s
389 Though in the final edition these paragraphs were found in chapter twenty-one (to which Diderot is 
credited), the paragraphs in question were also in earlier editions and are attributed to Raynal. Raynal, 
Justamond edition, 105-6, French edition, 123-4.
390 Salmon, Modern History, 10.
391 Salmon, Universal Traveller, 18.
392 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 112.
393 Mendoza, The historie o f  ...China, 69-70.
394/&</., 12-13.
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particular circumstances explained its deviation from European expectations, which in 
this case was being active in foreign trade.
Seventeenth century sources confirmed the significant scale of Chinese domestic trade. 
Ricci agreed there were as many boats in China as in all the rest of the world; however, 
he qualified this statement by arguing that it is only true if counting boats travelling on 
fresh water, as the Chinese have far fewer sea faring ships than Europe.395 Unlike most 
other subjects, where the missionaries were the most informed Europeans, on the topic 
of international trade secular observers offered many original and insightful 
observations. Johann Nieuhof, purser of the VOC embassy to China, was tasked with 
observing the economy of the towns and villages he passed through on the journey from 
Canton to Peking. He described the great trade he saw in detail, concluding, “No less 
doth this kingdom abound in shipping above all the rest; for the number of all manner of 
vessels is so great, that it seems as if all the shipping in the world were harbor’d there: 
but ‘tis no wonder, considering the situation of the rivers that run through this 
country....” China’s geography was often used to explain the success of its unique 
system of political economy.
Du Halde popularized this argument in the eighteenth century. China’s
reluctance to engage in foreign commerce was connected to an understanding of
its internal strength and history:
As the Inhabitants find within themselves every thing that is necessary 
for the conveniences and pleasures of life; so judging their native soil 
sufficient to supply all their wants, they have ever affected to carry on 
no commerce with the rest of mankind.. .397
He argued that this led the Chinese to believe they were “masters of the whole world”
and that everyone outside of China was barbarous. Chinese arrogance was thus
explained by their self-sufficiency. In fact, Du Halde took the view further, and
controversially stated the vastness of China’s domestic trade compared to the whole of
Europe’s: “The inland trade of China is so great, that the commerce of all Europe is not
to be compar’d therewith; the princes being like so many kingdoms, which
communicate to each other their respective productions”.398 By pointing out that each
395 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 13.
396 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 69.
397Du Halde, Cave edition, 237, Watts edition, 1-2, French edition, 1.
398 Du Halde, Cave edition, 334, Watts edition, 296, French edition, 204.
I l l
province specialized in particular productions, the Jesuit portrayed China’s self- 
sufficiency as a policy that still allowed for diversified products.
Made during a period of rapid expansion of European trade, this bold assertion was 
repeated numerous times in popular compendiums.399 Other mainstream sources 
restated the idea of Chinese self-sufficiency but did not make the controversial 
comparison to the European trade. The modem part of the Universal History described 
how the Chinese “chiefly [relied] on” their domestic trade, where each province was 
like a state or kingdom that had speciality goods and easy transportation to traffic them, 
but it did not claim this domestic trade was larger than elsewhere.400 It is remarkable 
that this influential source, which heavily relied on primary accounts, did not address 
the well-known speculation of Chinese internal trade being larger than European trade. 
This omission may indicate that the editors believed the assertion was either baseless or 
irrelevant.
Philosophical sources differed in their assessment of the claim that China’s domestic 
trade was larger than Europe’s. Montesquieu, for instance, believed the comparison was 
irrelevant. In De I ’esprit des lois (1748), Montesquieu described the implications of 
European global expansion. He argued, “Europe has reached such a high degree of 
power that nothing in history is comparable to it.” Immediately after asserting European 
power and dominance, he felt the need to challenge Du Halde’s contention about the 
relative size of China’s domestic trade, indicating his view that this claim undermined 
European supremacy. He argued that China’s internal commerce might be larger than 
Europe’s, but European foreign trade was, in fact, much greater: “Europe carries on the 
commerce and navigation of the other three parts of the world, just as France, England, 
and Holland, carry on nearly all the navigation and commerce of Europe”.401 
Montesquieu’s argument about the relevance of China’s internal trade did not travel far 
in other philosophical sources, however some popular geographies, notably Daniel 
Fenning and J. Collyer’s A New System o f Geography (1764-5), recounted the dispute 
between Du Halde and Montesquieu.402
399 For instance a direct quotation can be found in Anonymous, The Chinese Traveller, 189; Claude 
Francois Lambert, A collection o f  curious observations on the manners, customs, usages, different 
languages, government,... translated by John Dunn 2 Volumes (London: Printed for John Dunn, 1750) 
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A fellow Frenchman, Francis Quesnay, vehemently contested Montesquieu’s view of 
China. In a section entitled “Commerce Viewed as Serving Agriculture” in Despotisme 
de la Chine (1767) Quesnay used China as model to attack the belief that “nations must 
trade with foreigners in order to grow rich in money.” 403 Commerce was necessary, he 
argued, but it was dependant on agriculture. Quesnay repeated Du Halde’s assertion that 
China’s internal trade was greater than Europe’s and that each province specialized in 
particular products, making commerce between them necessary so they did not lapse 
into poverty. The Physiocrat believed “the greatest opulence possible consists in the 
greatest consumption possible,” which “has its source within the territory of every 
nation” [emphasis added].404 Opposed to the mercantilist view, Quesnay differentiated 
between China’s domestic commerce (which was driven by consumption) and the 
commerce of merchants (which was often extended afar). He believed “foreign 
commerce is perhaps more injurious than favourable to the prosperity of the nations that 
devote themselves to it” and it only serves to profit the merchant class and encourage 
“frivolities which support an injurious luxury”.405 Quesnay could not find an example of 
a nation attached to foreign commerce that, apart from their traders, “provides examples 
of prosperity.”406 The Chinese system, according to the Physiocrat, represented the 
Natural Order and thus he praised their elevation of domestic trade above foreign 
commerce.
Adam Smith, who had a great deal of respect for the French economiste Quesnay, also
believed China was uniquely situated for domestic trade and disagreed with the
mercantilist view of wealth, however he did believe in the added benefits of foreign
trade. He argued China’s geography deterred it from foreign trade for several reasons:
A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most 
likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and 
commercial nations. A great nation surrounded on all sides by 
wandering savages and poor barbarians might, no doubt, acquire great 
riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own interior 
commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this 
manner that the antient Egyptians and the modem Chinese acquired 
their great wealth...the modem Chinese, it is known, hold [foreign
403 Maverick, China a Model fo r  Europe, 208. Accurately translated from the original French, see 
Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine”, 603.
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trade] in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the decent 
protection of the laws.407
Later he added,
the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its 
inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in 
its different provinces, and the easy communication by means of water 
carriage between the greater part of them render the home market of 
that country of so great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very 
great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of 
labour.408
Following Du Halde’s and Quesnay’s (from Du Halde through Rousselot de Surgy) 
assertion that Chinese products were diversified, Smith argued that China had 
significant subdivisions of labour. From the Scottish philosopher this was a great 
compliment indeed, as he asserted in The Wealth o f Nations (1776) that the division of 
labour was key to economic growth. However, Smith moderated his assessment of the 
size of China’s domestic trade, claiming it was “perhaps, in extent, not much more 
inferior to the market of all the different countries of Europe put together” 409 By the 
end of the eighteenth century with European commerce rapidly expanding, even the 
tempered claim that China’s domestic market was near the size of all of Europe’s, and 
the view that China had significant subdivisions of labour from its internal commerce, 
were both complimentary of the Chinese system.
Recognizing China’s self-sufficiency did not mean abandoning hope for its engagement 
in an active international trade. Smith argued that “a more extensive foreign 
trade...could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, and to 
improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry” as well as 
offering externalities such as extensive navigation, technology transfer and “other 
improvements of art and industry”.410 It was possible to understand China’s reasons and 
respect its ability to limit foreign trade, and still believe that a profitable foreign trade 
was in its interest and was indeed possible.
Primary authors, geographers and philosophers ruminated on China’s unique reasons 
for restricting international trade, as well as its unusual ability to gamer significant 
wealth from domestic commerce. As theories of freer international trade continued to 
rise in prominence in the eighteenth century, China’s ability to gamer a relatively high
407 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 623.
408Ibid., 865-6.
409 Ibid., 866.
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level of wealth while heavily restricting foreign trade required an explanation. European 
views of China’s political economy often discussed the exceptionality of the Middle 
Kingdom as an explanatory factor as to why it did not fit European theories and 
assumptions. China represented a system that had the capacity to greatly diversify 
products in its domestic economy. In the case of foreign trade, the Middle Kingdom 
offered a different model for growth that depended almost entirely on domestic 
consumption and production. A minority of commentators such as Quesnay believed 
that China’s system was based in a natural order and thus was replicable meaning all 
countries should prioritize domestic agriculture over foreign trade; others such as Smith 
recognized China’s unique capacity for domestic growth but still believed it would 
benefit from increased foreign trade.
3.3. A EUROPEAN PROBLEM? NATIONAL RIVALRIES AND MONOPOLIES
While Europeans attempted to understand and even, at times, appreciate China’s 
restrictions on international trade, the policies of the Middle Kingdom also offered an 
opportunity to analyse European trade practices. Indeed, many observers maintained 
that the European system itself was at fault for limiting the China trade. From national 
rivalries to the nature of the monopolistic system controlling trade, there was a great 
deal of self-criticism in the European approach to the China trade. Aside from thinkers 
such as Quesnay who did not believe in the merits of international trade, many 
European commentators demanded reform of their own systems.
National rivalries, particularly between the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and English, led 
to competing European interests hindering advancements in East Asian trade. As Istvan 
Hont argues, jealousy of trade emerged “when success in international trade became a 
matter of the military and political survival of nations”.411 During the first half of the 
seventeenth century, the Dutch began to make their presence in East Asia felt. Unlike 
the Spanish and Portuguese, the Protestant Dutch (and later the English) were not as 
concerned with spreading Christianity, but focused their empires largely on commerce. 
The Dutch East India Company (VOC), formed in 1602, was chartered with the control 
of the Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan, 
putting it in direct conflict with the Portuguese declared monopoly of Asian trade. As 
such, the VOC was given authority to “wage defensive war, negotiate treaties of peace
411 Hont, Jealousy o f  trade, 5.
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and alliance in the name of the States General, and build fortresses.”412 This led to 
several VOC attacks on the Portuguese establishment at Macao. Ultimately, the Dutch 
gained a monopoly in the Japan trade and increased their presence in East Asia 
throughout the seventeenth century. By 1685, with the opening of Canton to foreign 
commerce, the English also began to assert their standing in the China trade. The 
divided London and English East India companies formally united in 1708 giving the 
British a strong position in the East Indian trade.
The descriptions of European observers reveal the nationalism involved in international 
trade with China in particular, and the East Indies in general. In the seventeenth century, 
Nieuhof publicised the tension between the Dutch and the Portuguese in the Far East in 
his Het gezantschap der Neerlandtsche Oost-Indische Compagnie (1665) 413 He was 
part of a mission from 1655-1657 led by a Dutch merchant, Frederick Schedel, who was 
sent by the Chief Council of New Batavia to China to verify recent changes in China’s 
foreign policy. In his account Nieuhof argued that the mission to negotiate a freer trade 
with the Chinese government was doomed from the start because the Portuguese at 
Macao and the Jesuits in Peking had portrayed the Dutch as pirates without a country 
who “got their livings by stealth and piracy” and who sought to plunder the Chinese 
Empire.414 According to Nieuhof, these Portuguese told the Tartar leaders that previous 
Chinese emperors would not engage with the Dutch since they were seen “as the mine 
and plague of that Empire.”415 He also accused the Portuguese of bribing the Jesuits and 
the Chinese to ensure the Dutch trade demands were not met.416 Descriptions of how the 
Portuguese stifled Dutch efforts are prevalent in Nieuhof s account and constitute a 
unique contribution of the secular author to primary knowledge of European relations 
with China. This information travelled into the eighteenth century as Raynal repeated 
these descriptions, reminding his readers how in 1607 the Dutch tried to open up the 
China trade but “The Portuguese found means, by bribery, and the intrigues of their 
missionaries, to get the Hollanders excluded.”417 It became evident to European 
commentators, through these sources, that conflicts between European countries greatly 
affected trading relationships with China.
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Englishmen expressed similar frustrations over conflicts with the Portuguese and Dutch. 
Direct conflicts such as the 1623 Amboyna massacre of twenty men, ten of who were 
members of the British East India Company, by agents of the VOC undoubtedly 
contributed to the tone of tracts on the East India trade. Geographers, polemicists and 
philosophers complained about the problems that arose from these national rivalries. 
The national competitiveness led to a mistrust of information circulating on the trade: 
“The difficulty of trading with the Chineses in their own Country, is not so difficult as 
the Portingals and Hollanders would perswade the World for their own advantage”.418 
The anonymous author of this tract on the East India Company argued that, despite the 
hindrances by the Portuguese, the English have traded in Canton with great success.
Over the course of the eighteenth century, national rivalries were less prominent 
explanations for the inability to establish a flourishing China trade. European 
commentators began to argue the largest problem on the European side of the China 
trade was not the high degree of competition between countries, but rather the lack of 
competition between companies. This was a result of the rising power of the European 
East India companies. The debate over the impact of chartered companies and 
monopolies in the China trade featured prominently in eighteenth century popular 
sources, in which many authors argued against the monopolies and for the rights of 
individual merchants. For instance, a letter addressed to the Aldermen of the City of 
London in 1754 attacked the claim that free merchants did not have the ability to carry 
on the East India trade in the same manner as the East India Company. The anonymous 
author argued “every one knows, that the trade to China may be carried on from Britain 
directly, as it is from Sweden, and that, without a Company the same may be done from 
all other parts.”419 The high level of country trade (local trade that took place in the East 
Indies) conducted by free merchants indicated their ability to be successful, and “they 
do not ruin themselves, nor do they lose the trade, or give away all the profits to the 
natives.”420
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In contrast to the idea that China was solely responsible for limiting the number of ports 
where international trade could be conducted, some believed the large monopolistic 
European East India companies made this decision. Joshua Gee, an English merchant 
who wrote The Trade and navigation o f Great Britain considered (1729) -  a work that 
made him famous and went through many editions including a French translation in 
1750 -  argued that the English East India Company was at fault for limiting the China 
trade, and in particular, the number of ports at which international trade was 
conducted.421 He believed that the sales of British woollen goods would be higher in the 
colder, northern Chinese provinces, but the English captains chose to stay at Canton. 
According to Gee private traders knew better: “when private traders had liberty to go to 
China, they were of another opinion; they went to those places where they could get 
most money.”422
In reality, the East India companies did hinder the China trade. The English abandoned 
their factories at the port of Amoy and Chusan in 1707 and 1710 respectively because 
of the favourable possibilities of trade at Canton. This was well before the 1757 official 
Chinese restriction of foreign trade to Canton.423 A popular dictionary of trade in the 
eighteenth century written by Richard Rolt described the “inducement which the 
European merchants have to frequent Canton” in comparison to Amoy, namely that 
“whole fleets may be freighted in a short time there, and are not in danger of being 
delayed til the monsoon sets in.. .”424By 1740, the British met with a solid monopoly on 
in Canton, the Hong Merchants (a small group of elite merchants who dominated the 
Canton trade). By 1762, to combat the strength of the Hong monopoly, the English East
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India Company created one unified council to regulate all of its ships. Thus the trade 
was a dual monopoly where the interests of both China and Britain were represented, 
and vehemently defended.
Enlightenment philosophers, especially those of the Scottish Enlightenment, devoted a
great deal of time to analysing the distorting nature of these chartered companies on the
China trade. David Hume was one of the first prominent scholars to point out those
European actions that hindered the China trade (particularly as expressed by the varying
prices in gold and silver): “Thus the immense distance of China, together with the
monopolies of our India companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in Europe
the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in
that kingdom.”425 Later, Adam Smith also pointed to the negative impact of the
monopolistic system. If, as he argued, “rich and civilized nations can always exchange
to a much greater value with one another than with savages and barbarians”, he had to
explain how Europe has “derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East
Indies from that with America”.426 To answer this puzzle, he did not turn to descriptions
of isolationism, but rather blamed the fact that the “Portuguese monopolized the East
India trade to themselves for about a century” and when the Dutch began in the
seventeenth century to expand in that area, “they vested their whole East India
commerce in an exclusive company”. He continued on:
The English, French, Swedes, and Danes have all followed their 
example, so that no great nation in Europe has ever yet had the 
benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason 
need by assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the 
trade to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe 
and its own colonies, is free to all its subjects. 27
While Smith recognized the Chinese reasons for restricting foreign trade, he also
attributed some of the blame to the European system of national monopolies.
European observers and commentators recognized the European policies that hindered 
the China trade, particularly the influence of national rivalries and the existence of 
competing monopolies. As with European discussions of Chinese morality, the example 
of China helped Europeans reflect on the flaws in their own theories and policies.
425 D. Hume, “O f the Balance o f Trade”, in E. F. Miller (ed.) Essays Moral, Political, Literary, 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987).
426 Other factors Smith mentioned included the disadvantages to slave labour over free labour, which 
would acted against the success o f North America, and the role of the English constitution governing the 
North American colonies as benefiting their development.
427 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 564.
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Europeans did not assume their foreign trade practices were superlative. Smith believed 
China would improve if it expanded its foreign trade. However, he also argued 
European countries would grow if they revised their own monopolisitic practices.
3.4. AWARENESS OF CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE
Although the primary sources, geographers and philosophers attempted to understand 
the limitations of the China trade (both from the Chinese and European perspectives), 
they were also aware that some international trade did exist. From knowledge of active 
Chinese encouragement of foreign trade, to the numerous ways in which Europeans and 
Chinese merchants could exchange goods without formal permission, eighteenth 
century Europeans realized that while the China trade was restricted, the country was 
never completely isolated. During the Ming Dynasty, European sources had described 
how Chinese foreign trade occurred under the guise of tribute, a context that gave the 
Chinese a dominant position in the exchange. For instance, at the very start of his 
description of China, Olfert Dapper explained that the Chinese followed “too strictly” 
an Ancient Law prohibiting strangers from entering in their country, and noted 
“excepting such onely as bringing Tributes from adjacent Borders, paid Homage to their 
Emperor, as Supreme Lord of the World; or else Foreign Embassadors, under which 
pretence many drove there a subtile trade...”428 Dapper reported that some Turks, 
Tartars and Moguls feigned being ambassadors while actually behaving as merchants. 
When they presented cheap gifts to the emperor as a gesture, they tended to get at least 
twice the value in return 429 However, the Europeans sent few missions to the court of 
China, and the missions that were sent did not submit to tributary status (see Nieuhof s 
discussion above) 430 European sources also recognized that policies did not always 
dictate reality and subterfuge trade did exist. For instance, Richard Rolt in a dictionary 
on trade and commerce described the advantages of trading silver in China in exchange 
for gold. He noted “the exportation of gold is prohibited in China; but the magistrates, 
notwithstanding, will privately sell it to the Europeans.”431
428 Olfert Dapper, Atlas Chinensis: Being a second part o f  a relation o f  remarkable passages in two 
embassies from the East-India Company o f  the United Provinces to the Viceory o f  Singlamong and 
General Taising Lipovi and to Konchi, Emperor o f  China and East-Tartary... Translated by John Ogilby 
(London: printed by Tho. Johnson, 1671), 1. Note that the title page misattributes the original Dutch work 
to Amoldus Montanus.
429Ibid., 2.
430 Between 1655 and 1795 there were approximately seventeen Western missions that reached the 
emperor (six from Russia, four from Portugal, three or four from Holland, three from the Papacy, and one 
from Britain) J. K. Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West”, 148-9.
431 Rolt, A new dictionary o f  trade and commerce, 130.
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With the transition from the Ming to Qing Dynasty in 1644, primary sources of 
information on China reported the government’s active encouragement of international 
trade. Louis Le Comte’s Nouveaux Memoires (1696) was one of the first sources to 
explain the effect that dynastic change had on the China trade. He described the tenth 
“principle maxim” of Qing policy “to encourage trade as much as possible thro’ the 
whole empire...[And] To increase commerce, foreigners have been permitted to come 
into the ports of China, a thing till lately never known.”432 Around the same time, 
Nieuhof discussed how “the Great Cham of Tartary had conquer’d the empire of China, 
and all the kingdoms belonging thereunto, with the slaughter of some hundred 
thousands of people, and had proclaim’d a free trade in the city of Canton to all foreign 
people.”433 He also described how the Canton viceroys “jug’d, that the Holland 
merchants would bring great advantage and profit to the inhabitants of China, in regard 
that through the mutual commerce of these people, the defects of the country would be 
supply’d, and what was superfluous would be exported, which must necessarily very 
much advance the trade thereof, and increase the revenues of the country.”434 These 
viceroys then published this consent to a free trade, allowed the Dutch merchant 
Frederick Schedel to erect a factory and gave some of his companions leave to continue 
at Canton. However, soon after a commissioner from Peking arrived and dissuaded 
them from these overtures, claiming “it was one thing to grant a port to a foreign people 
and another to allow a constant habitation”.435 While an open relationship with 
established European factories was cautiously undertaken, the Chinese reportedly 
believed foreign trade with the Europeans was profitable. Nieuhof was still impressed 
that in Canton ships arrive from “all quarters of the world with a all manners of goods, 
wherewith they make a considerable gain.”436
In the eighteenth century, Du Halde reiterated these changes in Chinese policy and 
pointed out that trade had been opened to all nations, though adding the qualifications 
that it was only the port of Canton that is open to Europeans, and then only at certain 
times of the year, and even then they must anchor outside the port.437 In spite of these
432 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 290. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 73.
433 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 20.
434Ib id , 23.
435 Ibid.
436Ibid., 36.
437 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 335, Watt’s edition, Vol. 2, 302, French edition, Vol. 2, 208.
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limitations, a belief remained that China offered new opportunities for trade. The 
secular primary authors also described the existence of foreign trade with China.
Laurence Lange gave a complex portray of the chaotic diplomacy between the Russian 
trade embassy at the Chinese court at Peking.438 He revealed the difficulties, confusions 
and contradictions in engaging with the Chinese officials. Lange recounted a Chinese 
official statement that “commerce is looked upon by [them] with contempt...These 
[European] merchants come here to enrich themselves, not our people...”439 This is the 
aspect of Lange’s embassy that Smith referred to when he noted the Chinese disdained 
commerce. However later in his journal, Lange commented that he was “very glad to 
learn that the court had also begun to enter into a trade, which they had before looked 
upon as so contemptible a thing with them...that, since his majesty had given such 
authentic marks of the esteem he had for commerce....”440 Lange certainly noted the 
difficulties of the China trade such as the story of a French commissary trying to 
dispatch a ship from Canton but being meeting with corruption and excessive duties. 
However, he also commented on the substantial European trade at Canton, where he 
argued “they carry to China from Europe, and bring back from China, a very great 
variety of toys, and different sorts of curiosities, upon which they make a very 
considerable profit”.441 Anson also alluded to European trade with China. He described 
Canton as “frequented by European ships,” and identified an established European 
presence such as the English super cargoes and the resident Portuguese at Macao who 
he consulted with.442
Geographies repeated the advances in Chinese policy. In the Universal Traveller 
(1735), Patrick Barclay noted “in former times [the Chinese] exported in their own 
bottoms, not allowing any foreigner to enter their ports. But now they are grown wiser, 
and allow a free trade, as other nations do”.443 B. Le Stourgeon in A compleat universal 
history (1732-1738), pointed out the importance of foreign trade to the Qing: “The 
Chinese carry on a very great Trade with the Europeans, it being one of their State
438 Laurence Lange, “Journal o f Mr. De Lange” in Travels from St. Petersburgh in Russia to various parts 
o f  Asia ed. John Bell (Edinburgh: printed for William Creech, 1806).
439 Lange, “Journal o f Mr. De Lange”, 481-2.
™  Ibid., 487.
441 Ibid., 459.
442 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 353.
443 Patrick Barclay, The universal traveller: or, a complete account o f  the most remarkable voyages and 
travels o f  eminent men... (London: Printed for J. Purser, T. Read and S. Hester, 1735), 614. Similarly, in 
Modern History, Thomas Salmon wrote that the Chinese “admit everyone into their ports, and carry 
merchandise out o f China themselves”. Salmon, Modern History, 21.
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Maxims to encourage trading as much as possible, both at home and abroad; and as all 
their political maxims are calculated for the peace and plenty of their country, they 
would be soon reduc’d to great extremities, if their trade should once fail.”444 He 
described how China changed from a highly restricted foreign trade to a policy where 
Qing mandarins were required to facilitate trade, and “frequently furnish merchants 
with sums of money to improve to the best advantage.”445 Thus, the changes in China’s 
policy were widely discussed in European sources.
European observers and commentators recognized that China was not as absolutely 
chained to their ancient maxims as previously supposed. The changes in the China trade 
under the Qing Dynasty indicated the government did have some flexibility in their 
policies.
3.5. BALANCE OF TRADE
In this trade China maintained a strong position, and Europeans debated whether this 
commerce hindered or helped expand the wealth of their own countries. From 1699 to 
1751 silver made up an estimated ninety percent British exports to China.446 In 
exchange for the silver the English primarily received luxury goods such as porcelain, 
silk and tea. The China trade was large enough that it allowed for the development of a 
chinoiserie trend in Europe for Chinese manufactured goods. Further, although 
antithetical to the idea that China was isolating itself from significant European trade, 
the commerce with China occasioned debate over the implications of the massive influx 
of Chinese luxury goods in exchange for European precious metals.
Before the sea route to East Asia was sufficiently opened to expand the China trade in 
the seventeenth century, there was little discussion about the balance of trade. For 
instance, in the sixteenth century, Mendoza did not express concern about the influx of 
goods from China, but this is not surprising as a significant flow of goods from China 
was yet to begin, and there was still hope that China would begin to accept European 
manufactured goods (not just silver). However, as the trade increased, the debate over 
balance of trade intensified and by the seventeenth century, foreign trade was an
444 B. Le Stourgeon, A compleat universal history, o f  the several empires, kingdoms, states &c. 
throughout the known world... (London: Printed by Benjamin Baddam, 1732-38), 29.
445Ibid.
446 H.B. Morse, Chronicles o f  the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834, 4 Volumes (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1926-29), Vol. 1, 307-13.
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extremely divisive topic.447 A sub-category of mercantilists, labelled “bullionists,” 
viewed the outward flow of silver in terms of the export of wealth (an idea that 
originated in earlier Spanish debates). In the view of the bullionists, the China trade was 
negative because luxury items were bought in exchange for precious metals, which they 
believed should be held as reserves 448
The varying views of the intrinsic value of money fundamentally shaped the balance of 
trade debate. Revisionist economic historians, in the wake of Adam Smith, argue that 
silver should be viewed as a commodity rather than “money”. David Porter contends 
that the Chinese disinterest in British wool and tin meant the English East India 
Company was “forced, at considerable political peril, to finance its purchases of tea, 
silks, and porcelain with silver bullion...”449 However, the East India Company was not 
“forced” to trade silver, often traders made significant profits in this trade, and the 
China trade was not just a bilateral exchange as the goods were often re-exported in 
exchange for specie or other goods.450 Many Europeans recognized the significant 
arbitrage profits from the silver trade to China because silver was often exchanged for 
gold. The editors of the modem part of the Universal History noted that the China trade 
“was once very advantageous to the Europeans.”451 The same view was presented in A 
new general collection o f voyages and travels and both sources described the large 
profits derived from exchanging precious metals. The increasing trade England had with 
China, it was argued, led to goods such as “cloths, crystals, swords, clocks, striking- 
watches, repeating-clocks, telescopes, looking-glasses, etc” becoming “as cheap as in 
Europe...so that at present there is no trading to Advantage with any-thing but Silver in 
China; where considerable profit may be made by purchasing gold, which is a 
commodity there”.452 These sources did not reflect alarm at the European drainage of 
specie for Chinese manufactures 453
447 See D.C. Coleman, “Mercantilism Revisited”, The Historical Journal, 23:4 (1980), 773-791 for a 
review o f the historiographical problems surrounding the study o f mercantilism.
448 Irwin, Against the Tide, 35 and 38.
449 David L. Porter, “Monstrous Beauty: Eighteenth-Century Fashion and the Aesthetics o f the Chinese 
Taste” Eighteenth-Century Studies 35:3 (2002), 400.
450 There were two cycles o f significant divergence in bimetallic ratios between Europe in China. In the 
first cycle, the gold/silver ratio in China was 1:6, while in Europe it was 1:12. In the second cycle the 
gold/silver ratio was 1:10-11 in China and 1:15 in Europe, with prices converging by 1750. Dennis O.
Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Cycles o f Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century”, Journal o f  World History, 13:2 (2002), 393.
451 The modem part o f  an universal h i s t o r y . Vol.8, 238.
452 Green, A new general collection o f  voyages and travels, Vol. 4, 125.
453 The drainage o f specie to China did not concern Adam Smith either, because the staunch anti­
mercantilist viewed silver as a commodity. He argued that there were two consequences o f the annual 
exportation o f silver to the East Indies: the first was that plate was somewhat more expensive in Europe,
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Not everyone agreed. In 1732 Richard Cantillon, an Irish author, argued for the 
maintenance of a favourable balance of trade, which to him meant exporting 
manufactured products.454 He believed that the East India trade was profitable to the 
Dutch Republic, at the expense of the rest of Europe, because the Dutch traded the 
Eastern goods to Germany, Italy, Spain and the New World in return for money, which 
they sent to the Indies to buy more goods. While his view of the balance of trade 
increasingly lost currency in the eighteenth century, Cantillon was an early observer of 
the global dimensions of trade networks and the important place of the East Indies held 
within them.
Indeed, the global nature of international trade was increasingly discussed as it grew
throughout the early modem period and this understanding affected views of the China
trade. Joshua Gee argued that although a great amount of bullion is sent to Asia, they
“sell to foreigners as many of the said commodities as repay for all the bullion shipped
out, and leave with us beside a very considerable ballance upon that trade.”455
Montesquieu recognized the multiple centres involved in the global exchange of silver:
The consequence of the discovery of America was to link Asia 
and Africa to Europe. America furnished Europe with the 
material for its commerce in that vast part of Asia called the East 
Indies. Silver, that metal so useful to commerce as a sign, was 
also the basis for the greatest commerce of the universe as a 
commodity. Finally, voyages to Africa became necessary; they 
furnished men to work the mines and land of America 456
While Montesquieu believed Europe was the master orchestrating this cycle, the place
of the East Indies, and especially China as the prime absorber of silver, reflected its
recognized place in global trade.
Geographies also identified the importance of China in global trade. For instance, a 
1743 geography by Joseph Randall, a schoolteacher and agriculturalist, demonstrated 
awareness that trade was not bilateral and deficits should not be considered in isolation
of the global system. Describing the East Indies trade, he argued British exports to
China, India and Persia, which included bullion, clothes and several other items were
and the second that coined silver rose in value. However, Smith maintained that these consequences were 
“too insignificant to deserve any part o f the public attention.” Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 565.
454 Richard Cantillon, Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General, Translated by Henry Higgs (London: 
Frank Cass and Co., 1959). Part III, Chapter I: Of Foreign Trade.
455 Gee, The Trade and navigation o f  Great Britain considered, 26.
456 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 392, Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Quatrieme partie, 71.
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exchanged for china-ware, tea, cabinets, and other luxury items, “of which, ‘tis 
supposed, as much is re-exported to foreign nations, as repays all the bullion carried to 
these places, and a considerable balance besides”.457 Discussion of global trading 
linkages reveals the integral part that China had in the international trade system. In this 
sense Eurocentricism and Sinocentrism both misrepresent the diversity of European 
worldviews in the eighteenth century, where many contemplated the multiple poles 
involved in global trade.
While Europeans still desired the China trade to increase, they also hoped it would 
diversify. The actual trade that existed with China, where China exported luxury goods 
in exchange for largely silver, reflected an image of China as holding a powerful 
position. Over the course of the eighteenth century, as the support for mercantilism 
waned, there was less concern over the negative balance of trade with China. Although 
China sold Europeans luxury goods in exchange for precious metals, the trade was 
understood as part of a larger system of global commerce.
CONCLUSION
By the end of the eighteenth century Europeans still looked for solutions to expand the 
China trade. Alexander Dalrymple -  a Scottish bom East India Company traveller and 
researcher who spent time in Canton tirelessly trying to develop a more open 
international commerce - argued in 1769 that the China trade should be moved from 
Canton to Balambangan Island, near Borneo, where the duties would be less and trade 
would be freer. He pointed out this was also in the interest of the Chinese merchants 
who could be freed from the Hong merchant monopoly under which they had to pay to 
preserve their privileges 459 In a neutral land, both the British and Chinese merchants 
would benefit from independence from their respective governments. This perspective 
allies the interests of the British and Chinese governments against British and Chinese 
merchants. Dalrymple’s suggestion reflects how the linear narrative of Europeans 
entering the modem world with Smith’s promotion of the free market, while the
457 Joseph Randall, A system o f  geography; or, a dissertation on the creation and various phenomena o f  
the terraqueous globe... (London: Printed for Joseph Lord, 1744), 344.
458 Andrew S. Cook, “Dalrymple, Alexander (1737-1808)”, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
459 Dalrymple, A plan fo r  extending the commerce o f  this kingdom, 13-16, and 96.
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Chinese stagnated due to their isolationism, fails to capture the various agendas and 
nuanced views of eighteenth century observers.
The comments in geographical, philosophical and primary works available in Europe 
indicate a well-rounded and complex understanding of China’s policy towards foreign 
trade. First, there was an appreciation of China’s motivations and unique capacity to 
focus inward and rely on internal markets through the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Second, the problems contributing to the difficult trade relationship were not 
always seen as stemming from the Chinese. National rivalries, and the monopolistic 
system of the European trading companies were deemed hindering forces on the 
European side. Third, there was awareness of active Chinese encouragement of foreign 
trade indicating Chinese policy was more flexible than previously thought. Finally, the 
existence of a debate over the balance of trade with China reveals an understanding of 
the multiple poles involved in global commerce and China’s importance therein. The 
narrative of Chinese isolation was not a post-Enlightenment construction; however, it 
reflects only part of a wider context of the early modem discussion on the China trade 
that points to European commentators and observers who understood China’s unique 
ability to gain wealth from domestic trade; who did not assume the superiority of their 
trading policies; and who recognized China’s integral place in the early modem world. 
China’s international trade policies, though criticized by most observers and 
commentators, were not sufficient to lead to the dismissal of its system of political 
economy, nor its potential to amass significant wealth. Chapters three and four have 
demonstrated that while China’s domestic and foreign commerce policies and practices 
could be improved, they were not considered fundamental flaws of the Chinese system. 
The next category of analysis that was of critical importance was China’s form and 
practice of government.
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O u t l i n e :  5. “L a  S c ie n c e  d e s  P r in c e s ”
5.1. O r ie n t a l  D e sp o t is m
5.2. C h in e s e  d e s p o t is m  in  E n l ig h t e n m e n t  d e b a t e s
5.3. T h e  m o d e r a t e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  C h in e s e  c o n s t it u t io n
The subtitle to Francis Bernier’s French translation of Confucius Sinarum 
Philosophus, “La Science des Princes,” not only reflects the high esteem in which 
Confucius was held, but also the attempts by interested Europeans at connecting 
Chinese philosophy to the rising intellectual pursuit in Europe of a science of man and 
society, and in particular, a science of government.460 As Virgile Pinot described in his 
discussion of Bernier’s translation, Confucianism was not a speculative philosophy but 
rather, when merged with politics, a concrete science that could be used to educate 
young princes throughout the world 461 Bernier believed the Confucian system should 
be judged by what the Chinese empire had achieved, in which case the moral system 
was successful, given the country’s wealth and large population. To Bernier, this proved 
that the principle of centralized authority had merits, even if its application was 
defective in France.462 This underlines one of the most significant tensions in the 
political debates of early modem Europe, namely the relationship between theory and 
application. If the application of centralized authority tended to corruption in France, 
could it have had positive or different outcomes in the Chinese case?
The discussions of China’s government revealed two images of China: one despotic and 
one moderate. China was often admired for its antiquity, the wisdom of its maxims, the 
uniformity of its laws, the virtue of its administrators, and for the regularity and order it 
maintained, in spite of the problems of state such as civil or foreign wars, the injustice 
of princes, and the avarice of mandarins. Reacting against this image of moderate 
China, philosophers such as Montesquieu famously decried it as a bastion of fear and 
oppression; it was an infamous example of that pejorative concept, oriental despotism. 
However, the tension between moderate and despotic China cannot be neatly divided 
along the lines of sources. In fact, Jesuits such as Le Comte addressed tyrannical powers 
in the Chinese government and Montesquieu considered China’s more moderate checks 
and balances. In other words, the same source could recognize China had both moderate
460 The translation project was completed but only partially published by the time o f Bernier’s death. The 
introduction was published in the Journal des Sgavans in 1688. Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la Formation 
de VEsprit Philosophique en France (1640-1740) (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1932), 377-384.
461 Ib id , 379.
462Ibid., 383.
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and despotic qualities. The dominating question was whether China fit into the 
theoretical models of European philosophers, or whether it was a genuinely unique 
system. If it was the latter, what were the lessons and potential for replication of such a 
unique system?
This chapter examines views of China’s form of government and asks in which ways 
European observers and commentators approached, accepted and criticized its model of 
government. Chapter six will also address China’s government, but specifically as it 
related to the realities of day-to-day operations (governance) and China’s economic 
success. These two themes certainly interacted with each other (particularly with 
regards to the topic of property rights) but due to the complexity of the subject, I will 
consider constitutional issues in detail before addressing the practices of government as 
they related to political economy. This chapter begins by discussing the evolution of the 
concept of oriental despotism and its pre-Enlightenment relationship to China. The 
extent to which China posed a challenge to Enlightenment theories of ideal systems of 
government is addressed in the second section, which will prioritize the debate between 
Montesquieu and Quesnay to reveal the dual imaging of China as both despotic and 
moderate. It will be shown that most Enlightenment philosophers concluded that the 
Chinese system struck a unique balance between centralized authority and moderation. 
While some, notably Montesquieu, believed this balance could not be reproduced 
elsewhere, Quesnay viewed the system as the expression of natural law that should and 
could be replicated in all states, including Europe. The third and final section addresses 
the unique structural, moral and internal checks and balances in the Chinese constitution 
that reflected the moderate elements of the Middle Kingdom. Information about these 
checks was discussed in numerous primary sources and well known amongst the 
geographers and philosophers interested in the Chinese system.
5.1. ORIENTAL DESPOTISM
When considering views of China’s government in the eighteenth century, the concept 
of oriental despotism inevitably arises. This concept evolved in relation to the states of 
the Near East. It is evident from the early modem European primary, geographical and 
philosophical sources that China never fit neatly into this category. As a result, debates 
about Chinese despotism were closely linked to the empirical evidence available about 
their system of government.
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European discussions of eastern despotism during the early modem period were 
fundamentally shaped by early modem European politics, and in particular by the 
contrasting trajectories of France and England. The absolute monarchy of Louis XIV in 
late seventeenth century France, centralized the government, eliminated feudalism, 
reformed the army and finances, and created a uniform law that limited the role of the 
parlements, all of which curbed the power of the aristocracy. It was a militaristic 
government fighting several wars that were exacerbated by famines leading to the 
deaths of millions. Louis XIV’s power over the church and aristocracy increased, and 
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which threatened Protestants with exile, led to the 
fear of his tyrannical tendencies. By contrast with the ‘gloire’ but also the ‘tyranny’ of 
Louis XIV, the reign of Louis XV from 1715 to 1774 (including the regence by Philippe 
d’Orleans) was less dramatic but more scandalous. Over the years the king became 
extremely unpopular for his private luxuries and for losing French colonies, maintaining 
the central power of the monarchy; meanwhile, popular demand for reform rose.
During the same period, England’s political history witnessed dramatic fluctuations. 
The turbulent seventeenth century witnessed the Exclusion Crisis, the Restoration and 
the Glorious Revolution and ultimately led to a mixed constitutional monarchy 
restrained by the House of Commons. The factional politics between the Tories (who 
endorsed a strong monarchy to counterbalance the power of parliament) and the Whigs 
(who supported constitutional monarchism and the role of aristocratic families and 
eventually wealthy merchants in government) heavily influenced many writers of early 
modem England. France, therefore, represented an absolute monarchy where, as David 
Hume put it, “law, custom and religion concur;”463 and England was an example of a 
mixed monarchy (as Hume described it, not wholly monarchical, nor wholly 
republican), where debates ensued over whether, and in which way, the delicate balance 
between powers could be maintained.
463 David Hume, “Of the Liberty o f the Press” in The Philosophical Works o f  David Hume 4 Volumes 
(Edinburgh: Printed for Adam Black and William Tait, 1826), vol. 3, 9. This essay was first published in 
1741. This is particularly interesting because o f the similarity to Montesquieu’s description o f how the 
Chinese “confused religion, laws, mores and manners”. Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 318. 
Montesquieu, De TEsprit des Lois, 105. In fact, Hume and Montesquieu agreed on numerous points. For 
more on Montesquieu’s relationship to the Scottish Enlightenment see James Moore, “Montesquieu and 
the Scottish Enlightenment” in Rebecca E. Kingston (ed.), Montesquieu and His Legacy (Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 2000), 178-195.
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Within this context, the concept of oriental despotism first expounded by Aristotle in 
reference to Persia re-emerged with new life. The definition of despotism was 
consistent from Aristotle through to the Enlightenment in terms of its status as a legal 
and hereditary regime (thus distinguishable from tyranny), and its location in an oriental 
context.464 Joan-Pau Rubies’ examination of oriental despotism from Botero to 
Montesquieu points to the relationship between the concept and empirical evidence in 
early modem Europe 465 Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
primary descriptions of the Near East were used to enhance and modify the original 
concept of despotism. Not enough was known about China’s government (especially 
compared to Mughal India, the Ottoman Empire and the Persian state) in this period for 
it to drive the model of oriental despotism.
The notion over Chinese exceptionality was present in the formative stages of the early 
modem European theory of despotism. Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza gave a complex 
portrayal of the Chinese form of government. In some ways, according to the 
Augustinian, the Chinese were more like slaves than free men, particularly in relation to 
the importance of personal service, the insecurity of property rights and the corruption 
of governors 466 However, Mendoza also depicted Chinese emperors throughout history 
as a mixture of tyrants and benevolent leaders. His characterization of the Chinese 
government focused on the operation of the system, rather than the theoretical 
intricacies of the system. This is not surprising as the sources Mendoza relied on for his 
description did not have as much access to Chinese intellectuals to gamer information 
on their governing principles, as later Jesuits would. The image of the people as slaves 
supported the notion of Chinese despotism, but the discussion of corruption and 
behaviour of individual emperors indicated a tyranny, which was not systematic.
Descriptions of oriental states, such as Mendoza’s account of China, influenced 
evolving theories classifying systems of government. Rubies looks to the important role 
of Giovanni Botero’s Relationi Universali (Rome, 1591-96) in the evolution of the
464 Joan-Pau Rubies, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism”, Journal o f  Early Modern History 
9:1-2 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 115. Franco Venturi, “Oriental Despotism”, Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas,
24:1 (1963), 133-142.
465 Others have noted moments o f important confluence between ethnographic descriptions o f Asia with 
the development (or criticism) o f the concept o f Oriental Despotism. However these focus on particular 
figures, notably, Abraham-Hyacinte Anquetil-Duperron, who travelled to Asia and criticized 
Montesquieu’s use o f primary reports and theory o f despotism by referring to India, Persia and Turkey. 
Venturi, “Oriental Despotism”, 136-138.
466 Mendoza, The historie o f  ..China, 73 and 82
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concept of despotism, through his use of empirical evidence to refine the Aristotelean 
definition.467 Botero concentrated on the importance of geography (in terms of size and 
climate) as leading to despotism in Asia. This focus remained important throughout the 
Enlightenment, particularly with regards to China’s unique system of government. 
Botero argued that large empires were in fact weaker than those of Europe and pointed 
to the “excessive, counter-productive concentration of authority and revenues” without 
structural limitations 468 According to Botero, despotic governments did not care for 
their subjects. However, China was a notable exception in his scheme. Although it was 
despotic, lacked a nobility and the emperor controlled the movements of the people; 
justice, good policy and industry flourished and China was ultimately very well 
governed with peace as its aim469 The two sides of China thus appeared in the 
development of oriental despotism. Botero’s momentous sixteenth century study of 
despotism recognized the uniqueness of the Chinese system that did not comfortably 
meet all the criteria of a despotic model.
As the concept of oriental despotism solidified, China’s classification remained 
questionable.470 It was increasingly labelled despotic rather than monarchical but the 
extent to which it resembled the ideal type of despotism, or other oriental models such 
as Mughal India was fiercely debated. Because oriental despotism was not defined in 
direct relation to China, evidence about the Middle Kingdom either had to be selected to 
fit the concept or the label had to be adapted to fit the reality of China. These concerns 
would continue to burden philosophers of the Enlightenment who grappled with 
understanding and placing the Chinese government.
467 Botero’s use o f Mendoza is evinced by his repetition of the information and names o f Chinese cities 
discussed in Della cause della grandezza e magnificenza della citta (Rome, 1588). He also relied on 
Barros, Maffei and Michele Ruggiero, and the Jesuit letters. Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 2,
238 and 245.
468 Rubies, “Oriental Despotism...”, 126.
469 Note however the English and French translations decided to avoid the Italian despotico for the terms 
“absolute” and “tyrannical.” Rubies, “Oriental Despotism...”, 124. Botero, Relations, o f  the most famous 
kingdoms, 596-597. Apart from the term despotico, this discussion was accurately translated from the 
original Italian. See Botero, Delle Relationi Universali, Parte Seconda, 65.
470 An example o f the disagreements in classification is seen in the variation between the original French 
and two English translations o f Du Halde’s section on the authority o f the Chinese emperor. The original 
French stated “II n ’y a jamais eu d’etat plus monarchique que celui de le Chine: l'empereur a une autorite 
absolue & a en juger par les apparences, c'est une espece de Divinite.” French edition, Vol. 2, 156. The 
Cave edition, held to be the more accurate, added the term despotic: “There is no government whose 
monarchy is more despotic than that o f China. The emperor is vested with absolute authority, and to 
appearance is a kind o f Divinity”. Cave edition, Vol. 1, 241. Finally the Watts edition used the term 
absolute: “There is no monarchy more absolute than that o f China. The Emperor has an absolute 
authority, and the respect which is paid to him is a kind o f adoration”. Watts edition, Vol. 2, 12.
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5.2. CHINESE DESPOTISM IN ENLIGHTENMENT DEBATES
By the eighteenth century, empirical information on China increased and the 
relationship between scholarly theory and the primary sources of information became 
even more pivotal to discussion of the Chinese government. Though numerous authors, 
notably Montesquieu, labelled China despotic, nearly all commentators struggled to 
reconcile the many unique elements of the Chinese system. Quesnay defended the 
Chinese system of government against Montesquieu’s criticisms, and believed that 
China, operating on the basis of natural law, was replicable. However, even the 
Physiocrat addressed empirical evidence that questioned the merits of the Chinese 
system. The debates over China’s government reflect -  but extend beyond -  the 
boundaries of sinophiles and sinophobes because both despotic and moderate images of 
China were present in the same texts. Enlightenment commentators demonstrated a 
genuine engagement with the empirical descriptions of China, even if at times this 
interest was a necessity in order to penetrate debates rather than a personal desire to 
understand the Middle Kingdom.
Montesquieu opposed the centralizing force of Louis XIV, defended the French 
nobility, and wanted constitutional limits on the monarch.471 Because he believed the 
conditions and principles for a monarchy, despotism or republic could change over 
time, the concern over the potential for a monarchy to degenerate into despotism, and in 
particular France’s threat of becoming despotic, led to Montesquieu’s vehement attack
A H ' )on despotism. Thus, he needed the concept of oriental despotism to revive the idea of 
mixed monarchy and discuss the threats of centralized monarchical power.473 It is worth 
focusing on his famous assessment of the Chinese government at length because it 
brings two relevant themes to light. First, his relationship with the empirical evidence 
on China provided by the primary sources was paradigmatic of the oscillation between 
selectivity and genuine engagement with the available information. There is great 
debate as to the extent and nature with which Montesquieu united empirical evidence
471 Rubies, “Oriental Despotism...”, 118. Franco Venturi addresses the close relationship between the 
concept o f despotism in seventeenth century France and the absolutism o f King Louis XIV. Venturi, 
“Oriental Despotism”, 133. Melvin Richter also describes the concept o f Oriental despotism being driven 
by images of Louis XIV as a “Grand Seigneur or Oriental despot” in the eighteenth century. However, 
Richter argues that Montesquieu “transcended the mere interests of his class” and his “theory o f  
despotism served nobler purposes than the rationalization o f prejudices o f a privileged caste”. Richter, 
“Despotism”, 8. For more on Montesquieu’s background see Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu: a Critical 
Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
472 Rubies, “Oriental Despotism...”, 163
473 Ibid., 111.
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with theoretical models.474 Regardless of Montesquieu’s personal feelings towards the 
validity of his ideal types, it is evident that he felt it was necessary to cite prominent 
primary sources and engage with the information they provided. He knew that 
detractors from his theory would be inclined to use the same material to rebut his 
arguments. With Montesquieu’s desire (or need) to connect the empirical evidence to 
his theories on government, the case of China proved to be a thorn in his side.475 In De 
VEsprit des Lois, Montesquieu made several varied efforts to explain how China fit into 
to his schema, recognizing the major objections it posed to his arguments. Second, 
Montesquieu’s endeavour to fit China into his ideal type of despotism revealed the 
uniqueness of China’s government. Although he struggled, Montesquieu ultimately 
labelled China as a variant form of his ideal definition of despotism.476
Montesquieu’s conception of despotism has been widely studied. David Young argues 
that the philosophe formed his ideas on despotism based on Turkey and Persia and 
relied on a selective reading of the travel literature on these countries to support his 
theory.477 Earlier, E. Carcassone maintained Montesquieu relied on knowledge of the 
Near East to formulate his theory of despotism, and then as an afterthought tried to label 
China despotic, but had to modify his original position because of the information 
provided by the Jesuits 478 The most recent study of Montesquieu’s use of China by 
Jacques Pereira highlights three specific difficulties that China posed to Montesquieu’s 
theories: the first was China’s challenge to his typology of government, the second was 
China’s position as an alternative monarchical model to the French system (whereas 
Montesquieu wanted to improve and imitate England’s constitutional model), and 
finally the Chinese system undermined Montesquieu’s appreciation of noble privileges
474 Ibid., 162. Melvin Richter has argued that Montesquieu’s use of evidence was “highly selective", 
demonstrating “how Europocentric he remained in his view o f the world”. He argues that Montesquieu 
ignored Jesuit evidence when it did not support his theories, and instead turned to the testimony of  
traders. Melvin Richter, The Political Theory o f  Montesquieu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 72 and 84. Richter argues elsewhere that Montesquieu’s concept o f despotism was always meant 
as an “ideal type” and was not expected to be “empirically embodied in all its aspects”. Richter, 
“Despotism”, 9.
475 Walter Demel claims “It is well known how difficult it was for Montesquieu to force China into his 
system o f  three forms o f government.” Walter Demel, “China in the Political Thought o f Western and 
Central Europe, 1570-1750” in Thomas H.C. Lee (ed.) China and Europe: Images and Influences in 
Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991), 53.
476 Rubies, “Oriental Despotism...”, 162 and 165.
477 David Young, “Montesquieu's View o f Despotism and His Use o f Travel Literature,” The Review o f  
Politics, 40:3 (Jul., 1978), 392-405.
478 E. Carcassone, “La Chine dans VEsprit des Lois,” Revue d ’histoire litteraire de la France, XXXI 
(1924), 193-205.
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and parlements in France.479 Pereira argues Montesquieu used Du Halde to discredit the 
presence of honour in China, relied on Anson to attack the presence of virtue (discussed 
in chapter three of this thesis), and finally looked to the letters of the Jesuit Dominique 
Parennin to argue the government existed through fear.480 As Pereira points out modem 
historians such as Muriel Dodds and Rene Etiemble along with Montesquieu’s 
contemporaries like Voltaire and Quesnay have highlighted the contradictions, 
manipulation of evidence and errors in Montesquieu’s assessment of the government of 
China481 What follows here is not a catalogue of the unsatisfactory elements in 
Montesquieu’s writings, but rather an alternative explanation for his understanding of 
the Chinese Empire. Pereira questions Montesquieu’s motive when he addressed China. 
Did he want to demonstrate China was not as idyllic as the missionaries claimed, or did 
he want to save his system by proving it was despotic? There was an alternative way for 
Montesquieu to protect the integrity of his system.482 While he labelled China despotic, 
the more important assessment he gave the Middle Kingdom was that it was unique.
It is clear that Montesquieu struggled to deal with the challenge of the Chinese 
government. This led him to question the missionary evidence and note that the 
merchant sources did not reveal any evidence of virtue (citing Lange and Anson). 
Though he did not accuse the Jesuits of malicious lies, he speculated that the 
missionaries deceived themselves. However, he ultimately concluded, “there is often 
something true even in errors” and “particular and perhaps unique circumstances may 
make it so that the Chinese government is not as corrupt as it should be.” The jump 
from questioning the Jesuits evidence, to admitting that their descriptions of China’s 
good governance might have some validity, reveals the tenuous way in which 
Montesquieu dealt with the China case. It also evinces the balance between prioritizing 
his theoretical model of governments and addressing the empirical evidence that 
contradicted it.
In book eight, chapter twenty-one of De VEsprit des Lois, Montesquieu’s battle with 
China took centre stage as he attempted to “answer an objection that may be raised
479 Jacques Pereira, Montesquieu et la Chine (Paris: L’Hartmattan, 2008), 3eme partie, esp. 256 -257 and 
272.
m  Ibid., 264-6.
481 Ibid., 267. Muriel Dodds, Les Recits de voyages, sources de VEsprit des lois de Montesquieu (Paris: 
Honore Champion, 1929). Etiemble, L ’Europe Chinoise.
482 Ibid., 266.
483 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 127. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 143.
135
about all [he] has said to this point”.484 Because the missionaries claimed that a mix of 
fear, honour and virtue governed China, the Chinese Empire posed a significant threat 
to his schematic distinction between republics based on virtue, monarchies based on 
honour, and despotisms based on fear. His response to this challenge oscillated between 
using evidence to attack the Jesuit position and questioning the evidence itself. In the 
first instance he asked, “how one can speak of honour among peoples who can be made 
to do nothing without beatings”.485 Here, he cited the Jesuit Jean Baptiste Du Halde, and 
claimed, “the stick governs China”. This piece of information can be traced back to 
Alvaro Semedo’s The History o f that great and renowned monarchy o f China... 
(1655). In a chapter entitled “Of the prisons, sentences and punishments of the 
Chinesses”, Semedo described how the Japanese claimed that “they cannot goveme 
without Catana [the Sword]...so it may be said of the Chinesses, that without Bambu, 
that is, the cudgel or Boston, with which they use to beat men, it is not possible they 
should be ruled”.487 Semedo also remarked that the bastinado was administered to 
people of diverse social status and magistrates even ordered the beating of mandarins, a 
point that would be particularly offensive to Montesquieu, himself a nobleman. 
However, Semedo’s discussion of the bastinado occurred in a section on justice not 
governance. Du Halde repeated Semedo’s description of the importance of the 
bastinado in a section on the prisons and punishments for criminals. However, his 
phrasing was a bit more forceful about the importance of the bastonado in government: 
“commonly in China all punishments, except pecuniary ones, begin and end with the 
bastonado, in so much that it may be said that the Chinese governments subsists by the
484 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 126. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 143.
485 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 127. Montesquieu, De I’esprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 143.
There has been significant discussion about Montesquieu’s use of this information by Carcassone, “La 
Chine dans I'Esprit des L o i s Pereira, Montesquieu et la Chine, 263; Dodds, Les Recits de voyages, 150. 
Dodds argues Montesquieu relied on the sinophile Jesuits and sinophobe Anson and Lange, and that 
drawing on these diverging sources led to contradictions in Esprit. However, as we have seen the Jesuit 
sources also reflected a tension between moderation and despotism. Catherine Volphillhac-Auger, “On 
the Proper Use o f the Stick: The Spirit o f  the Laws and the Chinese Empire” in Rebecca E. Kingston 
(ed.), Montesquieu and His Legacy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 81-92.
Volphillac-Auger dedicates her chapter to attacking Dodd’s view o f Montesquieu. In particular, 
criticizing Dodd’s reading o f Montesquieu’s “idea o f despotism” and his alleged deliberate misreading o f  
the primary sources. Volphillac-Auger, while criticizing Dodds for not finding Du Halde’s reference to 
the cudgel, does not herself identify the origins o f this idea in the work o f Alvaro Semedo. While she 
accurately defends Montesquieu’s honest approach to the sources, her view o f Montesquieu’s 
engagement with the Chinese model does not satisfactorily account for his struggle to engage the Chinese 
system.
4 6 Timothy Brook, Jerome Bourgon, Gregory Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 158.
487 Alvaro Semedo, The history o f  that great and renowned monarchy o f  China (London: Printed for E.
Tyler and John Cook, 1655), 142.
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J Q Oexercise of the battoon”. Du Halde drew the connection between the system of 
government and the bastinado in passing, but notably not in his lengthy section 
describing the government. Thus Montesquieu clearly stretched this point, and an 
eighteenth century reader would only have to turn to Du Halde to recognize this.489 
Even Thomas Salmon’s popular geography Modem History only referred to the 
bastinado as a common punishment for crimes, indicating that the context presented in 
the primary sources could be easily understood 490 This claim was insufficient to simply 
dismiss the Chinese government as despotic. Montesquieu’s use of evidence here is 
questionable.
Another problem in his discussion of China centred on the Jesuit descriptions of honour 
in China. Montesquieu argued honour could not be present in a despotism because when 
the people were all equally “slaves, one can prefer oneself to nothing”.491 And yet, in 
other sections of his work, Montesquieu implied there might be aspects of the Chinese 
system that involved honour. In a chapter entitled, “A good custom in China”, 
Montesquieu described the practice where the emperor performed a ritual ploughing 
ceremony to open cultivation of the fields. He argued this was an admirable tradition 
because it involved the emperor rewarding the “plowman who has most distinguished 
himself in his profession; [the emperor] makes him a mandarin of the eighth order”.492 
In the following chapter Montesquieu described how this custom should be followed in 
southern Europe where people are “so impressed by the point of honour, it would be 
well to give prizes to the plowmen who had best cultivated their lands” 493 He therefore 
connected the Chinese practice of rewarding the ploughmen to the existence of honour. 
And yet, he still concluded that China was ruled by fear.
The absence of an intermediate power was another criterion of despotism Montesquieu 
turned to in order to categorize China. In fact, Walter Demel speculates it was the 
absence of an intermediate power with a name of its own in China that led Montesquieu
488 Du Halde, Cave edition, 312, Watts edition, Vol. 2, 229, French edition, Vol. 2, 134. In the original 
French: “qu’on peut dire que le Gouvemement Chinois ne subsiste gueres que par ‘exercise du baton”
489 Arnold Rowbotham argues this information was not actually found in Du Halde and speculates that 
Montesquieu received this information in conversation with the excommunicated Jesuit Figurist, Jean 
Franpois Foucquet in Rome in 1729. Rowbotham also argues that Montesquieu’s confusion about the 
Chinese was a result o f a conflict o f evidence he received from Foucquet and read from Du Halde. See 
Arnold H. Rowbotham, “China in the Esprit des Lois: Montesquieu and Mgr. Foucquet,” Comparative 
Literature, 2 (1950), 357-8.
490 Salmon, Modem history, 33.
491 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 27. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 49.
492 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 238. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Troisieme Partie, 28.
m lbid.
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to describe China as despotic ,494 In monarchies, Montesquieu argued, this power was 
composed of the nobility, which operated based on honour. He argued a “monarchical 
government assumes...preeminences, ranks, and even a hereditary nobility”.495 The 
primary travellers reported the Chinese ensured nobility was never hereditary 496 They 
related the Chinese argument that non-hereditary nobility was beneficial to the system 
of political economy. This type of intermediate power offered several benefits: it was 
said to increase trade; revenues were increased because no estates were tax free and no 
person was exempt from poll-money; powerful families could not usurp the authority of 
the prince; and the people were subjects not “many little kings” thus the emperor was 
obeyed. However, there were some indications of a type of hereditary nobility that 
existed. For instance, Gabriel Magalhaes described the nobility acquired by arms, which 
did not last in a family for more than three hundred years. Du Halde claimed the noble 
order was composed of “princes of blood, the dukes, earls, mandarins of learning and 
arms, those that have been mandarins formerly, but are not so at present, and the literati, 
who by their studies...are aspiring to the magistracy and dignities of the empire”. 497 
But the noble class that had influence in the state was not hereditary. Magalhaes 
described mandarins who were part of the supreme court, tasked with watching the 
conduct of mandarins in the provinces, and reporting on their behaviour so “that some 
may be raised to the highest offices, as the reward of their virtue and merit; and others 
degraded for behaving unworthy of the station they were raised to. These are, properly 
speaking the Inquisitors of the state”.498 This class of individuals clearly acted as a 
check on government.
Some observers reacted positively to the non-hereditary nature of nobility in China. 
Pierre Poivre, notably the son of a wealthy silk merchant, described how China’s 
ancient laws and government have made it “sensible that all mankind are bom equal, all 
brothers, all noble. Their language has not even hitherto invented a term for expressing 
this pretended distinction of birth” 499 They are all “equally the children of the emperor” 
and “have never so much as suspected an inequality of origin amongst them”.500
494Demel, “China in the Political Thought...”, 56.
495 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 27. Montesquieu, D e Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 48.
496 Magalhaes, A new history o f  China, 146.
497 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 241, Watts edition, Vol. 2, 12; French edition Vol. 2, 10.
498 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 249. Watts edition, Vol. 2, 35. French edition, Vol. 2, 28.
499 Poivre, Pierre, The travels o f  a philosopher. Being observations on the customs, manners, arts, . . .o f  
several nations in Asia and Africa. Translated from the French... (London: printed for T. Becket and Co., 
1769), 153. Translated accurately from the original French. Pierre Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe 
(Yverdon: n.p., 1768), 123.
500 Ibid.
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However, others, such as Montesquieu, foresaw problems in this system. Because the 
status of mandarin was dependent on the state and without an independent institutional 
or legal outlet, this class could not represent society against the state. The central issue 
for Montesquieu was the protection of liberty. However, elsewhere, Montesquieu 
indicated that China had another useful check to control the emperor, namely the 
Chinese people.
Montesquieu’s most useful way to address the Chinese government was by arguing that 
in many respects China was unique and thus inimitable. For example, he explained 
China’s relative lack of corruption as a distinct characteristic of the Middle Kingdom. 
While he used geography to argue that large states should be despotic because they 
require quick, decisive action, Montesquieu argued that China’s climate, which resulted 
in a large population, made it distinct: “In this country causes drawn mostly from the 
physical aspect, climate, have been able to force the moral causes and, in a way, to 
perform prodigies.”501 Ultimately Montesquieu argued that in China the people “will 
triumph over tyranny” because bad governments were immediately checked by the 
people. Unlike European princes, who feared the afterlife, a Chinese emperor 
“[knew] that, if his government is not good, he will lose his empire and life”. The 
idea that popular rebellion could act as a check on tyranny in China extended beyond 
Montesquieu and will be discussed further below. Apart from rebellion, Montesquieu 
believed China’s large population acted as a check on bad government through the 
priorities it necessitated. The people and the government had to concentrate on 
subsistence, so that it was in everyone’s interest to be able to work “without fear of 
being frustrated for his pains.”504
According to Montesquieu, another exceptionality of the Chinese case related to the 
severity of penalties. Chinese authors, he noted, observed that in their empire the 
harsher the punishments were, the closer the people came to revolution. Montesquieu 
remarked, “that China, in this respect, is a case of a republic or a monarchy.”505 These 
vagaries were present more often than not when he mentioned China. For instance, he 
described how censors were not needed in despotic governments; but he noted, “the 
example of China seems to be an exception to this rule, but in the course of this work
501 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 127. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 144.
502 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 128. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 144.
503 Ibid.
504 Ibid.
505 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 82. Montesquieu, D e Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 99.
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we shall see the singular reasons for its establishment there”.506 China was evidently a 
fluid and ‘singular’ case that while labelled despotic, continuously diverged from the 
ideal type of despotism that Montesquieu described. A final example of Chinese 
variance related to his description of the pattern of Chinese dynasties. He argued that 
the dynasties all started off well but this did not last: “virtue, care and vigilance are 
necessary for China; they were present at the beginning of the dynasties and missing at 
the end.”507 Initially emperors remembered the previous revolution caused by the 
corrupting force of luxury and thus they preserved the virtue that led them to the throne. 
However, “after these first three or four princes, corruption, laziness, and delights 
master their successors” and ultimately there was a revolution and a new dynasty began 
and China thus moved from monarchy to despotism in cycles.508 Montesquieu did not 
simply ignore the evidence on China. In fact, he sufficiently engaged with it to the 
extent that he implicitly admitted China did not fit neatly into his category of despotism.
Montesquieu concluded his section on China with a general attack on the concept of 
legal despotism: “Some have wanted to have laws to reign along with despotism, but 
whatever is joined to despotism no longer has force.” Therefore, China is a despotic 
state whose principle is fear”.509 Acknowledging the rules in China that moderated 
power (discussed below), he still felt the Chinese system was more despotic than 
monarchical. However, given the aforementioned exceptions that Montesquieu 
described about the Chinese case, it is questionable why he categorized it as despotic. 
As we saw from the discussion of the bastinado, Montesquieu ultimately relied on an 
abuse of empirical descriptions to connect the Chinese state to fear, and even then his 
argument was not consistent.
Montesquieu’s discussion of China has been widely studied with opposing 
conclusions.510 Reichwein believes Montesquieu was most interested with making
506 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 71. Montesquieu, D e Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 89.
507 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 103. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 119.
508 He explicitly uses the dynasties o f the Jin and Sui as examples o f when a monarchy was ruined, 
Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 116-7. Montesquieu, D e Vesprit des lois, Premiere Partie, 132.
509 Ibid. Montesquieu added that Chinese despotism “arms itself with its chains and becomes still more 
terrible”. The chains refer to the laws that moderate the government. Quesnay quipped about 
Montesquieu’s conclusion: “The author attempted to terminate his case with vigor, but the vigor is found 
only in the style; for we do not understand, and he could hardly have understood himself, what he meant 
by these words”. Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 247.
510 See Rubies, “Oriental Despotism...”. In his work on Sino-Westem relations Ren6 Etiemble interpreted 
Montesquieu as a cryptosinophile but as Brook, Bourgon, and Blue argue, this is not an especially 
convincing interpretation because Montesquieu’s contemporaries read him differently. However, they do
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China fit his own dogmas and so relied “only on the reports of traders.”511 While he did 
explicitly refer to Anson and Lange in contrast to Jesuit sources, he clearly relied on the 
Jesuits for most of his arguments on China and even admitted that there must be some 
truth in their descriptions of China’s admirable government. Another explanation of 
Montesquieu’s decision to label China despotic was his criticism of how the Chinese 
treated aristocrats in the judicial system.512 As a defender of the nobility, China’s 
intermediate class defined through a meritocracy, along with the subsequent equality of 
punishment for this class offended his sensibilities. However, Montesquieu could have 
argued that there was an intermediate class whose power was protected by the 
bureaucratic system and imposed critical check on the absolute power of the emperor. 
One of the most convincing arguments is provided by Gunther Lottes who contends that 
China was the case that threatened Montesquieu’s system the most because it merged 
absolutism and rationalism. The Chinese government was a unique paternal despotism, 
because of its population, had to focus on tranquillity and agriculture so there was no 
room for liberty.513 This perspective reflects the importance of Chinese singularity, 
which was a critical aspect in the dismissal of the Chinese system of political economy 
because it could not be a universal model. Montesquieu did not label China despotic 
because China was part of the Orient, but because it was clearly not a republic (which 
many primary sources noted the Chinese had never heard of, and when they were told 
about it514) nor, more important, was it a constitutional monarchy like England. Thus 
according to his schema, it had to be despotic. Montesquieu, while admitting 
exceptionalities, did not want to idealize a system whose delicate balance was simply 
not replicable in a European context. China’s large population differed from France 
(and any other state in the world) and thus while China was a uniquely functional 
system it was not reproducible and thus could never be an alternative model of 
government.
Montesquieu’s contemporaries did not passively accept his labelling of the Chinese 
government. Fran?ois Quesnay launched a vehement attack on the notion of Chinese
note that Montesquieu considered Chinese despotism to be moderated. Brook, Bourgon, Blue, Death by a 
Thousand Cuts, 279.
511 Reichwein, China and Europe, 94.
512 Brook, Bourgon, Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 163.
513 Gunther Lottes, “China in European Political Thought, 1750-1850” in Lee (ed.) China and Europe, 78.
514 The modem part o f An Universal History cited Nieuhof and Le Comte in a discussion of the Chinese 
view o f the Dutch state as a republic, “which appeared to them rather as a monster with many heads, the 
spurious offspring o f lawless ambition and stubbornness, begotten and bred, as they supposed, in times of  
anarchy and confusion, could possibly subsist without some sovereign power to curb and suppress the 
one and steer and govern the other.” The modem part An Universal History, Vol. 8, 140.
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despotism.515 Quesnay devoted a relatively lengthy section of his Despotimse de la 
Chine to attacking the “Assertions of M. de Montesquieu”.516 Quesnay’s well- 
documented interest in China led the Marquis de Mirabeau, the co-founder of the school
c i  7
of Physiocracy, to describe him as the “venerable Confucius of Europe.” Like 
Montesquieu, Quesnay concerned himself with uniting empirical evidence of the world 
with his theoretical models. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese points out that while half of 
Quesnay’s library consisted of his medical collection, the remainder largely comprised 
of dictionaries, geographies and histories, demonstrating his interest in the empirical 
evidence of the wider world.518 However, the Physiocrats had a clear intellectual agenda 
of praising the natural benefits of an agricultural economic system. The differentiation 
between tyrannical despotism and legal despotism (where the monarch or emperor ruled 
according to natural laws) was in the Physiocrats’ view essential to understanding the 
nature of Chinese government. Legal despotism was an ideal, imitable model of 
government that encouraged a healthy political economy.
Quesnay was not as disapproving as Montesquieu on the subject of the bastinado (as the 
Physiocrat was a critic of hereditary aristocracy and appreciated the Chinese egalitarian 
system of punishments). He claimed that contrary to Montesquieu’s argument that the 
Chinese lived in fear, these beatings were only lightly administered.519 He also relegated 
the bastinado to its proper realm, that of the justice system, by asking, “Is there any 
government without penal laws?”520 Quesnay’s reference to the fact that the original 
description of the bastinado did not occur in a general account of the Chinese 
government indicated he paid close attention to the primary sources.
Quesnay also questioned Montesquieu’s claim that unlike princes in Europe, who are 
afraid of the ramifications of their bad behaviour in their afterlife, the Emperor of 
China’s concerns were more temporal and he “knows that if his government is not
515 A source that also directly attacked Montesquieu, and who Quesnay relied on heavily, was Jacques 
Philibert Rousselot de Surgy’s Melanges interessans et curieux... 10 volumes (Paris, 1763-1765). 
Specifically Volume 5 (Paris: Chez Lacombe, 1766), 180, which argued China did not fit into 
Montesquieu’s system o f despotism. For instance pages 168-169 refer to the battoon being about penal 
system. Rousselot de Surgy concluded for numerous reasons the “nous portent a regarder l’Empereur de 
la Chine, moins comme un despote absolu que comme un monarque en qui reside une autorite tres- 
etendue, mais temperee par les loix”, 177.
516 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 247 and 239. Maverick notes that a large part o f this work and 
particularly this section was taken from Rousselot de Surgy’s Melanges interessans et curieux...
17 Ronald L. Meek, The Economics o f  Physiocracy: Essays and Translations (London: Ruskin House, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962), 19.
518 Elizabeth Fox Genovese, The Origins o f  Physiocracy, 96.
519 Brook, Bourgon, Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 165.
520 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 239. Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 622.
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good, he will lose his kingdom and his life”. First, Quesnay pondered why 
Montesquieu was suddenly concerned with the role of the afterlife in controlling human 
behaviour, as his work was on the topic of human laws. The second and more pointed 
comment by Quesnay questioned why Montesquieu would not believe that the fear of 
losing kingdom and life would be the most effective check on tyrannical despotism. He 
asked, “Would the counter-weights, which [Montesquieu] would like to establish, be so 
much more powerful and more compatible with the permanent solidity of good 
government?”522 Quesnay was unnecessarily critical on this point because Montesquieu 
(and others, as we will see below) did recognize the importance of China’s large 
population as a check on government.
The Physiocrat claimed Montesquieu’s biggest failure was in seeing all despotisms as 
tyrannical and absolute. In other words, Montesquieu was too closely aligned with his 
theoretical structure, which led him to inaccurate characterizations of real world 
examples. However, Quesnay also had his own theoretical precepts that he prioritized. 
For instance, when discussing China he claimed, “[a] large population can accumulate 
only under a good government, for bad governments destroy wealth and men.”524 Like 
Montesquieu, Quesnay also had great difficulty balancing his theory with contradictory 
empirical information about China. One of his less convincing resolutions of this 
tension between theory and evidence rested on the distinction between the Chinese 
constitution and the practical administration of its government. In response to 
Montesquieu’s criticism of infanticide, Quesnay argued that it was not the result of the 
constitution of the government, but instead it was a problem of action. He argued that in 
a well-governed kingdom, the only way to prevent overpopulation was to have colonies, 
and on this issue “one may find in the administration of the government and in the 
inhabitants of China a clearly reprehensible fault”.525 In effect, Quesnay admitted to
521 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 245. Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 625.
522 Ibid.
523 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 247 Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 627.
524 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 244. Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 625.
525 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 262. Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 635. Quesnay drew 
the idea that colonies prevent overpopulation from Jean Francis Melon’s Essaipolitique sur le 
commerce (1734), which also encouraged agricultural economies. Melon’s essay also claimed that the 
Chinese did not follow their ideal theories o f government in practice and he was much more critical o f the 
Chinese government than Quesnay. Maverick, China, a model fo r Europe, 34 and 130. The 1761 edition 
o f Melon’s Essai included an extra seven chapters added to the original 1734 edition in 1736. Melon 
asked, “Quelle nation n'a pas un legislateur religieux ou philosophe, d'une morale aussi salutaire que celle 
de confucius et aussi mal observee?” Jean Francois Melon, Essai Politique sur le commerce Nouvelle 
edition (p.p., 1761), 389.
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admiring the Chinese system in theory but understood the problems it endured in 
practice.
Both Quesnay and Montesquieu prioritized their theoretical ideals, but both also 
concerned themselves with the empirical case of China, and its notable exceptions. 
Quesnay, believed the Chinese system was replicable (though it is unclear as to what 
extent), while Montesquieu’s label of China as despotic was full of exceptional 
elements that meant it was in effect inimitable. The notion of a moderate Chinese 
government was alluded to by Montesquieu, explicitly argued by Quesnay and based on 
the information provided by the primary sources of information on China.
The debate on Chinese despotism persisted into the end of the eighteenth century. 
Cornelius de Pauw’s Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois (1774) 
referred to China’s government as viciously despotic, like other Asian governments, 
keeping the notion of oriental despotism firmly alive. And yet Chinese despotism did 
not affect views of its economic potential or wealth. This can be explained because 
alongside the broad idea of Chinese despotism were primary descriptions, geographical 
summaries and philosophical acknowledgements of a number of distinct provisions and 
precautions embedded into the system that ensured that it functioned moderately.
5.3. THE MODERATE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION
From Montesquieu and Quesnay’s principal conclusions about the Chinese government 
two distinct images of Chinas appear, one despotic and one moderate. Rather than being 
seen as contradictory, these two labels fit the descriptions given by the primary sources. 
Le Comte explicitly referred to these two Chinas. He described how the “unbounded 
authority which the laws give the Emperor, and a necessity which the same laws lay 
upon him to use that authority with moderation and discretion, are the two props which 
have for so many ages supported this great brick of the Chinese monarchy”.527 The 
emperor was treated as the Son of Heaven, whose sacred commands were respected and 
obeyed. Le Comte discussed six examples that signified the supreme authority of the
526 De Pauw also discussed the bastinado as reflecting fear in Chinese society. He often compared China 
to other eastern states such as Persia and Turkey. Cornelius de Pauw, Philosophical dissertations on the 
Egyptians and Chinese Capt. J. Thomson (translator) 2 Volumes (London: printed for T. Chapman,
1795), vol. 1, 292. Accurately translated from the original French. Cornelius de Pauw, Recherces 
Philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois (Paris: Chez Francis Bastien) in Oeuvres philosophiques 
de Pauw 7 Volumes (Paris: J.F. Bastien, 1794) Vol.2, 425.
527 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 243. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 4.
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emperor ranging from his power in assigning bureaucratic and administrative posts, the 
extent of his revenue, his right of making peace and war, his liberty in choosing his 
successor, his dominion over dead subjects, and his power with regards to changing the 
Chinese language (as opposed to the power of custom in shaping it). However, in 
spite of all these powers, “so many are the provisions, and so wise the precautions 
which the laws have prescribed to prevent them, that a prince must be wholly insensible 
of his own reputation, and even interest, as well as of the publick good, who continues 
long in the abuse of his authority”. Here we have an image of a moderate China. 
Early modem observers and commentators disagreed about the language to express this 
form of government (from tyranny to despotism from enlightened to absolute) but even 
Montesquieu and Le Comte agreed that while the Chinese emperor enjoyed absolute 
authority, there were moral, structural and legal provisions in place that enabled 
Chinese civilization to achieve a delicate balance in government.
A  STRUCTURAL CHECK
Whether opposing, supporting or qualifying the idea of Chinese despotism, numerous 
sources described a unique check on the Chinese government, namely the role of 
insurrection. In Hume’s essay O f the Rise and Progress o f the Arts and Sciences (1742), 
he described the “extensive despotism of a barbarous monarchy.” His opposition 
between barbarous monarchy and a civilized monarchy gave rise to the question on how 
to situate China in this schema. Hume argued that although the Chinese government
CO A
was a pure monarchy, “it is not, properly speaking, absolute”. This was a result of the
nature of its geographic isolation and therefore lack of military discipline (discussed
further in chapter six) in combination with their large population. So that,
the sword, therefore, may properly be said to be always in the hands 
of the people, which is a sufficient restraint upon the monarch, and 
obliges him to lay his mandarins or governors of provinces under the 
restraint of general laws, in order to prevent those rebellions, which 
we learn from history to have been so frequent and dangerous in that 
government.531
This led Hume to speculate, in a footnote, that “perhaps, a pure monarchy of this kind, 
were it fitted for defence against foreign enemies, would be the best of all governments,
528 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 244-252. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 6-17.
529 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 252. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 17.
530 David Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress o f the Arts and Sciences” in The Philosophical Works o f
David Hume 4 Volumes (Edinburgh: Printed for Adam Black and Wiliam Tait, 1826), vol. 3, 122 f  13.
531 Ibid.
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as having both the tranquillity attending kingly power, and the moderation and liberty of
C I Opopular assemblies.” Hume’s relegation of this observation to a footnote is revealing.
If this were the recipe for the “best of all governments” then why would he not give it a 
more prominent place in his essay? Hume argued that China’s geographic isolation and 
large population led to this unique circumstance, which did not exist anywhere else in 
the world, thus the system was inimitable. As we saw above, both Monesquieu and 
Quesnay discussed the idea of China’s population as a check on government. This idea 
was also present in other primary, philosophical and geographical sources that revealed 
the uniqueness of the Chinese system.533
M o r a l  c h e c k s
Beyond the check of the people, a result of Chinese geography, Le Comte argued three 
things “are exceedingly conducive to the publick peace, and are as it were the very soul 
of the government. The first is the moral principles that are instilled into the people. The 
second is the political rules that are set up in every thing. The third is the maxims of 
good policy which are, or ought to be every where observed”.534 The most notable 
anchoring force for the Chinese system of government that underpinned the three 
elements conducive to the public peace was Confucianism.535
Ever since the publication of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus in 1687, Europeans were 
aware of the role and impact of the philosophy of Confucius in China. Many of the 
fundamental Confucian principles made their way into analysis and discussion of the 
Chinese government. The view of Confucianism as providing the basic principles of 
morality and governance led to an image of a stable Chinese system. From Adam
533 Etienne de Silhouette, who eventually became controller-general o f France, made a similar argument 
as Hume in Idee generate du gouvernement det de la morale des Chinois (1731). However Silhouette 
argued that the authority o f the Chinese emperor was ‘despotique’ but it was controlled by concern for his 
reputation and interests because he could not abuse his power for long due to the laws and the threat o f  
revolution. Etienne de Silhouette, Idee generate du gouvernement det de la morale des Chinois {n.p.,
1731). Silhouette’s work on China was notably influential on his successor as controller-general, Henri 
Bertin (who would also support French Jesuit work in China as well as encourage East India Trade). See 
Gwynne Lewis, “Henri-Leonard Bertin and the Fate o f the Bourbon Monarchy: the ‘Chinese 
Connection’” in Malcolm Crook, William Doyle, and Alan Forrest, Enlightenment and Revolution:
Essays in Honour o f  Norman Hampson (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2004), 71. The hazard o f  
rebellion in China was also repeated in the modem part An Universal History, which cited Juan de 
Palafox y  Mendoza, Martini, Le Comte, and Du Halde. The modem part An Universal History, vol. 8,
142.
534 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 265. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 35.
535 For a discussion o f the influential and important role of the relationship o f Confucianism and the West 
see Mungello, Curious Land.
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Smith’s arguments about the importance of civic education to Quesnay’s emphasis on 
the importance of educating “the thinking part of the people” about government, 
philosophers agreed that morality should be viewed as part of the science of 
government. Quesnay believed that “the natural laws include the rule, and the evidence 
of the excellence of the rule [whereas the] positive laws show only the rule”. While 
having the proper structural checks and balances in place was necessary, an embedded 
morality must also govern.
Attention was drawn to three particular moral constraints: the respect children pay their 
parents, the veneration which all pay the emperor and his officers, and the “mutual 
humility and courtesy of all people”.537 These tenets reflected a wider approach to 
morality regulating society. Melvin Richter points out the Greek etymology of the term 
despot being despotes, which referred either to the head of a family, or the master of 
slaves.538 The origin of this term had particular resonance for China. The ancient 
Chinese lawgivers asserted the maxim that kings were the fathers of the people, not 
masters to slaves. Navarrete described the emperor as the father of the empire and then 
compared this principle to the late fifth and early sixth century King Theodorick’s 
adage, “The prince is the publick and common father.”539 The paternal care resulted in 
constant inquiring into the state of the empire so that when a calamity occurred the 
emperor was aware and deprived himself of pleasures so he suffered along with his 
subjects. The Jesuit Gabriel de Magalhaes reported the nine qualities of a virtuous 
prince according to Confucius’ The Golden Mediocrity.540 He noted that if the Emperor 
behaved in a virtuous way, this would be imitated by the mandarins and down the 
bureaucratic ladder until everyone in China behaved morally in the image of the Prince. 
Du Halde also described the ready obedience of the people who venerated the 
mandarins like parents, in part because they were taught to, and in part because the
536 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 275.
537 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 279. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 56. This was 
repeated in Anonymous, The Chinese Traveller, V ol.l, 92 and 106.
53 Melvin Richter, “Despotism” in Dictionary o f  the History o f  Ideas 7 Volumes (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s sons, 1973), vol. 2, 2.
539 Theodorick was also known as “the people’s king”. He was King o f the Ostrogoths, ruler o f Italy, 
regent o f the Visogoths and Viceroy o f the Eastern Roman Empire. Churchill, A Collection o f  Voyages 
and Travels, Vol. 1, 22.
540 Gabriel de Magalhaes, A new history o f  China containing a description o f  the most considerable 
particulars o f  that vast empire...done out o f  French (London: Printed for Thomas Newborough, 1668), 
193.
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mandarins treated them well. This allowed the mandarins to govern easily as their 
orders were obeyed.541
The reputation of the emperor and government administrators was based on their 
behaviour as fathers and wise, moral leaders. The use of reputation as a check on 
passions is reminiscent of Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator” in the Theory o f Moral 
Sentiments. This type of check on behaviour was not just seen as existing for the 
Emperor, but also applied to all other levels of government. The role of the daily Peking 
Gazette enabled this constraint to operate on a practical level because it reported the 
names of mandarins who lost their offices and the reasons for their dismissal (for 
instance negligence in gathering the emperor’s tribute, or squandering it), as well as 
those who were promoted and the reasons for their promotion.542 In addition, the paper 
reported all capital convictions, natural disasters (and the responses by mandarins to 
them), the expenses for the subsistence of soldiers, the necessities of the people, and the 
present state of public works. Connected to the role of reputation in controlling the 
negative passions of the emperor, there was also a practice of having a select group of 
men write the history of an emperor’s reign and daily actions. These men kept their 
writings sealed until the entire dynastic line died and then the information was 
published.543 This type of constraint by such a highly regarded spectator in China -  
history -  took Smith’s impartial spectator a step further. China’s lengthy history 
enabled a consistent morality based on Confucianism to emerge. This morality acted as 
a check on government and thus was a unique feature of the Chinese system.
I n t e r n a l  c h e c k s
Constitutional checks also existed to control the negative passions of the imperial 
administration. These checks were built into the system and led to the praise for China’s 
admirable model of government. China had ten principal maxims of good policy, which 
were expounded by Le Comte and repeated in most popular geographies that described 
the Middle Kingdom.544 These maxims were (1) to never give someone office in his 
own province; (2) to retain at court the children of the mandarins to ensure their fathers 
perform their duties; (3) to prevent money from affecting the outcome of the justice
541 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 252. Watts edition, Vol. 2 ,4 6 . French edition, Vol. 2. 34-35.
542 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 260. Watts edition, Vol. 2, 70. French edition, Vol. 2, 50.
543 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 255. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 20.
544 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 279-291. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 56-74.
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system by allowing the emperor to appoint a new judge to a case if he believes the 
sentence was not appropriate; (4) to bestow offices based on merit; (5) to not allow 
strangers to share in administration; (6) to never allow the nobility to become 
hereditary; (7) to keep up in peace and war great armies, maintain credit and respect 
from neighbours (which will be addressed in the following chapter); (8) to be liberal in 
rewards and severe in punishments; (9) to forbid women from all trade and commerce; 
and finally, (10) to encourage trade throughout the whole empire.
Although not explicitly discussed in the list of ten maxims, the ability of mandarins and 
the people to lodge formal complaints was also often reported as an essential and 
remarkable check on executive power. Le Comte listed several examples supporting the 
principle of mandarins telling the Emperor of his faults. One such example was the case 
of an officer of the court telling the emperor that he left the palace too often, and stayed 
too long abroad in Tartary. At times these complaints were heeded, other times ignored 
or punished.545 Le Comte added that if the mandarin was correct in his criticism and the 
emperor punished him for it, the mandarin became a public martyr. Similarly, the 
people had the power to protest their situation through the channels of government. Any 
citizen could petition the Emperor for the removal of a mandarin if they could prove 
they were mistreated.546 Further, mandarins were to be accessible to hear complaints 
from the people under their care. But as Le Comte noted this could be difficult in 
practice, thus the Emperor also dispatched trusted spies to monitor behaviour of the 
provincial mandarins, who were often removed by great distances from the centre of the 
empire. The risks of the decentralized power were mitigated by morals and monitoring. 
According to the editors of the modem part of An universal history, the emperor’s 
engagement and care for the people distinguished him from “other Eastern monarchs” 
because although some claimed he indulged in pleasure and lived with concubines, he 
was in fact constantly occupied with the welfare of his state.547
The Jesuits also reported that checks on government officials should not often be 
required as they are promoted on a meritocratic rather than hereditary basis. As 
mentioned, the fourth maxim of the Chinese government was to never to sell any 
offices, but bestow them based on merit and judged by the examination system. Many
545 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 254. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 19-20.
546 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 261. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 28.
547 The modem part o f An Universal History, Vol. 8, 144. Salmon, M odem History, 25 made the same 
point.
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sources, beginning with Barros’ Decadas (1552), described the formation of the 
Chinese civil service and the practice of examining those who held office.548 Mandarins 
enjoyed significant power. Ricci commented that China was, to a certain extent, an 
aristocracy because of the emperor’s lack of power to increase a monetary grant or to 
confer a magistracy upon someone “except on request of one of the magistrates”.549 Le 
Comte noted, “Merit, that is honesty, learning, long experience, and especially a grave 
and sober behaviour” are the only determinant qualities in appointing members to his 
bureaucracy.550 The highest post in the land, that of Emperor, was also in theory able to 
be assigned based on merit. As another example of the Emperor’s supreme authority, Le 
Comte pointed out that he had the ancient right to choose his successor not only from 
the royal family, but also from other subjects. He claimed this was put into practice with 
“impartiality and wisdom” so that successors were chosen based on their virtue and 
understanding.551 Poivre described an account of ancient emperors who chose as their 
successors “two simple labourers”, who subsequently “advanced the happiness of 
mankind.” Le Comte qualified such claims earlier by pointing out that these 
examples are “seldom known” and Emperors in recent history chose their successor 
from within their own families, though they did not always choose the oldest son.
Numerous anecdotes were provided in the Jesuit publications, and repeated in the 
popular geographies to support the claim that these maxims were in fact practiced in 
China. For instance, Le Comte recounted a story about the journey of the emperor who 
crossed the path of a peasant. The peasant told the emperor that a Tartar mandarin took 
away his only son and left him without any help. In response, the emperor gave the 
mandarin’s office to the peasant and executed the mandarin involved.553 This story not 
only revealed the swiftness of justice, but also the meritocratic system practiced in 
China. Another example about the consequences of corruption stemmed from Le 
Comte’s own time in China. When he was in Peking it was discovered that three colaos, 
who he noted were equivalent to Ministers of State, had taken bribes. Upon learning 
this, the Emperor took their salaries, ordered them to retire, and one of them was
548 Lach, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, Vol. 1, 740.
549 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 46.
550 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 244. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 6.
551 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 250. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 14. Du Halde also 
discussed the remarkable tendency o f princes o f “preferring the welfare o f their subjects to the glory and 
splendor o f their own family” but noted that more recently the emperor chose his successors from his 
family based on merit and capacity to govern. Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1,242. Watts edition, Vol. 2,
16. French edition, Vol. 2, 13.
552 Poivre Travels o f  a philosopher, 152. Poivre, Voyages d ’un Philosophe, 122.
553 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 262. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 30-31.
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condemned to guard the palace gates with other common soldiers.554 This story 
reflected the equality with which the intermediate class was punished. These individual 
anecdotes were significant for seemingly uniting China’s precepts of government with 
its practice.
The notion that the Chinese government was perfect in theory but not in practice is 
reminiscent of the praise of Chinese moral theory and criticism of its practical morality. 
Le Comte argued that tyranny and oppression in China stemmed from the “princes own 
wildness, which neither the voice of nature, nor the laws of God can ever 
countenance.”555 When the Emperor was “full of violence and passion”, his mandarins 
followed suit, the system disintegrated, people formed together into armies and the 
public peace was disturbed.556 Le Comte’s discussion of the Chinese dynastic cycles of 
corruption demonstrates the criticism of the Chinese system and honest recognition of 
its instability. Again, the sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy does not hold.
Thomas Percy (the English proto-sinologist and author of Hao Kiou Choaun (1761)) 
similarly discussed the gap between the Chinese government in theory and in practice: 
“If we examine the Chinese government in theory, nothing seems better calculated for 
the good and happiness of the people; if in practice we shall no where find them more 
pillaged by the great.”557 The magistrates were greedy and laws could not successfully 
check these tendencies because “after all, as the Chinese laws are merely political 
institutions, and are backed by no sanctions of future rewards and punishments, though 
they may influence the exterior, they will not affect the heart, and therefore will rather 
create an appearance of virtue, than the reality.”558 Percy claimed Anson was mistaken 
for only seeing the visible corruption of the Chinese and thus conceived a poor opinion 
of their laws. He also argued the editors of the modem part of An Universal History 
were incorrect for believing in the excellence of the Chinese laws and thinking their 
corruption was only partial and recent. Indeed, Percy claimed, “that grand source of 
corruption, a strong desire of gain, must always have prevailed in a country so
circumstanced as China: nor was it in the power of any laws merely human to prevent
its effects”559
554 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 245. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 6.
555 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 243. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 4.
556 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 257. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 17.
557 Percy, Hau Kiou Choaan, Vol. 2, 166.
55*Ibid , 167.
559 Ibid., 168-9.
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Thomas Salmon, the English geographer who travelled on part of Anson’s voyage, 
described the government of China as a monarchy whose corruption was comparable to 
“a certain European nation,” (referring to Britain), where there laws were good but 
hardly put into execution.560 He blamed the emperor’s ministers for hiding corruption 
from the emperor, as he argued was done in Europe, because when the emperor was 
made aware of corruption he punished it severely. “Upon the whole, the Chinese seem 
to be a nation of exquisite hypocrites; and, like some other pretenders, while they carry 
a fair outside are guilty of all manner of fraud, vice and extortion.”561 Salmon was most 
critical of the eunuchs that surrounded the monarch, who he blamed for the fall of the 
Ming Dynasty (citing Adam Schall von Bell), as he believed they had “then the 
principal share in the administration” just as the princes of Europe must rely on 
advisors.562 Salmon’s Tory political position was quite evident, in particular his belief in 
the royal prerogative and importance of a balanced constitution, which he maintained 
was threatened by the excess power of any element of government. Indeed, he saw the 
English constitution “as an impossible balancing act which is always being pushed 
towards the extremes of tyranny by self-interested parties who wish to monopolize 
power”.563 In his argument about the difficulty of ensuring the successful functioning of 
the balanced mixed monarchy, Salmon drew a close connection between the issues of 
the English mixed monarchy and Chinese government, in contrast to the issues of the 
French absolutist state.
In the view of many Enlightenment thinkers, all existing political systems were flawed
and these commentators sought to identify their weakest links and best elements. The
Chinese system was presented as a balance between absolutist impulses and structural,
moral and internal checks designed to control negative aspects of such centralized,
potentially despotic power. As the editors of The modem part o f the Universal History
argued, some of China’s
excellent monarchs had the peace and welfare of their subjects at heart, 
but also how tender they were of wounding the antient constitution of 
the empire by too despotic a use of their power and authority; for one 
may plainly see, that it was chiefly owing to this strict observance of
560 Salmon, Modem History, 26.
561 Ibid., 27.
562 The modem part o f An Universal History followed Salmon’s comparison of China to England by 
pointing out difference between theory and practice The modem part o f An Universal History, Vol. 8,
149.
563 Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography, 136.
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the fundamentals of their government, that the Chinese have been able 
to preserve it in such wealth and splendour during so long a series of 
ages; and still continue to do, even under a foreign yoke.564
CONCLUSION
In his essay Of Civil Liberty, David Hume wrote: “I am apt, however, to entertain a 
suspicion, that the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics, which 
will remain true to the latest posterity”.565 He followed with several examples, including 
how the principle that “commerce can never flourish but in a free government” was 
proven wrong by France’s commercial prowess. Philosophers such as Montesquieu and 
Quesnay, who were vehemently attached to their analytical systems, did not support 
Hume’s point; and yet these same philosophers made notable exceptions for the Chinese 
case. A more fundamental difference beyond their diverging labels of the Chinese 
government was Montesquieu’s view that China’s unique system was inimitable and 
Quesnay’s belief in the universal applicability of the natural law followed in China. The 
two philosophers used the empirical descriptions in such a way to support their distinct 
views, but both also engaged, to varying levels of success and honesty, with the 
evidence that contradicted their theories.
The Chinese government endured many labels, but the greatest apparent contradiction 
was between the concepts of Chinese despotism and Chinese moderation. Even the 
most manifest critics found it difficult to dismiss China on the basis of its system of 
government. Turning back to the guiding question that began this thesis, namely, what 
did Europeans see as China’s future prospects with regards to political economy, 
especially compared to other extant systems, it is evident that the nature of China’s 
government and its unique brand of “despotism” were not considered sufficient threats 
to the wealth and success of the Chinese state. While elements of the internal maxims of 
the Chinese system may be replicated elsewhere, the structural and moral checks were 
unique to the Middle Kingdom.
This chapter has shown how eighteenth century European observers and commentators 
approached the Chinese principles and model of government. While there was much to 
admire and criticize in the Chinese political system, it is evident that for many the
564 The modem part o f An Universal History, Vol. 8, 166-8.
565 David Hume, “O f Civil Liberty” in The Philosophical Works o f  David Hume 4 Volumes (Edinburgh: 
Printed for Adam Black and Wiliam Tait, 1826), vol. 3, 87.
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model was deemed to work because of the peculiar nature of the Chinese Empire. In 
particular, geography had gifted China with a large population, and its longevity had 
ingrained it with a unique system of morality based on Confucian ethics that dictated its 
particular political maxims. The longevity of the Chinese system was viewed as a 
testament to its success. As Le Comte commented: “the plan of their government was 
not a whit less perfect in its cradle, than it is now after the experience and tryal of four 
thousand years”.566
Because European analysis of China’s constitutional structure was conflicted by these 
co-existing images of despotism and moderation, which led to a formulation of Chinese 
government as a sui generis case, a closer analysis of the practice (rather than the form) 
of China’s government is required to determine assessments of the role of government 
in China’s political economy.
566 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 242. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 4.
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O u t l i n e :  6 . D u t ie s  o f  G o v e r n m e n t
6.1 . E x p e n s e  o f  D e f e n c e
6.2 . E x p e n s e  o f  Ju s t ic e
6.3 . C o m m e r c ia l  In s t it u t io n s
6.4. T a x e s
Discussion of the administrative practicalities of the Chinese government featured 
prominently alongside those of despotism and constitutional structure in Enlightenment 
assessments of the nature and prospects of the Middle Kingdom. To reflect on 
contemporary concerns and classifications, this chapter defines the categories of 
government administration according to Adam Smith’s description of the duties of 
government in Chapter I, Book V of Wealth o f Nations. Smith identified four expenses 
of government: defence, the administration of justice, the provision of public works and 
institutions, and maintaining the dignity of the sovereign (though he devoted very little 
attention to this final expense). Chapter II of Smith’s fifth book examined how these 
duties were to be funded, specifically examining the taxation policies of the 
government. It was not only Adam Smith who found these categories useful and 
important. In fact, earlier Francois Quesnay enumerated the constitutive laws of nations 
based on the natural rights of men: the laws of distributive justice, armies to assure the 
protection of the nation, and the establishment of public revenue to provide the funds 
for security, good order, and prosperity; therefore, he only neglected to prioritize public
ci.r*7
works and institutions, and maintaining the dignity of the sovereign. Smith’s respect 
for the system developed by the economistes is well documented and they shared a 
common laissez-faire approach to the government’s role in society. Thus, in the two 
most prominent theoretical economic systems of the eighteenth century, these were the 
essential categories of assessing the role of government. There is also a noteworthy 
Chinese comparison to these duties of government. The primary reports described six 
bureaus of the Chinese government, which included a bureau that looked after military 
affairs, one in charge of the justice system, another that monitored the public buildings 
and works, and one in control of the treasury and taxes. While the other two tribunals 
(one supervising the meritocratic system and the other overseeing ancient customs and 
religion) were unique to the Chinese system, the other four corresponded directly to 
Smith’s duties of government discussed in this chapter.
567 Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 265. Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine”, 637.
568 Phillipson, Adam Smith, 192-197.
155
This chapter addresses Enlightenment views of the first three of Smith’s duties. The 
final section examines views of China’s public revenue and taxation policies. Each of 
the four sections in this chapter is divided into three parts. The first provides the 
background and context to the topic in the British and French systems. The second 
presents and discusses the information provided by the primary sources. The final 
section considers how receivers of information in Europe (the geographers and 
philosophers) assessed the information they received.
The preceding chapters addressed China’s economic culture, its policy of international 
trade, and its structure of government. While the Enlightenment discussion of these 
subjects certainly contained a fair degree of criticism of China, these objections did not 
constitute a definitive dismissal of China’s potential to be a wealthy and prosperous 
civilization. However, in the discussion of the duties of government the dismissal of the 
Chinese model becomes more evident. In particular, nearly every observer and 
commentator (save a notable few discussed below) deemed China’s military weakness 
to be a critical failure of government. The justice system (especially the enforcement of 
property rights), commercial institutions (particularly national infrastructure) and the 
policies of taxation all had room for improvement but were not believed to leave the 
Chinese Empire in the hopeless state that a weak military structure could.
6.1. EXPENSE OF DEFENCE
The first and most important duty of government, according to Smith and other 
eighteenth century philosophers, was “protecting the society from the violence and 
invasion of other independent societies.”569 China’s military was almost universally 
seen as the Achilles’ heel of their system. From the primary authors to the geographers 
and philosophers, there was a broad consensus that in spite of its immense population, 
China was unable to defend its borders. Although China’s geographic features were 
believed to provide a unique degree of security from outside invasion, many European 
observers saw the devastating mid-seventeenth century Manchu Conquest and 
subsequent dynastic change as a warning against a complacent civilization.
569 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 879.
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E u r o p e a n  C o n t e x t
A strong military was critically important to the survival and success of early modem 
European states. As Richard Bean argues, “War, preparation for war, and the payments 
to debts from previous wars were more important than the sum of all other types of 
expenditure combined”.570 Military strength was connected to the success of state’s 
system of political economy because it protected the state’s wealth. Clifford Rogers 
argues “if the ‘carrot’ of the production and allocation of wealth is one of the basic 
motive forces of history, the ‘stick’ of the creation and application of coercive force is 
the other.”571
The weight given to military prowess is understandable given the history of early 
modem Europeans who suffered through numerous wars including the immensely 
destructive Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and several wars of the eighteenth century, 
notably the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), War of Austrian Succession 
(1740-1748), the Seven Years War (1754-1763) and numerous domestic conflicts. The 
size and nature of the early modem European armies changed from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries and while alliances within Europe shifted, states (and the 
commentators who lived within them) were cognizant of the significance of military
c n ' j
strength. The expansion of overseas empires during these centuries made European 
military strength compared to the rest of the world evident. During the Enlightenment, 
military power was a key criterion of assessing a state. As we saw in chapter four some 
individuals, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, made the case for 
restricting international relations; however, even those who praised Chinese isolation 
agreed that the government must be able to defend itself if attacked.
570 Richard Bean, “War and the Birth o f the Nation State”, The Journal o f  Economic History, 33:1 
(March. 1973), 216.
571 Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolution in History and Historiography” in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) 
The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation o f  Early Modem Europe 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 1.
572 The extent to which European states underwent a military revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries is still contested amongst historians. See Rogers ed., The Military Revolution Debate. See John 
Brewer, The sinews o f  power: war, money, and the English state, 1688-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). See also Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994). Specific figures are discussed below.
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P r i m a r y  D e s c r i p t i o n s
The immense size of China’s military was one of the most prominent characteristics 
reported. Primary descriptions of China from the sixteenth-century accounts by the 
Augustinians Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza and Martin de Rada to the reports given by 
the Jesuits Louis Le Comte and Jean Baptiste Du Halde in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries ranged in estimating China’s infantry from 700 000 to nearly six 
million.573 The discrepancies with regards to the numbers in these sources were in part 
due to the varying aspects of China’s military they addressed (for instance, a standing 
army in comparison to the potential size of a conscripted army). These numbers also 
reflected dramatic shifts in China’s actual military structure over the early modem 
period, and in particular the changes affected by the Manchu Conquest.574 By the 
eighteenth century, popular geographies reported figures for Chinese infantry of one 
million strong.575 Notwithstanding the variations in these figures, it was apparent that 
they dwarfed those of the European states. Precise figures for early modem militaries 
are very difficult to compute and though numbers fluctuated greatly across countries 
and between periods of wartime and peace, armies of 20 000 to 120 000 were the norm 
in European conflicts of the eighteenth century.576
573 Mendoza claimed the infantry was 5, 846, 500 strong. Mendoza, The historie o f  China, 91; Martin de 
Rada listed 4, 178, 000 for the infantry. Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 272; Louis Le 
Comte noted there were one million men stationed on the Great Wall o f China. Le Comte, Memoirs and 
observations, 285. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 65; Jean Baptiste Du Halde claimed there 
were 700 000 soldiers dispersed in the provinces. Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 261. Watts edition,
Vol. 2, 75. French edition, Vol. 2, 45.
574 For instance, the system changed with the end o f hereditary military system by the 1570s, and the rise 
of a paid army. Peter Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China 900-1795 (Routledge:
London, 2005), 128.
575 Fenning and Collyer, reported 770 000 soldiers held in constant pay and near 565,000 horses to 
remount the cavalry.
Fenning and Collyer, A New System o f  Geography, 51. The editors o f the English Universal History cited 
Magaillan, Le Comte, Navarrete, Gemel and Martini and reported 902 054 soldiers guarded the frontier.
The modem part o f An universal history, Vol. 8, 12.
576 David Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-century Europe (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 27. At 
the time o f the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the average annual personal o f the British navy and army 
was 167 476 (though this number certainly overestimates the actual number o f people on the ground).
The peacetime standing army shortly after the Seven Years War averaged about 45 000 men. Brewer, The 
sinews o f  power, 29-30. By the end of the seventeenth century, France had the largest European army 
totally 420 000 soldiers on paper. By the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), France’s military was 
reportedly 390 000 and during peace times it fell to 160 000. John A. Lynn, Giant o f  the grand siecle: the 
French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 32 and 55. Military historians 
have extensively debated the issues around these “paper” numbers but here they serve as an indication of 
the relative size o f the European military systems. Notably, from the time o f Ricci to that of Smith near 
the end o f the eighteenth century, the size o f both the British and French militaries grew dramatically. For 
instance, from 1680 to 1780 the British army and navy trebled in size. See Brewer, Sinews o f  Power, 29- 
30.
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Although China clearly outnumbered the European military forces, nearly all observers 
commented on the low quality of its military. Primary descriptions of China by 
members of different missionary orders, merchants, emissaries, and military men all 
observed that the Middle Kingdom lagged far behind Europe in military capacity, 
especially given its status as a relatively advanced civilization. The Augustinians, such 
as de Rada, advanced the view of an uncourageous population in the early descriptions 
of China. These reports were intensely discussed because they connected to the Spanish 
plan to conquer China from the Philippines in the 1570s and 1580s.577
The Manchu Conquest578 that created the Qing Dynasty in 1644 was one of the most 
significant events in the formation of early modem European views of China. Nearly 
every European observer viewed the triumph of “barbarians” over a civilized empire as 
an embarrassing failure and evidence of a fundamental flaw in the Chinese Empire. 
Both the Ming and Qing governments used the Jesuits Adam Schall von Bell and 
Ferdinand Verbiest to help them build European cannons. The Chinese use of Jesuits, 
Portuguese and Dutchmen to help construct and man artillery demonstrated the 
comparable advancements of European military skill.579 By the mid-eighteenth century, 
it was widely recognized that the Chinese had mastered the use of artillery long before 
Europe -  an observation made earlier by Mendoza -  but most observers agreed that 
despite this advantage, China failed to develop this technology and thus had fallen far 
behind Europe.580 Chapter seven deals with the subjects of science and technology in 
greater detail, but it is evident that the Chinese did not prioritize the development of 
military technology.
The Jesuits offered a nuanced analysis of the conquest, painting a picture that included 
the internal decay of the Ming Dynasty alongside military struggles. From 1613 to 
1636, Alvaro Semedo was stationed in the south of China.581 During this time, the Ming 
Dynasty was suffering from significant incursions by the Manchus as well as internal
577 In 1576 Francisco de Sande (the governor o f the Phillipines) formally proposed to attack China. He 
assumed, as the Portuguese prisoners did, that two to three thousand men could accomplish this, as the 
Chinese people would revolt as soon as operations began. While these ideas o f an early invasion o f China 
never took hold in Europe they do reflect the low level at which China’s military capacities were held. 
Lach, V ol.l, 746.
578 The Manchus and the Mongols were both referred to as Tartars by early modem Europeans.
579 This was reported by Martini. Martino Martini’s, Bellum Tartaricum was included in the translation by 
Thomas Henshaw FRS o f Alvaro Semedo's The History o f  the Great and Renowned Monarchy o f  China, 
261.
580 Mendoza, The History o f  the Great and Mighty Kingdom o f  China, Vol. 1, 129.
581 His manuscript on the Middle Kingdom was translated, re-arranged and published in Spanish as 
Imperio de la China in 1642.
rebellions. Semedo offered an ambivalent image of China’s military capacities. While 
the Chinese had ancient knowledge of war, and had “formerly been a valiant and 
warlike nation”; Semedo noted that their only advantage at the time of his observation 
was the size of their military.582 Some of the Chinese soldiers fought with valour, but 
others were cowardly, perhaps resulting from their lack of experience. Semedo noted 
that they were not full-time soldiers, but had other professions such as shoemakers and
CM
tailors. In addition to criticizing China’s military technology, Semedo offered various 
explanations as to why the Chinese had a feeble military: first, they lived in ease and 
idleness, a result of the peacefulness of the Empire; second, they prioritized learning 
above all else; third, they chose captains by examination; fourth, the soldiers in China 
were not courageous by their nature or by the example set from a nobility or by the 
discipline that they experienced in their training; fifth, the generals were too remote to 
give proper orders; and finally, their councils of war had no soldiers on them. 
Semedo’s incisive criticisms attacked core values of the Ming Dynasty such as 
introversion (with regards to imperialism, not commerce), Confucianism and 
meritocracy. While a number of his criticisms could be remedied, others, such as 
prioritizing peace, would require a fundamental reworking of the Chinese system of 
political economy.
Jesuit descriptions also pointed to the corruption of core principles as an explanation for 
the conquest, taking some of the blame away from the weakness of the military. 
Martino Martini produced the first detailed description of the Manchu Conquest in 
1654. De bello tartarico told the story of the internal decay of the Ming and the 
Sinicization of the Tartars.585 Echoing the Chinese explanation, he argued that the 
mismanagement of Manchu and Mongol relations by the court of the Wanli Emperor, 
the broader alienation of officials, the famine, and the avarice of the emperor “who 
exhausted the people by imposts and taxes”, all explained the fall of the Ming Dynasty. 
Pointing to the internal problems of the Ming Dynasty did not dissipate criticism of the 
military. The domestic problems of the Ming combined with a weak military to enable
582 He cited Ricci as claiming China had more than one million soldiers, whereas the Jesuit John 
Rodriguez (a Jesuit who spent 22 years in China from 1611 until his death 1632) reported the Chinese 
had 594 000 soldiers (excluding those at the coast) and 682 888 stationed at the Great Wall. Semedo, The 
history o f  that great and renowned monarchy o f  China, 97.
583 Ib id , 98.
584 Ib id  99-100.
585 This view was repeated in the eighteenth century by Du Halde. Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 238; 
Watts edition, Vol. 2, 3; French edition, Vol. 2, 3.
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an internal rebellion to grow, which in turn opened the gates of Peking to the Manchu 
invaders.586
China’s tranquil history and the character of its people were used to explain the low 
quality of its military. China’s geography discouraged international interactions and 
warfare. In addition to the Great Wall, China was protected by the sea and mountains, 
which also contributed to the isolation of the Empire. Although China’s geography 
assisted its security efforts, Europeans proposed a major lesson could be learnt from its 
history: peace and tranquillity can render governments vulnerable. However, the 
achievement of public tranquillity was not solely an accident of geography, but also 
recognized as part of Chinese culture.
By the mid-seventeenth century information about the Chinese priorities of government 
increased and the weakness of the Chinese character in battle was attributed to the 
empire’s prioritization of learning and peace. In 1665 Nieuhof described the difference 
between the customs and manners of Tartars and Chinese. The Dutchman was well 
situated to comment on this topic as he travelled to Peking from 1655 to 1658, a decade 
after the Manchu invaders had taken Peking. On his route to China, he passed through 
areas loyal to the Ming Dynasty such as Guangdong province and Nanjing, which 
meant he had access to Ming loyalists, Manchu conquerors, and average Chinese people 
caught in between the conflict.587 His diverse exposure to both the Tartars and the 
Chinese led to a complex portrayal of their respective behaviour. He described the 
Chinese as being “of an affable and peaceable disposition, addicted to husbandry, and 
loving all good arts and sciences: But the Tartar, on the other hand, delights in nothing 
so much as hunting, being very cunning and deceitful, lusting after war, and of a very 
loose and uncivil comportment.” 588 They both shun idleness but for very different ends, 
“the one to live temperately and honestly; but the other only to range abroad in a wild 
and bestial barbarism”.589 On a personal level, however, Nieuhof described Chinese 
individuals as ranging from brave and heroic leaders to traitorous cowards.590 He 
explained these attributes largely by turning to geography. The Manchus were “bred up 
to arms from their cradles, which makes them such excellent soldiers” and in this way
586 See Ibid. for Martini’s discussion o f the mismanagement o f the Manchu relations (257), his 
speculation that the war was punishment for the Chinese persecution o f Christians (260), and his 
discussion o f the internal problems o f the Ming Dynasty (269).
587 For N ieuhof s route in China see Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making o f  Europe, 1689.
588 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-lndia Company, 250.
5i9Ibid.
590 “jjjgj-g was no courage wanting on either side”. Ibid., 264.
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he believed they were similar to the ethnically Chinese people of province of Liaodong, 
which was very close to the northern border with the Manchus.591 However, culture was 
mutable, particularly when confronted with the dominating numbers in China. Referring 
to the Mongol conquering of China, he noted that once the invaders were comfortable in 
Peking, they became effeminate like the Chinese. Even though the Manchus were a 
militaristic people, the Chinese could take this away, as they had done throughout their 
history by sinifying their enemies.
The view of the Chinese as naturally weak was carried through by Le Comte who 
argued that because of its size China’s military “should awe all Asia”; however, its 
idleness and “natural effeminacy” rendered it weak.593 The principle of bravery present 
in Europe did not exist in the Chinese Empire, something he directly attributed to their 
high level of civilization: “The Chinese are always talking to their children of gravity, 
policy, law, and government; they always set books and letters in their view, but never a 
sword into their hands.”594 Only a few decades after the dynastic change, Le Comte 
argued, the priorities of the Chinese government had not changed.
By the eighteenth century, the primary observers of China believed the Tartars 
assimilated to the weak and uncourageous Chinese culture. Anson criticized the 
“defenceless state of the Chinese Empire” where “by the cowardice of the inhabitants, it 
continues exposed not only to the attempts of any potent state, but to the ravages of 
every petty invader”.595 Once again, this famous ‘sinophobe’ source on closer scrutiny 
appears to be remarkably similar to the Jesuit accounts it sought to question. Du Halde 
similarly concluded that the Chinese troops were “not comparable to our troops in 
Europe either for courage or discipline.. .”596 He invoked the often-repeated view that 
the Chinese had an effeminate character, which he argued also infected the ‘Tartar 
disposition’ in the aftermath of the Manchu Conquest. Du Halde, like Le Comte, 
attributed this character flaw directly to China’s high level of learning: “the esteem that 
they have for learning preferable to every thing else, the dependence that the soldiers 
have upon men of letters, the education that is given to youth.. .is not capable of giving
591 Ibid., 255 and 260.
592Ibid., 250.
593 Though contemporary English translations of French works used the term “effeminate”, the original 
French used by Le Comte and Voltaire was “mollesse” meaning softness. Le Comte, Memoirs and 
observations, 309. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 102.
594 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 309. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 103.
595 Anson, Voyage Round the World, 546.
596 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 261; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 75; French edition, Vol. 2, 45
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men a warlike genius”.597 Thus several Jesuits attacked the weakness of the Chinese 
character by arguing there was a relationship between education and military weakness. 
Again, this reflected in part the Jesuit agenda of allaying European concerns and 
securing their position in the Middle Kingdom, but it was also a genuine criticism of the 
vulnerability of the Chinese Empire.
The primary descriptions of China’s military, from the Jesuit and non-Jesuit sources 
were very disparaging. Every observer commented on the vulnerability of the Chinese 
and offered several interconnected explanations as to why China had such a weak 
defence. Whether it was argued to be a result of geography, culture, the priorities of the 
state or a combination of all three, the Chinese were deemed to have an effeminate 
character. Further, the government did not compensate for this by developing 
significant artillery (as we will also see in more detail in chapter seven).
R e c e p t i o n
The descriptions and explanations offered in the primary sources were repeated and 
modified by eighteenth century geographers and philosophers. A consistent narrative 
was formed that the Chinese did not prioritize their military and thus their civilized 
empire was vulnerable to attack.598 Thomas Salmon’s Modern History (1727) relied 
heavily on Le Comte’s account of China and repeated the explanations he gave for the 
dynastic change, including the trade grievances with the Tartars and the corruption and 
famine within China that led to rebellion. Salmon also described the sinicization of the 
Tartars as well as the efforts of the Tartar leaders to win over their new Chinese subjects 
by “[remitting] to the people one third of their taxes, [governing] them by their own 
laws, and like our Henry VII [delivering] the commons from that tyranny the great men 
used to exercise over them.”599 Thus the geographer added his view of the Tartars 
liberating the Chinese from their corrupt government. He also commented on the 
varying cultures of the Chinese and Tartars. Those Tartars who did not live at the court 
“are neither so effeminate or luxurious as their more southern neighbours, nor do they 
apply themselves to traffick near so much; hunting, horsemanship, and other manly
598 Leibniz argued the Chinese were inferior to the Europeans in the military sciences “not so much out of 
ignorance as by deliberation”. However, he argued” even the good must cultivate the arts o f war”. Lach,
The Preface to Leibniz ’ Novissima Sinica, 69.
599 Salmon, Modem History y ol.l, 3.
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exercises take up great part of their time.”600 Salmon implied that the effeminate nature 
of the Chinese connected to their commercial activity, something Smith would argue 
decades later.
After accompanying Anson on part of his voyage around the world, Salmon cited the 
commodore in his condemnation of the Chinese for their immorality and corruption, but 
above all argued “that government which does not, in the first place, provide for the 
security of the publick against the attacks of foreign powers, must be a most defective 
institution; and yet this populous, this rich, and extensive country was conquered by a 
handful of tartars, and even now, through the cowardice of the inhabitants, and the want 
of proper military regulations continues exposed to the ravages of every petty invader; 
the Centurion Man of War alone, was an overmatch for all the naval power of 
China.”601
The idea of the Tartars as warlike barbarians meeting the civilized and effeminate 
Chinese persisted throughout the eighteenth century. William Guthrie, a Scottish 
geographer, identified potential advantages to the Chinese military as a result of the 
dynastic change. He argued China was “a far more powerful empire, than it was before 
its conquest by the eastern Tartars in 1644.”602 Guthrie believed that because the first 
Tartarian emperor blended the Tartars and the Chinese together, the Chinese became 
stronger. However, he also warned of the threat to the Tartars that they would lose their 
skills by the “disuse of arms”. He claimed the Chinese land army included five million 
men, but noted most of these were employed in collecting revenue, preserving canals 
and roads and the public peace.603 Guthrie, like the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers 
he popularized, was concerned with progress. He concluded, “Though this [ancient] 
system preserved the public tranquillity, for an incredible number of years, yet it had a 
fundamental effect that often convulsed and at last proved fatal to the state, because the 
same attention was not paid to the military as the civil duties.”604 All efforts of good 
government could be laid to waste if the government lacked the capacity to protect its 
people.
600 Salmon, M odem History, V ol.l, 44.
601 Salmon, Universal Traveller, 25.
602 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 469.
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid., 468.
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Several commentators drew a connection between military prowess and purpose of 
state. The modem part of An Universal History repeated Du Halde’s view that the
Chinese army was unequal to European armies in courage and discipline and soldiers
were “easily put into disorder, and routed.”605 They added that the Chinese 
overestimated the degree of protection provided by Great Wall, as it did not stop the 
Tartars,
which sufficiently shews the shortness of human forecast; since it 
was their too great confidence in these, and some other advantages 
we are going to mention, that lulled them into that state of luxury 
and indolence which made them fall so easy a prey into the hands of 
their warlike neighbours, when they least thought of it, or were least 
able to make head against them.606
The Chinese army had little practice fighting and soon grew complacent. The forward-
looking orientation of European states contrasted with the present or backwards minded
Chinese.
To Rousseau, the revolution provided fodder for his argument about the ill 
consequences of civilization. In his 1750 essay on the question “Has the restoration of 
the arts and sciences had a purifying effect upon morals?” Rousseau turned to China to 
support his argument. He described the China as an “immense land where Letters are 
honored and lead to the foremost dignities of State” and concluded “If the sciences 
purified morals, if they taught men to shed their blood for the fatherland, if they 
animated courage; the peoples of China should be wise, free, and invincible.”607 And 
yet, he found the Chinese to be avaricious, corrupt and above all argued “neither the 
enlightenment of the ministers, nor the presumed wisdom of the laws, nor the large 
number of inhabitants of this vast empire have been able to protect it from the yoke of 
the ignorant and coarse Tartar”. Of the Chinese, he asked, “what use have all its 
scholars been?” China’s pursuits and aims were deemed useless in the face of the purest 
test of a nation -  whether it can defend itself. Here, China became the Athens to 
Rousseau’s idealised Sparta. On this point Rousseau was not representative of 
Enlightenment values, but he did reflect criticisms of China’s military.
605 Directly from Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 261; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 75; French edition, Vol. 2,
45. This was repeated in The modem part o f An universal history, vol. 8, 151.
606 The modem part o f An universal history, vol. 8 ,11.
607 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and other early political writings. Victor Gourevitch (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 135. Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts Edition 
electronique par Jean-Marie Tremblay (1750), 11.
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Voltaire in Essai sur les moeurs (1756) also claimed the Tartars had characteristics 
which distinguished them from the Chinese. He raised the often-asked question of how 
barbarians could conquer a civilized state: “It is very extraordinary, that the Tartars, 
only with bows and arrows, should prevail against those who had artillery to defend 
them: This was the reverse of what happened in America, and shews the superior genius 
of northern over southern nations.”608 The last comment praised the Tartar barbarians 
above the American savages, and used it as evidence supporting geographic 
explanations for military strength. He described the war between the Manchu and the 
Ming Dynasty as more primitive than those in Europe and as such argued “Strength of 
body was what determined the victory: And the Tartars, accustomed to lie in the open 
fields, must naturally have the advantage over a people used to a more delicate life.”609 
The delicate life of the Chinese led to their defeat, and lack of caution regarding the 
savages to the north. Voltaire extrapolated from the Chinese case: “The same 
effeminacy which ruined Persia and India, produced a revolution in China in the last 
century, more complete than that of Jenghiz-chan and his grandson”.610 Voltaire built on 
this notion of effeminate behaviour and connected it to a broader concept of Asiatic 
pride when he discussed how the emperor killed his two eunuchs for carrying a letter 
from the rebel mandarin: “Here we see the nature of Asiatic pride, and how consistent 
it is with effeminacy”.611 The noted ‘sinophile’ criticized the impracticality of Chinese 
priorities. Their brilliant laws were set back by “a most terrible catastrophe” because
£  1 f j
they could not defend their empire.
Others philosophers disregarded the established implications of China’s military 
weakness. Quesnay minimized the relevance of China’s lack of military strength by 
arguing that war should be rare “since a good government excludes all senseless 
pretexts for war”. However, he differentiated between making war and defending 
one’s land. Quesnay, like his contemporaries, believed “defense assured by force...must 
always be a principal object of a competent government.”614 Natural laws “assure the 
success of agriculture, and it is agriculture that is the source of wealth that satisfies the
608 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, Vol. 3, 329. Essai sur les moeurs, 602.
609 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, Vol. 3, 326. Essai sur les moeurs, 601.
610 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, Vol. 3, 324. Essai sur les moeurs, 600.
6,1 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, Vol. 3, 327. Essai sur les moeurs, 601. Voltaire’s concept o f  
“Asiatic pride” is worth further study.
612 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, Vol. 3, 325. Essai sur les moeurs, 600.
613 Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 301. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 658.
614 Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 285. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 648.
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needs of men and supports the armies necessary for their security.”615 The Physiocrat 
thus placed agriculture at the root of defence. However, China had successful 
agriculture and a weak military. Once again Quesnay faced evidence in China that 
contradicted his theory of political economy. When he described China’s military 
forces, he did not refer to the Manchu Conquest and instead focused on the bureaucratic 
structure, the number of forces (from Du Halde) as 760 000, and claimed all the soldiers 
were “quite adequately maintained” and “discipline is very well observed.”616 Nearly 
every word of Quesnay’s section on China’s military came from Rousselot de Surgy’s
1 7 •Melanges interessans section on the state of the military. However, China’s military 
weakness was well known and Quesnay was very likely aware of these criticisms. On 
the topic of military, even Quesnay could not muster a defence of his idealized model.
Raynal, on the other hand, managed to formulate a way to dismiss China’s deficient 
military. He followed the dichotomy created between learning and defence. He agreed 
that because the Chinese valued “reason and reflection”, he argued, they left “no room
r t  o
for that enthusiasm, which constitutes the hero and the warrior”. Raynal differed from 
the majority of his contemporaries by not regarding this as problematic. He extended 
Quesnay’s view by highlighting the importance of the sinicization of the tartars: “When 
a nation has found the art of subduing its conquerors by its manners, it has no occasion 
to overcome its enemies by force of arms”.619 This was possible because of the 
formidable numbers of the ethnically Han Chinese relative to conquerors. Montesquieu 
admitted this point as a “property peculiar to the government of China”; and argued that 
because religion, laws, mores and manners were united in China, anyone who 
conquered China would adapt to Chinese practices.620 However, Raynal’s argument, 
while supported by primary sources and earlier philosophers such as Montesquieu, was 
not sufficient to justify China’s deficient military, for what country would choose to 
endure violence and dynastic change rather than building up their defences?
616 Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 176-177. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 584.
617 Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy, Melanges interessans et curieux 9 Volumes (Paris: Chez 
Lacombe, 1766), Vol. 5, 203-207.
618 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, 104; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 113.
This line was absent from the 1770 edition but present from 1774 onwards. In the 1770 edition Raynal 
argued the Chinese had countless militia but lacked tactics and skill, Raynal, Histoire philosophique et 
politique, 634. Raynal made several changes to his description o f China in the 1774 edition due to his 
reading o f new works on China such as that by Cornelius de Pauw.
6,9 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, 105; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 114.
This line was absent from the 1770 edition but present from 1774 onwards.
620 From this he concluded that Christianity could never be established in China. Montesquieu, The Spirit 
o f  the Laws, 318-319. Montesquieu, De I'esprit des lois, 105-106.
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Adam Smith also viewed the Manchu Conquest as a result of the prominence of 
commerce, though not of “arts and sciences”. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, he made 
a general argument about the “universal experience” of minds being enervated by 
“cultivating arts and commerce”.621 He posed this as an explanation for global events as 
diverse as the Scots taking possession of parts of England in 1745, the European 
penetration of India, and the Manchu’s defeat of China. These instances demonstrated 
the “disadvantages of a commercial spirit.” In the Wealth o f Nations, Smith described 
how a rich state is more likely to be attacked, and “unless the state takes some new 
measures for the public defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether 
incapable of defending themselves”.622 The government must either mandate regular 
military drills for its populace or establish a standing army in order to effectively defend 
itself. China’s failures on this front and the lessons they offered were nearly 
unanimously recognized. Enlightenment thinkers, therefore, established a connection 
between wealth, civilization, and learning with weakness, unless the state focused on 
their military, something that was evidently not a priority to the Chinese government.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the French Jesuit Jean-Joseph Marie Amiot had 
translated Sun Tzu’s The Art o f War, as well as added a great deal to the European 
understanding of China’s military.623 However, these developments were not sufficient 
to overturn the predominant view of China’s military weakness, which became even 
more pronounced in the early nineteenth century. The focus on quality over quantity 
became key to dismissing the potential of the Chinese Empire and the accomplishments 
of its government. Although explanations (geographic, cultural and socio-economic) 
varied, both European observers and commentators were in agreement about the failure 
of the Chinese government to defend its people and wealth. To Enlightenment 
philosophers, it became an example through which to analyse the implications of state 
priorities and the potential trade-offs between various government agendas. In spite of 
the positive assessments in other categories of administration, it was only a few utopian 
admirers of peace (notably Raynal) who saw the potential for the Chinese government 
to progress without military strength. The place of military should not be 
underestimated in answering the central question of this thesis: it is evident that military
621 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 541.
622 Ibid., 698.
623 For more on this topic see Waley-Cohen, The Sextants o f  Beijing.
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weakness and consequent defensive vulnerability was a critically important area 
through which Enlightenment thinkers dismissed China’s model of political economy.
6.2. EXPENSE OF JUSTICE
According to Smith, the second duty of the sovereign was the protection of members of 
society by establishing “an exact administration of justice”.624 Interest in this theme can 
be divided into two areas, namely protecting the integrity of the justice system 
(reducing corruption) and securing property rights. The discussion of the structural 
checks and balances in chapter five reflect views of the precautions in the Chinese 
system designed to fight against corruption thus this section will focus on the second 
topic raised by Smith, the nature of property rights. Enlightenment sources contain 
relatively little information and discussion of Chinese property rights, most probably 
due to the incommensurability of European and Chinese conceptions of property rights.
E u r o p e a n  C o n t e x t
Property rights in early modem Europe varied dramatically, but both France and 
England prioritized their reform. In England, the fiscal crises of the seventeenth century 
and subsequent insecurity of property due to the threat of expropriation by the monarch 
led to a rejection of absolutism and focus on securing property rights.625 The Inclosure 
Acts of the mid-eighteenth century accelerated the privatization of property by 
enclosing open fields and commons, but by this time, individual property was already 
secured from seizure by the monarch. In France, the complex legal system led to mass 
confusion about property rights. Most French villages had communal property over 
which individual landowners, the community and the seigneur had conflicting rights. 
Judicial reform under Louis XIV revised the criminal code, appeal system and limited
624 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 708.
625 There is a debate between economic historians about the timing o f secure property rights. Douglas 
North and Barry Weingast attribute property rights to the Glorious Revolution, whereas Gregory Clark 
argues property rights existed at least in 1600 and perhaps before that even under autocratic and 
dictatorial regimes. See Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution o f Institutional Governing Public Choice in seventeenth-century England”, The Journal o f  
Economic History, 49: 4 (December 1989), 803-832. Gregory Clark, “The Political Foundations of  
Modem Economic Growth: England, 1540-1800”, Journal o f  interdisciplinary History, 26:4 (Spring 
1996), 563-588.
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judicial abuses but could not resolve the complex issue of property. The inherent
£9£contradiction of law, customary rights and feudal privileges led to endless lawsuits.
Early modem European philosophers addressed the topics of justice, property rights, 
and natural law in relation to each other. Thomas Home has pointed out that two 
developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made the philosophical 
analysis of property an imperative: the voyages of discovery (leading to questions about 
ownership of newly discovered lands and rights over oceans) and the struggle between
£97absolutist rulers and representative institutions. As we saw in chapter five, security of 
property was a key component identifying an absolute or despotic government. Property 
rights were also essential in discussions of economic growth. At the root of discussions 
of property rights was the question of their origin. There was disagreement over 
whether they originated in nature or whether they were a result of a social contract. For 
instance, Thomas Hobbes argued that rights of property stemmed from the consent of 
societies that relied on a powerful central figure for protection. In his view this led to a 
defence of absolutism. Since property rights were a creation of the state, only a 
sovereign could grant them. Thus for Hobbes, property rights were secured by civil law. 
Others, such as Samuel Pufendorf, argued that individual property was established in
£9Rnatural law (though he made room for the importance of property in civil law). By the 
eighteenth century, theories of property rights continued to be closely related to political 
and economic circumstances, especially relative to the distribution of property, or 
inequality. The idea of property rights stemming from nature was never very popular in 
England throughout the eighteenth century as the majority of land was held by the
£90government and great landlords who themselves did not work on the land. In France, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau also did not believe property was a natural right. However, 
the Physiocrats, consumed as they were by natural law, argued property was a natural 
right. Thus views of Chinese property rights were highly dependant on these conflicting 
theories.
626 See James B. Collins The State in early modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009) 114.
627 Thomas A. Home, Property Rights and Poverty: Political Argument in Britain, 1605-1834 (Chapel 
Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1990), 9. Home describes the relationship between the 
intellectual history o f property rights and changing agendas o f political economy (such as mercantilism, 
representative institutions and economic growth) in Britain from the seventeenth to early nineteenth 
century.
628 Home, Property Rights, 33.
629 Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History o f  an Idea (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1951), 162
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P r i m a r y  D e s c r i p t i o n s
The primary sources on China reported little on the subject of security of property 
rights, reflecting fundamental conceptual differences between China and Europe. The 
modest amount of information received about the status of property in China often 
occurred in passing remarks. For instance, when discussing the power of the Chinese 
emperor, Le Comte noted that “every one be perfect master of his estate, and enjoys his 
lands free from disturbance and molestation.” However, he added that the Emperor 
could lay any amount of taxes he chose depending on the necessities of the state. Du 
Halde described how civil cases “which merely regard private property, are determin’d 
by the great officers of the provinces,” indicating court cases about property rights were 
fairly common. An interesting addition on this subject is found in the second English 
translation of Du Halde, published by Edward Cave in 1738. While the original French 
and Watts edition of 1736 both described how everyone in China had the right to be 
judged by a court tribunal, the Cave edition added a footnote about the implications of 
this piece of information.631 As discussed in chapter two, a likely editor of this edition 
was John Green. He added the comment “Such is the monarchy of China: where, the 
people are more free, from being in the most profound subjection; and where, the most 
despotic power in the prince is reconciled, with the most perfect liberty and property of 
the subject. A paradox not to be solved on this side of the globe.” Green used the 
discussion of court tribunals as an opportunity to proclaim China as moderate monarchy 
with secured property. Du Halde himself does not comment on the security of property. 
In fact, few seventeenth and eighteenth century primary descriptions concerned 
themselves with this subject. One possible reason for this paucity of information was 
China’s unique history and particularly its lack of feudal roots. Furthermore, the Jesuits 
had access to Confucian insights on governmental practices, but there was not the same 
style of discourse on property rights in the Confucian works as was present in European 
philosophical circles.
China endured similar struggles to Britain and France in reforming their property rights, 
but did not articulate them in a comparable way to the Europeans. It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to discuss the recent scholarship on property rights and contract law in 
early modem China, but it is important to point out that there was information that the
630 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 248. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 11.
631 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1,313; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 234; French edition, Vol. 2, 161.
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missionaries might have drawn on in their reports back to Europe about China. Anne 
Osborne argues the changes occurring from the mid-seventeenth century through the 
eighteenth century “made the determination of rights to property an urgent matter” in 
China. Indeed, the Manchu Conquest was responsible for leaving vast stretches of 
productive land uncultivated, and the eighteenth century push to settle new frontier 
lands increased the need for understanding property rights. As Thomas Buoye points 
out, China’s population more than doubled in the eighteenth century creating new 
pressures on land that often resulted in either legal disputes or violence. The policy of 
the Chinese emperors changed over time. Jonathan Ocko describes the different 
approaches of various emperors: “they broke up large landholdings, required partible 
inheritance, ordered regular redistribution of land, and implanted cadastral surveys to 
ensure that all land under cultivation was also susceptible to taxation”.634 In spite of this 
evident concern on behalf of the Chinese government, “no land law of the sort that we 
find in Europe ever developed”, nor did any argument similar to Locke’s articulation of 
private property and liberty arise. Further, “though contracts were an integral part of 
daily life, a law of contract did not arise”. These historians argue that although a 
rights-based discourse did not exist in China, this did not reflect the absence of rights.
Fortunately for curious philosophers, Pierre Poivre travelled to China. Poivre dedicated 
nearly the entire section on China in his Voyage d ’un Philosophe (1768) to its 
agriculture and fiscal policies. Property rights along with simplified taxation structure 
were key pillars of a successful agricultural system, thus Poivre made considerable 
observations on these topics. There is no doubt of the high esteem with which Poivre 
held agriculture, its relationship to security of person and property, and its impact on the 
general wealth of the empire. For instance, when describing the success of Protestants 
who fled to the Cape of Good Hope, Poivre commented that they found “security, 
property and liberty with it, which are the sole real encouragers of agriculture, the sole 
principles of plenty”. The Chinese government was praised because it did not neglect
632 Anne Osbome, “Property, Taxes and State Protection of Rights” in Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K.
Ocko and Robert Gardella (eds.) Contract and Property in Early Modem China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 120.
633 Thomas Buoye “Litigation, Legitimacy and Lethal Violence: Why country courts failed to prevent 
violent disputes over property in eighteenth-century China” in Zelin et. al. (eds.) Contract and Property 
in Early Modem China, 95.
634 Jonathan Ocko, “The Missing Metaphor: Applying Western Legal Scholarship to the Study of 
Contract and Property in Early Modem China” in Zelin et. al. (eds.) Contract and Property in Early 
Modern China, 179.
635 Ibid
636Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 10. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 12.
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“to secure to the labourers that liberty, property, and indulgence which are the great
springs for the improvement of agriculture.”637 He described how the Chinese “quietly
enjoy their private possessions” as well as those that are indivisible by their nature (such
as canals). According to Poivre those who bought a field or received it by inheritance
become the “lord and master” of that land.
The lands are as free as the people; no feudal services, and no fines 
of alienation; none of those men interested in the misfortunes of the 
public; none of those farmers who never amass more exorbitant 
fortunes...none of that destructive possession, brought forth in the 
delirium of the feudal system, under whose auspices thousands of 
processes arise, which drag the labourer from his plough into the 
dark and perilous mazes of chicane, and thereby rob him, while 
protecting his rights, of that time which would have been usefully 
employed in the general service of the human race.638
In a later section, Poivre compared the agriculture of Africa and the rest of Asia to that 
of China. He pointed to Malabar “without property subjected to the tyrannical 
government of the Moguls”, Siam “under the cruel sceptre of the despote”, and the 
Malais “fettered by their feudal laws”, where the land may be fertile but the laws 
crushing to the pursuit of agriculture.639 Poivre clearly believed that liberty and the right 
of property were tied to successful cultivation, and lauded the absence of feudalism in 
China. He concluded his book by imploring kings to follow the example of China, who 
cultivated every part of their land, and who because of their “liberty, [and] their 
unmolested right of property” established a flourishing agricultural empire.640 In line 
with the tone and style of his book, Poivre did not cite direct evidence or examples 
supporting his claim of the security of property in China. He did, however, relate what 
he saw to be the most convincing evidence for China’s agricultural success: there was 
no other way that China could support such a large population without a flourishing 
agriculture; indeed, a flourishing agriculture could only exist under the right conditions 
of governance and law, which for Poivre included private property. Though he did 
spend time in China, he ultimately relied on his theoretical beliefs in order to support 
the notion that China had secure property rights, thus earning his title as a philosopher.
637 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 161. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 129.
638 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 162. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 129-130.
639 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 166. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 133.
640 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 173. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 137.
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R e c e p t io n
Just as revealing as discussions of Chinese property rights was the absence of mention 
of Chinese property rights. Montesquieu avoided the subject of Chinese property rights 
altogether likely because the information available did not fit his model. When he 
referred to the connection between despotism and weak property rights directly, he used 
the examples of Turkey and Bantam.641 His views on property rights in Europe were 
complicated, as his noble background led him to support certain feudal privileges. He 
argued that laws were more complicated in a monarchy, and referred to differences in 
rules of property established by hereditary rights.642 China was not an ideal model of 
despotism in Montesquieu’s system.
The reports of the primary observers were sufficient to reflect an image of a non-feudal 
property regime in China. For instance, in 1727 Thomas Salmon reported that in China 
“Every subject has an estate of inheritance in his lands, and does not hold them of any 
superior Lord; yet the Emperor may levy what taxes he sees fit”.643 In his 1756, several 
years before Poivre’s public lecture, Voltaire argued that under a despotic government 
the prince could, “consistently with law, strip a private citizen of his property, or life, 
without form of justice, or any other reason than his will. Now, if ever there was a 
government, where the life, honour, and estate of the subject are secured, it is that of 
China”.644 Voltaire tied the security of property directly to the debate about despotism.
Most philosophical discussions on China’s property rights focused on the desirability of 
the Chinese agricultural system. The Physiocrats believed that China’s prioritization of 
agriculture, and the consequent security of property rights, could and should be 
replicated in Europe. In contrast to many philosophers, notably Montesquieu and 
Rousseau, the Physiocrats argued that property was the basis of freedom and stemmed 
from natural law. Relying extensively on Poivre, Quesnay’s Despotisme de la Chine 
extolled the security of property in the Chinese Empire.645 Explaining why a Chinese 
peasant was content with his rice and tea in the evening after toiling in the fields all day, 
Quesnay pointed to the fact that the peasant “has his liberty and property assured; there 
is no chance of his being despoiled by arbitrary impositions...Men are very
641 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 61-62. Montesquieu, De Vesprit des lois, Premiere partie, 80-81.
642 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 72-73. Montesquieu, De I ’esprit des lois, Premiere partie, 90-92.
643 Salmon, Modem History, V ol.l, 34.
644 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, Vol. 3, 324. Essai sur les moeurs, 600.
645 Maverick, China, A Model fo r  Europe, 44.
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hardworking, wherever they are assured the benefits of their labor”.646 In a section 
entitled “Ownership of Property,647” he added, “The ownership of wealth is quite secure 
in China” and the right of property “is extended even to slaves or bonded domestics”.
To Quesnay, these observations exemplified “the extent of the right of inheritance and 
the security of the right of property in this empire”.649 Quesnay’s agenda called the 
prioritization of a land-based economy over commerce or manufacturing. Once again, 
China served Quesnay’s agenda of promoting his agricultural model of political 
economy.
Raynal also relied on Poivre’s assessment of Chinese agriculture and property rights. In 
discussing Chinese agriculture, he referred to “A philosopher, whom the spirit of 
observation has led into their empire, has found out and explained the causes of the 
rural oeconomy of the Chinese”.650 He argued the sea, rivers and canals were all 
common property but “a subject who is in possession of an estate, whether acquired by 
himself or left by his relations, is in no danger of having his right called in question by 
the tyrannical authority of the feudal laws.”651
In the Wealth o f Nations, Smith distinguished between natural rights (such as personal 
liberty and protection of one’s body) and acquired rights, which included property. In 
this respect, he moved away from the argument supported by the Physiocrats that placed 
property amongst natural rights. In describing the evolution of civilization from hunters 
and gathers in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith noted “Till there be property there 
can be no government, the very end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich 
from the poor.” The intimate relationship between property and government was 
evidently important in Smith’s model. Like Quesnay, Smith relied on Poivre for his 
discussion of Chinese property rights, which he again directly connected to its
646Ibid., 170. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 580. It is highly likely Quesnay received this impression 
of Chinese property from Poivre as neither Melanges interessans, or the French edition o f Du Halde made 
this claim.
647 The original French title was “La propriete des biens” but Maverick translated this as the “ownership 
o f wealth”. Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 203. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 599.
648 Ibid.
649 Maverick, China, A Model fo r  Europe, 204. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 600.
650 Raynal, Justamond edition, vol. 1, 89. French edition, 105. The line directly referencing the 
“philosopher” was present only in 1774 edition. The 1770 edition made the same argument that China 
had the best agriculture in the world. See Raynal, Histoire des deux Indes, 632.
651 This line was also found in the 1774 edition. Raynal removed the line arguing there was no servitude 
in China because o f the criticism of Cornelius de Pauw, Recherches philosophiques, Vol. 1, vii. Raynal, 
Histoire des deux Indes, 106.
652 Smith, Lectures On Jurisprudence, 404.
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agricultural system. He followed Poivre in arguing that “[i]n China, the great ambition
of every man is to get possession of some little bit of land, either in property or in lease;
and leases are there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently
secured to the lessees.” However, elsewhere Smith alludes to the lack of security of
the property of the poorer classes because of corruption. Without acknowledging a
direct source, he could have relied on numerous Jesuit and non-Jesuit primary
descriptions of Chinese corruption. Smith argued the insecurity of the lower class
hindered Chinese growth:
In a country too, where, though the rich or the owners of large capitals 
enjoy a good deal of security, the poor or the owners of small capitals 
enjoy scarce any, but are liable, under the pretence of justice, to be 
pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarines, the 
quantity of stock employed in all the different branches of business 
transacted within it, can never be equal to what the nature and extent of 
that business might admit. In every different branch, the oppression of 
the poor must establish the monopoly of the rich, who, by engrossing 
the whole trade to themselves, will be able to make very large profits.
Whether at the hands of the sovereign or inferior mandarins, unjust expropriation was
detrimental to the system.
Views of the security of Chinese property rights were limited by a lack of empirical 
evidence. Most of the few primary descriptions dealing with this topic only offered 
vague generalizations. While observers of China could assess the military from the 
numbers found in Chinese books, or from the outcome of the Manchu conquest, or 
report on the canal systems from their interior travels, they did not have the same ability 
to understand Chinese property rights. One explanation is the lack of discourse on 
property rights among the Chinese literati. Geographers and philosophers did not have 
much information to debate or evaluate and thus were relatively superficial in their 
analysis. Though knowledge of Chinese corruption led to questions about the security 
of property rights the area was still insufficient to dismiss the Chinese model of political 
economy, as not enough information was garnered on the ways in which rights were 
threatened, secured or enforced. However, Smith’s comment about the existence of 
corruption in China was a notable and significant flaw in his view of the Chinese 
system.
653 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 680.
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6.3. COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Smith’s third expense and duty of government was “that of erecting and maintaining 
those public institutions and those public works” that are advantageous to society but do 
not offer enough profit to induce private agents.654 Smith divided this duty into two 
main parts: the first involved facilitating and promoting commerce; and the second was 
education. Education will be addressed in chapter seven, as it related closely to the 
development (or lack thereof) of science and technology in China. The subject of 
facilitating and promoting domestic commerce is treated briefly in this section, because 
there was general agreement amongst sources that the Chinese government was 
extremely efficient in undertaking this responsibility. The only question to be answered 
was why this was so.
E u r o p e a n  C o n t e x t
In early modem England, a national canal system emerged in the eighteenth century, 
highlighted by the completion of the Bridgewater canal in 1760. These canals were 
created at the impulse of landlords wanting to extend the market of their estates, the 
owners of family businesses, farmers needing supplies and a rising demand for coal. 
Landlords used their clout to influence parliament, which ultimately passed numerous 
ordinances supporting these projects. Several sources were responsible for the financing 
of these canals including capital derived from rents, income borrowed from friends, and 
increasingly joint stock enterprises, where most of the capital was raised in the locality 
that the project was designed to serve.655 The administration of roads in England used to 
be assigned to ad hoc local public bodies, however in the eighteenth century, the 
maintenance costs were transferred to the users of the roads through the formation of 
turnpike trusts, meaning tolls were paid to use the roads.656 This model was so 
successful that in a few generations, England had a national road network established. 
Ashton notes that the English parliament occasionally contributed to works of public 
utility, such as giving money to rebuild London Bridge in 1757. However, “generally its
654 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 916.
655 T.S. Ashton An Economic History o f  England: The Eighteenth Century (Oxon: Routledge, 2006 
[1955]), 74.
656 Ashton, An Economic History, 80.
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functions were to regulate than to initiate”.657 Thus infrastructure development in 
England was encouraged by private profit.
In late seventeenth century France, the internal minister Colbert centralized the 
responsibility for the maintenance of roads. The project was relatively successful but 
after Colbert died, the central control was relaxed until a reorganization of budget and 
training occurred in the 1740s. While these changes significantly improved passenger 
traffic, the movement of freight was still lethargic, something Adam Smith commented
/ r r o
on. France had a large-scale canal project long before the canal era began in England.
In 1681 the Canal du Midi, which connected the Atlantic to the Mediterranean was 
completed. It was a project requiring great funds, engineering and innovation. The work 
began as an initiative by an estate owner, Pierre Paul Riquet, who dreamt of an efficient 
way to market his produce. Riquet received support from Colbert and about half of the 
funds for the project were derived from the central government, the rest from the local 
estates and Riquet personally.659 However, the completion of this project did not initiate 
a canal age comparable to that which characterized the construction of the Bridgewater 
canal in England. While England transported its goods on the water and on roads at a 
ratio of 50:50, France’s ratio was 1:10.66°
P r i m a r y  d e s c r i p t i o n s
Primary sources were largely in agreement about China’s infrastructure. Le Comte 
reported China’s centralized emphasis on infrastructure maintenance, noting that for 
governors ensuring the quality of the roads “concerns their fortunes but sometimes their 
life.”661 He told a story about a village of the third rank in the province of Shanxi, where 
the governor had just hung himself in despair as he did not have enough time to repair a 
road that the Emperor was going to travel on. Du Halde and most other observers also 
noted the ease with which one could travel on the main roads of China as they were 
well kept, safe and had regular lodges along the major routes. The most praise was 
given to Chinese canals. Primary sources from missionaries to emissaries described the
651 Ibid., 83
658 Tim Blanning, The Pursuit o f  Glory: Europe 1648-1815 (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 8; Chandra 
Mukeiji, Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009).
659 Blanning, The Pursuit o f  Glory, 25. Mukeiji, Impossible Engineering, 85-86.
660 Blanning, The Pursuit o f  Glory, 23.
661 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 307. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 99.
662 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1,265; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 87; French edition, Vol. 2, 51.
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beneficial canals throughout the empire.663 Du Halde reported “The Chinese not 
contented with these canals, which are of infinite conveniency for travellers and trading 
people, have dug many others with admirable industry and art for the reception of rain 
to water the fields of rice”.664 The Grand Canal epitomised the relationship between 
public works and the Chinese economy.
Poivre related his amazement at the extensive canals in China that allowed for the 
transportation of goods “with great ease, and small expence”.665 However, the 
philosopher-traveller was less impressed by their public roads, which he compared to 
European footpaths. Yet this was not deemed a problem because canals are more useful, 
because as Poivre argued, “there is no comparison between the weight which can be 
transported in a boat, and that which can be conveyed by any kind of land-carriage; no 
proportion between expense”.666 An even greater benefit was that the canals were public 
and thus not controlled for the benefit of a few.667
R e c e p t i o n
This topic was not controversial as geographers repeatedly asserted, and philosophers 
agreed, that the Chinese had well-maintained public infrastructure. For instance, 
Salmon’s Modem History compared Chinese highways to Roman roads as they ran 
from one end of the kingdom to the other.668 He noted the public paid for the military to 
guard the roads for security and the emperor encouraged the maintenance of the roads 
by the constant prospect of his visitation to all the provinces. Salmon also described the 
Grand Canal in each province that served as a high road with smaller canals cut from it 
concluding, “Europe we are assured has nothing to boast of comparable to this.”669 The 
Grand Canal, he reported, ran from Canton to Peking making it 1200 miles long (with 
one day’s interruption from a mountain). To compare, the innovative Canal du Midi 
was 150 miles long. However, Salmon did claim their technology was not as advanced 
as that of Europe, as they did not have the use of floodgates. The canals were so widely 
discussed that William Guthrie’s brief description of China contained a section entitled
663 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-lndia Company, 182. Anson did not describe the interior canals as 
he did not travel around China, and only remained in Canton.
664 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 325; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 272; French edition, Vol. 2, 156.
665 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 141. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 113-114.
666 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 142. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 114-115.
667 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 161. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 129.
668 Salmon, M odem History, 14.
m Ibid , 5.
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‘Canals’. He claimed these canals “are sufficient to entitle the antient Chinese of the
£7ftcharacter of being the wisest and most industrious people in the world.”
Montesquieu did not address the Chinese canals, which is not surprising given his focus 
in the L ’Esprit des Lois and his less practically minded discussion of economic 
prospects. Other philosophers praised the ease of transportation in China. Most 
complimented China’s canals over their roads. For instance, both Quesnay and Raynal 
offered praise for the ease of trafficking goods in China because of their navigable 
canals. Raynal expressed an Enlightenment thought of man conquering nature in his 
praise of Chinese industry. “As the Egyptians checked the course of the Nile...To the 
movements of the globe, the Chinese oppose the efforts of industry.” In the 1770 
edition of Histoire des deux Indes, Raynal praised “the beauty of the roads, and the 
amount of canals.”673 However in the 1774 edition, he removed the line about “the 
beauty of the roads” and only left in the praise for the amount of canals.674 It is likely 
that Raynal received some criticism from the readers of his first edition for his praise of 
Chinese roads, and thus removed it, but maintained the information about he canals 
because that was widely held to be true.
Scepticism about the quality of China’s public works increased in Smith’s Wealth o f 
Nations. After addressing the advantage to private interest controlling highways and 
canals, he was particularly interested in the case of China’s public works. Smith noted 
that provincial governors are judged according to how well they have maintained such 
works. Though he believed this was the practice in several governments of Asia, it was 
particularly so in China “where the high roads, and still more that navigable canals, it is 
pretended, exceed very much every thing of the same kind which is known in
f.nc
Europe”. Smith claimed to doubt the veracity of the information provided by “weak 
and wondering travelers” and “stupid and lying missionaries” and noted that Bernier’s 
reports on Indostan reflect how such descriptions have been exaggerated before. He 
hypothesized that China, like France, maintained the canals and roads that were “likely 
to be the subject of conversation at the court and in the capital”, while “all the rest
670 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 464
671 Maverick, China, a model fo r  Europe, 223-224. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 612-613; Rousselot 
de Surgy, Melanges, Vol. 5, 227-8.
672 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, 88. Raynal, Histoire des deux Indes, 104. He also noted 
the canals were public property.
673 Raynal, Histoire des deux Indes, 631.
614 Ibid., 103.
675 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 925.
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neglected.” Nevertheless, he felt it necessary to describe why the Chinese
government would have the incentive to invest in public works. Smith connected the
nature of China’s agricultural system, to taxation and subsequently to public works. It
was “natural” for Chinese emperors to support agriculture as their yearly revenue
depended on it. Because the revenue was collected from the land, the executive power
had the incentive to maintain the high roads and the navigable canals in order to
facilitate the marketing of produce. In China, Indoston and several other governments of
Asia, the revenue was gathered from land taxes or rents, which
rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce of the 
land...The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in 
such countries necessarily and immediately connected with the 
cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the 
value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great 
and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a 
market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, 
and the least expensive communication between all the different parts 
of the country; which can be done only by means of the best roads and 
the best navigable canals.
This was contrasted to Europe, where the revenue of the sovereign is not primarily from 
land tax or rent, and the dependency on the land was “neither so immediate, nor so 
evident.” The European sovereign had little interest in promoting and increasing the 
produce of the land and maintaining good roads and canals to help market produce. 
Smith described how it was the church in Europe that, like the Chinese government, 
was supported by a land tax proportioned to the produce of the land, not to the rent. 
However, because the tithe of the Church in Europe was divided into such small 
portions, it did not have the same interest as the Chinese state for maintaining good 
roads and canals. He concluded that while it might be true that in some parts of Asia 
“this department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive power, 
there is not the least probability that, during the present state of things, it could be 
tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe.”677 Once again, the Chinese 
case was deemed unique. Most observers and commentators agreed that China had a 
well-developed public infrastructure, particularly with regard to its canal system, but 
again this was a result of its land-based economy from which Europe could not draw 
any lessons.
616Ibid., 926.
611 Ibid.
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6.4. TAXES
Adam Smith carefully considered from where the funds for the main expenses of 
government should be derived. He argued that the funds for defence and for the 
subsistence of the sovereign should come from the general revenue, whereas those for 
justice should arise from fees and those for infrastructure should be based on the local 
beneficiaries of a project (as often occurred in the join-stock ventures in England); the 
funds for roads and education could be derived either from the general revenue or from 
local budgets or tolls. These concerns led Smith to the second chapter of his fifth book, 
the “sources of the general or public revenue of the society”. These funds were divided 
into those that belong to the sovereign (or commonwealth) - primarily revenue from 
land - and those that derived from taxes (on rent, profit or wages). These taxes, he 
argued, should be proportional, certain, convenient and efficiently collected.678 This 
topic was of the utmost importance, for without sufficient revenues and their proper 
management (or, avoiding corruption), the aforementioned duties of government could 
not be fulfilled. Enlightenment observers and commentators of China addressed two 
main subjects regarding Chinese taxation. The first regarded the scale and the second 
the specific policies of extraction.
E u r o p e a n  C o n t e x t
The appeal of the Chinese system stemmed from the dramatically contrasting situation 
in France and England. After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the English 
government’s options for raising money were limited to levying taxes and raising 
voluntary loans (selling state or crown lands, or offices were no longer feasible 
solutions). John Brewer reports the average annual tax revenue during the Nine Years’ 
War (1688-97) was 3.64 million pounds (double the state’s tax income before the 
Glorious Revolution).679 By 1775 the total net tax income was over 12 million pounds 
per annum, and reached just less than 20 million pounds by the end of the eighteenth 
century. However, tax collection during the end of the Restoration in England
Z Q  1
“lacked administrative coherence”. It was divided into four different bodies (local 
government, employees of tax farmers, parliamentary commissioners, and royal
6n Ibid., 1042-1046.
679 Brewer, Sinews o f  Power, 88.
660Ibid., 89.
681 Ibid., 91.
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officials). This variation led to problems with tax collection. By the Glorious 
Revolution, there were reforms that brought this system into greater order, such as the 
establishment of the Treasury Board to oversee state revenues and expenditure. The 
chief taxes that contributed to the regular income in the late seventeenth century were: 
the customs (taxes on international trade); the excise (duties on domestically produced 
commodities such as alcohol); and the hearth tax (graduated property tax based on
/'M
number of household hearths). The collection was the responsibility of private 
business -  tax farmers -  who, not coincidentally, were also government creditors. By 
1684, they shifted from tax farming to direct collection. After the Glorious Revolution, 
the unpopular hearth tax, the customs, excise and land tax provided about 90% of state’s 
revenue.683
French philosophers-cum-administrators showed a great deal of interest in the Chinese 
tax system for reasons of their own. At the time, the French monarchy determined tax 
rates on a local basis all over the country, creating a fragmented taxation system.684 
After the French famine in 1693, Louis XIV implemented the capitation, the first direct 
tax to all subjects. In 1710, the War of Spanish Succession led to another universal tax, 
the dixieme. However tax collection was still uneven and abused. The process of tax 
collection was privatized and led to intense corruption. The historic influence of 
privilege continued and many nobles and clergymen did not pay the taille, a direct tax, 
which largely fell on the peasantry. It also varied greatly across regions. The French 
state inefficiently extracted more revenues from its populace as its national debt
roc
continued to rise.
P r i m a r y  d e s c r ip t io n s
As noted in previous chapters, China’s sizeable population was widely recognized and 
considered to be a unique feature of the empire. Before the rise of Malthusian concerns, 
population size was typically associated with national wealth. Navarrete cited Proverbs 
14:28 when he discussed China’s population: “In the multitude of the people is the
682Ibid., 92.
™ Ib id .,95.
684 For more on French fiscal policy see Michael Kwass, Privileges and the Politics o f  Taxation in 
Eighteenth Century France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
685 See Phillipe Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 
1450-1789  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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honour of the king.”686 A large population demonstrated the ability of the country to 
feed a large number of people, thereby attesting to a successful agricultural system, and 
also meant that the government could collect revenue from a substantial tax base.
Specific information on the size of China’s population was popularized in Europe in the 
sixteenth century through Mendoza who estimated that there were over 35 million 
taxpayers in the empire.687 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (before 
and after the Manchu Conquest), Jesuits and emissaries reported on the number of 
China’s taxpaying men (excluding soldiers, eunuchs, women, children and those who 
do not pay taxes) within the range of 58 and 59 million men.688
However, some did reflect concerns of overpopulation in China. For instance, in 
between his descriptions of Chinese spices and trees, Du Halde argued 
“Notwithstanding this great plenty it is however true, though a kind of a paradox, that 
the most rich and flourishing empire in the world is in effect poor enough; for the land, 
though so very extensive and fruitful, hardly suffices to support its inhabitants.”689 
Chinese poverty caused infanticide and the selling of children of slaves, leading Du 
Halde to speculate “that to live comfortably they have need of a country as large
* j) 690again .
In spite of the disagreements about the specific number of inhabitants of the empire, 
there was broad acceptance that China was extremely large. The actual population of 
China oscillated over the Ming dynasty and historians disagree on the total population. 
It is estimated that China’s population 1600 was 150 million.691 Due to epidemics as
686 Churchill, A collection o f  voyages and Travels, Vol. 1, 21.
687 Mendoza, The History o f  the Great and Mighty Kingdom, 80-81.
688 Ricci citing a Chinese book from 1579 listed the adult population subject to taxes as 58 550 801. Ricci 
and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 9; Semedo, listed 58 550 180 taxpayers. Semedo, The 
history o f  that great and renowned monarchy o f  China, 3; Nieuhof listed the sum o f families is 10 128 
067 and the sum o f fighting men 58 916 783. Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 404; 
Gabriel de Magalhaes claimed there were 59 788 364. Magalhaes, A new history o f  China containing a 
description o f  the most considerable particulars o f  that vast empire (London: Printed for Thomas 
Newborough, 1688), 40; Du Halde claimed 58 000 000 formerly paid the tribute but by the beginning o f  
reign o f Kangxi Emperor there were 11 052 872 familes and 59 788 364 men able to bear arms. This was 
the same as Magalhaes decades earlier though Du Halde did not cite it. Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1,
244; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 20; French edition, Vol. 2, 14-15.
689 Du Halde, Cave, Vol. 1,318; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 250; French edition, Vol. 2, 145.
690 Du Halde, Cave, Vol. 1,318; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 250; French edition, Vol. 2, 145.
691 Timothy Brook points out three different figures reached by three distinct approaches to determining 
China’s population in 1600: 66 million, 150 million and 230 million and argues it is most useful to follow 
China’s population as being 150 million. Timothy Brook, The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and 
Ming Dynasties (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010), 45.
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well as the Manchu invasion, the population dropped by the beginning of the Qing 
dynasty before increasing dramatically in the eighteenth century, surpassing 300 million 
by the end of the century. In comparison, the population of England and Wales in 1650 
was 5.6 million and by 1750 it had reached 6.1 million (7.4 million including 
Scotland). Even France, which in the eighteenth century was the most heavily 
populated country in Europe and the third largest in the world (after China and India), 
was dwarfed by the Chinese figures. In 1650, France had an estimated population of 21 
million and on by 1750 it reached 25 million.693 These comparisons were understood as 
early as the sixteenth century. Botero acknowledged the lack of certainty about China’s 
population before estimating it at around 70 million.694 He directly compared China to 
Italy (with its population of nine million), Germany (with the Swiss Confederacy and 
Dutch Republic totalling 15 million) and England (with its much smaller population of 
three million), demonstrating the remarkable size of the Chinese Empire.695
To infer fiscal wealth from population size was a common leap at the time. Here too, 
the primary sources from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reported varying 
figures. Ricci claimed that the revenue from tax returns, impost and other tribute 
exceeded 150 million pounds a year.696 Navarrate added up the taxes on ploughed lands, 
the duties on silk and other clothes, the customs and tolls, the poll tax and the ground 
rent on houses to be worth 100 millions of fine silver.697 He discussed the varying 
figures, noting Ricci’s claim as well as Martini’s that the revenue amounted to 150 
millions of silver. Later, Le Comte pointed out the difficulty in calculating the revenue 
of the empire as it is collected partially in specie, and partially in goods. Basing his 
assessments on the officers and their books, he estimated the treasury received about 22 
million crowns of China (which the Portuguese referred to as taels).698 In addition to 
this sum received in specie, the treasury was also paid in rice, com, salt, silks, cloths, 
varnish and other commodities that were estimated to be worth more than 50 million 
Chinese crowns. Le Comte concluded the ordinary revenues to equal 120 600 000
692 Blanning, The Pursuit o f  Glory, 42-43.
693 Ibid.
694 Giovanni Botero, Relations, o f  the most famous kingdoms, 595. Botero Delle Relationi Universali,
Parte Seconda, 64-65.
695 Ibid.
696 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 46.
697 Churchill, A Collection o f  Voyages and Travels, Vol. 1, 25.
698 In 1642, the largest year o f their silver collection in revenue, the Ming government collected 23 
Million taels o f silver. Richard von Glahn, “Comment on Arbitrage, China, and World Trade in the Early 
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pounds, “at least”, thus dropping his figure below Ricci.699 By the eighteenth century an 
exact figure that could be reported was still absent. Du Halde also noted that it was not 
easy to give account of great revenues because they were paid partly in money and 
partly in commodities.700 He described the personal tribute paid by those between the 
ages of twenty and sixty and offered an account of the payment in kind received by the 
emperor (in goods such as rice, wheat and salt). He concluded that the entire revenue of
7 n ithe emperor was equal to 200 million taels or ounces of silver.
It was not just the scale of China’s tax revenue that was discussed but also particular
policies of taxation and collection, and the institutions that determined spending.702 As
information increased, explanations as to how easily the taxes were collected began to
circulate. The Chinese government was deemed to have a just tax policy and this
contributed to the ease with which taxes were collected. Mendoza argued that the rate of
Chinese taxation was lower than in Europe: “Although this kingdome is great and very
rich, yet there is none that both pay so little tribute ordinarily unto their kings as they
do: neither amongst Christians, Moores, nor gentiles that we know.”703 The image of a
reasonable tax level continued into the seventeenth century. Navarrete provided insight
into the Chinese philosophy behind taxation. He cited Emperor T’ai Tsung from the
Tang Dynasty, who argued:
It is but reasonable to lay a burden upon him that has strength to bear it; 
but it is a madness to place the weight upon him that is not able to carry 
himself. The Chinese oblige all persons, from two and twenty to sixty 
years of age, to pay taxes, supposing they are not able to bear that 
burden either before or after... To take a morsel of bread from him that 
has but two to feed four mouths, is not sheering, but devouring the 
sheep and what good can it do the sovereign but breed ill blood”.70
While Navarrete claimed the taxes in China were light and proportional, he did
70^comment the mandarins abused their power and stole from the subjects. Corruption 
was indicated as a problem, which Smith eventually picked up on.
699 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 249. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 13.
700 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 244; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 20; French edition, Vol. 2, 14-15.
701 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 244; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 21; French edition, Vol. 2, 15.
702 In reality, China’s fiscal policy was much more complicated than these primary reports indicated. Due 
to a systemic breakdown in the rural fiscal policy during the Ming period, the entire system was 
reformed. George William Skinner and Hugh D. R. Baker (eds.), The City in late imperial China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977)
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Other primary sources, notably Le Comte, praised the Chinese methods for tax 
collection. Le Comte claimed “of all their wholesome institutions there is nothing which 
contributes so much to the keeping up peace and order, as does their method of levying 
the Emperor’s revenues”.706 Unlike France, “they are not troubled in China with such 
swarms of officers and commissioners”. All the estates were measured, families 
registered, and what the emperor excised on goods or taxes on persons was publicly 
known and everyone paid the mandarins or governors of the third rank. Those who did 
not pay did not lose their estates by confiscation, as that would punish an innocent
7fi7family, instead the individual was imprisoned until they paid. Apart from 
imprisonment, other punishments for failure to pay taxes included being beaten or being 
forced to billet the poor or aged. All of these different punishments were designed to 
avoid seizing goods.708 After the taxes were collected, the mandarins gave an account to 
a general officer of the province, who then reported to the responsible court in Peking.
Descriptions from primary sources about spending government revenue contradicted the 
notion that an absolute despot controlled China. Ricci argued that the emperor was not 
solely responsible for deciding how to spend government income. He commented on 
the misconception that the revenue collected from the Chinese public went directly into 
the Imperial Exchequer so the King could use it as he pleased. Instead, he argued, the 
silver “is placed in the public treasure, and the returns paid in rice are placed in the 
warehouses belonging to the government”.709 The Emperor could only offer rewards 
from his private fortune, not from the public revenue but he still argued “the size of the 
national budget is far in excess of what Europeans might imagine” because the national
710treasury paid for public buildings, palaces, prisons, fortresses, and war supplies. 
Primary observers from missionaries to merchants, as well as geographers and 
philosophers were aware of the imperial court called Houpo or Hopu, which was 
deemed equivalent to the Department of the Treasury and handled tax collection, public
• 711debts, negotiation of loans and other financial transactions. The revenue was 
disbursed in provinces to pay for pensions (especially for maintaining the poor), salaries 
of the mandarins and soldiers, public buildings and for structures necessary to facilitate
706 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 307-8. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 99.
707 Ibid.
708 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 244; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 21; French edition, Vol. 2, 15.
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7 1  7commerce. Primary accounts also described the Chinese system of public treasuries 
and rice warehouses that ensured the revenue was spent in the best interest of the 
empire, and not just the emperor.713 This accountability was seen as conducive to tax 
collection.
Ricci described the Emperor’s ability to raise new funds. When there is an insufficient 
amount of money in the treasury, “new taxes are imposed to balance the budget”.714 
However, Le Comte commented that the Emperor rarely invoked his power to levy new 
taxes and describes another custom of “exempting every year one or two provinces 
from bearing their proportion in the tax, especially if any of them have suffered thro’ 
the sickness of the people, or if the lands thro’ unreasonable weather have not yielded 
so good an encrease as usual”. Du Halde concurred, writing that the emperor very 
rarely raised new taxes and “there is scarcely a year he does not remit the whole tribute 
to some province, if it happens to be afflicted with any kind of calamity”. 
Extraordinary resource mobilization in Europe was primarily for military expenditures, 
whereas in China it was largely for major public works projects, particularly for water 
control and grain storage.
An important eighteenth century primary description on this subject was that of Pierre 
Poivre. As discussed, he showed particular interest in property rights and taxation. 
Poivre confirmed earlier descriptions noting that taxes in China were paid with the 
“greatest fidelity” because the payers knew where their money went.717 The people of 
China were aware that when there was a scarcity, the stored grain was open to the 
public. They knew that the remainder of the impost was sold in public markets, and the 
profits were then given to the treasury under the custody of the “respectable tribunal of 
Ho-pou” where it was given to supply the general necessities of the court.718 The Peking 
Gazette supported knowledge of the public works that revenue was spent on. Discussed 
in the previous chapter, this daily paper related the expenses of the Chinese government 
and in particular described the public works. China’s taxes were confirmed as easy to
712 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 245; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 22; French edition, Vol. 2, 16.
713 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 47. Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 258. Le 
Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 24. Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 164-5. Poivre, Voyages 
d ’un philosophe, 132.
714 Ricci and Trigault, 47.
715 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 248. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 11.
716 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 244; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 21; French edition, Vol. 2, 15.
717 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 164-5. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 132.
718 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 165. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 132.
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collect because of the efficient survey of lands and census of families, as well as the
71 Qefficiency of the officials in charge of tax collection. Poivre highlighted this point 
when he wrote that the Chinese pay taxes “not to avaricious farmers-generals, but to 
honest magistrates, their proper and natural governors”. Thus he directly contradicted 
Navarrete’s claim of the low-level corruption in tax collection. Poivre discussed the 
“impost named the tenth”, which he noted was “regulated according to the nature of the 
lands” so that in poor soils it might only be around one thirtieth part, a topic that, as we 
will see below, was of great interest to Adam Smith.721
R e c e p t i o n
On the receiving end, the geographers and philosophers questioned the information and 
often relied on outdated figures. The modem part of An universal history referred to 
“some authors” but clearly relied on Du Halde, as the editors listed the number of 
taxpaying males as 59, 788, 364. The author of An Irregular Dissertation (a text 
devoted to attacking Du Halde’s work) questioned the validity of the calculation of 
China’s population. He argued there were 64 million fighting men in China, and 
calculated this meant there were a total of 256 million people in the empire.723 The 
author then utilized Du Halde’s fact on the number of families (rounding the number to 
11 million), questioned the assumption that the number of families in China had the 
same implications as it would in Europe.724 The Chinese Traveller, which had a 
favourable position towards using the Jesuit sources, also relied on Du Halde but did 
not cite him as a source.’725 Another popular compendium compiled by William Guthrie 
demonstrated a more sceptical view of China’s population. In a short paragraph on ‘the 
population and inhabitants’ of China, he argued that by the best accounts, the 
population of China is not less than fifty million. He also commented on the other, 
higher, numbers available: “Most of those accounts are exaggerated, and persons, who 
visit China without any view of becoming authors, are greatly disappointed in their 
mighty expectations.” 726 Paradoxically, in a description questioning the veracity of
719 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 307-8. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 99.
720 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 164. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 131.
721 Poivre, The travels o f  a philosopher, 163. Poivre, Voyages d ’un philosophe, 131.
722 The modem part o f An universal history, Vol. 8, 11.
723 Anonymous. An irregular dissertation, occasioned by the reading o f  Father Du H alde’s description o f  
China. Which may be read at any time (London: Printed for J. Roberts, 1740), 50.
724 Anonymous, An irregular dissertation, 46.
725 Anonymous, Chinese Traveller, 20-21.
726 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 465.
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sources, the author does not cite his own sources for the fact of China’s population 
being less than fifty million.
The debate and desire for exactness intensified over time. Cornelius de Pauw exclaimed 
“the population of China, which as shall now appear, has been prodigiously 
exaggerated.’727 He noted the inconsistency in the reports on China’s population where 
authors
even vary in their calculations as far as one hundred millions...All the 
details we possess on this subject have been written at random. Father 
du Halde gives Pekin three millions of inhabitants: Father le Comte 
admits only two millions; and Father Gaubil expresses himself in so
798vague a manner, that nothing can be concluded from his accounts.
He accepted that there may be 82 million people in China (though noted it is ‘most 
probably is exaggerated’) nevertheless he argued, ‘China has still much less people, in 
proportion to its size, than Germany’.729
By the eighteenth century a few philosophers, including Montesquieu, followed the 
primary sources in expressing concern about China’s large population,730 Quesnay also 
identified Chinese overpopulation as a fundamental flaw in their system of political 
economy, arguing “However great that empire may be, it is too crowded for the 
multitude that inhabit it. All Europe combined would not number so many families”.731 
Quesnay criticized the common European belief that a “large population is the source of
7^ 9wealth” and instead argued, “population exceeds wealth everywhere”. Repeating Du 
Halde’s descriptions of infanticide and slavery, Quesnay argued where population 
exceeds wealth to the extent that it did in China, terrible acts of inhumanity become 
common.733 However, he did not attribute Chinese poverty to inequality in the 
distribution of property, nor the Chinese, claiming, “Population always exceeds wealth 
in both good and bad governments...”734 In Quesnay’s view, to prevent overcrowding 
in a well-governed nation there was “no other recourse but that of colonies”. According
727 Cornelius de Pauw, Philosophical dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese Translated by Capt. J.
Thomson (London: Printed by T. Chapman, 1795), 72. 
in  Ib id , 15 and 76.
729 Ibid, 84.
730 Montesquieu, relying on Du Halde in his discussion of luxury in China, noted “women are so fertile 
and humankind multiplies so fast that the fields, even heavily cultivated, scarcely suffice to produce 
enough food for the inhabitants.” Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 102. Montesquieu, De I’Esprit des 
Lois, Premiere part, 118.
731 Maverick, China, a Model fo r Europe, 168.
732 Ibid
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to Quesnay, this imperfection of the Chinese system was fairly easily corrected. A 
policy of expanding into uninhabited territory would deal with the problem of surplus 
population and China would then embody his ideal model of political economy.
Geographers repeated the varying figures of revenue provided by the primary sources. 
Giovanni Botero made this connection at the end of the sixteenth century, arguing that 
the Chinese revenues amount to 120 millions of gold “which value although it may 
seeme impossible to him that shall make an estimate of the states of Europe with the
7^  ckingdom of China”. Salmon, however, directly challenged the primary descriptions. 
He questioned the accuracy of Le Comte’s figure because England’s revenue during the 
War of Spanish Succession was nearly half as much as the Chinese and after the war, in 
full peace, their revenue was above one-fourth of the Chinese. Considering how much 
smaller England was than China, Salmon argued it was “not easily conceived” how the 
Chinese paid their civil bureaucracy and five million soldiers.
Nonetheless, European commentators from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century 
largely admired Chinese taxation policies. Botero posed the question: “Wherefore since 
this Empire is so huge, and all the profits thereof are in [the emperor’s] hands, how can 
the former assertion of so great a yearly revenue, to men of reason seem any thing 
admirable at all?”737 Botero then answered his own question by arguing that the Chinese 
system should be admired for several reasons. Firstly, taxes were paid not only in coin 
but also in kind, which can then be redistributed to those in need. Secondly, the emperor 
distributed “three parts” of his total revenue: “people receive againe by those expences 
as much as they laid out in the beginning of the years”.738
Chinese tax policy was considered to be a simple land-tax model that imposed a 
payment of between one-tenth and one-thirtieth of the value produced by a piece of 
land. In 1707, frustrated by the inefficiency and complications of the French taxation 
system, Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban argued for the utility of a simplified royal tithe 
in Dime Royale (1707). Famed as a military engineer, Vauban was frustrated by the 
inefficiency and complications of the Colbert taxation system. He noted that a
735 Giovanni Botero, Relations, o f  the most famous kingdoms, 599. Botero Delle Relationi Universali,
Parte Seconda, 67.
736 Salmon, Modem History, V ol.l, 30.
737 Giovanni Botero, Relations, o f  the most famous kingdoms, 600. Botero, Delle Relationi Universali,
Parte Seconda, 68.
738 Ibid.
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simplified tax was not a new idea, and was mentioned 3000 years earlier in the 
Scriptures, as well as in Profane history, which “tells us, that the greatest states of the 
world used it to very good purpose”, the Greek and Roman Emperors as well as 
currently the King of Spain in America, and that the Great Mogul “and the King of 
China do use it over all their vast Empires”.739 The English translator noted in the 
preface that Vauban’s motivations for writing this work stemmed from the love his 
country and his access to information, which led to a realization “about how both prince 
and people were cheated by those who have the management of publick money. An evil 
not peculiar to France, nor confined to arbitrary governments”.740 The translator pointed 
out how Vauban knew “that the true greatness and riches of a kingdom consists in the 
numbers of men, wisely govern’d, and usefully employ’d”.741 The translator concluded 
the “reasonable remedy” to ensure the King was “rich and powerful” while the subjects 
were “happy” was to introduce proportional taxation to all subjects regardless of “rank, 
quality, or condition”.742 The taxes should remain between one-tenth and one-twentieth 
depending on the needs of the government. He proposed a tax “laid upon all the fruits of 
the earth, on one hand; and on all that produces yearly incomes on the other”.743 It was a 
system less liable to corruption and employed fewer hands to collect it and a lower cost. 
He also recommended an annual census for France and suggested a way to achieve this 
was to “divide all the people into decuries, as the Chinese do”.744 Although dismissed 
by French officials at the time, Vauban’s taxation policy was very influential to the later 
Physiocrats. Quesnay remarked that Vauban’s argument for a principle tax of one tenth 
of the agricultural harvest and industrial production was remarkably similar to the 
practice in China. However, Quesnay argued that it should not be the total value that 
was taxed, but rather the net product (the rent paid by the farmer to the landlord).745
Quesnay deemed China’s tax burden fair, at least in theory. He described how in China 
no land was exempt from the tax, and if a tax was extracted from farmers, the cost of 
farming was subtracted from the charge. Quesnay believed natural law dictated taxes 
could only be drawn from the soil itself and not from people because “man by himself is 
bare of riches”, and they could not come from his wages which were needed for
739 Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, A project fo r  a royal tythe: or, general tax (London: n.p., 1708), 
Vauban’s preface, viii.
740 Ibid., Preface by the English translator.
741 Ibid.
742 Ibid.
743 Ibid. Vauban’s preface, viii.
™ Ibid., 159.
745 Maverick, China, a Model fo r Europe, 120.
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subsistence, which Quesnay believed could not pay for both subsistence and taxes, as 
the cost of labour would have to be raised without production increasing.746 He believed 
that the Chinese followed these fundamental principles. Quesnay argued the Chinese 
personal tax on labour could not contribute to the public revenue because it would 
reduce cultivation of the land and violate natural law.747 However, the Chinese system 
was not perfect. In a section entitled “Taxes other than on land”, Quesnay addressed the 
“irregular taxes” in China. By this he meant customs duties, tolls and the poll tax. He 
believed that if these “allegations [of irregular taxes in China] have foundation” then 
“the state is not sufficiently enlightened as to its true interests; for in an empire, the 
wealth of which springs from the soil, such impositions are destructive to taxation itself 
and to the revenues of the nation”. To Quesnay this was “indisputably demonstrated by
nAQ
mathematics”. Although Quesnay believed these irregular taxes were the “seed of a 
devastation”, he did not think they would destroy the empire because they were 
moderate and fixed. He also noted that the defect was one of administration not of 
government (going back to his line of argument discussed in chapter five). He argued 
the fault “may be corrected without involving any change in the constitution of that 
empire”.749 Once again, he criticized the improper application of his ideal model. Other 
philosophers agreed with Quesnay that minimal and simplified taxation was beneficial 
to agricultural production. For instance, Raynal, following Poivre again, commented 
about China (in every edition of Histoire des deux Indes), “the smallness of the taxes is 
still a farther encouragement to agriculture”. 750
Once again, Cornelius de Pauw was distinctively critical in his description of Chinese 
taxation. He argued “in all despotic states, the revenues of the sovereigns are much less 
than we are tempted to believe”.751 In China, this was a result of the disorder introduced 
by the eunuchs into the state finances. He also, however, described the efforts of the 
Tartars to reform the treasury but noted again the corrupting forces of the eunuchs who 
“dreamed of nothing but imposts”.752 De Pauw evidently believed the ideal system of 
taxation in China meant little in the face of the greedy role of the eunuchs.
746 Ibid., 291. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 652.
747 Maverick, China, a Model fo r  Europe, 292. Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 653.
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Adam Smith, who was aware of de Pauw’s work, listed four general maxims for 
taxation, they should be: equal (meaning taxes are proportionally determined), certain 
not arbitrary, convenient to be paid, and economically collected. While evidence on 
China’s taxes indicated they were certain, convenient and collected economically, 
Smith doubted their equality. He argued taxes that were proportioned to the produce, 
rather than the rent, were very unequal. Different agricultural situations required 
different percentages to replace employed capital. In other words, the ratio of produce to 
expense varied.754 Chinese taxes were reportedly proportioned to produce. “In China, 
the principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of all the 
lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very moderately, that, in
HCC
many provinces, it is said not to exceed a thirtieth part of the ordinary produce.” 
Smith compared this to tax rates elsewhere, noting that the land tax paid to the 
Mahometan government of Bengal (before it was dominated by English East India 
Company) and that paid in ancient Egypt were both approximately one fifth part of the 
produce. This demonstrated to him a very low tax burden on Chinese peasants. Smith 
cautioned however that payment in kind rather than in money was more liable to 
manipulation and fraud.756 This again points to the differences between China and 
Europe, especially in regard to Europe’s overwhelmingly money-based economies. 
Both de Pauw and Smith cautioned about the potential for corruption in China.
Eighteenth century commentators demonstrated great interest in China’s organization of 
revenue collection. The high level of revenue, the low rate of taxation and the 
consistency, efficiency and theory of the policy were generally admired, most agreed 
elements of the Chinese system could be reformed for greater benefit. Many 
philosophers, such as Quesnay, believed that even if China was not the perfect model of 
taxation, it was the closest approximation and thus lessons could be learned from the 
Middle Kingdom. Adam Smith, however, articulated a fundamental difference of the 
Chinese tax system, based on an agricultural economy that collected a portion of its 
taxes in kind, in comparison to Europe’s increasingly money-based political economies 
leading to a threat of corruption. Moreover, he argued that China’s taxes were unequal 
and thus not ideal. On the subject of revenue, observers and commentators admired
753 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 1043-1044.
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China’s wealth, although they disagreed about China’s taxes, reflecting the 
Enlightenment debates on political economy.
CONCLUSION
Assessed on the execution of its duties of government, China’s priorities and 
circumstances were identified as unique. One clear and unrelenting failure of the 
Chinese state was its ineffectual military, which was particularly acute after the Manchu 
Conquest. Some commentators believed the masculine force of the Tartars who 
assumed power could assist the development of China’s military strength, yet also 
recognized the tendency in China for the conquerors to adopt the manners of the 
conquered. While Raynal attempted to rationalize and justify China’s passive stance, 
most observers and commentators agreed that China was vulnerable because of its lack 
of state strength. Quesnay, needing to preserve his model of political economy, ignored 
the implications of this key state failure. This vulnerability was to haunt the Chinese 
empire in the nineteenth century, but even without foresight, eighteenth century 
observers were aware of this fatal flaw.
When it came to property rights, commercial institutions and revenue, China was not 
viewed as perfect, but none of the criticisms were sufficient to dismiss their system of 
political economy altogether. Its legal system was seen as functioning and fair, with 
property secured. The idea of corruption loomed over the topic, as it did when it came 
to assessing the form of China’s government and revenue. The restricted information on 
this topic, however, ensured it never became a defining feature of China’s system of 
political economy. It was widely held that the Chinese government provided useful 
commercial infrastructure. However like the topic of China’s trade policy, this was seen 
to be a feature of its unique circumstances. China’s agricultural base, according to 
Smith, was an incentive for the government to provide a good system of infrastructure 
to transport goods. Finally, China’s revenue was considered large, effectively collected, 
and responsibly spent. While Quesnay admitted China’s taxes might be imperfect and 
Smith argued their taxes were unequal and vulnerable to corruption, these were points 
that might be improved, but not considered fatal flaws in the Chinese system of political 
economy.
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O u t l i n e : 7. “r a is o n n e u r s  t r e s  ig n o r a n t s ”757
7.1. T h e  S t a t u s  o f  S c ie n c e  a n d  T e c h n o l o g y
7.2. A s s e s s in g  C h in a ’s  sc ie n c e  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y
7.3. E x p l a n a t io n s  f o r  S t a g n a t io n
Thus far, this research has identified China’s military as an area that Enlightenment
Europeans established as fundamentally inadequate. This chapter examines views of
China’s technology and sciences, which stand beside China’s weak defence as deficient
in European eyes. For instance, Voltaire, a noted ‘sinophile,’ heavily criticized China’s
scientific achievements:
It is sufficiently known, that they are, at the present day, what we all were 
three hundred years ago, very ignorant reasoners. The most learned 
Chinese is like one of the learned of Europe in the fifteenth century, in 
possession of his Aristotle.
However, unlike the military, the connection between technology and sciences with
assessments of China’s system of political economy was not all that evident. During the
Enlightenment, the material advancement of society was not directly connected to what
was considered at the time to be the more esoteric pursuits of natural philosophy (or the
sciences). The importance of technological developments to economic gains was also
not as evident as it would be a century later, at the height of the Industrial Revolution.
While not necessarily connected to the assessment of the wealth of a nation during the
Enlightenment era, science and technology were still important in judging the status and
progress or stagnation of a civilization, particularly that of China.
Retrospectively economic historians such as Joel Mokyr have established that science 
and technology are key components of growth.759 Francesca Bray notes that scientific 
progress and technological development “play star roles in the master narrative of ‘the 
rise of the West’”.760 However science and technology have not been consistently 
viewed as a defining feature of a successful civilization, particularly during the early 
modem period. Michael Adas argues that over the course of the eighteenth century 
achievements in material culture became increasingly important to shaping European 
perceptions of the rest of the world, including China. This chapter agrees with Adas
757 Voltaire, “De La Chine”, 151. Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 83.
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that the influence of science and technology as assessors of civilization grew during the 
Enlightenment; however, it argues that by 1776 (the end point of this study) lack of 
progress in science and technology was not typically connected to assessments of 
China’s wealth or potential for improvement.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the complex and fluid terms science and 
technology. While acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing between the two 
terms, Adas defines science as “endeavours that are aimed at gaining a knowledge of 
the natural environment” while technology includes “efforts to exercise a ‘working
nfyy
control’ over that environment”. He argues further that prior to the Industrial 
Revolution, science and technology were both part of material culture, with areas such 
as architecture, housing and ship building being more critical to determining European 
attitudes than subjects like astronomy. James Ferguson, m a review of Adas’ 
Machines as the Measure o f Men, argues the categories of science and technology only 
became meaningful after the Industrial Revolution and he criticizes the “inappropriate 
projection backward in time of a modem category.”764 To avoid anachronism, the first 
section of this chapter examines the contemporary definitions and concludes that 
adopting the terminology of science and technology is useful, as long as the evolving 
early modem categories of analysis are considered. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
speculative sciences are referred to as ‘science’, whereas the mechanical arts and 
applied sciences are labelled ‘technology’.
The second section of this chapter considers the assessment of China’s science and 
technology by early modem observers and commentators. An examination of the 
primary descriptions of China’s science and technology reveals that they reported that 
European science was more advanced than that of the Chinese. Adas argues 
“eighteenth-century merchants and naval commanders such as [Laurence] Lange and 
[George] Anson were the first to broach many of the criticisms that would be directed 
against China in the era of industrialization”.765 However, the Jesuits also heavily 
criticized Chinese science before the accounts of Lange and Anson. In fact, this section 
will show that science is one particular area where the lines between sinophiles and 
sinophobes were most blurred. Descriptions of technology varied to a greater extent,
764 James Ferguson, "Review: Machines as the Measure o f  Men by Michael Adas” American 
Anthropologist, New Series 93:1 (1991), 220-230.
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and primary reports often praised China’s skill and techniques of production while 
criticizing their inability to invent. Both geographers and, as we saw with Voltaire 
above, philosophers acknowledged the criticisms of Chinese science, and identified 
those particular elements of Chinese technology that were laudable.
The final section of this chapter addresses the explanations offered by the primary, 
geographical and philosophical sources for China’s relative stagnation in science and 
technology. Joseph Needham famously formulated a puzzle about China in the 1950s 
and 1960s: why, when China had once led the world in science and technology (which 
itself was a revisionist view in Needham’s era), did it eventually fall behind the 
West? Needham’s puzzle has encouraged a continuing body of research on the 
progression of Chinese science and technology; however, it was not the first time in 
history that someone from the West had wondered about the relative stagnation of 
Chinese scientific advancement. From the reports of the primary observers, four 
principal (and interconnected) explanations can be identified: China’s language, 
geographical isolation, educational priorities and the character of its people were 
offered as reasons for China’s lack of progress in science and technology. European 
geographers and philosophers who addressed China’s scientific stagnation used a 
combination of these same four explanations to determine why an advanced civilization 
such as China, which had a much longer history, had fallen behind Europe in science 
and technology.
7.1. THE STATUS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The status of science in eighteenth century Europe was rapidly changing and it was 
becoming increasingly institutionalized in universities and academies throughout 
Europe. However many still questioned the esoteric qualities and utility of science. 
Projects such as the creation of the Encyclopedic by Diderot and D’Alembert (whose 
aim was to expose guild secrets) demonstrated the practical value of science and 
technology. However, as we will see below with Adam Smith, for many thinkers, 
scientific advancement was associated with overcoming superstitions associated with
766 Many, such as Francesca Bray, argue that the Needham question is problematic for imposing modem 
values and categories anachronistically and for being framed as a negative (ie. what went wrong?) rather 
than understanding technology’s individual role in Chinese history. Bray, “Towards a critical history of  
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religion rather than material improvement. As Dorinda Outram has succinctly 
explained, “The intellectual status of science was contested, its institutional 
organizations often weak, and certainly thin on the ground, and the nature of its
• 768relations with the economy and with government often tenuous.”
The subjects within the categories of ‘science’ and ‘technology’ were by no means 
solidified. The concepts of science and technology did not exist as they do at present. 
For instance, in Adam Smith’s writings “the terms philosophy, physics, arts, sciences,
76Qand natural philosophy are used almost indiscriminately”. As Francesca Bray argues, 
“the linking of science and technology is again a product of our modem industrial
770world, rooted in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century...” While this is 
true, it is nonetheless possible to address early modem views of science and technology 
as long as we examine the specific areas of interest to contemporary sources.
To avoid imposing concepts on the past it is necessary to turn to contemporary 
definitions of the terms associated with what we now consider science and technology. 
Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary o f the English Language (second edition, 1755-56) and 
the French Academy’s Dictionnaire de VAcademie franqaise (4th edition, 1762) both 
reveal the fluidity and uncertainty associated with the concept of science during the 
Enlightenment. For instance one of Johnson’s listed definitions for art is “a science; as, 
the liberal arts”; while definitions for science included ” “any art or species of 
knowledge”, “one of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, arithmetick, musick, 
geometry, astronomy”.771 The definition of science also had several meanings in the 
French dictionary. Art, again, was defined as “les septs arts liberaux,” “arts 
mecaniques” and “methode de bien faire un ouvrage selon certaines regies.” Science 
was still defined as “connoissance”, or connaissance meaning knowledge. Technology 
was not a concept that existed in the eighteenth century, however similar topics relating 
to that concept did exist. Categories such as the “mechanical arts” were often used to 
refer to the areas that would now be considered technology. For instance the French
768 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
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dictionary described mecanique as “des arts qui ont principalement besoin du travail de
777la main”. They noted that the arts are divided into the liberal arts and mechanical arts.
The Encyclopedic attempted to clarify the divisions of knowledge. Diderot and 
D’Alembert’s system of human knowledge, inspired by Bacon, was divided into 
memory (history), reason (philosophy) and imagination (poetry). Arts, crafts and 
manufactures such as minerals, gold and silver, arms manufacture, glass making, 
practical architecture, and silk were included under memory. Logic, grammar, rhetoric, 
ethics, architecture, economic matters such as trade, politics (including military 
matters), knowledge of nature, mathematics, arithmetic,' algebra, geometry, applied 
mechanics, hydraulics, navigation, astronomy, geography, agriculture and chemistry 
were included in the category of reason. These divisions reveal the difficulty of 
identifying a clear contemporary classification.
While the terminology was not stable, the primary sources of information on China 
gave an indication of where the greatest interest in particular aspects of China relating 
to the above subjects lied. Ricci’s chapter on China’s “mechanical arts” addressed 
architecture, the art of printing, painting, music, time-keeping instruments, dramatic
* 77*5representations, the art of making seals, making ink, and the trade m fans. The 
following chapter covered “the liberal arts, the sciences and the use of academic 
degrees”. This section considered the Chinese language and the “higher philosophical 
sciences” such as moral philosophy, logic, astronomy (which was tied to Chinese 
astrology), mathematics, arithmetic, geometry, the art of medicine and the Chinese 
education system.774 While agricultural techniques were not placed in this scheme, there 
is a division between applied, more economic mechanical arts, and the speculative 
sciences (which included the seven liberal arts).
Du Halde largely followed a similar division of Chinese science and technology though 
he further categorised the subject areas. The beginning of his second volume contained
n n c
a section on “The Ingenuity of Mechanics, and Industry of the Common People” in 
which he addressed Chinese public works, trade, varnish, porcelain, silk and printing. 
Elsewhere he included another section entitled, “Of the Skill of the Chinese in the
772 Dictionnaire de VAcademie frangaise 4th edition (Paris : Chez B. Brunet, 1762), 109.
773 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 19.
774Ibid., 30-32.
775 “De l'adresse des artisans et de l'industrie du menu people”
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sciences,” in which he discussed the seven liberal arts (though notably substituting 
mathematics in the place of grammar). Popular geographies followed similar lines of 
categorization. A useful insight into contemporary classifications is offered in Rousselot 
de Surgy’s description of China’s science and technology in volume 5 of Melanges 
interessans. From pages 37 to 144 he gave the following categorization: Chinese 
science (subtopics: language, morals, history, and the canonical works); speculative 
sciences (subtopics: poetry, logic, plays, music, arithmetic, geometry); astronomy; 
optics, mechanics and architecture; geography; medicine; manual arts; manufactures; 
porcelain production; paper production; printing; education. From Rousselot de Surgy 
we can clearly see that topics within the modem categories of science and technology 
were addressed in consecutive sections.
These contemporary categorisations do not reveal a prioritization of either science or 
technology. Adas argues that technological achievements were “far less important than 
scientific advance in shaping European attitudes toward African and Asian societies” 
because the dramatic changes in production and communication were not evident until 
the Industrial Revolution.776 However, with particular attention to the Chinese case, we 
find that technology was a significant element in descriptions of the Middle Kingdom. 
One particular example epitomizes the relevance of Chinese technology as it related to 
assessing their civilization. Semedo’s chapter on the “nature, wit and inclination” of the 
Chinese described their ingenious mechanics and manufactures. He confirmed 
Aristotle’s claim, “Asia exceeded Europe in ingenuity; but was exceeded by Europe in 
valour.” Semedo argued, “There are many, which even to this day do call the Chinesses, 
Barbarians, as if they spoke of the Negroes of Guynea, or the Tapuyi of Brasile. I have 
blusht to hear some stile them so, having been taught the contrary by many years travels 
among them. Although the fame and manufactures of China are sufficient to teach it us;
777it being now many years that we have heard the one; and seen the other.”
7.2. ASSESSING CHINA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
From the early Jesuit encounters, science and technology were key pillars in converting 
the Chinese, and gaining their acceptance. Combined with the strategies of cultural 
accommodation, and the top-down approach to conversion, the use of Western science
776 Adas, Machines as the Measure o f  Men, 77.
777 Semedo, The history o f  that great and renowned monarchy o f  China, 27-28.
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and technology to gain the trust and interest of the Chinese was an explicit tool of the 
Christian missionaries. Jesuit education was characterized by its comprehensiveness, 
and many Jesuit missionaries were selected for the China mission based particularly on 
their training in natural philosophy. However, the Jesuit relationship to science was 
complicated by their connection to the Catholic Church.778
On the whole, there was a mixed impression of the Chinese as industrious, ingenuous, 
inventors and imitators. Before the Jesuits arrival in Peking, there was little information 
available on Chinese science. Additionally, in the fifteenth century, the Scientific 
Revolution was still in its nascence. Mendoza exemplifies this earlier period when 
Europeans were impressed with China’s invention of the printing press, gunpowder and 
the compass. He discussed their invention of printing 500 years before Europeans; 
dismissing the “vulgar opinion” that Johannes Gutenberg invented printing in 1458.779 
He praised land sailing vessels and their architecture “and the necessaries that they 
have to build with [as] the best that is in the world.”780 As the Spaniard concluded, the 
Chinese were “great inventors of things”.781
Once the Jesuits reached the Chinese court, the perceived gulf between European and 
Chinese science and technology grew. Matteo Ricci exemplified the utility of 
combining science and technology with the Christianizing mission.782 During his 
pioneering trip to Peking, he was captured and imprisoned. The Wan Li Emperor 
released the Jesuit in exchange for a European clock and a painting. Ricci proceeded to
778 The Jesuits did not always present the most up to date scientific discoveries from Europe. As agents of 
the Catholic Church, an institution that was often threatened by scientific developments and was coming 
to terms with the place o f science in what they saw as a theological world, the Jesuits were -  and had to 
be - religious missionaries before scientists. For instance, they did not report the heliocentric theory o f the 
universe until 1760 (it was banned by the Church until 1757). Wayley-Cohen, Sextants o f  Beijing, 108. 
For more on the Jesuit education system, and in particular the place o f science refer to Brockey, Journey 
to the East, 215-217. See also Nicholas Standaert (ed.), Handbook o f  Christianity in China: Volume One 
(635-1800) (Leiden: Brill, 2001)
779 Mendoza, The History o f  the Great and Mighty Kingdom o f  China, Vol. 1, 131.
780Ib id , 26.
781 Ibid., Vol. 1, 32.
782 Regardless o f their efforts to respect the church’s stance on science, the Jesuit involvement in Chinese 
science was controversial in Europe and contributed to the Rites Controversy. There were several Jesuit 
activities in China that received scorn from European observers. For instance, the calendar given to the 
Chinese was used to predict lucky and unlucky days, contradicting the Christian religion and seen as 
pagan. Further, Ricci’s geographic contribution to China -  a 1584 map o f the world produced for the 
Chinese court - placed China, not Europe, at the centre o f the world. Finally, the missionaries assisted in 
the production o f artillery for a foreign empire. Schall made over 500 cannons for the Ming dynasty and 
Verbiest produced more than half o f the cannons made under the entire Kangxi reign. For more detailed 
information on the Jesuit experience in China, particularly with regards to science and technology see 
“Technology in China” special edition o f History o f  Technology (ed.) Ian Inkster, Volume 29 (December 
2009).
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entertain the Chinese court by demonstrating that the sun is larger than the earth and the 
moon smaller, explaining the law of gravity, and revealing to them a map of the earth. 
He noted, “once this new knowledge became known to a few, it was not long before it 
found its way into the academies of the learned class”.783 With the assistance of Xu 
Guangqi (the highest level Christian convert and influential Imperial Grand Secretary), 
Ricci translated Euclid’s Elements o f Geometry. Xu Guangqi also translated Western 
Irrigation Methods, and built three telescopes just 21 years after the European 
invention. Ricci noted that “the high esteem acquired by the Christian religion...” was 
built up in part from things such as the expert craftsmanship in the binding of books,
no a
ornamented in gold. He tried to impart on his European readership the importance of 
science to the Christian mission: “Whoever may think that ethics, physics and 
mathematics are not important in the work of the Church, is unacquainted with the taste 
of the Chinese, who are slow to take a salutary spiritual potion, unless it be seasoned 
with an intellectual flavoring.”785 He argued that “the reasoning demanded in the study 
of mathematics” helped the missionaries awaken some Chinese to the absurdity of idol 
worshipping.786
From the outset of the Jesuit engagement with Peking, the Chinese court oscillated 
between acceptance and rejection of Western science and technology. The internal 
decay of the Ming encouraged a restoration of orthodoxy and expelling of the 
missionaries in 1617. However, the Manchu incursions that began in 1618 led the 
Chinese to invite the missionaries back to assist in the construction of cannons. It is not 
surprising that the Chinese were willing to learn from these Christian interlopers. The 
Chinese had a tradition of allowing foreigners to contribute to their scientific inquiries. 
Indian astronomers were present in the Tang Dynasty (618-907); Persian and Central 
Asians astronomers were present in the Chinese court from the Mongol Yuan Dynasty 
(1271-1368) and were appointed to the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy. Ricci described 
the astrological instruments he found in Peking and his belief that the foreigners who 
designed them had some knowledge of European astronomical science.787 However, it 
was the newly arrived Christians who dominated a competition sponsored by the court 
in 1629 to predict an eclipse. When the Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell, presented 
a new calendar to the Qing court, he was appointed the director of the Astronomical
783 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 326.
784 Ibid., 157.
785 Ibid., 325.
786Ibid., 328.
787 Ibid., 331.
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Bureau in 1645. Although this provoked a conservative reaction from the Chinese court, 
Schall -  along with Ferdinand Verbiest -  designed new astronomical instruments and 
served as tutors to the young Kangxi Emperor. China’s willingness to learn science 
from foreigners became an important aspect of whether science led to dismissal of 
Chinese civilization and will be discussed further below.
Before China exiled the Jesuits, the missionaries gathered and reported on a significant 
amount of information on Chinese science and technology. Adas argues that this led 
Europeans to be especially critical of Chinese natural philosophy. Unlike India, 
Europeans were made aware of Chinese natural philosophy through the translation 
efforts of Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci.788 The Jesuits were dismissive of China’s 
capabilities in natural philosophy, but offered some praise for their technological 
abilities.
Ricci claimed that the Chinese had most of the mechanical arts because of the 
encouragement they receive from their great raw material and talent for trading. 
However, he criticized the quality of their goods, arguing because “these people are 
accustomed to live sparingly, the Chinese craftsman does not strive to reach a perfection 
of workmanship in the object he creates.”789 He denigrated Chinese architecture, 
painting, music and instruments for keeping time and measurements. Moderate praise 
was reserved for Chinese printing (which was necessarily different than European 
techniques because of the Chinese language) and their plays. Giving the examples of 
similarity between European and Chinese tables, chairs and beds he concluded: “In the 
practice of the arts and the crafts we have mentioned, the Chinese are certainly different 
from all other people, but for the most part of the other arts and sciences is quite the 
same as our own, despite the great distance that separates them from our 
civilization.”790 The following section addressed “the liberal arts, the sciences and the 
use of academic degrees among the Chinese.” He reported that through Confucius 
moral philosophy was the only one of the “higher philosophical sciences” that the
701Chinese knew, and even then they introduced many errors.” Ricci argued that the 
Chinese had no logic, and their ethics were a confused set of maxims. He noted some 
progress in astronomy and the branches of mathematics, but argued that despite being
788 Adas, Machines as the Measure o f  Men, 54.
789 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 19.
790Ibid., 25.
791 Ibid., 30.
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proficient at arithmetic and geometry these fields were in a state of confusion. He 
also noted the Chinese made some progress in the field of medicine, particularly with 
regards to their knowledge of the pulse.
Other seventeenth century primary sources followed Ricci’s ambivalent assessment of
7Q<5
China’s science and technology. In 1642 Semedo described the Chinese method of 
categorizing sciences, noting that they consider three things in the universe: the heavens 
(beginning of natural things, starts, planets), earth (seasons, production, fields, 
agriculture) and man (morality and politics, the liberal and other arts) and divide their 
learning in the science of each.794 He agreed with Ricci’s assessment of China’s 
deficiency in the liberal arts and also reserved moderate praise for Chinese medicine. 
Semedo contributed to discussion of how quickly the Chinese took up knowledge from 
the Jesuits, indicating their inferiority but also their willingness to learn.795 His 
description of Chinese manufactures was even kinder than that of Ricci, though he 
argued that European manufactures and its mechanical arts were superior (apart from 
lacquer).796
By the end of the seventeenth century Le Comte repeated the original assessments of 
China’s science and technology, but added more detailed commentary. In a letter on the 
“character of the wit and temper of the Chineses”, Le Comte argued that one would 
assume from their libraries, universities, doctors and observatories that they would be 
ingenious and “perfectly well verst in all sorts of sciences, that they have a vast reach, 
invention, and a genius for every thing.” However, even though they have rewarded the 
learned for four thousand years, “they have not had one single man, of great 
atchievements in the speculative science: they have discovered all these precious mines, 
without troubling themselves to dig for them...”797 Again he recognized the Chinese 
were better at manufactures and the mechanical arts than science: “The Chineses that 
are mean proficients in sciences, succeed much better in arts; and tho’ they have not
7QRbrought them to that degree of perfection we see them in Europe.” Le Comte also
192 Ibid., 32.
793 For instance, Nieuhof cited Ricci on this subject and largely repeated his descriptions. Nieuhof, An 
embassy from the East-India Company, 154.
794 Semedo, The history o f  that great and renowned monarchy o f China, 49-50.
195 Ib id , 242.
796Ib id , 27.
797 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 221. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires (1697) Vol. 1, 356.
798 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 231. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, (1697) Vol. 1, 382-383
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emphasized the view that the Chinese were better imitators than inventors.799 He 
described their imitations of European glass, watches, pistols and bombs, though noting 
the Chinese might have given Europe gunpowder, printing and the use of the compass. 
While he did acknowledge China’s three major inventions, these were not sufficient to 
continue to label them admirable inventors because they had not been improved upon 
for many years. Le Comte underscored that although the Chinese were beneath Europe 
in the sciences and arts, they were Europe’s equals in politeness “and that perhaps they 
may surpass [the Europeans] in politicks and in government.”800
Du Halde description of China in the eighteenth century confirmed that Chinese
inventions were “not so good as that of [European] Mechanicks” but argued “they can
* 801imitate exactly enough any pattern that is brought them out of Europe”. He largely
repeated Le Comte’s description of the Chinese sciences though giving greater detail
R09about Chinese astronomy and interaction with Jesuit science.
Anson’s critique of China’s science and technology does not represent a watershed 
moment. The Commodore knew nothing of their sciences and his criticism of China’s 
manufacturing abilities was not unique. In fact, at one point he even praised the Chinese 
as “a very ingenious and industrious people”, which he claimed was demonstrated by 
the “great number of curious manufactures which are established amongst them, and 
which are eagerly sought for by the most distant nations.” To be sure, he was also 
very critical. He claimed their skill in handicraft arts is “of a second rate kind; for they 
are much outdone by the Japanese in those manufactures, which are common to both 
countries; and they are in numerous instances incapable of rivaling the mechanic 
dexterity of the Europeans.” Anson concluded that China’s “principal excellency seems 
to be imitation and they accordingly labour under that poverty of genius, which 
constantly attends all servile imitators.” Later he attacked their ability to imitate 
European clocks, watches and firearms because they could not understand the whole 
product. He also criticized artists for the poor quality of paintings.804 While Anson was
799 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 231. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, (1697) Vol. 1, 383. 
Navarrate also argued the Chinese were better at imitation. Churchill, A collection o f  voyages and 
Travels, V ol.l, 58.
800 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 239-240. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 409-410.
801 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1, 277; Watts edition, Vol. 2, 124; French edition, Vol. 2, 72.
802 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 2, 124-139; Watts edition, Vol. 3, 63-109; French edition, Vol. 3, 264- 
289.
803 Anson, Voyage Round the World, 411.
904Ib id , 412.
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arguably more critical of the quality of Chinese imitations, there was nothing in his 
description of Chinese manufactures that could not be found in earlier Jesuit sources. 
However, Anson presented his views in opposition to what he deemed was a Jesuit 
tendency to idealize China. Therefore, while the observations were not new, the tone 
had changed.
The sixteenth century observer Mendoza praised Chinese inventions, but the Jesuit 
descriptions of the seventeenth century reported European superiority over the Chinese 
in terms of both science and technology. There was also an increasing sense that 
Chinese science and technology had either stagnated or declined since the 
transformative inventions of gunpowder, printing and the compass.
R e c e p t i o n
Unlike the topic of China’s form of government, there was little confusion or 
controversy in Europe about the status of China’s science and technology. Geographers 
and philosophers agreed, as early as Leibniz, that the Chinese were inferior to Europe in 
the speculative sciences and equal or slightly inferior in the mechanical arts.
In the preface to Novissima sinica (1699) Leibniz argued, “In the useful arts and in 
practical experience with natural objects we are, all things considered, about equal to 
them, and each people has knowledge which it could with profit communicate to the 
other.” However, when “In profundity of knowledge and in the theoretical disciplines 
we are their superiors. For besides logic and metaphysics, and the knowledge of things 
incorporeal, which we justly claim as peculiarly our province, we excel by far in the
oAr
understanding of concepts which are abstracted by the mind from the material...” 
Leibniz concluded the Europeans and Chinese were equal in “the industrial arts” while 
the former were superior in the “contemplative sciences” and the latter better in 
“practical philosophy,” which referred to ethics and politics. The argument was a 
succinct, if somewhat simplified, version of the image painted by the Jesuits who 
Leibniz largely relied on for information.
805 Donald Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, 68-69.
806 Ibid.
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By the eighteenth century, geographers synthesized the Jesuit assessment of China’s 
science and technology.807 Salmon followed the Jesuits arguing the Chinese “ignorance 
is so notorious in the speculative science, and even in some mechanick arts, such as 
clockwork, architecture, &c.”808 He noted China’s ability to imitate reasonably well as 
well as their historical inventiveness: “The Chinese imitate the inventions of the 
Europeans very well, and now make glass, watches, pistols, grenades, or shells for 
bombs. They had it seems gunpowder, printing and the use of the compass long before 
us”.809 Salmon acknowledged the Chinese had the loadstone and compass before the 
Europeans, but mistakenly asserted they never travelled on long voyages.810 In another 
chapter he gave an “account of their learning, arts and sciences, languages, characters, 
history and chronology”. Here, Salmon assessed the state of the liberal arts in China 
exactly as the Jesuits did before him. For instance, he criticized their lack of logic, 
superficial geometry and the poor quality of music. By the time he published Universal 
Traveller in 1752, after his travels with Anson, his assessment had not changed but his 
negative rhetoric intensified. He repeated Anson’s description of their inferiority in 
mechanics to Japan and Europeans and described China’s inclination towards imitation 
as reflecting a “poverty of genius.”811 Notably, Salmon did not mention the willingness 
of the Chinese to learn and improve from the Jesuits European science and technology 
thus offered little hope for their improvement in this sphere.
The editors of the modem part of An universal history (1759) repeated European 
superiority in the “liberal sciences,” but reserved more praise than Salmon for their 
manufactures. When describing China’s “learning, arts, sciences, languages, &c.”812, 
they argued for finding a middle ground in reports, concluding the missionaries praised 
them too much whereas other writers “unjustly undervalued” the Chinese. Referencing 
Gaubil and Du Halde, they repeated views of China’s liberal arts and noted that in the 
subject of moral philosophy, the Chinese are not as advanced as they believe (noting 
they made no distinction between morality and politics).813 According to these editors, 
“in point of richness, opulence, sundry manufactures, handicrafts, and, to say nothing of 
their excellent agriculture lately mentioned, and the many excellent ways they have of
807 For instance, Rousselot de Surgy followed Le Comte’s assessment o f China’s speculative sciences. 
Melanges interessay, Vol. 5, 63.
808 Salmon, Modem History, Vol. 1,10.
809 Ibid  22.
810 Salmon, Modern History, 18.
8,1 Salmon, The Universal Traveller, Vol. 1, 21.
812 The modern part o f  an universal history, vol. 8, 179.
8,3 Ibid., 193-200.
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fertilizing and improving even their most barren lands, it will hardly be denied that they 
exceed any country in Europe...”814 They followed Anson, commenting that Chinese 
lacquer was not as good as that of Japan, and Chinese porcelain was of a lower quality 
than that produced in Saxony.815 In another section on “the agriculture, silk 
manufacture, China-ware, Japan, varnish, and other inferior arts of the Chinese” they 
praised their irrigation techniques and improvement of the lands, but commented in a 
footnote “that if those who wrote on the subject of agriculture among them, had been 
more versed in physics and natural philosophy, they might have still made much greater
Q I  (Z
improvements in that so useful and necessary art.” These editors believed in the 
applicability of physics and natural philosophy (or science) to the useful arts (or 
technology).
The editors of An Universal History discussed the rate of scientific advancement. They 
also recognized China’s early inventions such as gunpowder, but similar to Salmon’s 
qualification that the Chinese never made the best use of the compass, they noted the
Q1 7
Chinese used gunpowder mostly for fireworks. They compared this to the Europeans 
who only recently received scientific knowledge from the Greeks and Romans and 
“have so far outstripped not only them, but the Chinese, within the compass of two or 
three centuries.”818 Thus, they too pointed out that while China may have developed 
earlier, it became stagnant while Europe rapidly progressed.
O IQ
Rousselot de Surgy made a similar point in Melanges interessans. After a lengthy 
assessment of China’s capacity in the sciences he created a section entitled “Arts 
manuels”. In it he argued that the Chinese were better in the arts than in the sciences, 
but still not as good as Europe. He believed they had what was necessary for life and 
what contributed to the “commodite, a la proprete & a une magnificence bien 
entendue.”820 While their industry and imitation was sufficient they did not have the
capacity for invention as the Europeans did. Later he argued even their imitations were
0 91
not flawless. Quesnay closely followed Rousselot de Surgy’s assessment.
8.4 Ibid., 9-10.
8.5 Ibid., 243-244.
8.6 Ibid., 217.
817 Ibid., 152.
818 Ibid., 179.
819 Rousselot de Surgy, Melanges interessans, Vol. 5, 62.
™ Ibid., 104.
™ Ibid
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Enlightenment philosophers who addressed China’s science and technology usually did 
so within the context of explaining rather than assessing their state. The Encyclopedic 
focused heavily on the mechanical arts, which as Robert Damton argues, “constituted 
the most extensive and original part of the Encyclopedic itself.” Louis de Jacourt, 
who compiled nearly one-fourth of the entire Encyclopedie, wrote several specific 
articles describing Chinese bridges (which he praised as better than those in Europe), 
boats, vamish and paper.824 He gathered his information on China largely from Du 
Halde. On the other hand, Denis Diderot’s article on the philosophy of the Chinese 
pointed out the relative deficiency of Chinese science, though he predominantly focused 
on Confucianism, metaphysics and religion. He did complement their manufactures 
(especially in fabrics and porcelain) but attributed this to their materials, not their skill 
or taste. Diderot described how the Kangxi emperor learnt from the Jesuits science, 
philosophy, mathematics, anatomy, astronomy and mechanics, however his son, the 
Yongzheng Emperor did not follow him in this regard. To Diderot, the Chinese 
willingness to learn from the Jesuits was evidence of their deficiency. He argued that 
the high estimation in which the Chinese held the Jesuits (who were not experts in these 
fields) is evidence of China’s lack of knowledge of mechanics, astronomy and 
mathematics.828
Much like Diderot, Voltaire’s assessment of China’s science and technology was not as 
systematic as the primary and geographical sources. He praised China’s silk, paper and 
porcelain production but disparaged their skill in producing glass. Similar to the 
commentators before him, Voltaire discussed Chinese inventions; however, unlike 
earlier sources he directly connected their lack of developing technology to their needs. 
For instance, he suggested that even though they had the compass much earlier than 
Europe, they did not have a similar need to circumnavigate because their lands
823 R. Damton, The great cat massacre and other episodes in French cultural history (New York: 
Vintage, 1984), 198.
824 Richard Schwab, “The Extent o f the Chevalier de Jaurcourt’s Contribution to Diderot’s 
Encyclopedie”, Modem Language Notes, 72:7 (1957), 507-508 ; Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond 
D'Alembert (eds.) Encyclopedie, ou dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers Robert 
Morrissey (ed) (University o f Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopedie Projet, Spring 2010 Edition) vol. 13, 72; 
vol. 16, 807; vol. 17, 76; vol. 11, 851; See also, Roberts, “L'image de la Chine dans l'Encyclopedie”.
825 James Doolittle, “Jaucourt’s Use o f Source Material in the Enclycopedie”, Modern Language Notes 
65:6 (1950), 387-392, 388.
826 Diderot, “Chinois, Philosophic des”, Encyclopedie, vol. 3, 346.
827Ibid., 347.
828 Ibid
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contained everything they needed.829 But, the philosophe did not try to explain away all 
of China’s deficiency in science and technology. When addressing their lack of military 
technology, he argued it was not attributable to their virtue because they “have 
nevertheless been used to war.”830 In other words, they had the need for military 
technology but still did not improve it. China’s astronomy was positively assessed, 
which Voltaire attributed it to being a field of observation that required “the fruit of
O'} 1
patience,” something the Chinese had in abundance. As Diderot and Voltaire 
demonstrate, philosophers certainly relied on the primary sources of information on 
China to arrive at their estimation of China’s science and technology, but their 
descriptions were not as detailed. These Europeans were more concerned with the 
explanations for and implications of the information provided by the primary sources.
From the primary sources a consistent assessment of China’s science and technology 
emerged, which translated into the accounts of the geographers. On the whole, China’s 
manufactures and mechanical arts received moderate praise, while their advancements 
in the speculative sciences were almost entirely dismissed (with some exception in the 
case of astronomy). It should be remembered that these assessments were most 
frequently given in direct comparison to Europe. When China was compared to other 
states their science and technology were discussed more positively. When Voltaire 
described Chinese instruments, he argued they were not as good as European ones, but 
they were much better than those from the rest of Asia.832 While moral philosophy was 
not categorized as one of the liberal arts, it was often included in sections that addressed 
Chinese science and learning. When the Jesuits were criticized for extolling Chinese 
science it was largely with regards to the specific area of moral philosophy because 
there was little doubt of their negative assessments of the speculative sciences. 
Europeans acknowledged China’s invention of the compass, printing and gunpowder, 
but commented on their lack of improvement, indicating Chinese stagnation. It is 
evident that China’s science was heavily criticized and its technology was deemed 
inferior to Europe’s and in need of improvement. The important question then became 
how easily could these issues be remedied: could China improve its science and 
technology?
829 Voltaire, An Essay on Universal History, Vol. 1,16. Voltaire, “Essai sur les moeurs”, 78.
830 Voltaire, An Essay on Universal History, Vol. 1 o f 4, 15. Voltaire, “Essai sur les moeurs”, 78.
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7.3. EXPLANATIONS FOR STAGNATION
While European writers largely agreed upon the assessment of China’s science and 
technology, there were varied explanations as to why China was not more advanced in 
these fields. There were four predominant and interconnected explanations found in the 
primary sources, which were then recycled in various forms by the geographers and 
philosophers. The primary sources argued China’s language, geographic isolation, 
educational priorities and innate character were responsible for hindering their progress 
in sciences and technology.
L a n g u a g e ? 33
Matteo Ricci first speculated that the hindrance of China’s scientific development 
stemmed from their language. The Jesuit argued that spoken Chinese was the most 
equivocal language and there were frequently misunderstandings in conversations. In 
a section on the sciences and academics, Ricci argued that the learning of language 
consumes a great deal of time “that might have been spent in the acquisition of more 
profitable knowledge.”835 Nonetheless, he argued that China’s written language had the 
advantage of allowing different nations in the region to communicate with each other.
At the end of the seventeenth century, two important China Jesuits publically disagreed 
about the Chinese language. Gabriel Magalhaes’ argued that because language was 
learnt by memory and Chinese had relatively small vocabulary, it took only one year to 
grasp, thus making it easier to learn than Greek or Latin. He therefore believed that it 
was not responsible for the stagnation of the Chinese sciences. He cited the numerous 
books authored by the Jesuits in Chinese as evidence of the ease of learning the 
language. Eight years later Le Comte’s description of China explicitly refuted 
Magalhaes’ claim: “I cannot tell whether some missionaries had not better have
labour’d in the mines than to have apply’d themselves for several years to this labour,
0^ 0
one of the hardest and most discouraging that one can experience in matter of study.”
833 Early modem European debates about the Chinese language were extensive. They related to issues of 
chronology, history and religion. However, this section is focused on the issue o f language as it related to 
the development o f science and technology.
834 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 28.
835 Ibid., 29.
*36 Ibid., 28 and 29.
837 Magalhaes, A new history o f  China, 77-78.
838 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 182. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 300.
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He questioned Magalhaes’ claim that Chinese was easier to learn than all the languages 
in Europe. Following Ricci, Le Comte saw a direct connection between China’s lack of 
science and their language: “This abundance of letters is in my opinion the source of the 
Chineses ignorance, because they imploy all their days in this study, and have not 
leisure so much as to think of other sciences, phansying themselves learned enough if 
they can but read.”839 Learning Chinese characters, he added, was a horrible way to 
spend time because it was a mindless activity unlike “the sciences of Europe, which, in 
fatiguing, do not cease to captivate the spirit with delight.”840
By the time of Anson’s account in 1748, two widely read Jesuits reports by Ricci and 
Le Comte had already put forth the argument that China’s language hindered its 
science. Anson followed them, proclaiming the Chinese language was “too great for 
human memory.” However, he added his own detail to the argument, claiming that the 
Chinese language inhibited the transmission of information over generations: “Hence it 
easy to conclude, that the history and inventions of past ages, recorded by these 
perplexed symbols, must frequently prove unintelligible; and consequently the learning 
and boasted antiquity of the nation must, in numerous instances, be extremely 
problematical.”841
If, as these primary sources argued, a major explanation for the lack of scientific and 
technological advance was linguistic, they saw little hope for improvement. Unless the 
Chinese completely reconstructed their language and created an alphabet, a great 
amount of time would always be spent in the study of language. This explanation, 
however, did not account for the early inventions and advances of the Chinese that 
Europeans were aware of, and therefore could not be the only factor explaining 
scientific progress.
G e o g r a p h i c  I s o l a  t io n
Several primary sources pointed to China’s lack of competition and exchange with other 
civilizations as an explanation for their scientific stagnation. Whereas European 
scientific and technological innovation progressed in part due to competition between 
countries, China could maintain their (ignorant) arrogance because they were not
839 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 187. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 308.
840 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 188. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 309.
841 Anson, Voyage Round the World, 413.
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exposed to competitors on a regional level.842 Chinese arrogance was widely addressed. 
For instance, Le Comte described how the Chinese believed themselves to be “the most 
intelligent nation in the world.”843
In a section addressing China’s mechanical arts (such as architecture, music, painting
and printing) Ricci, who observed China in a moment when it was only beginning to
learn about European science and technology, argued,
the Chinese, who in other respects are so ingenious, and by nature in no 
way inferior to any other people on earth, are very primitive in the use 
of these latter arts, because they have never come into intimate contact 
with the nations beyond their borders...Such intercourse would 
undoubtedly have been most helpful to them in making progress in this 
respect.844
However, he also believed that the Chinese “possess the ingenuous trait of preferring 
that which comes from without to that which they possess themselves, once they realize 
the superior quality of the foreign product.” In fact, he concluded, “their pride, it would 
seem, arises from an ignorance of the existence of higher things and from the fact that 
they find themselves far superior to the barbarous nations by which they are 
surrounded.”845 This idea was supported by knowledge of the role that Muslim 
astronomers had played in Chinese history. Marco Polo had a chapter on “the 
Astrologers of the City of Kanabalu [Beijing]” where he described the astrologers as 
“Christians, Saracens, and Cathaians”, who used astronomical instruments “likely 
introduced by the Muslims”.846 Ricci argued that when the Chinese were proven wrong, 
they could admit it and learn from their mistakes. The view of Chinese openness to 
foreign ideas fluctuated (as did the fate of the missionaries stationed in China over the 
early modem period).
As mentioned above, Magalhaes also blamed China’s isolation for the hindrance of 
their science and technology. He argued the Chinese “are ignorant of many sciences, for 
want of communication with other people.”847 Le Comte attributed China’s lack of 
letters to the “little converse they have had with other neighbour nations, or thro’ the 
small account they made of foreign inventions.”848 By the eighteenth century, Du Halde
842 Philipp Pattberg, “Conquest, Domination and Control: Europe’s Mastery o f Nature in Historic 
Perspective”, Journal o f  Political Ecology, 14(2007): 1-9.
843 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 220. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 356.
844 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 22.
™ Ibid., 22-23.
846 Marco Polo, The Travels o f  Marco Polo, 133.
847 Magalhaes, A new history o f  China, 88.
848 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 186. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 307.
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argued one reason for the low level of China’s speculative sciences was that “there is 
nothing within or without the Empire to stir up their emulation.”849 Du Halde believed 
states could encourage each other through competition or inspiration to improve their 
sciences.
If China’s stagnation in the sciences was attributed to their geographic isolation this 
could be remedied by greater interaction with the civilized Europeans. This argument, a 
useful one for the Jesuits who participated in Chinese science in Peking, offered hope 
for China’s ability to rapidly improve their science and technology.
E d u c a  t io n a l  P r i o r i t i e s
A third explanation for the stagnation of China’s science and technology was their 
bureaucratic structure of rewarding members of society based on an examination system 
that prioritized Confucian learning. China’s civil service system was a culturally and 
historically embedded part of Chinese society. As Rachel Ramsey points out, the 
Chinese education system was radically different from the patronage system and limited 
bureaucracy that existed in England.850 To be sure, primary sources described benefits 
of the Chinese system. For instance, it fought the potential regionalism that existed in 
the massive empire, and it allowed for a dream of social mobility to exist in Chinese 
society. However, the Chinese education system was largely believed to act against 
scientific advancement rather than promote it.
Mendoza again represented the pre-Jesuit period where Chinese science was admired to 
a greater extent. He maintained the Chinese education system included areas other than 
moral philosophy: “For one to be of [the king’s royal counsel], it is not sufficient that 
they be expert and learned in the lawes of the countrie, and in morall and naturall 
philosophic, and commenced in the same, but they must also be expert in astrologie and 
judgements”.851 He also described how the “king” pays for colleges in every city where 
students are taught literacy, arithmetic and “studie naturall or morall philosophic,
849 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 2, 124; Watts edition, Vol. 3, 64; French edition, Vol. 3, 264.
850 Ramsey, “China and the Ideal o f Order in John Webb”, 499. Ramsey also points out the recent 
research by Benjamin Elman that demonstrates that China was not a true meritocratic system. For more 
see Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History o f  Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 2000), 248.
851 Mendoza, The History o f  the Great and Mighty Kingdom, 97.
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astrologie, lawes of the countrie, or any other curious science”. The reports he relied 
on had a small geographical sample and the extent to which education was provided to 
the Chinese people was debated in primary sources through to the eighteenth century.
The critique of China’s meritocratic system on the development of the sciences began in 
earnest with Ricci. In a section “Concerning the Liberal Arts, the Sciences, and the Use 
of Academic Degrees Among the Chinese”, Ricci pointed out discrepancies between 
various reports about Chinese education, particularly with regards to its universality. 
Similar to Mendoza, he acknowledged other fields of interest but left no doubt that 
moral philosophy dominated. Ricci noted that there were specialist exams for different 
fields such as the military, mathematics and medicine. The practice of having mandarins 
who specialised in philosophy assessing all other fields of exams, he reflected, “might 
seem to be a rather strange and perhaps a somewhat inefficient method” to European 
observers. Ricci described how medicine is taught through an apprentice system 
rather than in a university setting. Though you can take an examination in medicine, he 
claimed it was a formality of little consequence.854 As more detailed information about 
China spread, it began to be established that the education system elevated moral 
philosophy above medicine or mathematics. He argued that it was evident that “no one 
will labor to attain proficiency in mathematics or in medicine who has any hope of 
becoming prominent in the field of philosophy.” The only reason someone would 
devote themselves to the study of areas such as mathematics or medicine would be if 
their family affairs or “mediocrity of talent” forced them to these studies. Ricci believed 
that students were attracted to philosophy “by the hope of the glory and rewards 
attached to it.”855 The argument that there were no incentives to study science increased 
in prominence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Semedo confirmed Ricci’s assessment of the lack of rewards for sciences, but focused 
specifically to the study of medicine. He argued there are no medical schools in China 
and obtaining a degree of doctor of physick “doth advance neither the honor or respect 
of the person. And for this reason it is probably, that few or none study physick but the 
meaner sort of people, because the very profession thereof (which is so honorable in
852 Ibid., 122.
853 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 41.
%SA Ibid., 32.
855 Ibid.,, 32.
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other places) is there is no esteem, nor adds the least reputation to him that gains it.” 
Similarly, Le Comte argued the Chinese were much better in arts than sciences and 
concluded that “They would have got a great deal farther, had not the form of 
government, that hath prescribed bounds to the expences of private persons, put a stop
or'!
to them”. There was varying speculation as to why the Chinese government followed 
these restricted priorities, most of which were connected to some notion of Chinese 
focus on tradition.
Du Halde concurred that a lack of incentives was a major problem stopping the progress 
of the sciences in China. In China, he believed, there were neither great men of 
speculative science to admire nor any encouragement to move forward. He claimed, 
“Those who are able to distinguish themselves therein have no reward to expect for 
their labour”.858 As such, he saw no benefit to applying oneself to the speculative 
sciences: “and as the study of them is not the road to affluence and honours, it is no 
wonder that these sort of abstracted sciences should be neglected by the Chinese.”859
Unlike specific taxation policies, Confucian moral philosophy was recognized as a 
fundamental pillar of the Chinese system of political economy, implying that significant 
shifts would be required to suddenly prioritize the development of scientific fields of 
inquiry.
C h a r a c t e r
The final predominant explanation for the Chinese lack of scientific advancement given 
by the primary sources related to their character, which was purportedly influenced by 
their veneration for tradition.
Le Comte argued “without offering them any injury, that amongst the qualities 
wherewith heaven hath respectively inriched the people of the world, they have not 
shewed that spirit of penetration and nicety, so necessary to those who addict 
themselves to the research of nature”860 This vague notion that the Chinese lacked the 
spirit of penetration might be attributed to the Chinese tendency to look backwards to
856 Semedo, The history o f  that great and renowned monarchy o f  China, 155.
857 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 232. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 383.
858 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 2, 124; Watts edition, Vol. 3, 64; French edition, Vol. 3, 264.
859 Ibid
860 Le Comte, Memoirs and observations, 221. Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires, Vol. 2, 357.
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tradition rather than forwards to progress. Du Halde was “not willing to find fault with 
their capacity, since it is very plain that they succeed in other things which require as
o r  1
great a genius and as deep penetration as the speculative sciences.” However he did 
offer an example of China’s stubbornness to change when he described the response of 
the Chinese mandarins when Verbiest demonstrated the inaccuracies of their calendar: 
“The Mandarins...could not bear with patience that the Chinese astronomy should be 
abolish’d, and that of Europe introduced...” The mandarins argued that the Emperor 
would suffer if he changed this science “since hitherto all nations had deriv’d their laws, 
politicks, and skill in government from there”. The Chinese, according to Du Halde, 
concluded it was better to follow a somewhat defective calendar than to reform it. Du 
Halde, however, noted the Manchu mandarins disagreed with the Chinese unwillingness 
to learn from the foreigners and wanted to work with the missionaries, perhaps a result 
of their lack of connection to Chinese history. This indicated that there might be some 
hope for a change in attitudes towards science.
In addition to the difficulty of their language, Anson also attributed China’s stagnation 
in the arts to their character: “And it may perhaps be truly asserted that these defects in 
their arts are entirely owing to the peculiar turn of the people, amongst whom nothing 
great or spirited is to be met with.”863 Salmon directly repeated Anson’s line in his 
Universal Traveller.864
These ill-defined attributions of China’s stagnant sciences to their disposition that led 
them to look backwards were contrasted with an image of Europeans motivated by a 
penetrating spirit. Unless, as Du Halde alluded to, the Manchu disposition altered the 
Chinese norm (which was unlikely as we saw in chapter six the conquerors end up 
assimilating to the conquered), the Chinese sciences were likely to continue to be 
hindered by their character.
R e c e p t i o n
European geographers and philosophers recycled the explanations found in the primary 
sources. Salmon’s repetition of Anson’s critique of the Chinese character (mentioned
861 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 2, 124; Watts edition, Vol. 3, 64; French edition, Vol. 3, 264.
862 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 2, 137; Watts edition, Vol. 3, 105; French edition, Vol. 2, 287.
863 Anson, Voyage Round the World, 412.
864 Salmon, The Universal Traveller, Vol. 1,21.
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above) diverged from his earlier geography first published in 1727. In Modem History, 
Salmon argued the Chinese were ingenious and explained “the reason they fall short of 
the Europeans in the speculative sciences does not proceed from any defect in their 
capacities or intellects, but from their situation; being separated so far from the rest of 
the learned world, and conversing with none but people so much inferior to 
themselves.”865 The blame he attributed to China’s geographic isolation was likely 
drawn from Ricci. Salmon also added his own arguments about the implications of 
being geographically removed from other advanced civilizations: “There cannot be a 
greater misfortune happen to any man or nation, than the being instructed only in one 
set of notions, and never meeting with opposition or contradiction.” In fact, he believed 
that considering China was clearly the superior civilization in Asia, it was quite 
remarkable and showing “a wonderful tractable disposition that they should submit to 
be taught and instructed by the Europeans.”866 To Salmon, the willingness of the 
Chinese to learn from the Jesuits indicated their ingenuity and offered hope that they 
could improve their science and technology. Salmon disagreed with the view that 
China’s meritocracy was to blame, because they had rewarded and encouraged learning 
for four thousand years and “yet has not any one man amongst them made any great 
advances in the speculative sciences.” Salmon also expounded the disagreement 
between Le Comte and Magalhaes about the difficulty of learning the Chinese 
language, noting that language was Le Comte’s explanation for the lack of 
improvements in Chinese science.868 In fact, the Chinese language provoked a 
considerable amount of debate and analysis in Europe. John Webb’s An Historical 
Essay Endeavoring a Probability that the Language o f the Empire o f China is the 
Primitive Language (1669) argued that China preserved the first language of Adam and 
Eve through Noah after the Great Flood.869 The idea of China possessing the “primitive 
tongue” was attached to a vision of Chinese socio-political stability stemming from a 
dominion over nature.870 However the connection between language and Chinese 
progress in science and technology did not travel far during the Enlightenment. The 
Jesuit Dominique Parrenin rejected the suggestion by Jean Baptiste Dortours de Mairan,
865 Salmon, Modern History, 21.
866 Ibid.
867 Ibid.
868 Salmon, Modern History, 23.
869 Ramsey, “China and the Ideal o f  Order.. 4 8 3 .
870 Ibid., 488.
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the director of the Academie des Sciences, that language explained China’s lack of 
scientific progress.871
The editors of the modem part of An Universal History made similar arguments to those 
of Salmon in his Modem History. They cited the Jesuits in their argument that China’s 
scientific deficiency could not be explained by a “want of genius and capacity.” Instead, 
they supported the geographical argument, noting that the Chinese were “debarred the 
benefit of travelling and corresponding with other learned nations of the world; so that, 
all things considered, it ought to be rather a wonder that they had made so great a 
progress...” Like Salmon, they offered hope for improvement, commending the 
Chinese “understanding and capacity, that they so readily submitted to be taught by a 
people of whom they had scarcely heard before”. Finally, they repeated the debate on 
China’s language between Magalhaes and Le Comte and commented “most writers 
impute the small progress and improvements which the Chinese nation hath made in the 
sciences, there being so great a part of their time spent in learning to read and write their 
own language.”873 While geographers such as Salmon and the editors of An Universal 
History found it necessary to address China’s science and technology, they did not offer 
any new views explaining their relative stagnation.874
Philosophers were equally intrigued by the puzzle of China’s lack of scientific 
advancement. In the Encyclopedie Diderot referred to members of Academie des
r
Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Academie des sciences, Societe des Missions Etrangeres 
de Paris as well as Leibniz and Le Comte in his scathing explanation for China’s lack of 
progress in the sciences.875 Clearly recognizing the view of some that China’s isolation 
was, at least in part, to blame, Diderot argued that if they had been better men, their 
philosophers would have broken any barriers to learning because of their inability to 
stay still. He believed that the general spirit of the East was quiet and lazy, more
871 Adas, Machines as the Measure o f  Men, 85. O’Brien has pointed out that the most historians now  
agree that the Chinese language was not an impediment to the advancement o f abstract science and 
technology. Patrick K. O'Brien, “The Needham Question Updated: a Historiographical Survey and 
Elaboration”, Special Edition: Chinese Technological History: The Great Divergence, Kent Deng and 
Jerry Liu (eds.) History o f  Technology 29 (December 2009).
872 The modern part o f  an universal history, vol. 8, 180.
873 Ibid., 208.
874 Similarly, Rousselot de Surgy in France followed the explanation that China’s sciences were flawed 
because there were no incentives in government or in society. Since the Chinese are actuated by gain, 
they would only study what was practical. Rousselot de Surgy, Melanges interessans, Vol. 5, 37-8.
875 Diderot, “Chinois, Philosophic des”, Encyclopedie, vol. 3, 347-348.
876 “que s'ils avoient eu des hommes superieurs, leurs lumieres auroient force les obstacles par la seule 
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interested in preserving what was already established, especially when compared to the 
West.877 Diderot forcefully maintained that China could have overcome their isolation if 
it was in their character to. China, in particular, was driven by a uniform government 
with durable laws but the sciences and arts require “a curiosity that never tires of 
searching” and because they lacked this, even though the China was an older 
civilization, Europeans have outstripped them.878 Attributing the stagnation of their arts 
and sciences to their character offered little prospects for improvement.
Cornelius de Pauw was noted for his opprobrium of China. For instance, Voltaire 
concluded that de Pauw had too intensely criticized China while he himself had exalted
870it too much. De Pauw argued Egyptians did not progress in the sciences because of 
their language, and even they had use of an alphabet making them superior to the 
Chinese language. However, de Pauw articulated a direct (albeit unique) path that the 
Chinese could follow to improve their sciences. He believed the Tartars emperors “have
o o r v
not ceased, during more than a century, to encourage the sciences”. However, their 
efforts had not led to significant changes. He believed “If the Chinese could divest 
themselves of that natural vanity... they would adopt without hesitating the writing and 
language of the [Manchus].” It would not be as difficult as some may think since the 
mandarins already new it and all Tartars who married Chinese were obliged by law to 
teach it to their children. The Tartar language “is infinitely superior to the Chinese
OO 1
jargon, in which nothing can be written with precision on true science”.
Voltaire grew increasingly critical of China’s science over time, but even in his earlier
writings he disparaged the Chinese character for hindering science. In the introductory
dedication of L ’Orphelin de la Chine (1755) to his friend the statesman, soldier and
member of the Academie Franfaise, Le due de Richelieu, Voltaire questioned how the
Chinese, whose dramatic productions surpassed Europe’s in the fourteenth century, still
remained in the “infancy of this art” while Europeans had achieved the status of best in
the world. He noted:
The Chinese, like the other Asiatics, have stopt at the first elements of 
poetry, eloquence, physicks, astronomy, painting, known by them so long 
before us. They begun all things so much sooner than all other people,
877 “plus tranquille, plus paresseux, plus renferme dans les besoins essentiels, plus borne a ce qu'il trouve
etabli, moins avide de nouveautes que l'esprit d'occident”. Ibid.
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never afterwards to make any progress in them. They have resembled the 
ancient Egyptians, who having first instructed the Grecians, were 
afterwards incapable of being their disciples.882
By the publication of Essai sur les moeurs (1756), Voltaire explained the different
priorities (or abilities) of the Chinese: “It seems as if nature had given to this species of
men, so different from ours, organs formed for discovering all at once whatever was
necessary for them, and incapable of going any further”; Europe, however, made their
scientific discoveries more recently but perfected them quickly. Voltaire gave two
further specific explanations for China’s meager progress in arts and science. First, he
blamed the “great respect they have for whatever has been transmitted to them by their
ancestors,” thus they did not question ancient knowledge in order to move it forward.
Second, he pointed to “the nature of their language, the first principle of all human
knowledge,” which he described as difficult to communicate in and very time
consuming to learn.884
In the Philosophical Dictionary (1764) Voltaire strengthened his view that China’s
reverence for tradition was responsible for their lack of progress: “the respect
entertained by the Chinese for their ancestors is an evidence that such ancestors have
existed”. He repeated the observation, so often made, “that a reverential respect has in
so small degree impeded, among this people, the progress of natural philosophy,
geometry and astronomy”.885 The disposition of the Chinese was to look backwards to
tradition. This contrasted to the Enlightenment priorities to push ancient knowledge
forward. Voltaire, however, did not view science as the distinguishing feature of an
admirable civilization as his comments on the “necessary arts of life” demonstrate:
But it is possible to be a very bad natural philosopher, and at the same 
time an excellent moralist. It is, in fact, in morality, in political economy, 
in agriculture, in the necessary arts of life, that the Chinese have made 
such advances towards perfection. All the rest they have been taught by
oor
us: in these we might well submit to become their disciples.
To Voltaire, morality, political economy and agriculture were considered “necessary 
arts of life.” This view was very similar to Raynal’s argument several decades later.
882 Voltaire, The Orphan o f  China translated from the French by Arthur Murphy, (Dublin: William Smith, 
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883 Voltaire, An Essay on Universal History, Vol. 1,16. Voltaire, “Essai sur les moeurs” 78.
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Voltaire’s Lettres chinois (1776), written as a response to Cornelius de Pauw’s attack on 
China, was even more dismissive of China’s science. In this work, Voltaire expressed 
his astonishment that they cultivated the sciences for so long and yet remained where 
Europe was in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries.887 Voltaire also undermined the 
advances the Chinese had made in the arts (both liberal and mechanical) noting that 
their ability to play music, have mechanical works and calculate eclipses, without
OQO #
understanding the science behind these endeavours. By 1776, Voltaire was convinced
OOQ
that their respect for their ancestors prevented them from progressing in the sciences. 
However he did offer some hope, noting that at present the Chinese had “begun to use 
their minds, thanks to our European mathematicians”.890
Voltaire’s discussion of Chinese science was influential to Raynal. Like the other 
philosophers discussed, Raynal acknowledged that in China “improvements” that are 
based on complicated theories are not as advanced as one would expect from an ancient,
OQ |
active and hardworking people. However he believed “this riddle is not inexplicable” 
and offered several explanations for the relative stagnation of the Chinese sciences. 
First, he turned to the Chinese language, which “requires a long and laborious study” as 
well as their rites and ceremonies, which occupy a man’s life and memory. Next, the 
Chinese were “too much taken up in the pursuit of what is useful, they have no
QQ"1opportunity of launching out into the extensive regions of imagination.” Finally, the 
Chinese had “an excessive, veneration for antiquity, [which made] them the slaves of 
whatever is established.”894 He concluded that it took the Chinese centuries to bring any 
thing to perfection, thus descriptions of China’s arts and sciences from Marco Polo’s 
time were not dramatically different from descriptions of the eighteenth century.895 In 
the 1774 edition of Histoire des deux Indes, Raynal added another paragraph explaining, 
“the lows state of learning, and the fine arts in China”, which he attributed to “the very
887 Voltaire, Lettres Chinoises, Indiennes et Tartares. A Monsieur Paw  (Geneve: 1776), 51. Voltaire
reduced the quality o f Chinese plays further back from their equivocation to fourteenth century European
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perfection of its government”.896 He agreed with the view that the Chinese system 
prioritized the study of law above all else and hence learning concentrated on the 
regulation of manners and the public welfare. As mentioned above, this view was 
discussed by several primary sources. However, Raynal went further in explaining the 
focus of the Chinese education system. He believed that China’s unique political 
economy led to it being “exceedingly populous, and requires a constant attention in its 
learned members to make subsistence keep an equal pace with population.” As a result 
of this necessary focus in China, “the speculative and ornamental parts of science cannot 
be expected to arrive at that height of splendor they have attained in Europe.” Clearly 
Raynal did not believe the sciences had an impact on the maintaining the wealth of the 
country. Raynal concluded that the Chinese leamt the arts of luxury and vanity from the 
Europeans, but were superior to Europeans in the science of good government, or “the
807study how to increase, not how to diminish the number of inhabitants.” Raynal thus 
formulated a choice between good government and scientific advancement, and 
believed that the Chinese had selected correctly, connecting his view of China to that of 
Leibniz one century earlier.
Scholars such as Montesquieu and Smith did not address China’s science and 
technology directly. Smith mentioned China’s prioritization of the agricultural labourer 
over the artificer, compared to Europe where the condition of the artificer was superior 
to that of the labourer.898 This was a result of China’s concentration on agriculture, and 
indicated their lack of attention on inventing and developing products, but he never 
discussed this in relation to Chinese stagnation. Earlier in Wealth o f Nations, Smith 
hinted at a connection between science, technology and economic development. He 
described one of the advantages of the division of labour as the encouragement of 
machinery invented by workmen, and by “those who are called philosophers or men of 
speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, 
upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most 
distant and dissimilar objects.”899 Smith recognized some connection between scientific 
and technological innovation and economic progress. However, this notion was still in 
its infancy. When he discussed science in a section on education, he argued that one of 
the chief uses of science was as an “antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and
896 Ibid. In the original French he referred to “l’imperfection des letters & des beaux-arts” and used the 
word “science” to refer to the time it takes an individual to “understand” the duties he owes to the public.
897 Ibid.
898 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 31.
899 Ibid., 18.
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superstition.”900 As we will see in the conclusion, Smith had different explanations for 
China’s stationary status.
The primary sources, geographers and philosophers posited several reasons for 
China’s stagnation in the sciences. Whether attributed to language, geographic 
isolation, educational priorities or the Chinese character, there evidently was an 
inadequacy that required an explanation. Adas is correct in arguing the status of 
science and technology as categories for assessing civilizations increased over the 
eighteenth century. However, by the publication of Smith’s Wealth o f Nations, 
science and technology were not yet fundamental areas of assessing the wealth of 
a nation; further, there was potential for China to improve its capacity for 
developing these areas of knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Early modem European observers of China, including the Jesuits, assessed the various 
aspects of Chinese science and technology and concluded that for the most part China 
lagged behind Europe. While there was more room for praise of China’s manufacturing 
capabilities, they lambasted Chinese scientific knowledge. The perceived scientific and 
technological gap between Europe and China increased from Mendoza’s praise to the 
criticism given by Le Comte and Leibniz, but the negative descriptions remained stable 
over the course of the eighteenth century. The primary authors and geographers 
presented some optimism in their reports that China was, at times, willing to leam 
European sciences. Some of the explanations given for the low level of sciences were 
believed to be remediable. Further, by 1776 there was not a definite connection between 
overall wealth or improvement with the development of science and technology 
(notably seen through Smith’s lack of discussion of China’s technology). Nonetheless, 
considering their early invention of printing, gunpowder and the compass, it was 
evident that the Chinese had stagnated in their domestic innovation. This view is akin to 
the larger context in which, as we shall see in the next chapter, Adam Smith labelled 
China’s entire political economy as stagnant.
900 Ibid., 1005. This was the same context in which Cornelius de Pauw discussed Chinese science. De 
Pauw, Philosophical dissertations, Vol. 2, 208. Similarly, Quesnay had earlier argued that in China 
because the speculative sciences are neglected, there is too much superstition. Maverick, China, a model 
fo r  Europe, 190.
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8. C o n c l u s io n
This study started by invoking Sir James Steurt’s argument that the duty of the 
speculative person and the statesman was to “judge of the expediency of different 
schemes of oeconomy”.901 The dissertation has examined the various ways in which 
early modem Europeans, from primary observers to geographers and philosophers, 
actively engaged in the assessment of other systems of political economy. Like Steuart, 
geographers believed in the utility of comparing countries across space and time. As 
Edward Wells, author of a popular, educational eighteenth century geography argued, 
his text “is of excellent use, not only to be able to reckon up all the antient and present 
countries (&c.) by themselves, but also to know how they stand in relation one to 
another”.902 Several primary sources even offered their own rankings of Asian 
civilizations. For instance, Du Halde claimed that “China is, beyond all dispute, the 
largest and finest kingdom known to us”. He continued, “Even the Indians themselves, 
tho not altogether so mde, can be accounted little better than barbarians, when 
compared with our civiliz’d nations.”903 China was of particular interest in these 
assessments because of its status as a relatively advanced civilization -  in many ways 
offering to Enlightenment observers a captivating mirror against which to assess and 
measure advances in their own countries. In evaluating China’s system of political 
economy, Europeans also analysed and debated specific elements of their own 
commercial culture, geographic situation, political institutions and scientific thinking. In 
the process, they revealed a genuine interest in the lessons offered by China’s system of 
political economy.
This study has identified the application of the European system of knowledge on the 
non-European world to the Enlightenment project of improving the welfare of states. 
Not only were boundaries between types of sources obscured in the travelling of 
knowledge or views on China’s political economy, but a significant ability to transcend 
religious dogma and focus on secular interests also existed.
Discussion of China’s commercial culture revealed the struggle of Enlightenment 
authors to bring moral philosophy in line with the rapidly growing commercial world. 
Analysis of the primary reports reveals both criticism of the insatiable greed of the
901 Sir James Steuart, An inquiry into the principles o f  political oeconomy, 3.
902 Edward Wells, A Treatise o f  antient and present geography... (Oxford: Printed at the Theater, 1701)
903 Du Halde, Cave edition, Vol. 1,1; Watts edition, Vol. 1, 2; French edition, Vol. 1,1.
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Chinese and praise for their system of moral philosophy, often within the same sources, 
bringing into question the crude dichotomy of sinophilia and sinophobia that has 
prevailed amongst many modem historians. Discussion of Chinese greed led to self­
reflection and to the recognition of a similar problem of avarice in European societies. 
On the topic of commercial culture, China was a useful model through which to 
examine the implications of boundless self-interest in society. While Europeans 
lambasted the Chinese for their excessive self-interest, this topic did not occasion a 
fundamental rejection of the Chinese system. China’s commercial inclinations also led 
to a recognition of its vast internal trade. The uniqueness of China’s size and geographic 
situation enabled its domestic trade to sustain a very wealthy economic system. 
Numerous observers, notably Adam Smith, argued that if China expanded its foreign 
commerce, its economic situation would improve. This belief was similar to 
contemporary claims about how European countries needed to improve their own 
commercial policies, and therefore was not a criticism uniquely given to the Chinese. In 
other words, both European states and China could improve their foreign trade 
practices. Europeans recognized that China’s foreign trade policies were flexible and, as 
late as Smith’s Wealth o f Nations, there was a belief that they could change and allow 
increased foreign commerce. While problematic, China’s approach to foreign commerce 
did not signify the fundamental failure of the system in the eyes of Enlightenment 
observers.
Assessments of China’s government varied to a greater extent. When it came to 
constitutional structure, the same observer or commentator often described China as 
both despotic and moderate. Most Enlightenment commentators agreed that China’s 
form of government was the unique result of their geography and longevity, which 
enabled the Confucian system to become engrained in Chinese culture. Quesnay was a 
notable exception because he believed that China’s system of legal despotism was 
reproducible, and thus could serve as a universal model. The dual image of the Chinese 
government as moderate and despotic made it difficult for Enlightenment commentators 
to draw conclusions about the effect of the Chinese form of government on their system 
of political economy.
To gain insight into the Enlightenment’s understandings of the effect of China’s 
government on their political economy, it was necessary to examine the practicalities of 
governance. The primary sources did not report detailed information on Chinese
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property rights, but in general, believed that they were secure. Adam Smith criticized 
the insecurity of property of the poorer classes, but attributed this to corruption rather 
than to a systemic flaw in the constitutional structure. The corruption of the Chinese 
mandarins was certainly seen as problematic, but, as discussed in chapter five, 
Europeans described the numerous checks and balances in the system that sought to 
deter this form of abuse. The assessment of China’s public institutions was, on the 
whole, extremely positive. While there was some debate about the nature of Chinese 
roads, observers and commentators agreed that goods were easily transported 
throughout the Empire. Smith’s explanation for China’s success in this area pointed to 
yet another area where China was deemed a unique case, namely its agricultural system 
and the extent of its empire. On the topic of revenue, Europeans agreed that China was 
wealthy, and that its taxes were moderate and efficiently collected. Some, such as 
Quesnay, noted imperfections of China’s policies, particularly with regard to irregular 
taxes, but believed that these could be modified with relative ease.
The discussion of China’s military did not, however, result in a similarly hopeful 
conclusion. In fact, most Europeans identified China’s ineffectual defence as a 
fundamental weakness of China’s system of political economy. Raynal tried to 
rationalize the deficiency, while Quesnay ignored it, revealing the extent to which 
Europeans recognized China’s military weakness as a significant vulnerability that 
could not be easily resolved.
The final chapter addressed the second major weakness of the Chinese system, namely 
the lack of development of the arts and sciences. Scientific advancement was a criterion 
of assessing a civilization, though it was not yet fully connected to the improvement of 
political economy. However, eighteenth century Europeans did recognize the 
importance of technological progress, which led to publications such as the 
Encyclopedie. Europeans considered China’s failure to prioritize the development of the 
arts and sciences in their education system as well as and in their society more generally 
as a fundamental flaw, no less than the noted weakness of its military. China’s 
comparatively low-level of arts and sciences were connected to core Chinese principles 
that could not be altered easily.
The assessments of various elements of China’s system of political economy 
demonstrate the openness of the Europeans to learn from the experiences of another
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advanced civilization. At times, China was useful to encourage self-reflection, such as 
when Europeans addressed China’s commercial behaviour. At other times, namely in 
discussions of taxation policies, China offered useful policies that Europeans might be 
able to adopt. However, as we have seen with our discussion of China’s military and 
science, Europeans believed the Chinese system of political economy had significant 
flaws. Further, China was often revealed to be a unique case because of its history, 
geography and culture, one that did not easily fit into the universal models created by 
Enlightenment philosophers.
There is no doubt that the idea of progress, which was not limited to, nor even 
originated in relation to economic matters, was a significant development over the 
course of the eighteenth century. Ultimately, it had a profound effect on the European 
worldview.904 Whereas Europeans once admired Chinese historical stability, the 
obstinacy of China’s customs became the focus of some of the greatest critiques. 
However, European progress (both the idea and the phenomenon) emerged slowly over 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.905 In The Great Map o f Mankind P.J. Marshall 
and Gyndwr Williams centralize the role of progress in shaping European views of the 
non-European world. They describe the process whereby Europeans throughout the 
eighteenth century moved from curiosity about the non-European world, to a belief that 
Europeans were needed to improve it. And yet, their assessment of China, relying 
heavily on the work of Donald Lach for the seventeenth century, concludes that 
Eighteenth-century Englishmen began their inquiries on Asia “with comfortable 
assumptions of superiority.”905 This might have been the case in their religious 
approach to China, but it was less certain for the economic approach. This dissertation
904 Michael Heffeman, “On geography and progress: Turgot’s Plan d’un ouvrage sur la geographie 
politique (1751) and the origins o f modem progressive thought”, Political Geography 13(4) (1994): 328- 
343. David Spadafora, The Idea o f  Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1990). J.B. Bury, The Idea o f  Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth (London, 
1920)
905 Most historians who address the role o f progress in European views o f China look to the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. Arthur Wright maintains that the growth o f the idea o f progress from 
the late eighteenth century coincided with the rise o f Europe's power and prosperity, which led Europeans 
“to categorize the histories o f non-European peoples” and differentiate their own progressive history from 
the despotic Orient. Wright, “The Study o f Chinese Civilization”, 241; David Jones removes causality 
between the rise o f progress and the rejection o f China, and instead argues they rose in tandem in the 
nineteenth century, noting how China’s transformation from an admired model to “the sick man o f  the 
east” encouraged European reflection on progress. David Martin Jones, The Image o f  China..., 76; 
Gregory Blue and Timothy Brook assert by the end o f the eighteenth century, China was increasingly 
seen as stationary, and “Chinese historical stagnation became a cliche over the following century, a cliche 
that European social theory mobilized to develop its understanding o f capitalism”. Brook and Blue, China 
and Historical Capitalism, 4.
906 Marshall and Williams. The Great Map o f  Mankind, 25.
has revealed the important nuances in discussions of China’s political economy that 
reflects insecurity in the voice of the European observes and commentators.
This research had revealed that while the rise of the idea of progress in Europe, together 
with China’s stationary status, certainly impacted European hierarchies of civilization, 
this was not a predominant method of assessing China’s political economy until at least 
the publication of Smith’s Wealth o f Nations. The Chinese, as self-interested, 
industrious, and self-sufficient people with a uniquely balanced and responsible 
government contained many elements that Europeans admired; however, their weak 
military and stagnation in the arts and sciences were significant failures of their system. 
While the government could modify their taxation and foreign trade policies, improving 
their ineffectual military would require changing the priorities of the state and 
developing their arts and sciences would likely necessitate either altering their language 
or the structural foundations of their bureaucracy.
The notion of progress as applied to China is most emblematically embodied in Smith’s 
labelling of the Middle Kingdom as stationary. However, there was much more in his 
discussion of China than this label implies. In Smith’s view China was unquestionably a 
wealth country: “China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, 
best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the world”907 
However, at the same time, “The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far 
surpasses that of the most beggarly nations in Europe.”908 While the primary sources 
differed on some subjects, Smith argued, travellers agreed on the low wages of labour 
and the difficulty of raising a family in China. He explained the wages of labour and 
profits of stock were low in China because it had been stationary for several centuries 
(at least since Marco Polo’s visit).909 Chinese towns were not deserted, their lands not 
neglected and they maintained the same annual labour, thus, unlike Bengal, China was 
not retrogressing.910 He also argued that China was not improving like many countries 
in Europe.911 Smith surmised that China “acquired that full complement of riches which 
the nature of its laws and institutions permit it to acquire”. By pointing to China’s “laws 
and institutions”, China’s stationary status was, by no means, a historical imperative. 
Smith believed “this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and
907 Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, 101.
908 Ibid., 102.
institutions, the nature of its soil, climate and situation might admit o f’.912 He 
specifically pointed out that China should change its policies towards foreign commerce 
and enhance the security of the poorer class. Other obstacles to the success of the 
Chinese system included overcoming the hindrance of being surrounded by “wandering 
savages and poor barbarians”.913 However, their situation could improve and thus the 
standard of living for their labouring class would as well. While Smith’s schema of 
declining, stationary and improving states is a prominent element of his system, his 
analysis of specific elements of China’s political economy, based on ethnographic 
information as well as other philosophers, was not dependant on the idea of progress.
Enlightenment writers debated whether China had the capacity to address the 
weaknesses in their system. In particular, the Chinese needed to improve their military 
and arts and sciences. Europeans disagreed on the extent to which this was possible. For 
instance, Montesquieu argued that the Chinese confused religion, laws, mores and 
manners, which to him meant that they were immutable.914 Others, such as Quesnay 
believed in the transformability of any state towards natural law. China could eliminate 
their irregular taxes and encourage settlements and in the process perfect their system. 
In this view, rather than seeing Montesquieu as a sinophobe and Quesnay as a sinophile, 
it is useful to see the former as someone who labelled China as immutable and 
irreproducible, while the latter believed China was changeable and imitable. These 
characterizations of their approach to China are more relevant to the discussion of 
political economy than the traditional sinophile-sinophobe dichotomy.
China also needed a motivation to change their system, which European observers and 
commentators noted they might lack. When describing Chinese architecture, Ricci 
remarked, “When they set about building, they seem to gauge things by the span of 
human life, building for themselves rather than for posterity. Whereas, Europeans in 
accordance with the urge of their civilization seem to strive for the eternal.”915 Ricci’s 
view of the contrast between the Chinese as focused on the present and Europeans as 
looking forward, is exemplary of the portrayal of China’s distinct priorities. China’s 
elevation of agriculture combined with the prime motivation of public tranquillity
912 Ibid., 132.
9,3 Ibid., 623.
914 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 318-319. Montesquieu, D e I ’Esprit des Lois, Troisieme partie,
105.
915 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 19.
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differed greatly from the increasing significance of commerce and manufacturing, as 
well as expansionary enterprises, in early modem Britain and France.
By the publication of Smith’s Wealth o f Nations philosophers were still piecing together 
varying aspects of political economy to formulate their ideal models. The rise of 
progress played a crucial role in constructing hierarchies of civilization. In particular, 
Smith’s labelling of China as stationary in contrast to the improving states of Europe 
was an important moment in European assessments of China’s political economy. 
However, in the eighteenth century there was more flexibility in accepting an alternative 
model of civilization than previously assumed. A major hindrance to adopting the 
Chinese system as a universal model (apart from the issues associated with their 
military and science) was that, while for many writers specific elements could be 
imitated elsewhere, only the Physiocrats, and those who followed their philosophy such 
as Poivre and Raynal, believed that the entire Chinese system was replicable. The most 
likely alternative system to the one emerging in the British context was 
comprehensively considered through systematic assessments of China’s commercial 
behaviour, trade policies, constitutional structure, duties of government and arts and 
sciences. Europeans, whether labelled sinophiles or sinophobes, and throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, considered China’s military and scientific weakness 
to be the most problematic elements of its system. This was an early recognition of two 
of the main elements that led to the unravelling of the Qing Dynasty in the following 
centuries.
As the first comprehensive study of British and French views of China’s political 
economy during the Enlightenment, this dissertation has revealed several important 
conclusions. First, examining the views of China across primary, geographical and 
philosophical sources on one particular area - political economy -  reveals the 
unsuitability of the sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy. Second, in contrast to the belief 
that European views of China were dominated by a sense of supremacy, Europeans 
displayed a willingness to learn from China’s system of political economy. Finally, this 
learning was based on a genuine engagement with the primary descriptions of the 
Middle Kingdom. European philosophers and geographers turned to China with an open 
mind to assess not only its prospects for prosperity but also to reflect on the aspects of 
the Middle Kingdom that made it unique and sincerely engage with the insights of an 
alternative system of political economy.
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Appendix I
A New Catalogue o f Bell’s Circulating Library, consisting o f above fifty thousand 
volumes, (English, Italian, and French)... Which are lent to read, at twelve shillings per 
year; or, four shillings per quarter: By John Bell, Bookseller (London, 1778).
The catalogue lists 8486 works each associated with a number. Below is a list of the 
relevant works that discuss China’s political economy and their number in the 
catalogue.
96. Ogilby’s Description of China 2 volumes
215. Churchill’s Collection of Voyages and Travels 6 vols.
Vol.I Navarrete’s Acount of the Empire of China 
216. Vol. II Nieuhoff s voyages 
227-228. Hakluyt’s Voyages and Travels 3 vols.
229-230. Harris’s Collection of Voyages and Travels 2 vols 
574. Parke’s History of China
591. Astley’s Collection of Voyages and Travels, 4 vols.
613. Isbrand Ides Travels from Muscovy to China
1352-1355. Du Halde’s History of China, 4 vols. [1. General view, 2. Antiquity of 
monarch 3. Novels, 4. Siberia]
1407. Le Compte’s History of China
1424. Magillan’s History of China
1451. Pallasox Conquest of China by the Tartars;
1497. Salmon’s Modem History; 19 volumes vol. 1 
1572-1593. An Universal History, 21 volumes 
1592. Vol. 20 
1594. Modem Part of a Universal History 
1601. Vol. 8
1643. Voltaire’s General History and the State of Europe 3 Vols.
1655. Wonders of Nature and Art, Volume III
1669. Anson’s Voyage round the World by R. Walter
1683. Brand’s Travels from Muscovy to China over Land
1724. Curious Relations, or entertaining correspondent Vol. 1
1802. Lockman’s Travels of the Jesuits into various Parts
1831. Osbeck’s Voyage to China and the East Indies, translated by Forster
1852. Robinson Cmsoe
1873. Travels of a philosopher
2531. Chinese Traveller
4060. Chinese Spy
4500. London Magazine 42 volumes
4570. Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws
6595. Ouevres de Voltaire. 4 Tomes
6655. Oeuvres de Voltaires. 9 Tomes
4976-5011. Voltaire’s Works translated by Dr. Smollet, &c 36 volumes 
5343. Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments916
916 Notably his Wealth o f  Nations was not included in this travelling library. This is likely a result o f the 
fact that it was only published two years earlier, and that it is Smith’s more famous work only 
respectively. Even the Scotsman himself thought he was more likely to be remembered for his Theory o f  
Moral Sentiments.
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Appendix II
Thomas Percy, Hau kiou choaan or the pleasing history. A translation from the Chinese 
language, to which are added, I. The argument or story o f a Chinese play, II. A 
collection o f Chinese proverbs, and III. Fragments o f Chinese poetry. In four volumes. 
With notes. (London : Printed for R. and J. Dodsley in Pall-mall, 1761)
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